Yes, Obamacare Really Does Disadvantage Individuals with Disabilities

My article last week regarding disability groups’ political and policy views prompted some comments and criticisms on Twitter. Rather than trying to explain detailed subjects in bursts of 140-character tweets, I considered it best to compile them into a longer-form article.

To summarize my prior work: Obamacare provides states with a greater incentive to expand Medicaid to able-bodied adults than to cover services for individuals with disabilities. States receive a 95 percent match this year (declining to 90 percent in 2020 and all future years) to cover the able-bodied, but a match ranging from 50-75 percent to cover individuals with disabilities, while more than half a million are on waiting lists to receive home or attendant care.

Many of the responses I discuss in greater detail below attempt to obscure two separate and distinct issues: The question of the amount of funding for programs versus the priorities within those programs.

As a conservative, I’m likely to disagree with liberals on the ideal size of many government programs, but I thought I would at least agree with them that individuals with disabilities should receive precedence within those programs. However, Obamacare actually tilted Medicaid’s preference away from individuals with disabilities, which makes disability groups’ silence on that front surprising.

There Is No Correlation Between Waiting Lists and Medicaid Expansion

The timeliest rebuttal comes from a story on a long-term care report none other than AARP released yesterday. Susan Reinhard with that organization—no right-wing conservative group, by any stretch—said that

Many states have struggled to expand home- and community-based options for Medicaid enrollees needing long-term care because that is an optional benefit. Nursing homes are mandatory under federal law. While states focus on Medicaid coverage for children and families — as well as non-disabled adults covered by the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act — adults with disabilities have received less attention. ‘Long-term care is a stepchild of the program and not a top focus for states,’ she said. (emphasis mine.)

That statement notwithstanding, several people cited two different analyses that compare states’ decisions on expansion to the able-bodied and their waiting lists for home-based care for individuals with disabilities. But each of those “studies” (based on only one year of data available) take an overly simplistic approach, and therefore don’t get at the core issue of the extent to which the skewed incentives Obamacare created have encouraged states to prioritize the able-bodied over those with disabilities.

A state’s decision to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied, or reduce its waiting lists for individuals with disabilities, depends on myriad factors. For instance:

  • A wealthy state with a greater tax base would have more resources both to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied and to reduce its waiting list of individuals with disabilities, while a poorer state with a smaller tax base might not have resources to do either;
  • A state with “bad” demographics (e.g., an older and sicker population), or higher costs for health and personal care services, might have more difficulty reducing their Medicaid waiting lists;
  • A state may face other fiscal pressures—controversy over school funding, a natural disaster, a pension crisis—that could affect overall Medicaid spending.

Numerous variables affect states’ budget choices, and therefore their Medicaid waiting lists. The “studies” controlled for exactly none of them. They examined whether a state expanded Medicaid and the total number of people on a state’s waiting list, and that’s it.

Moreover, under Obamacare, all states receive the same (higher) federal match to cover able-bodied adults—another change in policy (prior to Obamacare, all Medicaid match rates were based on states’ relative income) skewing the balance in favor of wealthier expansion states. Yet, as noted above, the analyses claiming no correlation between expansion and Medicaid waiting lists didn’t even attempt to control for these variables—or any other.

Therefore, in the absence of a quality study examining the issue, I’ll go with something far simpler: Common sense. If you’re a state that wants to spend more money on Medicaid, and you can do something (i.e., cover the able-bodied) that gives you 95 cents on the dollar, or something (i.e., reduce waiting lists for individuals with disabilities) that gives you 50 cents on the dollar, which are you going to do first?

I thought so. The incentives in Obamacare strongly favor coverage of the able-bodied over coverage for individuals with disabilities. And no number of crude analyses attempting to provide retroactive justification for this bad policy can hide that fact.

Waiting Lists Are Worst In Two Non-Expansion States

This comment reinforces the crudeness of the analysis being cited. All else being equal, as the second- and third-largest states in the Union, Texas and Florida would be expected to have a larger number of people on its waiting lists for home- and community-based services than a smaller expansion state like Connecticut. All else isn’t equal, of course, but did the analysts attempt to control for these kinds of factors? Nope. They examined raw waiting list numbers, rather than waiting lists as a percentage of the population.

But just suppose for a second that the commenters above are correct, and there is no correlation between expansion to the able-bodied and waiting lists for home-based care. That means that the greater incentives Obamacare gives to states to cover the able-bodied—and while the advocacy community might not want to admit it, Obamacare clearly does give states greater incentives to cover the able-bodied—didn’t affect state behavior, or decisions about whether to reduce disability waiting lists at all.

In that case, why has the disability community expressed such outrage about the impact of per capita caps or block grants on Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities? If states make decisions without considering federal incentives—the point of the claims that there is no correlation between expanding Medicaid to the able-bodied and longer waiting lists for individuals with disabilities—then why also claim that “cost-shifting to states will force massive cuts in Medicaid services?” Why wouldn’t states shift around resources to protect individuals with disabilities—what the disability community claims that states did to reduce waiting lists even while expanding Medicaid under Obamacare?

There are really only two credible possibilities:

  • States are affected by incentives, therefore Obamacare—by giving states a higher match to cover the able-bodied—encouraged discrimination against individuals with disabilities; or
  • States are not affected by incentives, and therefore the per capita caps—which generate a comparatively small amount of savings in the House repeal bill—will have little impact, because states will re-prioritize their budgets to protect the most vulnerable.

It’s therefore worth asking why some appear to be trying to argue both sides of this question, and doing so in a way that neatly lines up with partisan lines—trying to ignore Obamacare’s skewed incentives, while roundly castigating the House Republican bill for incentives that will “force massive cuts in Medicaid.”

Republicans’ Bill Would Cut Program Helping People Live at Home

This is a true statement: Section 111(2) of the American Health Care Act, House Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” bill, would sunset the enhanced match for the Community First Choice program on January 1, 2020. That option provides states with a 6 percent increase in their federal match for home- and community-based services, including to individuals with disabilities. But here again, raising this issue demonstrates the inherent disconnect between the incentives being offered to states, and the disability community’s responses to those incentives.

  • Obamacare provides states with a match ranging from 20-45 percentage points higher to cover the able-bodied than individuals with disabilities: “No correlation between expansion and waiting lists for individuals with disabilities!”
  • Obamacare provides states with a 6 percentage point increase for home-based services: A “huge change to improve HCBS [home and community-based services] care.”
  • The Republican alternative to Obamacare would reduce Medicaid spending for traditional (i.e., non-expansion) populations by a comparatively small amount: “Massive cuts to Medicaid services.”

Isn’t there a slight contradiction in these responses—both in their tone and in their logic? And isn’t it worth noting that these contradictions all happen to align perfectly with the natural partisan response to each of these issues?

This Is A Political Problem, Not a Policy Problem

Claiming that the greater federal match to cover able-bodied adults than individuals with disabilities stems from a “political history problem” deliberately obscures its roots. This “history” did not take place half a century ago, at Medicaid’s creation, it took place in the past few years, as part of Obamacare.

When crafting that legislation, Democrats could have come up with other policy solutions that expanded Medicaid to the able-bodied without discriminating against individuals with disabilities in the process. They could have proposed increasing the federal match for coverage of individuals with disabilities, in exchange for states covering the able-bodied at the existing federal match rates. Congress enacted a similar type of “swap” in the Medicare Modernization Act. The federal government took over the prescription drug cost of Medicare-Medicaid “dual eligibles” in exchange for a series of “clawback” payments from states.

Democrats in Congress could have considered other ways to expand Medicaid without giving states a greater match to cover the able-bodied than individuals with disabilities. To the best of my knowledge, they chose not to do so. President Obama could have insisted on a more equitable Medicaid formula, but he chose not to do so. And the disability community could have pointed out this disparity to the president and leaders in Congress, but chose not to do so.

Agree or disagree with them, these were deliberate policy choices, not a mere historical accident.

How Can You Support Lower Funding While Complaining About Access?

The argument about lower funding levels misses several points. First, while the Congressional Budget Office has not released estimates of how much the per capita caps (as opposed to changes associated with scaling back Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion) will reduce federal spending, multiple estimates suggest a comparatively small amount of savings from this particular change—at most 1 or 2 percent of spending on traditional Medicaid populations over the coming decade.

Second, if given sufficient flexibility from Washington, states can reduce their Medicaid spending, rendering the discussion of “cuts” under the caps moot. Rhode Island’s Global Compact Waiver, approved in January 2009, actually resulted in a year-on-year decline of Medicaid spending per beneficiary. Moreover, the non-partisan Lewin Group concluded that Rhode Island’s waiver reduced that spending by improving beneficiary access and care, not by denying medical services.

Third, if caps on Medicaid are so harmful and damaging, then why did Obamacare cap spending on Medicare—and why did disability groups remain silent about it? Current law imposes a per capita cap on Medicare spending, one enforced by Obamacare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) of unelected bureaucrats.

What’s more, Obamacare imposes an annual inflation adjustment (gross domestic product growth plus 1 percent) likely to be lower than the inflation adjustment for disabled populations included in the House-passed bill (medical inflation plus 1 percent). Yet a critique of the Medicare payment caps or IPAB appears nowhere in the disability community’s 14 pages of comments regarding the bill that became Obamacare.

So the question to the disability community is obvious: Why does a Democratic proposal to impose per capita caps on Medicare raise no objections, but a Republican proposal to impose (potentially higher) per capita caps on Medicaid guaranteed to prompt “massive cuts in Medicaid services?”

Let’s Just Pay More for Everyone

This comment attempts to obscure the distinction between the amount of funding and the priorities for that funding. I might disagree with liberals about the overall level of funding for the program—not least because efforts like that in Rhode Island demonstrate the potential for Medicaid to become more efficient—but I should agree with them about the need to prioritize care for the most vulnerable. Unfortunately, Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion goes in the opposite direction.

In thinking about the important distinction between overall program funding and priorities within a program, I’m often reminded of a speech that former House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) gave on the House floor in September 2009: “At some point in time, my friends, we have to buck up our courage and our judgment and say, if we take care of everybody, we won’t be able to take care of those who need us most. That’s my concern. If we take care of everybody…then we will not be able to take care of those most in need in America.”

Yes, Hoyer’s speech discussed Medicare, not Medicaid, and he voted for Obamacare (and its Medicaid expansion) six months after giving it. But the speech raises an important point about the need to prioritize entitlements, one that the notion of giving higher reimbursement rates to all populations ignores.

That’s what’s wrong with focusing solely on the question on the amount of funding for a program. Reasonable people can (and will) disagree about where to draw the funding line, but it has to be drawn somewhere. “Solving” the question of funding priorities by increasing reimbursements for all populations—the equivalent of promising everyone a pony—will, by failing to choose wisely now, cause even tougher fiscal choices for generations to come.

Disability Groups Have More Important Priorities

Yes, I have worked with disability groups. For one, in 2013, I served on the Commission on Long-Term Care Congress created in the wake of the CLASS Act’s failure and repeal. We took many hours of public testimony from disability groups and others, and received dozens of other written comments—many from dedicated and passionate parents or caregivers of individuals with disabilities, and all of which I made a point to read. I won’t claim to have made disability policy my life’s work, but my jobs over the years have intersected with the disability community on several occasions.

By claiming that disability groups have “way more priorities than comparing their FMAP [i.e., their federal match rate],” this comment actually makes my point for me. The January 2010 letter by the Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) setting out priorities for what became Obamacare was 14 pages in length, amounted to over 5,500 words, and included (by my count) 73 separate bulleted recommendations regarding the legislation. All that, and yet not one word on the bill prioritizing coverage of the able-bodied over individuals with disabilities? Frankly, the issue seems quite conspicuous by its absence.

Just Interview Someone From This Consortium

I received a series of tweetsculminating in a dramatic “Shame on you”—attacking me for not having contacted any members of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) prior to writing my piece. It is correct that I didn’t reach out to any CCD member groups before printing the article. I didn’t need to because I had already spent years working with them.

The charge that I never spoke to “ONE SINGLE CCD MEMBER” is false—and demonstrably so. For nearly four years, from the spring of 2004 until the end of 2007, I worked as a lobbyist for the National Association of Disability Representatives (NADR). During that time, I spent many hours in CCD task force meetings, interacting both directly and indirectly with CCD members. The commenter’s accusation that if I had reached out to CCD members, I would know about the lengthy adjudication process for many Social Security disability claims holds no small amount of irony—I handled those issues over a decade ago.

In reality, my time working with CCD members while representing the disability representatives prompted me to write my article last week. While attending CCD meetings, I saw firsthand how some meeting participants—several of which remain in their current positions and active in CCD activities—made offhand comments of a rather partisan nature. Not everyone joined in the political commentary, but several felt comfortable enough to make clear their partisan affiliations in open discussions, even if I and others did not.

Similarly, I recall how the disability community fought against George W. Bush’s idea for personal accounts within Social Security almost uniformly, and even before Congress and the administration had an opportunity to fully develop their proposals. At the time, my client, the National Association of Disability Representatives, took an agnostic view towards the personal account concept, focusing more on the specifics of whether and how it could work for the disability community.

For instance, NADR wanted to ensure that any personal account proposal would hold the Social Security Disability Trust Fund (separate from the Old Age and Survivors Trust Fund) harmless, and that people who spent time receiving disability benefits would not be financially harmed (e.g., lack the opportunity to save wage earnings in a personal account, yet have their retirement benefits reduced) for having done so.

By contrast, most CCD members opposed the proposal from the get-go, often coordinating with Nancy Pelosi, Sander Levin, and other Democrats for events and strategy meetings. Archives on the disability coalition’s website from that era appear incomplete, but a 2005 August recess “Action Alert: Efforts to Privatize Social Security Continue!” gives a sense of the message coming from most CCD members, and the organization as a whole.

At this point any liberals still reading might applaud the disability community for having come out so strongly against the Bush proposal. But that idea focused on the Social Security retirement system, not the disability program, and the Bush administration and Republicans in Congress wanted to engage with disability groups to ensure any reforms held the disability community harmless. So how did failing to engage them—choosing instead to oppose from the outset—help the disability community?

In truth, early and vocal opposition to personal accounts may have put the disability community at greater risk had the personal account proposal been enacted without disability groups’ technical expertise on how best to structure it. And given both the partisan comments I heard from at least some CCD members at CCD meetings, it’s worth asking whether partisan or ideological concerns—separate and distinct from the interests of the disability community—unduly or improperly influenced the organization’s collective judgment back then.

Their inherent contradictions in the current debate—remaining silent about Obamacare’s unfair Medicaid match rate disparity and Medicare payment caps, while strenuously objecting to Republican attempts to impose payment caps on Medicaid—reinforce those concerns about undue partisanship.

It isn’t always easy stating inconvenient truths—pointing out that laws one doesn’t like should be enforced along with every other law, or where policies proposed by lawmakers with whom one might ordinarily be aligned fall woefully short. But such truth-telling remains an essential ingredient to authenticity and credibility. As I argued last week, I don’t think the disability community has done that in this case. I wish they had.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

CBO Reveals Its Bias

Since the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its analysis of the House-passed health-care bill just before Memorial Day, conservatives have questioned CBO’s assumptions on several fronts—most notably scorekeepers’ almost dogmatic belief that an individual mandate holds the key to enticing tens of millions of Americans to purchase health coverage. But the CBO report revealed another key issue—the budget office’s inherent bias towards liberal cost-saving solutions rather than conservative ones.

That bias stems from one conclusion: Under the bill, a “few million people [CBO didn’t provide a more specific number] would buy policies that would not cover major medical risk.” In these cases, “the policies [purchased] would not provide sufficient financial protection to meet CBO’s definition of insurance coverage,” and “would not provide enough financial protection in the event of a serious and costly illness to be considered insurance.”

More importantly, though, at no point has CBO attempted to quantify whether and to what extent Americans—particularly those in government programs—are under-insured due to their inability to obtain medical treatment. Largely due to poor reimbursement levels for physicians and hospitals, some participants in programs like Medicaid may have great financial protection in theory, but little access to care in practice.

Conservative Versus Liberal Goals For Health Care

At the risk of stereotyping, conservatives often prefer less-comprehensive insurance—coverage largely for catastrophic expenses, with patients paying for many routine expenses out-of-pocket. Right-leaning analysts believe that by making costs explicit to patients—to use the wonky phrase, giving patients “skin in the game”—they will make smarter health care choices. By contrast, liberals generally make costs and tradeoffs opaque, supporting generous coverage of most medical procedures, while reducing costs to government through lower provider reimbursement levels often not visible to patients.

Obamacare provides an excellent example of the contrast. Two months after the law passed—while attempting to deflect the criticism that Democrats took money from Medicare to pay for Obamacare—Nancy Pelosi noted that the law included “no change in guaranteed benefits.”

In government programs, low reimbursement levels can make treatment hard for patients to obtain. At a briefing on “under-insurance” several years ago, an official who used to run one state’s Medicaid program acknowledged the access problem in government programs, admitting that “a Medicaid card [is] a hunting license…a chance to go try to find a doctor.”

Obamacare Made A Bad Situation Worse

On provider reimbursement, Obamacare made a bad situation worse. The nonpartisan Medicare actuary considers a series of payment reductions included in the law so Draconian—by 2040, half of all hospitals, and 90 percent of home health agencies, would be unprofitable—that they will not go into effect, “to ensure Medicare beneficiaries continue to have access to health care services.”

CBO has acknowledged the limitations on access created by Obamacare. In 2014, it noted that the new Exchange plans created that year had lower physician reimbursement levels and narrower provider networks than most employer plans. It has also estimated last fall that, thanks to the Medicare payment reductions included in Obamacare, up to half of all hospitals nationwide could be operating in the red by 2025—which could harm access to care, not just for seniors but all Americans.

Some critiques of CBO’s work on the House health care bill appear opportunistic. Protesting that many fewer Americans than CBO projects will drop coverage upon repeal of the individual mandate, without acknowledging that such a scenario would likely obliterate the budgetary savings in the House legislation, seems incongruous at best. But a budget office that examines only one side of the “under-insured” coin—Americans who face high out-of-pocket costs, but not those who cannot access care—likewise seems out of whack. Republicans in Congress should press CBO to quantify both sides of this important health-care issue.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

AARP’s Own Age Tax

Over the past few weeks, AARP—an organization that purportedly advocates on behalf of seniors—has been running advertisements claiming that the House health-care bill would impose an “age tax” on seniors by allowing for greater variation in premiums. It knows of which it speaks: AARP has literally made billions of dollars by imposing its own “tax” on seniors buying health insurance policies, not to mention denying care to individuals with disabilities.

While the public may think of AARP as a membership organization that advocates for liberal causes or gives seniors discounts at restaurants and hotels, most of its money comes from selling the AARP name. In 2015, the organization received nearly three times as much revenue from “royalty fees” than it did from member dues. Most of those royalty fees come from selling insurance products issued by UnitedHealthGroup.

Only We Can Profit On the Elderly

So in the sale of Medigap plans, AARP imposes—you guessed it!—a 4.95 percent age tax on seniors. AARP not only makes more money the more people enroll in its Medigap plans, it makes more money if individuals buy more expensive insurance.

Even worse, AARP refused good governance practices that would disclose the existence of that tax to seniors at the time they apply for Medigap insurance. While working for Sen. Jim DeMint in 2012, I helped write a letter to AARP that referenced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Producer Model Licensing Act.

Specifically, Section 18 of that act recommends that states require explicit disclosure to consumers of percentage-based compensation arrangements at the time of sale, due to the potential for abuse. DeMint’s letter asked AARP to “outline the steps [it] has taken to ensure that your Medigap percentage-based compensation model is in full compliance with the letter and spirit of” those requirements. AARP never gave a substantive reply to this congressional oversight request.

Don’t Screw With Obamacare, It’s Making Us Billions

Essentially, AARP makes money off other people’s money—perhaps receiving insurance premium payments on the 1st of the month, transferring them to UnitedHealth or its other insurance affiliates on the 15th of the month, and pocketing the interest accrued over the intervening two weeks. That’s nearly $3.2 billion in profit over six years, just from selling insurance plans. AARP received much of that $3.2 billion in part because Medigap coverage received multiple exemptions in Obamacare. The law exempted Medigap plans from the health insurer tax, and medical loss ratio requirements.

Most importantly, Medigap plans are exempt from the law’s myriad insurance regulations, including Obamacare’s pre-existing condition exclusions—which means AARP can continue its prior practice of imposing waiting periods on Medigap applicants. You read that right: Not only did Obamacare not end the denial of care for pre-existing conditions, the law allowed AARP to continue to deny care for individuals with disabilities, as insurers can and do reject Medigap applications when individuals qualify for Medicare early due to a disability.

The Obama administration helped AARP in other important ways. Regulators at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) exempted Medigap policies from insurance rate review of “excessive” premium increases, an exemption that particularly benefited AARP. Because the organization imposes its 4.95 percent “age tax” on individuals applying for coverage, AARP has a clear financial incentive to raise premiums, sell seniors more insurance than they require, and sell seniors policies that they don’t need. Yet rather than addressing these inherent conflicts, HHS decided to look the other way and allow AARP to continue its shady practices.

The Cronyism Stinks to High Heaven

AARP will claim in its defense that it’s not an insurance company, which is true. Insurance companies must risk capital to pay claims, and face losses if claims exceed premiums charged. By contrast, AARP need never risk one dime. It can just sit back, license its brand, and watch the profits roll in. Its $561.9 million received from UnitedHealthGroup in 2015 exceeded the profits of many large insurers that year, including multi-billion dollar carriers like Centene, Health Net, and Molina Healthcare.

But if the AARP now suddenly cares about “taxing” the aged so much, Washington should grant them their wish. The Trump administration and Congress should investigate and crack down on AARP’s insurance shenanigans. Congress should subpoena Sebelius and Sylvia Mathews Burwell, her successor, and ask why each turned a blind eye to its sordid business practices. HHS should write to state insurance commissioners, and ask them to enforce existing best practices that require greater disclosure from entities (like AARP) operating on a percentage-based commission.

And both Congress and the administration should ask why, if AARP cares about its members as much as it claims, the organization somehow “forgot” to lobby for Medigap reforms—not just prior to Obamacare’s passage, but now. AARP’s fourth quarter lobbying report showed that the organization contacted Congress on 77 separate bills, including issues as minor as the cost of lifetime National Parks passes, yet failed to discuss Medigap reform at all.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Obamacare and Disability Groups

On Tuesday, a series of groups representing individuals with disabilities organized a series of rallies protesting the House health-care bill and its proposed changes to Medicaid. The rallies, supervised by the Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), encouraged advocates to “stand up for people with disabilities” and “join us in saying ‘no’ to over $800 billion in [Medicaid] cuts that will leave 10 million individuals at risk.”

However, the CCD version of events omits several inconvenient truths.

Unfortunately, the CBO estimate did not specifically delineate the spending reductions due to the phase-out of the Obamacare expansion versus the other Medicaid reforms (a block grant or per capita spending caps) in the bill. But the idea that repealing just some of the spending associated with Obamacare’s expansion would “decimate” the program seems hyperbolic in extremis.

How Expanding Medicaid Hurts Those with Disabilities

Second, repealing Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion would actually eliminate a major source of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As I have previously written, the Medicaid expansion gives states a greater incentive to cover able-bodied adults under expansion than individuals with disabilities previously eligible for Medicaid. And states have done just that: Illinois cut medication funding for special needs-children on the same day it voted to expand Medicaid under Obamacare, and Ohio Gov. John Kasich cut eligibility for 34,000 individuals with disabilities, even while expanding the Medicaid program to the able-bodied.

Third, CCD did not speak out against Obamacare’s discrimination against individuals with disabilities prior to the bill’s passage. In a 14-page, single-spaced letter dated January 8, 2010, this coalition of disability groups said not one word about the fact that the proposed legislation gave state Medicaid programs a greater federal match to cover able-bodied adults than individuals with disabilities.

Let’s Be Clear: People’s Lives Are At Stake

Given this history, it’s more than a bit rich for CCD to be calling on Americans to “stand up for people with disabilities,” as it said nothing about an issue of critical importance to those individuals seven years ago. On the one hand, it might be unsurprising that individuals working for disability rights groups—with generally leftist political leanings—did not point out a key flaw in a bill that sought to accomplish the liberal dream of universal health insurance coverage for Americans.

But on the other hand, at least hundreds of individuals with disabilities have died awaiting access to Medicaid services since Obamacare’s enactment. These are just some of the more than half a million individuals with disabilities still on waiting lists for home-based personal care, even as millions of able-bodied adults obtain coverage under Medicaid expansion.

Those individuals might not think that living—or dying—on a Medicaid waiting list was a price worth paying to achieve liberal advocates’ shibboleth. And those advocates might rightly find their own political motivations questioned when they can muster all manner of self-righteous indignation over Republican Medicaid reforms yet say not a word when a Democratic president signs a bill that encourages states to discriminate against individuals with disabilities.

My personal view is that some disability groups have chosen to prioritize the general liberal goal of ‘universal health care’ rather than the specific needs of individuals with disabilities they’re supposed to represent. And I think that ultimately does a disservice to individuals like you and your son.

If CCD wants to represent its actual constituents—as opposed to the general wishes of the Left—then it should stop scaring individuals like this mother, and apologize for having stood by while Obamacare created an insidious form of discrimination against individuals with disabilities on Medicaid discrimination. That truly would be “standing up for people with disabilities”—a welcome change indeed.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Insurers’ Obamacare Extortion Racket

The coming weeks will see U.S. health insurance companies attempt to preserve what amounts to an extortion racket. Already, some carriers have claimed they will either exit the Obamacare exchanges entirely in 2018, or submit dramatically higher premium increases for next year, if Congress does not fund payments to insurers for cost-sharing reductions. While insurers claim “uncertainty” compels them to make these business changes, in reality their roots are the companies’ gross incompetence and crass politics.

While Obamacare requires insurers to lower certain low-income individuals’ deductibles and co-payments, and directs the executive agencies to reimburse insurers for those cost-sharing reductions, it nowhere gives the administration an explicit appropriation to do so. The Obama administration made payments to insurers without an explicit appropriation from Congress, and was slapped with a federal lawsuit by the House of Representatives for it.

Either the Companies Are Mismanaged Or Playing Politics

For insurers to assume that the cost-sharing reduction payments would continue through 2017, let alone 2018, required them to ignore 1) public warnings in articles like mine; 2) Collyer’s ruling; 3) the fact that President Obama would leave office on January 20, 2017; and 4) the apparent silence from both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during last year’s campaign on whether they would continue the cost-sharing reduction payments once in office.

Given those four factors, competent insurance executives would have built in an appropriate contingency margin into their 2017 exchange bids, recognizing the uncertainty that the cost-sharing reduction payments would continue during the new administration. Instead, some insurers largely ignored the issue. In its most recent 10-K annual report with the Securities and Exchange Commission, filed February 22, Anthem made not a single reference in the 520-page document to the cost-sharing reduction payments or the House lawsuit.

Therein lies the reason for insurers’ threats. All last year, several insurers assumed Clinton would win and continue the (unconstitutional) payments. Worse yet, some may have willfully ignored their fiduciary responsibility to create a contingency margin for their 2017 plan bids because they wanted to help Clinton by keeping premiums artificially low.

How the People’s Representatives Should Respond

Responding to this extortion racket requires several layers of accountability. First, insurers must accept responsibility for their persistent refusal to address the cost-sharing reduction issue sooner. The Securities and Exchange Commission should investigate whether publicly traded insurers failed to disclose material risks in their company filings by neglecting to mention the clearly foreseeable uncertainty surrounding the payments.

Likewise, the Justice Department’s antitrust division should examine whether insurers’ 2017 premium submissions represent an instance of illegal collusion. If the insurance industry collectively neglected to include a contingency margin surrounding the cost-sharing payments—either to keep premium increases low before the election, or to strong-arm the incoming administration to continue to fund them—such a decision might warrant federal sanctions.

Finally, conservatives and the Trump administration should shine a bright light on state insurance commissioners’ review of premium submissions. Commissioners who approve large contingency margins for 2018 due to uncertainty over cost-sharing reductions, yet did not require a similar contingency margin for 2017 premiums, can be reasonably accused of gross incompetence, playing politics with health insurance premiums, or both.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

What You Need to Know About Budget Reconciliation in the Senate

After last week’s House passage of the American Health Care Act, the Senate has begun sorting through various policy options for health care legislation. But looming over the policy discussions are procedural concerns unique to the Senate. Herewith a primer on the process under which the upper chamber will consider an Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” bill.

How Will the Bill Come to the Senate Floor?

The bill that passed the House was drafted as a budget reconciliation bill. The phrase “budget reconciliation” refers to a process established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, in which congressional committees reconcile spending in programs within their jurisdiction to the budget blueprint passed by Congress. In this case, Congress passed a budget in January that required health-care committees to report legislation reducing the deficit by $1 billion—the intended vehicle for an Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” bill.

What’s So Important about Budget Reconciliation?

Under most circumstances, the Senate can only limit debate and amendments by invoking cloture, which requires the approval of three-fifths of all senators sworn (i.e., 60 votes). Because the reconciliation process prohibits filibusters and unlimited debate, it allows the Senate to pass reconciliation bills with a simple majority (i.e., 51-vote) threshold.

Why Does the ‘Byrd Rule’ Exist as part of Budget Reconciliation?

Named for former Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV), the rule intends to protect the integrity of the legislative filibuster. By allowing only matters integral to the budget reconciliation to pass the Senate with a simple majority (as opposed to the 60-vote threshold), the rule seeks to keep the body’s tradition of extended debate.

What Is the ‘Byrd Rule’?

Simply put, the rule prohibits “extraneous” material from intruding in budget reconciliation legislation. However, the term “Byrd rule” is technically a misnomer in two respects. First, the “Byrd rule” is more than just a longstanding practice of the Senate. After several years of operation as a Senate rule, it was codified into law beginning in 1985, and can be found at 2 U.S.C. 644. Second, the rule consists of not just one test to define whether material is “extraneous,” but six.

What Are the Six Different Types of Extraneous Material?

So the Various Types of ‘Byrd Rule’ Violations Are Not Necessarily Equivalent?

Correct. While most reporters focus on the fourth test—when a legislative provision has a budgetary impact merely incidental to the provision’s policy change—that is not the only type of rule violation. Nor in many respects is it the most significant.

While violations of the fourth test are fatal to the provision—the extraneous material is stricken from the underlying legislation—violations of the third (material outside the jurisdiction of committees charged with reporting reconciliation legislation) and sixth (changes to Title II of the Social Security Act) tests are fatal to the entire bill.

Who Determines Whether a Provision Qualifies as ‘Extraneous’ Under the ‘Byrd Rule’?

How Does One Determine Whether a Provision Qualifies as ‘Extraneous’ under the ‘Byrd Rule’?

In some cases, determining compliance with the rule is relatively straight-forward. A provision dealing with veterans’ benefits (within the jurisdiction of the Veterans Affairs Committee) would clearly fail the third test in a tax reconciliation bill, as tax matters lie within the Finance Committee’s jurisdiction.

However, other cases require a more nuanced, textual analysis by the parliamentarian. Such an analysis might examine Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and other outside scores, to assess the provision’s fiscal impact (or lack thereof), the statute the reconciliation bill seeks to amend, other statutes cross-referenced in the legislation (to assess the impact of the programmatic changes the provision would make), and prior precedent on related matters.

When Does the Senate Assess Whether a Provision Qualifies as ‘Extraneous’?

In some respects, assessing compliance is an iterative process. Often, the Senate parliamentarian will provide informal advice to majority staff as they begin to write reconciliation legislation. While these informal conversations help to guide bill writers during the drafting process, the parliamentarian normally notes that these discussions do not constitute a formal advisory opinion; minority party staff and other interested persons are not privy to the ex parte conversations, and could in time bring her new information that could cause her to change her opinion.

Do Debates about the ‘Byrd Rule’ Take Place on the Senate Floor?

They can, and they have, but relatively rarely. As James Wallner, an expert in Senate parliamentary procedure, notes, over the last three decades, the Senate has formally adjudicated only ten instances of the fourth test—whether a provision’s fiscal impacts are merely incidental to its proposed policy changes.

Because most determinations of “Byrd rule” compliance (or non-compliance) have been made through informal, closed-door “Byrd bath” discussions in the Senate parliamentarian’s office, there are few formal precedents—either rulings from the chair or votes by the Senate itself—regarding specific examples of “extraneous” material. As a result, the Senate—whether the parliamentarian, the presiding officer, or the body itself—has significant latitude to interpret the statutory tests about what qualifies as “extraneous.”

Can the Senate Overrule the Parliamentarian about What Qualifies as ‘Extraneous’ Under the ‘Byrd Rule’?

Yes, in two respects. The presiding officer—whether the vice president as president of the Senate, the president pro tempore (currently Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-UT), or another senator—can disregard the parliamentarian’s guidance and issue his or her own ruling. Alternatively, a senator could appeal the chair’s decision, and a simple majority of the body could overrule that decision. There is a long history of senators doing just that.

As a practical matter, however, such a scenario appears unlikely during the Obamacare debate, for two reasons. First, some senators may view such a move as akin to the “nuclear option,” undermining the legislative filibuster by a simple majority vote. The recent letter signed by 61 senators pledging to uphold the legislative filibuster indicates that at least some senators in both parties want to preserve the usual 60-vote margin for passing legislation, and therefore may not wish to set a precedent of allowing potentially “extraneous” material on to a budget reconciliation bill through a simple majority.

Second, if the Senate did overrule the parliamentarian on a procedural matter related to budget reconciliation, a conservative senator would likely introduce a simple, one-line Obamacare repeal bill and ask the Senate to overrule the parliamentarian to allow it to qualify as a reconciliation matter. Since many members of the Senate, like the House, do not actually wish to repeal Obamacare, they would likely decline to head down the road of overruling the parliamentarian, for fear it may head in this direction.

Can the Senate Waive the ‘Byrd Rule’?

Yes—provided three-fifths of senators sworn (i.e., 60 senators) agree. In the past, many budget reconciliation bills—like the Balanced Budget Act of 1997—passed with far more than 60 Senate votes, which made waiving the rule easier.

However, Republicans did not agree to waive the rule for extraneous material included in Senate Democrats’ Obamacare “fix” bill in March 2010. That material was stricken from the legislation and did not make it into law. For this and other reasons, it seems unlikely that eight or more Senate Democrats would vote to waive the rule for an Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” bill.

Didn’t Democrats Pass Obamacare through Budget Reconciliation?

Yes and no. They fixed portions of Obamacare—for instance, the notorious “Cornhusker Kickback”—through a budget reconciliation measure that passed through both houses of Congress in March 2010. But the larger, 2,400-page measure that passed the Senate on Christmas Eve 2009 was enacted into law first.

Once Scott Brown’s election to the Senate in January 2010 gave Republicans 41 votes, Democrats knew they could not go through the usual process of convening a House-Senate conference committee to consider the differences between each chamber’s legislation. A conference report is subject to a filibuster, and Republicans had the votes to sustain that filibuster.

Instead, House Democrats agreed to pass the Senate version of the legislation—the version that passed with 60 votes on Christmas Eve 2009—then have both chambers use a separate budget reconciliation bill—one that could pass the Senate with a 51-vote majority—to make changes to the bill they had just enacted.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How the Media Care More About Obamacare Than the Constitution

Fewer than 12 months ago, some people—aka, yours truly—raised a warning about Obamacare’s cost-sharing reductions. The text of the law nowhere provided an appropriation for them, meaning that, as I wrote last May, the next President could shut them off unilaterally. At the time, I contacted several reporters, pointing out that such a move could have major implications for the health care law. None showed any interest in writing on the topic, and to the best of my knowledge, few if any reporters did.

Having now under-reacted regarding the issue during most of 2016, the media are compensating by over-reacting now. Since the House failed to pass “repeal-and-replace” legislation, breathless articles in multiple publications have examined the issue, whether the Trump Administration will cut off the subsidies, and whether insurers will bail on the Exchanges en masse as a result.

What Exactly Is Going On With Obamacare Subsidies?

For the uninitiated, the dispute involves one of two types of Obamacare subsidies: premium subsidies to lower monthly premium costs, and cost-sharing reductions that help with things like deductibles and co-payments. The law requires insurers to reduce cost-sharing for certain low-income individuals, and provides for a system of reimbursements to repay insurers for providing said reductions.

 However, Obamacare itself failed to provide any appropriation for the reimbursement payers to insurers. The lack of an explicit appropriation violates Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which requires that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Congress has the “power of the purse,” and Members of Congress believe that the Obama Administration violated that power.

To remedy that violation, the House of Representatives authorized legal action in July 2014, and filed suit in November 2014 seeking to stop the subsidies. Last May, Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled that the Obama Administration had in fact violated the Constitution by spending money without an express appropriation. The case, House v. Price (formerly House v. Burwell), remains on hold; the Obama Administration appealed Judge Collyer’s ruling last year, and the Trump Administration and the House are attempting to resolve the status of that appeal.

What’s The Media Saying About All This?

Given that background, it’s worth examining press coverage on the issue since Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” efforts collapsed, bringing questions about the lawsuit, and the subsidy payments, to the fore:

  • Politico noted that the House’s suit argued that the Obama Administration “had paid for [the subsidies] without congressional authority”—but also quoted an expert as saying failure to appropriate funds for the subsidies would “shoot [Obamacare] in the head.”
  • A separate Politico opinion piece said that “if the Republicans want to avoid a major mess, they need to make the suit go away and make sure the subsidies keep flowing.”
  • A Wall Street Journal article said that the House calls the payments “illegal.”

All three of these stories omitted one simple word: “Constitution.” As in, a federal judge said Barack Obama’s Administration violated the Constitution. As in, one analyst thinks the House needs to make a suit protecting its constitutional authority “go away.” As in, the payments weren’t ruled “illegal”—they were ruled unconstitutional.

Granted, other stories have at least mentioned the constitutional element of the dispute. But there haven’t been many stories focusing on the constitutionality of President Obama’s actions (which even Obamacare supporters have questioned), or even how the court ruling could rein in executive unilateralism. Instead of reading about how—by spending money without an appropriation—Barack Obama “sabotaged” the Constitution, or even “shot it in the head,” the public has seen all sorts of articles suggesting that President Trump may “sabotage” Obamacare—by upholding the Constitution.

Thanks For The Double Standard, American Media

That response merits a thought experiment in word substitution: If a federal court had ruled that the George W. Bush Administration violated the Constitution by giving tens of billions of dollars to—let’s pick a company at random here—Halliburton, do you think the press would be more focused on the violation of the rule of law and the unconstitutional payments, or on the chaos that would result if those payments to Halliburton suddenly ceased? If you think the latter, I’ve got some land I want to sell you.

If you’re still unconvinced that reporters are in the tank for Obamacare—or at minimum guilty of significant, and quite selective, double standards when it comes to their constitutional outrage—consider this recent Politico piece about a Donald Trump tweet threatening to change libel laws:

Trump’s comments on libel, coupled with his regular attacks on reporters and news organizations, have alarmed First Amendment advocates and his critics, who warned over the course of the campaign that his posture toward news organizations revealed a lack of respect for the role a free press plays in a democracy.

This high-minded rhetoric came one paragraph after Politico, citing various legal experts, pointed out “that there are virtually no steps within the President’s power to ‘open up libel laws,’ as Trump has suggested.”

But when a federal judge rules that President Obama violated (not threatened to violate, mind you, but actually violated) the Constitution by paying insurers tens of billions of dollars, the media focuses largely on how remedying that violation will impact the health care law. They seem to care more about protecting Obamacare than protecting the Constitution. Is it any wonder why people boo the press?

Spare Me Your Self-Righteousness

Within that double standard lies the major problem: the presumption that Obamacare is “too big to fail,” irrespective of whether or not the Obama Administration’s payments to insurers violated the Constitution. Some could be forgiven for thinking that the press coverage provides a disturbing lesson to future Presidents: If you violate the Constitution long enough and badly enough, it will become a norm, such that people will expect future leaders to accommodate the violation.

To all those reporters worried about President Trump’s attacks on reporters, I’ll simply posit that the Constitution is a binary choice: You either support it—all of it, even or especially the portions you find inconvenient—or you don’t. If you want the public to care about the Trump Administration’s stance towards the First Amendment, then it might be wise to give a damn about the other portions of the Constitution too.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Five Questions Regarding “Repeal and Replace”

At a Thursday morning press conference, Speaker Paul Ryan and House leaders unveiled amendment language providing an additional $15 billion in funding for “invisible high risk pools,” which the House Rules Committee was scheduled to consider Thursday afternoon.

That amendment was released following several days of conversations, but no bill text, surrounding state waivers for some (or all—reports have varied on this front) of Obamacare’s “Big Four” regulations: guaranteed issue, community rating, essential health benefits, and actuarial value. Theoretically, states could use the risk pool funds to subsidize the costs of individuals with pre-existing conditions, should they decide to waive existing Obamacare regulations regarding the same.

1. Do Republicans Believe in Limited Executive Authority?

The text of the amendment regarding risk pool funding states that the administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) “shall establish…parameters for the operation of the program consistent with this section.”

That’s essentially all the guidance given to CMS to administer a $15 billion program. Following consultations with stakeholders—the text requires such discussions, but doesn’t necessarily require CMS to listen to stakeholder input—the administration can define eligible individuals, the standards for qualification for the pools (both voluntary or automatic), the percentage of insurance premiums paid into the program, and the attachment points for insurers to receive payments from the program.

This extremely broad language raises several potential concerns. Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price has previously cited the number of references to “the Secretary shall” or “the Secretary may” in Obamacare as showing his ability to modify, change, or otherwise undermine the law. Republicans who give such a broad grant of authority to the executive would allow a future Democrat administration to return the favor.

The wide executive authority does little to preclude arbitrary decisions by the executive. If the administration wants to “come after” a state or an insurer, this broad grant of power may give the administration the ability to do so, by limiting the ability to claim program funds.

As I have previously written, some conservatives may believe that the answer to Barack Obama’s executive unilateralism is not executive unilateralism from a Republican administration. Such a broad grant of authority to the executive in the risk pool program undermines that principle, and ultimately Congress’ Article I constitutional power.

2. Do Republicans Believe in Federalism?

Section (c)(3) of the amendment text allows states to operate risk pools in their respective states, beginning in 2020. However, the text also states that the parameters under which those state pools operate will be set at the federal level by CMS. Some may find it slightly incongruous that, even as Congress debates allowing states to opt out of some of Obamacare’s regulations, it wants to retain control of this new pot of money at the federal level, albeit while letting states implement the federally defined standards.

3. How Is the New Funding for ‘Invisible High Risk Pools’ Much Different from Obamacare’s Reinsurance Program?

The amendment language echoes Section 1341(b)(2) of Obamacare, which required the administration to establish payments to insurers for Obamacare’s reinsurance program. That existing reinsurance mechanism, like the proposed amendment text, has attachment points (an amount at which reinsurance kicks in) and co-insurance (health insurers will pay a certain percentage of claims above the attachment point, while the program funding will pay a certain percentage).

Congressional leadership previously called the $20 billion in Obamacare reinsurance funding a “bailout” and “corporate welfare.” But the $15 billion in funding under the proposed amendment echoes the Obamacare mechanism—only with more details missing and less oversight. Why do Republicans now support a program suspiciously similar to one they previously opposed?

4. Why Do Conservatives Believe Any States Will Apply For Regulatory Waivers?

The number of states that have repealed Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion thus far is a nice round figure: Zero. Given this experience, it’s worth asking whether any state would actually take Washington up on its offer to provide regulatory relief—particularly because Congress could decide to repeal all the regulations outright, but thus far has chosen not to.

Moreover, if Congress places additional conditions on these waivers, as some lawmakers have discussed, even states that want to apply for them may not qualify. Obamacare already has a waiver process under which states can waive some of the law’s regulations, including the essential health benefits and actuarial value (but not guaranteed issue and community rating).

However, those waiver requirements are so strict that no states have applied for these—health savings accounts and other consumer-directed health-care options likely do not meet the law’s criteria. If the House plan includes similarly strict criteria, the waivers will have little meaning.

5. Will the Administration Encourage States to Apply for Regulatory Waivers?

President Trump has previously stated that he wants to keep Obamacare’s pre-existing conditions provisions. Those statements raise questions about how exactly the administration would implement a program seeking to waive those very protections. Would the administration actively encourage states to apply? If so, why won’t it support repealing those provisions outright, rather than requiring states to come to the federal government to ask permission?

Conversely, if the administration wishes to discourage states from using this waiver program, it has levers to do so. As noted above, the current amendment language gives the administration very broad leeway regarding the $15 billion risk pool program, such that the administration could potentially deny funds to states that move to waive portions of the Obamacare regulations.

The combination of the broad grant of authority to the executive, coupled with the president’s prior comments wanting to keep Obamacare’s pre-existing conditions provision, could lead some conservatives to question whether they are being led into a potential “bait-and-switch” scenario, whereby the regulatory flexibility promised prior to the bill’s passage suddenly disappears upon enactment.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Real Binary Choices Surrounding “Repeal and Replace”

During the run-up to the aborted vote on House Republicans’ Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” legislation, Speaker Paul Ryan repeatedly called the vote a “binary choice”: Republicans could support the leadership-drafted legislation, or, by failing to do so, effectively choose to keep Obamacare in place.

The rhetoric led to criticism of the speaker for attempting to bully or rush members of Congress into supporting legislation despite policy concerns and political unpopularity. That said, health care policy does involve several largely binary choices. They do not break down along the political fault lines the speaker proposed—support the leadership bill, or support Obamacare—but they demonstrate how health policy involves significant trade-offs that should be made very explicit as part of the policy-making process. Here are just three.

1: Obamacare’s Regulations Are (Mostly) All-or-Nothing

Here’s the problem: As long as insurers are required to accept all applicants regardless of health status or pre-existing conditions—a requirement known as guaranteed issue, and included in Obamacare—removing at least three other important Obamacare regulations would likely lead to unsustainable and perverse outcomes. These three are the following.

Community rating: Theoretically, insurers would have little problem with a requirement to accept all applicants, so long as they can charge those applicants an actuarially fair rate. However, “offering” a cancer patient an insurance policy priced at $50,000 per month would likely yield few acceptances (and would be politically unsustainable).

Obamacare allowed insurers to vary premiums only by age, family size, geography, and tobacco use. The House bill expanded the permissible rating variation, but only with respect to age. While this change would lower premiums for younger applicants, encouraging them to purchase insurance, it might not change insurers’ underlying assumption that applicants will be sicker-than-average.

Essential benefits: Requiring insurers to accept all applicants regardless of health status, but allowing them to vary benefit packages, would create incentives for insurers to structure their policies in ways that discourage sick people from applying.

For instance, no rational insurer would provide much (if any) coverage of expensive chemotherapy drugs, because doing so would prompt a flood of cancer patients to purchase coverage and run up large bills. Since Obamacare’s passage, HIV patients have already faced discrimination because of these inherent flaws in the law, even with the essential benefit requirements in place. Removing them would only accelerate a “race to the bottom.”

Actuarial value: Here again, removing the requirement that plans cover a certain percentage of expenses would lead to a rapid downsizing of generous plans from the marketplace—again, so insurers can avoid sick patients. Platinum plans have already become a rare breed on the Obamacare exchanges; removing the requirements would likely cause gold and silver plans to disappear as well.

These four major regulations—guaranteed issue, community rating, essential health benefits, and actuarial value—are inextricably linked. Repealing only one or two without repealing all of them, particularly the guaranteed issue requirements, would at best fail to lower premiums (largely what the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO, concluded about the House bill) and at worst could severely disrupt the market, while making the sickest individuals worse off.

CBO views these four interlinked changes as at the heart of the Obamacare regulatory regime. While lawmakers could repeal piecemeal other mandates beyond the “Big Four,” such as the requirement to cover “dependents” under age 26, or the preventive services mandate, doing so would have a much smaller effect on reducing premiums than the four changes referenced above.

2: Keeping Obamacare Regulations Requires Significant Insurance Subsidies

The January CBO analysis of the 2015 repeal bill passed under reconciliation illustrates the second binary choice. Because that 2015 reconciliation bill repealed Obamacare’s insurance subsidies (after a delay) and mandate to purchase coverage, but not its regulatory requirements on insurers, CBO concluded that the bill would severely damage the individual health insurance market. By 2026, premiums would double, and about three-quarters of the country would have no insurers offering individual insurance coverage, in CBO’s estimate.

The analysis revealed one big reason why: Eliminating subsidies for insurance would result in a large price increase for many people. Not only would enrollment decline, but the people who would be most likely to remain enrolled would tend to be less healthy (and therefore more willing to pay higher premiums). Thus, average health-care costs among the people retaining coverage would be higher, and insurers would have to raise premiums in the non-group market to cover those higher costs.

By contrast, CBO concluded that this year’s House Republican bill, which (largely) retained Obamacare’s regulations and included a new subsidy for insurance, would lead to a stable marketplace: “Key factors bringing about market stability include subsidies to purchase insurance, which would maintain sufficient demand for insurance by people with low health care expenditures…”

The obvious conclusion: While the individual health insurance market remained relatively stable without subsidies prior to Obamacare, and repealing both the law’s subsidies and its regulations would restore that sustainable market, as long as the regulatory changes wrought by the law remain in place, the market will require heavy insurance subsidies to remain stable.

3: Banning Pre-Existing Condition Consideration Versus Repealing Obamacare

This binary choice follows from the prior two. If the “Big Four” insurance regulations are so interlinked as to make them a binary proposition, and if a market with those “Big Four” requires subsidies to remain stable, then Republicans have a choice: They can either retain the ban on pre-existing condition discrimination—and the regulations and subsidies that go with it—or they can fulfill their promise to repeal Obamacare.

It’s not that others derided the House bill as ‘Obamacare Lite,’ it’s that the bill qualifies as such under Ryan’s own definition.

Consider, for instance, Ryan’s response to a reporter on February 16 questioning the similarities between the refundable tax credits in the House plan (later the House bill) and Obamacare: “They call them refundable tax credits—they’re subsidies. And they’re subsidies that say ‘We will pay some people some money if you do what the government makes you do.’ That is not a tax credit. That is not freedom. A tax credit is you get the freedom to do what you want, and buy what you need—and your choice.”

Based on Ryan’s own definition, the House bill qualifies as an Obamacare-esque subsidy, and not a tax credit. It gives some people (those with employer coverage or other insurance do not qualify) some amount—the credits had to be means-tested to solve major CBO scoring issues—if they buy insurance that meets government requirements.

For an individual “buy[ing] what [they] need,” the option to purchase health insurance without under-26 “dependent” coverage, or without maternity coverage for males, did not exist. So it’s not that others derided the House bill as “Obamacare Lite,” it’s that the bill qualifies as such under Ryan’s own definition.

Much of the problem lies in House Republicans’ Better Way proposal released last summer, which stated a desire to retain Obamacare’s pre-existing condition provision. The import of this proposal was not clear at the time. There are other, simpler ways to provide coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions (such as high-risk pools), and as Yuval Levin has pointed out, prior conservative health proposals did not include promises on pre-existing conditions. But Republicans’ unwillingness to upset the Obamacare standards for pre-existing conditions has significantly boxed in the party’s policy options regarding repeal.

To Govern Is To Choose

As with Barack Obama in 2008, Republicans face a self-inflicted dilemma, having over-promised voters by claiming they could keep the popular portions of Obamacare (pre-existing condition protections) while repealing the law.

But Republicans face what looks increasingly like a binary choice: going back to the status quo ante on pre-existing conditions, or breaking their seven-year-long pledge to repeal Obamacare. As the saying goes, to govern is to choose—but in this case, failing to govern may be the worst choice of all.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Lessons of the AHCA Collapse

Like the British evacuation of Dunkirk more than seven decades ago, Friday’s abrupt decision to halt proceedings on the American Health Care Act (AHCA) prior to a House vote represented victory only in that it averted an even costlier defeat—an embarrassing floor vote seemingly destined to fail, or passage of a bill unloved by wide swathes of the public and lawmakers alike.

Whether that decision is ultimately viewed as a “deliverance”—as Winston Churchill dubbed the 1940 Dunkirk evacuation—will depend in no small part on whether lawmakers can, both individually and collectively, learn the right lessons from an entirely predictable defeat.

Republicans Need to Remember How to Govern

Leadership outlined its strategy—such as it was—in a February 27 Wall Street Journal article: “Republican leaders are betting that the only way for Congress to repeal the Affordable Care Act is to set a bill in motion and gamble that fellow GOP lawmakers won’t dare to block it.”

Irrespective of what one thinks of the bill’s policy particulars—whether the bill represents a positive, coherent governing document and vision for the health care system—this thinking demonstrates that Republicans have to re-learn not just how to govern, but also how to legislate.

As a legislative strategy, the House’s gambit represented a puerile cross between the “chickie run” in “Rebel Without a Cause” and Hans Christen Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” Daring lawmakers to challenge the process, and attempting to bully and browbeat them into submission—“testosterone can get you in trouble,” as Rep. Mark Sanford (R-SC) reportedly noted during one meeting—does not a durable process make. Unsurprisingly, that process broke down after a mere 18 days.

In circumstances such as these, there is a fine line between learning lessons and pointing fingers. Focusing on the personalities behind the legislative failure would only further enflame tensions, while serving little productive purpose. On the other hand, understanding the reasons the legislation was in many ways doomed from the start can help prevent future calamities. Of the flawed premises that lay behind the legislative strategy, three seem particularly problematic.

1. Starting with the House

The House’s decision to consider the legislation first seemed ill-considered at the time, given the difficulties the chamber encountered the last time it moved first on repealing Obamacare. In the fall 2015, Congress considered and passed, but President Obama vetoed, repeal legislation under special budget reconciliation procedures. Passing the bill represented a “dry run” testing what a Republican Congress could do to dismantle Obamacare, but for the Democratic president who remained in the White House.

But as I noted the week after last November’s election, the House’s 2015 repeal reconciliation bill suffered from numerous procedural flaws. That legislation originally repealed Obamacare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), even though such Senate procedures meant that this provision, with an incidental fiscal impact, could not remain on a budget reconciliation bill. The House-reported legislation also increased the deficit in the years beyond the 10-year budget window, subjecting it to a potentially fatal point-of-order in the Senate.

Given that near-death experience fewer than 18 months ago, it made much more sense for the Senate to take the lead in crafting a reconciliation measure. At minimum, House staff needed to solicit greater feedback from the Senate regarding that chamber’s procedures during the drafting process, to ensure they wrote the bill consistent with the Senate’s budget reconciliation rules. Neither happened.

House leadership claimed they wrote their bill to comply with the Senate’s reconciliation rules. But experts in Senate procedure could readily see that AHCA as released suffered from multiple procedural flaws, several potentially fatal to the entire bill. Last week, days before its scheduled floor consideration, the relevant House committees released a managers amendment re-drafting the measure’s tax credit, precisely because of the procedural flaws in the initial version.

All of which makes one wonder why the House insisted on initiating action. The Senate not only has more detailed and arcane procedures to follow than the House, Republicans also hold a narrower majority in the upper chamber. While no more than 21 of 237  House Republicans (8.9 percent) can defect on a bill passing solely with Republican votes, no more than two of 52 Senate Republicans can defect in the upper chamber, a much narrower (3.9 percent) margin.

2. The Unrealistic Timetable

The day before House leadership released a document outlining their vision for what became AHCA, I published a lengthy analysis of the legislative environment. I concluded that any legislation featuring either comprehensive changes to Medicaid or a refundable tax credit—the former I generally favored, the latter I did not—just could not pass in the timetable allotted for it:

The likelihood that House Republicans can get a comprehensive “repeal-and-replace” bill—defined as one with either tax credits, Medicaid reform, or both—1) drafted; 2) cleared by the Senate parliamentarian; 3) scored favorably by CBO [the Congressional Budget Office]; and 4) with enough Member support to ensure it passes in time for a mark-up on March 1—two weeks from now—is a nice round number: Zero-point-zero percent.

Likewise the chances of enacting a comprehensive ‘repeal-and-replace’ bill by Congress’ Easter recess. It just won’t happen. For a bill signing ceremony for a comprehensive ‘repeal-and-replace’ bill, August recess seems a likelier, albeit still ambitious, target.

Nothing in the above passage proved inaccurate. House leadership even skipped steps in the process I outlined—going forward with markups without a CBO score, and not writing the bill to comply with Senate procedure until just before a scheduled House vote—yet still couldn’t meet their targets. This would lead most people to believe those targets were just too ambitious.

Two vignettes show the problems caused by the sheer haste of the process. First, the managers amendments released last Monday night had to be re-written on Tuesday night. In both cases, the House committees had to submit second-degree amendments “to address drafting issues,” because the original managers amendments had no fewer than ten separate drafting errors among them.

Second, the managers amendment included an extra pot of funds to increase the refundable tax credits given to those near retirement age. However, the legislation created that pot of money not by increasing the refundable credits, but by lowering thresholds for a deduction available to those who itemize medical expenses on their tax returns.

The decision to provide the additional funds through a deduction, rather than by adjusting the credits themselves, was almost certainly driven by the mechanics of budgetary scoring, and ultimately the bill’s timetable. While the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) could estimate the relatively straightforward financial effects of a deduction quickly, altering the tax credit levels for individuals aged 50-64 would create knock-on effects—would more individuals take the credit, would more individuals retire early and drop employer-sponsored coverage, etc.—taking CBO staff a week or more to model.

So, rather than “wasting” time coming up with a policy and finding out the effects of said policy, prior to House passage, congressional staff instead created a $90 billion “slush fund” and pledged to sort the details out later.

Just before Obamacare’s passage in March 2010, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi infamously said “we have to pass the bill so that you can find out what is in it.” House Republicans took her multiple steps further: By including a “slush fund” designed to change later in the process, and proceeding to both committee markups and a vote on House passage without a final CBO score, congressional leadership guaranteed that anyone who voted for AHCA would not by definition have known what was intended to be in the bill, let alone the fiscal effects of such policies.

The end result was a group of members in vulnerable districts who voted for the bill in committee without a CBO score—and could suffer serious, if not fatal, political consequences for having done so. Some of these moderates hold substantial disagreements with conservatives on how to structure an Obamacare repeal. But it was not conservatives that compelled the moderates to cast a tough vote for the legislation in committee without a CBO score analyzing the bill’s fiscal and coverage impacts—it was the hyper-aggressive timetable.

3. Unproductive White House Coordination

While publicly President Trump and others made statements insisting that his administration was “100 percent behind” the House Republican plan, the divisions within the administration were an open secret on Capitol Hill. From staff to officials, many had misgivings about the policy behind the bill, the legislative tactics and strategy, or both.

Those differences helped affect the ultimate outcome. Ryan attempted to turn his legislation into a “binary choice”—either support this bill, or support Obamacare—granting conservatives some concessions during the drafting process, but few thereafter. By contrast, factions within the administration attempted to woo conservatives and fought House leadership, which resisted making changes.

Ironically, had the administration halted negotiations sooner, and demanded an immediate vote earlier last week, they might have had a better chance of winning that tally. (Whether that victory would have ultimately proved Pyrrhic is another story, but they might have eked out a victory nonetheless.) But because the White House and congressional leadership weren’t on the same page, the former’s negotiations with conservatives left moderates to slowly trickle away from the bill, such that by Friday, it was virtually impossible to find a coalition to reach 216 votes whichever way leadership turned.

Even as the momentum slowly sapped from the bill, the administration and Capitol Hill leaders remained at odds on tactics. The New York Times reported on Saturday that some in the administration wanted to hold a House vote, even an unsuccessful one, to find out who opposed President Trump. But making such a demand misunderstands the dynamic nature of votes in the House of Representatives.

While AHCA might have passed narrowly, it would not have failed narrowly. Once a critical mass of 30 or so Republican “noes” signaled the bill’s clear failure, members would have abandoned the politically unpopular legislation en masse—likely with the implicit or explicit support of House leadership. Having witnessed these “jailbreak” votes in the House, it’s possible that, had the White House forced the issue, the bottom could have fallen out on support for the bill. As a tactic to snuff out disloyal behavior, calling a vote on a doomed bill would have yielded little in the way of political intelligence—only more political damage.

Underneath Tactical Errors Is Philosophical Disagreement

Beneath the obvious tactical errors lie some fundamental disagreements within the Republican party and the conservative movement about Obamacare, the future of our health-care system, and even the role of government. As I have written elsewhere, those differences do not represent mere window-dressing. They are as sizable as they are substantive.

That divide between ‘repealers’ and ‘replacers’ represents a proxy for the debate between reducing costs and maximizing coverage.

On the one hand, the conservative wing of the party has focused on repealing Obamacare, and lowering health costs—namely, the premiums that have risen substantially under the law. By contrast, moderates and centrists remain focused on its replacement, and ensuring that those who benefited from the law continue to have coverage under the new regime.

That divide between “repealers” and “replacers” represents a proxy for the debate between reducing costs and maximizing coverage, a debate that precedes Obamacare by several decades, if not several generations. Some have argued that facts on the ground—the individuals gaining coverage as a result of Obamacare—necessitate an approach focused on maintaining coverage numbers.

Others believe that “repeal means repeal,” that Republicans ran, and won, elections on repealing the law—including as recently as five months ago—and that breaking such a deeply ingrained pledge to voters would represent political malpractice of the highest order.

The drafters of the House bill attempted to split the ideological divide, in part by retaining the popular parts of Obamacare while minimizing the law’s drawbacks. Both the House bill and the Better Way plan that preceded it maintained Obamacare’s restrictions on pre-existing conditions, its requirement that insurers cover dependents under age 26, and its prohibition on annual and lifetime limits for health insurance.

But policy decisions come with trade-offs, and in health care in particular those trade-offs can prove troublesome. Barack Obama did not wish to impose a mandate to purchase health insurance, having fought against one during his 2008 primary campaign; but CBO scoring considerations forced him to endorse one in the bill that became Obamacare. Similarly, the “popular” insurance regulations that Republican leadership maintained in its bill were the same ones that raised premiums so appreciably when Obamacare went into effect.

The AHCA approach of repealing Obamacare’s mandates and subsidies while retaining most of its insurance regulations created what Yuval Levin, a policy wonk close to Ryan, called a “twisted, fun-house mirror approach” to prior conservative health policy that yielded “substantive incoherence.” Dropping the individual mandate while retaining most of the insurance regulations created a CBO score that showed substantial coverage losses while failing to lower premiums appreciably—the worst of all possible policy outcomes.

The ideological divisions within the Republican Party, and the incoherent muddle of legislation that attempted to bridge the two, may have been overcome had the House released its bill the morning after the election, on November 9. But it did not release the bill on November 9, or on December 9, or on January 9, or even on February 9. The House introduced its bill on March 6, with the goal of passing legislation through both chambers by April 6. That timetable didn’t envision reconciling ideological differences so much as it hoped to steamroll them. It was all-but-guaranteed not to end well.

Lessons For the Future

What then of the future? One can only but hope that Republicans follow the example of Kipling’s poem “The Lesson,” written during the Boer War: “Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should; We have had no end of a lesson: It will do us no end of good.”

But what are those lessons, and what good might result from heeding them? While the policy differences within factions of the Republican Party are sizable, the only way to bridge them lies through an open, transparent, and deliberative process—negotiating outcomes among all sides from the start, rather than imposing them from on high through fiat.

If, as President Reagan famously noted, “personnel is policy,” so too then process provides a key to optimal policy making. A good process by itself cannot create good policy, but bad process will almost assuredly result in bad policy outcomes. In the short- and long-term, five principles can provide the initial glimmer of a path forward from last Friday’s dark outcome.

1. Let the Senate Lead

The procedural details surrounding budget reconciliation, and the narrower margins in the upper chamber, both augur toward the Senate re-starting any action on health care. As a practical matter, tensions remain far too high—with tempers short, friendships among members and staff frayed, and patience thin—for the House to initiate any legislative action for at least the next few weeks.

On upcoming legislation ranging from appropriations to tax reform to additional action regarding Obamacare, the “world’s greatest deliberative body” will have to exercise its deliberative powers. The ideological gaps are no less narrow in the House than in the Senate—can Mike Lee and Susan Collins reach consensus on a path forward regarding Obamacare?—but the recriminations and scars of the past month smaller.

If the Senate, with its smaller margins and arcane procedures, can deliver a quality policy product, the House, having seen its legislation sink in mere weeks, might be much more inclined to adopt it as its own.

2. Listen

House leadership rightfully notes AHCA had its origins in the Better Way policy white paper released last June. Prior to that document’s release, leadership staff spent significant time and effort reaching out to members, interest groups, the think-tank community, and others to gain thoughts and feedback on their proposals.

But actual legislation is orders of magnitude more complex than a white paper. Moreover, Better Way and AHCA deviate from each other in multiple important respects. The Better Way proposal includes numerous provisions—incentives for wellness, conscience protections for health care professionals, and proposals to repeal sections of Obamacare regarding Medicare, and Medicare Advantage—never included in AHCA, or mentioned in any great detail as part of the House’s “three-phase” approach.

Meanwhile, AHCA doubles the funding for grants to states when compared to the Better Way proposal, and uses significantly different parameters for the state grants than the 2009 House Republican alternative to Obamacare referenced in the Better Way document.

It’s possible to speculate on why House leadership made all these changes, but leadership itself made very little attempt to communicate exactly why they made them, or even that they were making them at all. Saying that Better Way led to AHCA is like saying the Model T led to the DeLorean. The former are both health-care proposals just as the latter are both cars, but each differ in significant ways.

The process that led from Better Way to AHCA was almost as significant as the process that led from the Model T to the DeLorean, but was opaque to all but a few closely held staff. Even lawmakers who understood and supported every single element of the Better Way plan could rightfully feel whipsawed when presented with AHCA, told it was a “binary choice,” and they had to publicly support it within a few weeks of its introduction, or otherwise they would be voting to keep Obamacare in place and undermine a new president.

When the Republican Study Committee unveiled its health-care legislation in 2013, its public release culminated a months-long process of consultation and scrutiny of the legislative text itself. RSC staff reached out to dozens of policy experts (myself included), and spent hours going through the bill line-by-line to make sure the legislation would accomplish its intended goals, while keeping unintended consequences to a minimum.

AHCA would have benefited immensely from this type of under-the-radar analysis, rather than subjecting legislation not yet ready for prime time to the intense scrutiny that came with a white-hot political debate and a hyper-accelerated timeline.

3. Trust Experts

A note at the bottom of page 25 of a leaked draft of AHCA provides an important hint toward a larger issue. The bracketed note, in a passage regarding per capita cap reforms to Medicaid, calls for staff to “review with CMS [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services] any conforming amendments required.”

Congressional staff I spoke with over the past few weeks questioned whether anyone within the relevant agencies had in fact reviewed the legislation, to provide the technical expertise necessary to ensure that AHCA could be implemented as written, and would actually result in a workable health-care system.

Games of legislative hide-and-seek and talk of ‘binary choices’ preclude the received wisdom of all but the select few participating in the policy-making.

At the time the legislative process began, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had relatively few political appointees—no more than a few dozen out of about 150 total spots filled, and a CMS administrator not confirmed until the week prior to the scheduled House vote. The combination of a stretched staff and mistrust between political and career appointees within the agencies could well have limited the exchange of critically important details regarding how to draft, and implement, the legislation.

In addition to working with career personnel at the agencies, congressional staff should also utilize the institutional knowledge of their predecessors. While working for the House Republican Conference in 2009, I made it a point to start the Obamacare debate by finding out what I didn’t know, reaching out to those who had gone through the “Hillarycare” debate 15 years prior. My idea came from an unlikely source—former senator Tom Daschle, who in his 2008 book “Critical” described how lawmakers went through a “Health Care University” of policy seminars in 1993. In trying to replicate those seminars for both members and staff, I hoped we could obtain some of the collective wisdom of the past that I knew I lacked.

As I had previously noted in November, most of the senior Republican health-care staff working on Capitol Hill during the Obamacare debate in 2009-10 have moved on to other posts. But they, and others like them, are not far removed from the process. Based on my experience, most would gladly offer technical guidance and expertise; in many cases, even the lobbyists would do so with “client hats” removed, in the hopes of arriving at the best possible product.

But reaching out in such a manner requires a deliberative and inclusive process; games of legislative hide-and-seek and talk of “binary choices” preclude the received wisdom of all but the select few participating in the policy-making.

4. Be Honest

The House Ways and Means Committee’s section-by-section summary of AHCA illustrates the dilemma lawmakers faced. Page three of the document, discussing verification of eligibility for the new tax credit, states that “the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to create a system—building upon already developed systems—to deliver the credit.”

There’s just one minor detail missing: The “already developed systems” for verifying eligibility Ways and Means referenced are Obamacare eligibility systems. This goes a long way toward explaining the omission: If the House is using an Obamacare eligibility system to deliver a refundable tax credit (also included in Obamacare), how much of the law is it really repealing?

Capitol Hill leadership could never reconcile the inherent contradictions in their product. On MSNBC, Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady (R-TX) called AHCA “the best opportunity to deliver on our promise to repeal the awful law of Obamacare”—eliding the fact that the bill explicitly retains and utilizes portions of that “awful law.” When pressed, leadership staff relied upon absurd, legalistically parsed statements, afraid to admit that the bill retained portions of Obamacare’s infrastructure.

These Clintonian definitions—“It depends upon what the meaning of the word ‘repeal’ is”—do nothing but build mistrust among members and staff alike. At least some in the policy community felt that House leaders were relying upon Elizabeth MacDonough, the Senate’s parliamentarian, as a de facto human shield—claiming the House couldn’t repeal portions of Obamacare under budget reconciliation, when in fact leadership wouldn’t, for policy or political reasons.

The fact that House leaders claimed their bill comported with reconciliation requirements, yet had to re-write major portions of AHCA at the last minute because it did not, gives added credence to this theory.

Whenever “repeal-and-replace” legislation comes back before Congress, the leaders and committees preparing the legislation should include a list of all the major provisions of Obamacare not repealed by the measure, along with clear reasons why. Even if some members want a more robust repeal than that offered, transparency would at least prevent the corrosive mistrust—“You’re not being up-front about this, so what other things are you hiding?”—that comes from an opaque process.

5. Be Humble

More than perhaps any bill in recent memory, AHCA represented a feat of legislative hubris. As a policy matter, Obamacare imposed a more sweeping scope on the nation’s health-care system. But the tactics used to “sell” AHCA—“We’re doing this now, and in this way. Get on board, or get out of the way”—were far more brutal, and resulted in a brutal outcome, an outcome easily predicted, but the one its authors did not intend.

There is a different approach, one I’ve seen on display. Some job interviews are thoroughly unremarkable, but two during my tenure on Capitol Hill stand out—the chief of staff who described himself as a “servant leader,” one who ensures all the members of the team have the tools they need to succeed; and the legislative director who told me, “We want to make sure you have a voice.” Of course I took both jobs, and felt myself privileged to work in such inclusive and empowering environments.

In some ways, the process that led to AHCA represents the antithesis of servant leadership, with members being given a virtual ultimatum to support legislation many neither liked nor understood. But in its purest form, public service should be just that—service—to one’s constituents, and, in the case of elected congressional leaders, to the members who chose them.

A more humble, inclusive, open, and transparent process will not guarantee success. The policy differences among the disparate Republican factions are real, and may not ultimately be bridgeable. But an opaque, authoritarian, and rushed process will almost certainly guarantee failure, as it did in the case of AHCA.

Listening Is Crucial

Ultimately, the failure to legislate on AHCA lay in a failure to listen to the policy concerns of Members, and to the warning signs present from the start. One can only hope that Republicans learn from this proverbial mule-kick, and start listening to each other more carefully and more closely. That process can yield the wisdom and judgment that comes from understanding, which can only help to heal the many breaches within the party following the events of recent weeks.

On November 8, Republicans received an important gift from voters—the chance to serve the country. Recovering from last week’s setback will require leaders of a humbled party to recommit themselves to service, both to the American people and to each other, in service of a common good. The chance to serve the American people is solely within the public’s gift. That gift, if and when squandered, will likely not be renewed for a long time.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.