Democrats’ Anti-Choice Agenda

In response to various abortion legislation enacted in Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, and other states, the left has called for a national day of protest on this Tuesday. The groups calling for the protest object to “Donald Trump’s anti-choice movement.”

The groups know of which they speak. The left wants to prohibit choice in medicine, by forcing doctors and health-care providers with religious objections to perform abortions. Multiple Democrat health-care bills would not only force taxpayers to fund abortions, they would commandeer doctors to perform abortions—not to mention other medical procedures that might violate their deeply held religious beliefs.

Existing Conscience Protections

The second conscience provision, the Church Amendment, exists in permanent federal law. It prohibits organizations from discriminating against individuals who refuse to participate in abortions or sterilizations. However, the Church Amendment’s provisions only apply to entities receiving grants or loans under certain statutes and programs:

  • The Public Health Service Act;
  • The Community Mental Health Centers Act;
  • The Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act; and
  • Contracts for biomedical or behavioral research under any HHS program.

The last three programs in particular represent a relatively small percentage of federal funding. And while the Public Health Service Act encompasses a broad set of programs, it does not contain nearly the amount of federal funding as larger entitlements like Medicare and Medicaid.

Single Payer Undermines Conscience Protections

Single-payer legislation in both the House (H.R. 1384) and Senate (S. 1129) would undermine conscience protections. These bills would create a new, automatic funding mechanism for the single-payer program.

Because the single-payer program would not get funded through the Labor-HHS appropriations bill, the Weldon Amendment conscience protections included in that measure would not apply to the program. For the same reason, the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on taxpayer funding of abortion, also included in the Labor-HHS spending bill, would also not apply.

In theory, the Church Amendment conscience protections would still apply. However, these protections only apply to the discrete federal programs listed above, and therefore may not apply in all cases. Moreover, if existing federal grant programs get subsumed into a new single-payer system—as the sponsors of the legislation would no doubt hope—then conscience protections might go away entirely.

Medicare for America: No Conscience Protections At All

Eliminating conscience protections would fit the rubric established by the Medicare for America bill (H.R. 2452). As I pointed out in the Wall Street Journal last week, the legislation belies its “moderate” label, as it would ban all private health care. On top of that, language on page 51 of the version of the bill introduced earlier this month makes clear that conscience protections do not apply to any medical professional, under any circumstance:

(3) HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS.—Health care providers may not be prohibited from participating in the Medicare for America [sic] for reasons other than their ability to provide covered services. Health care providers and institutions are prohibited from denying covered individuals access to covered benefits and services because of their religious objections. This subsection supercedes any provision of law that allows for conscience protection.

Even more than the Sanders bill, this language makes clear: Doctors have zero conscience protections under Medicare for America, whether about abortion or any other issue. To put it another way, medical professionals can practice their faith for one hour at church on Sunday, but if they wish to live their religious beliefs, they must join another profession.

Philosophical and Practical Concerns

Beyond the moral concerns outlined above, abolishing conscience protections could come with very severe unintended consequences. More than 600 Catholic hospitals (to say nothing of hospitals with other religious affiliations) serve more than one in seven U.S. patients.

Would passage of these bills force these religiously affiliated facilities to close, rather than have the facilities and the professionals within them violate their consciences? And if facilities close, or doctors leave the profession rather than performing procedures that violate their deeply held religious beliefs, who will pick up the slack? After all, our nation already faces looming physician shortages, and the promise of “free” care under a government-run system will only encourage more consumption of health services.

Liberals might want to keep the focus on the state initiatives in Alabama and elsewhere. But forcing people to violate their religious beliefs, and potentially chasing doctors and nurses out of the medical profession as a result, represents the truly radical policy.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Summary of Health Care “Consensus” Group Plan

Tuesday, a group of analysts including those at the Heritage Foundation released their outline for a way to pass health-care-related legislation in Congress. Readers can find the actual health plan here; a summary and analysis follow below.

What Does the Health Plan Include?

The plan includes parameters for a state-based block grant that would combine funds from Obamacare’s insurance subsidies and its Medicaid expansion into one pot of money. The plan would funnel the block grant funds through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), using that program’s pro-life protections. In general, states using the block grant would:

  • Spend at least half of the funds subsidizing private health coverage;
  • Spend at least half of the funds subsidizing low-income individuals (which can overlap with the first pot of funds);
  • Spend an unspecified percentage of their funds subsidizing high-risk patients with high health costs;
  • Allow anyone who qualifies for SCHIP or Medicaid to take the value of their benefits and use those funds to subsidize private coverage; and
  • Not face federal requirements regarding 1) essential health benefits; 2) the single risk pool; 3) medical loss ratios; and 4) the 3:1 age ratio (i.e., insurers can charge older customers only three times as much as younger customers).

Is That It?

Pretty much. For instance, the plan remains silent on whether to support an Obamacare “stability” (read: bailout) bill intended to 1) keep insurance markets intact during the transition to the block grant, and 2) attract the votes of moderate Republicans like Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski and Maine Sen. Susan Collins.

As recently as three weeks ago, former Sen. Rick Santorum was telling groups that the proposal would include the Collins “stability” language. However, as I previously noted, doing so would likely lead to taxpayer funding of abortion coverage, because there are few if any ways to attach pro-life protections to Obamacare’s cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers under the special budget reconciliation procedures the Senate would use to consider “repeal-and-replace” legislation.

What Parts of Obamacare Would the Plan Retain?

In short, most of them.

Taxes and Medicare Reductions: By retaining all of Obamacare’s spending, the plan would retain all of Obamacare’s tax increases—either that, or it would increase the deficit. Likewise, the plan says nothing about undoing Obamacare’s Medicare reductions. By retaining Obamacare’s spending levels, the plan would maintain the gimmick of double-counting, whereby the law’s payment reductions are used both to “save Medicare” and fund Obamacare.

Insurance Regulations: The Congressional Research Service lists 22 separate new federal requirements imposed on health insurance plans under Obamacare. The plan would retain at least 14 of them:

  1. Guaranteed issue of coverage—Section 2702 of the Public Health Service Act;
  2. Non-discrimination based on health status—Section 2705 of the Public Health Service Act;
  3. Extension of dependent coverage—Section 2714 of the Public Health Service Act;
  4. Prohibition of discrimination based on salary—Section 2716 of the Public Health Service Act (only applies to employer plans);
  5. Waiting period limitation—Section 2708 of the Public Health Service Act (only applies to employer plans);
  6. Guaranteed renewability—Section 2703 of the Public Health Service Act;
  7. Prohibition on rescissions—Section 2712 of the Public Health Service Act;
  8. Rate review—Section 2794 of the Public Health Service Act;
  9. Coverage of preventive health services without cost sharing—Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act;
  10. Coverage of pre-existing health conditions—Section 2703 of the Public Health Service Act;
  11. Summary of benefits and coverage—Section 2715 of the Public Health Service Act;
  12. Appeals process—Section 2719 of the Public Health Service Act;
  13. Patient protections—Section 2719A of the Public Health Service Act; and
  14. Non-discrimination regarding clinical trial participation—Section 2709 of the Public Health Service Act.

Are Parts of the Health Plan Unclear?

Yes. For instance, the plan says that “Obamacare requirements on essential health benefits” would not apply in states receiving block grant funds. However, Section 1302 of Obamacare—which codified the essential health benefits requirement—also included two other requirements, one capping annual cost-sharing (Section 1302(c)) and another imposing minimum actuarial value requirements (Section 1302(d)).

Additionally, the plan on two occasions says that “insurers could offer discounts to people who are continuously covered.” House Republicans offered a similar proposal in their American Health Care Act last year, one that imposed penalties on individuals failing to maintain continuous coverage.

However, the plan includes no specific proposal on how insurers could go about offering such discounts, as the plan states that the 3:1 age rating requirement—and presumably only that requirement—would not apply for states receiving block grant funds. It is unclear whether or how insurers would have the flexibility under the plan to offer discounts for continuous coverage if all of Obamacare’s restrictions on premium rating, save that for age, remain.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

24 New Federal Requirements Added to the Graham-Cassidy Bill

Last week, I outlined how a white paper Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) released essentially advocated for Obamacare on steroids. That plan would keep the law’s most expensive (and onerous) federal insurance requirements, while calling for more taxpayer dollars to make that expensive coverage more “affordable.”

Unfortunately, Cassidy also would extend this highly regulatory approach beyond mere white papers and into legislation. A recently disclosed copy of a revised Graham-Cassidy bill—originally developed by Cassidy and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) last fall—imposes two dozen new requirements on states. These requirements would undermine the bill’s supposed goal of “state flexibility,” and could lead to a regime more onerous and expensive than Obamacare itself.

18 New ‘Adequate and Affordable’ Coverage Rules

Specifically, that coverage must:

  • Include four categories of basic services defined in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) statute:
    • Inpatient and outpatient hospital services;
    • Physicians’ surgical and medical services;
    • Laboratory and X-ray services, and
    • Well-baby and well-child care, including age-appropriate immunizations;
  • Include three categories of additional services also defined in the SCHIP statute:
    • Coverage of prescription drugs;
    • Vision services; and
    • Hearing services;
  • Include two other categories of services as defined by Obamacare:
    • Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; and
    • Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices;
  • Comply with actuarial value standards set by the SCHIP statute:
    • Cover at least 70 percent of estimated health expenses for the average consumer; and
  • Comply with requirements included in eight separate sections of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by Obamacare:
    • Section 2701—Rating premiums only based on age (with older applicants charged no more than three times younger applicants), family size, geography, and tobacco use;
    • Section 2702—Required acceptance for every individual or employer who applies for coverage (i.e., guaranteed issue);
    • Section 2703—Guaranteed renewability of coverage;
    • Section 2704—Prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions;
    • Section 2705—Prohibition on discriminating against individuals based on health status;
    • Section 2708—Prohibition on excessive waiting periods;
    • Section 2711—Prohibition on annual or lifetime limits; and
    • Section 2713—Requiring first-dollar coverage of preventive services without cost-sharing (i.e., deductibles and co-payments).

As noted above, “adequate and affordable health insurance coverage” would include many of Obamacare’s insurance requirements, and in at least one way would exceed them. Whereas Section 1302(d) of Obamacare requires selling insurance with an actuarial value—that is, the percentage of medical expenses paid for the average individual—of at least 60 percent, the revised Graham-Cassidy would require “adequate and affordable” coverage with an actuarial value of at least 70 percent.

If asked, Graham and Cassidy might state that these requirements would only apply to a certain subset of the population. After all, the revised bill text indicates that each state “shall ensure access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage (as defined in clause (ii))”—the clause referring to the 18 separate requirements listed above—“for [high-risk individuals].” The bill lists the brackets in the original, which might indicate that Cassidy’s office intends to apply these 18 separate coverage requirements only to plans that high-risk persons purchase.

Thankfully, the new draft removes the “population adjustment factor” allowing CMS to rewrite the block grant formula unilaterally. But even as it took away CMS’ power to alter the funding formula, new language on page 15 of the revised draft allows CMS to cancel states’ block grant funds for “substantial noncompliance.” That provision, coupled with the revised bill’s lack of definition regarding “affordable” coverage and “high-risk individual” provides a future Democratic administration with two clear ways to hijack the block grant program.

For instance, a new administration could define “high-risk individual” so broadly that it would apply to virtually all Americans, subjecting them to the 18 costly coverage requirements. A new administration could also define “affordable” in such a manner—for instance, premiums may not exceed 5 percent of an individual’s income—that states would have to subsidize insurance with sizable amounts of state funds, in addition to the federal dollars included in the block grant. Any state failing to comply with these edicts could see its entire block grant yanked for “substantial noncompliance” with the bureaucratically imposed guidelines.

It seems paradoxical to assert that a bill can be both too prescriptive, imposing far too many requirements on states that undermine the supposed goal of “state flexibility,” and too vague, giving vast amounts of authority to federal bureaucrats. Yet somehow the section on “adequate and affordable health coverage” manages to do both.

Two New Required Uses of Block-Grant Funds

Supporters of the bill would argue that these supposed “guardrails” will prevent states from subsidizing Medicaid coverage, or creating some other government-run health program. But as I noted last week, Obamacare has its own “guardrails” regarding state waivers, which undermine any attempt to deregulate insurance markets.

By adding these new “guardrails,” Graham-Cassidy would essentially replicate Obamacare, albeit with slightly different policy objectives: “The Cassidy plan would give states the ‘flexibility’ to do what Bill Cassidy wants them to do, and only what Bill Cassidy wants them to do. That isn’t flexibility at all.”

Block Grant Reductions with Multiple Risk Pools

On Page 31, the bill includes new language requiring a reduction in block-grant funds, by a percentage not specified, for states electing to create multiple risk pools. Under current law, Section 1312(c) of Obamacare requires insurers to place all individual insurance market enrollees—whether they purchase coverage through the exchange or not—in a single risk pool.

If a state elects to choose multiple risk pools and uses a “substantial portion” of its block grant to subsidize insurance with an actuarial value of under 50 percent, then the state would see an unspecified reduction in its block grant. This language contains many of the flaws of the other provisions described above: It nowhere defines what comprises a “substantial portion” of the block grant, and penalizes states that may choose to create multiple risk pools and subsidize only catastrophic insurance coverage, thus belying Graham-Cassidy’s promise of “state flexibility.”

3 New Requirements for State Waivers

The revised Graham-Cassidy text moves and alters language regarding state waivers of Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements, and in so doing makes three substantive changes. (The original language started in the middle of page 143 of the bill; the new language begins on the top of page 42 of the revised bill.)

First, and perhaps most disturbingly, the revised bill requires the Department of Health and Human Services to waive Obamacare’s insurance requirements for a state only if “such state establishes an equivalent requirement applicable to such coverage in such state.” Taken literally, this provision could mean that states could “opt-out” of Obamacare’s federal requirements if and only if they enshrine those exact same requirements in state law—rendering any supposed “flexibility” under Graham-Cassidy completely nonexistent.

Graham and Cassidy may not have meant to craft language with such a literal interpretation. They may mean to say, for instance, that a state can waive out of Obamacare’s age-rating requirements (which prohibit insurers from charging older people more than three times what they charge younger people) if they establish a more permissive regime—for instance, five-to-one age rating—on the state level.

But taken literally, that’s not what the current bill text says. That vague language raises serious questions about the authors’ intent, and why they chose such unclear, and arguably sloppy, bill language.

Second, the section imposes two new requirements on states selecting multiple risk pools. As noted above, those states would have to comply with the 18 new requirements regarding “adequate and affordable” health coverage, and states creating multiple risk pools could see their block grant reduced as a result.

In addition, however, states must also guarantee that insurers offering coverage in one risk pool offer coverage in all of them. Moreover, premiums charged “by a health insurance issuer for the same health coverage offered in different risk pools in the state [may] not vary by more than 3 to 1.”

The first requirement echoes the Consumer Freedom Amendment offered by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) last year. That amendment allowed insurers to offer plans that did not comply with Obamacare’s requirements, so long as they continued to offer one Obamacare-compliant plan. The second requirement would effectively limit the extent to which insurers could charge individuals more on the basis of pre-existing conditions or health status.

Two Dozen (More) Reasons for State Concern

Both individually and collectively, these two dozen new requirements inserted into the most recent version of Graham-Cassidy present problems for conservatives. The myriad requirements would sharply limit the bill’s ability to deliver lower premiums to consumers—one major goal of “repeal-and-replace” legislation.

More broadly, though, the revised bill drifts further away from any semblance of conservative objectives. While Graham-Cassidy purports to provide more flexibility to states, the revised bill would instead ensnare them in numerous requirements that would impede any attempt at innovation.

Like the proverbial Lilliputians who attempted to tie down Gulliver, the new bill looks to rob states of their ability to manage their own insurance markets and lower premiums for residents, one federal requirement at a time.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

What You Need to Know about the Proposed Short-Term Plans Rule

On Tuesday morning, the Trump administration issued a proposed rule regarding short-term health insurance plans. The action represents the second prong of the Trump administration’s strategy, outlined in last October’s executive order, to offer regulatory relief to insurance markets. The Department of Labor acted on the first prong, issuing a proposed rule expanding access to association health plans, in January.

As I noted in October, the Obama administration issued a rule in October 2016 designed to limit short-term plans. The Public Health Service Act specifically exempts “short-term, limited-duration insurance” from the definition of “individual health insurance coverage,” exempting such plans from all of Obamacare’s new, federally imposed regulatory regime (though they are regulated by states).

The Trump Administration’s Proposal

The Trump administration’s proposed rule would revise the disclosure slightly (in part to reflect the repeal of Obamacare’s individual mandate, set to take effect in January 2019), and restore the prior definition of short-term coverage to “less than 12 months.”

The proposed rule also requests comment on the ways to facilitate streamlined renewal of short-term plans. As I noted in an article last year, limiting individuals’ ability to renew policies harmed people who develop illnesses while on short-term plans:

Jimmy Kimmel forgot to mention it, but prohibiting coverage renewals harms individuals with pre-existing conditions, because it forbids customers who develop a pre-existing condition while on short-term plans from continuing their coverage. In discouraging these short-term plans, the Obama administration preferred individuals going without coverage entirely over seeing anyone purchase a policy lacking the full panoply of ‘government-approved’ benefits.

The Trump administration can and should rescind this coercive rule and its perverse consequences immediately.

Effective Dates and Impact

The administration estimates that the proposed rule would lead only about 100,000-200,000 individuals to switch from individual coverage to short-term plans, only about 10 percent of whom would have qualified for Obamacare insurance subsidies on exchanges. The administration also estimates the rule would raise spending on premium subsidies by $96-168 million annually. Because the individuals shifting to short-term coverage would be younger and healthier than average, they would slightly increase premiums, and thus premium subsidies, on the insurance exchanges.

However, these comparatively modest estimates on both the coverage and cost fronts suggest that short-term plans may have less of an impact than conservatives had hoped—or liberals have feared. Time will tell if the predictions prove an over-estimate or under-estimate; perhaps more definitive actions to allow for the guaranteed renewal of short-term coverage will increase their popularity.

What Should Be the Next Steps?

Now that it has proposed this rule, the administration should take regulatory action on another front, by stopping a movement in Idaho to offer non-compliant health plans. Last month, the state’s insurance department offered guidance to insurers about new coverage offerings. The new plans could:

  • Impose limits on pre-existing conditions for individuals without continuous coverage;
  • Limit benefits provided to $1 million annually;
  • Not offer maternity care in all cases (although each carrier must sell one plan with maternity coverage); and
  • Charge older individuals up to five times as much as younger individuals when calculating premium rates.

But the Idaho guidance hints at one big problem. It instructs insurers selling the plans in question to disclose to consumers that “This policy is not fully compliant with federal health insurance requirements.”

Therefore, as a matter of law, I cannot support the Idaho effort, not because I support or want to sustain Obamacare—I don’t—but because I support and want to sustain the rule of law, which is more important than any single piece of legislation. Unfortunately in this instance, federal law supersedes state law, which means the federal law must prevail.

I wrote in January 2017 that the Trump administration had an obligation to enforce the individual mandate. Likewise here, the administration has an obligation to enforce the Obamacare statute, and either redirect Idaho’s efforts to bring them into compliance with the law—perhaps through a Section 1332 innovation waiver, although that waiver may not bring the state sufficient flexibility—or quash them. The administration has a constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and it should not follow the Obama administration’s example of picking and choosing which laws it wishes to enforce.

Better yet, Congress can and should repeal the regulations that represent the beating heart of Obamacare. They have a roadmap to do so, even with a slim Senate majority. Such action would allow Idaho, and 49 other states, to innovate to their heart’s content to provide more affordable coverage to their residents—an outcome consistent with the rule of law, and federalism, that conservatives could embrace whole-heartedly.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

What You Need to Know about Cost-Sharing Reductions

A PDF version of this document is available via the Texas Public Policy Foundation.

On October 12, the Trump Administration announced it would immediately terminate a series of cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers. Meanwhile policy-makers have spent time debating and discussing cost-sharing payments in the context of a “stabilization” bill for the Obamacare Exchanges. Here’s what you need to know about the issue ahead of this year’s open enrollment period, scheduled to begin on November 1.

What are cost-sharing reductions?

Cost-sharing reductions, authorized by Section 1402 of Obamacare, provide individuals with reduced co-payments, deductibles, and out-of-pocket maximum expenses.[1] The reductions apply to households who purchase Exchange coverage and have family income of between 100% and 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL, $24,600 for a family of four in 2017). The system of cost-sharing reductions remains separate from the subsidies used to discount monthly insurance premiums, authorized by Section 1401 of Obamacare.[2]

What are cost-sharing reduction payments?

The payments (also referred to as CSRs) reimburse insurers for the cost of providing the discounted policies to low-income individuals. According to the January Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline, those payments will total $7 billion in the fiscal year that ended on September 30, $10 billion in the fiscal year ending this coming September 30, and $135 billion during fiscal years 2018-2027.[3]

What is the rationale for CSR payments?

Insurers argue that CSR payments reimburse them for discounts that the Obamacare statute requires them to provide to consumers. However, some conservatives would argue that the cost-sharing reduction regime might not be necessary but for the myriad new regulations imposed by Obamacare. These regulations have more than doubled insurance premiums from 2013 through 2017, squeezing middle-class families.[4] Some conservatives would therefore question providing government-funded subsidies to insurers partially to offset the cost of government-imposed mandates on insurers and individuals alike.

Why are the CSR payments in dispute?

While Section 1402 of Obamacare authorized reimbursement payments to insurers for their cost-sharing reduction costs, the text of the law did not include an explicit appropriation for them. Some conservatives have argued that the Obama Administration’s willingness to make the payments, despite the lack of an explicit appropriation, violated Congress’ constitutional “power of the purse.” In deciding to terminate the CSR payments, the Trump Administration agreed with this rationale.

What previously transpired in the court case over CSR payments?

In November 2014, the House of Representatives filed suit in federal court over the CSR payments, claiming the Obama Administration violated both existing law and the Constitution, and seeking an injunction blocking the Administration from making the payments unless and until Congress grants an explicit appropriation.[5] In September 2015, Judge Rosemary Collyer of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the House of Representatives had standing to sue, rejecting a Justice Department attempt to have the case dismissed. Judge Collyer ruled that the House as an institution had the right to redress for a potential violation of its constitutional “power of the purse.”[6]

On May 12, 2016, Judge Collyer issued her ruling on the case’s merits, concluding that no valid appropriation for the CSR payments exists, and that the Obama Administration had violated the Constitution by making payments to insurers. She ordered the payments halted unless and until Congress passed a specific appropriation—but stayed that ruling pending an appeal.[7]

How did the Obama Administration justify making the CSR payments?

In its court filings in the lawsuit, the Obama Administration argued that the structure of Obamacare implied an appropriation for CSR payments through the Treasury appropriation for premium subsidy payments—an appropriation clearly made in the law and not in dispute.[8] President Obama’s Justice Department made this argument despite the fact that CSR and premium subsidy regimes occur in separate sections of the law (Sections 1402 and 1401 of Obamacare, respectively), amend different underlying statutes (the Public Health Service Act and the Internal Revenue Code), and fall within the jurisdiction of two separate Cabinet Departments (Health and Human Services and Treasury).

The Obama Administration also argued, in court and before Congress, that it could make an appropriation because Congress had not prohibited the Administration from doing so—effectively turning the Constitution on its head, by saying the executive can spend funds however it likes unless and until Congress prohibits it from doing so.[9] In her ruling, Judge Collyer rejected those and other arguments advanced by the Obama Justice Department.

Did Congress investigate the history, legality, and constitutionality of the Obama Administration’s CSR payments to insurers?

Yes. Last year, the Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce Committees organized and released a 158-page report on the CSR payments.[10] While congressional investigators received some documents relating to the Obama Administration’s defense of the CSR payments, the report described an overall pattern of secrecy surrounding critical details—portions of documents, attendees at meetings, etc.—of the CSR issue. For instance, the Obama Administration did not fully comply with valid subpoenae issued by the committees, and attempted to prohibit Treasury appointees who volunteered to testify before committee staff from doing so. However, despite the extensive oversight work put in by two congressional committees, and the pattern of secrecy observed, neither of the committees have taken action to compel compliance, or redress the Obama Administration’s obstruction of Congress’ legitimate oversight work.

What has the Trump Administration done about the CSR payment lawsuit?

After the election, the Justice Department and the House of Representatives filed a motion with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.[11] The parties stated that they were in negotiations to settle the lawsuit, and sought to postpone proceedings in the appeal (which the Obama Administration had filed last year). The Justice Department and the House have filed several extensions of that request with the court, but have yet to present a settlement agreement, or provide any substantive updates surrounding the issues in dispute. In announcing its decision to terminate the CSR payments, the Trump Administration said it would provide the court with a further update on October 30.

In August, the Court of Appeals granted a motion by several Democratic state attorneys general seeking to intervene in the suit (originally called House v. Burwell, and renamed House v. Price when Dr. Tom Price became Secretary of Health and Human Services).[12] The attorneys general claimed that the President’s frequent threats to settle the case, and cut off CSR payments, meant their states’ interests would not be represented during the litigation, and sought to intervene to prevent the House and the Trump Administration from settling the case amongst themselves—which could leave an injunction permanently in place blocking future CSR payments.

Upon what basis did President Trump stop the CSR payments to insurers?

Under existing law, court precedent, and constitutional principles, a determination by the executive about whether or not to make the CSR payments (or any other payment) depends solely upon whether or not a valid appropriation exists:

  • If a valid appropriation does not exist, the executive cannot disburse funds. The Anti-Deficiency Act prescribes criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for any executive branch employee who spends funds not appropriated by Congress, consistent with Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”[13]
  • If a valid appropriation exists, the executive cannot withhold funds. The Supreme Court held unanimously in Train v. City of New York that the executive cannot unilaterally impound (i.e., refuse to spend) funds appropriated by Congress, which would violate a President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”[14]

Has a court forced President Trump to keep making the CSR payments?

No. In fact, until the Administration had announced its decision late Thursday, no one—from insurers to insurance commissioners to governors to Democratic attorneys general to liberal activists and Obamacare advocates—had filed suit seeking to force the Trump Administration to make the payments. (While the Democratic attorneys general sought, and received, permission to intervene in the House’s lawsuit, that case features the separate question of whether or not the House had standing to bring its matter to court in the first place. It is possible that appellate courts could, unlike Judge Collyer, dismiss the House’s case on standing grounds without proceeding to the merits of whether or not a valid appropriation exists.)

Given the crystal-clear nature of existing Supreme Court case law—if a valid appropriation exists, an Administration must make the payments—some would view the prolonged unwillingness by Obamacare supporters to enforce this case law in court as tacit evidence that a valid appropriation does not exist, and that the Obama Administration exceeded its constitutional authority in starting the flow of payments.

How will the decision to stop CSR payments affect individuals in Exchange plans?

In the short- to medium-term, it will not. Insurers must provide the cost-sharing reductions to individuals in qualified Exchange plans, regardless of whether or not they get reimbursed for them.

Can insurers drop out of the Exchanges immediately due to the lack of CSR payments?

No—at least not in most cases in 2017. The contract between the federal government and insurers on the federal Exchange for 2017 notes that insurers developed their products based on the assumption that cost-sharing reductions “will be available to qualifying enrollees,” and can withdraw from the Exchanges if they are not.[15] However, under the statute, enrollees will always qualify for the cost-sharing reductions—that is not in dispute. The House v. Burwell case instead involves whether or not insurers will receive federal reimbursements for providing the cost-sharing reductions to enrollees. This clause may therefore have limited applicability to withdrawal of CSR payments. It appears insurers have little ability to withdraw from Exchanges in 2017, even if the Trump Administration stops reimbursing insurers.

If insurers faced a potential unfunded obligation—providing cost-sharing reductions without federal reimbursement—to the tune of billions of dollars, how did they react to Judge Collyer’s ruling last year?

Based on their public filings and statements, several did not appear to react at all. While Aetna and Centene referenced loss of CSR payments as impacting their firms’ outlooks and risk profiles in their first Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quarterly filings after Judge Collyer’s ruling, most other companies ignored the potential impact until earlier this year.[16] Some carriers have given decidedly mixed messages on the issue—for instance, as Anthem CEO Joseph Swedish claimed on his company’s April 26 earnings call that lack of CSR payments would cause Anthem to seek significant price hikes and/or drop out of state Exchanges,[17] his company’s quarterly SEC filing that same day indicated no change in material risks, and no reference to the potential disappearance of CSR payments.[18]

Even before Judge Collyer’s ruling in May 2016, one could have easily envisioned a scenario whereby a new President in January 2017 stopped defending the CSR lawsuit, and immediately halted the federal CSR payments: “Come January 2017, the policy landscape for insurers could look far different” than in mid-2016.[19] However, despite public warnings to said effect—and the apparent lack of public statements by either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton to continue the CSR payments should they win the presidency—insurers apparently assumed maintenance of the status quo, disregarding these potential risks when bidding to offer Exchange coverage in 2017.

Did insurance regulators fail to anticipate or plan for changes to CSR payments following Judge Collyer’s ruling?

It appears that many did. For instance, the office of California’s state insurance commissioner reported having no documents—not even a single e-mail—analyzing the impact of Judge Collyer’s May 2016 ruling on insurers’ bids for the 2017 plan year.[20] Likewise, California’s health insurance Exchange disclosed only two relevant documents: A brief e-mail sent months after the state finalized plan rates for the 2017 year, and a more detailed legal analysis of the issues surrounding CSR payments—but one not undertaken until mid-November, after Donald Trump won the presidential election.[21]

Some conservatives may be concerned that insurance commissioners’ failure to examine the CSR payment issue in detail—when coupled with insurers’ similar actions—represents the same failed thinking that caused the financial crisis. That herd behavior—an insurer business model founded upon a new Administration continuing unconstitutional actions, and regulators blindly echoing insurers’ assumptions—represents the same “too big to fail” mentality that brought us a subprime mortgage scandal, a massive financial crash on Wall Street, a period of prolonged economic stagnation, and a taxpayer-funded bailout of big banks.

How can Congress restore its Article I power?

With respect to the CSR payments, conservatives looking to restore its Article I power—as Speaker Ryan recently claimed he wanted to do by maintaining the debt limit as the prerogative of Congress—could take several appropriate actions:[22]

  • Insist on a settlement of the lawsuit in the House’s favor, consistent with the last Congress’ belief that 1) Obamacare lacks a valid appropriation for CSR payments and 2) decisions regarding appropriations always rest with Congress, and not the executive;
  • Ask the Justice Department to investigate whether any Obama Administration officials violated the Anti-Deficiency Act by making CSR payments without a valid congressional appropriation; and
  • Insist on enforcement of the subpoenae issued by the House Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce Committees during the last Congress, and pursue contempt of Congress charges against any individuals who fail to comply.

How can Congress exercise its oversight power regarding the CSR payments?

Before even debating whether or not to create a valid appropriation for the CSR payments, Congress should first examine in great detail whether and why insurers and insurance commissioners ignored the issue in 2016 (and prior years); any potential changes to remedy an apparent lack of oversight by insurance commissioners; and appropriate accountability for any unconstitutional and illegal actions as outlined above.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, by blindly making a CSR appropriation without conducting this critically important oversight, Congress would make a clear statement that Obamacare is “too big to fail.” Such a scenario—in addition to creating a de facto single-payer health care system—would, by establishing a government backstop for insurers’ risky behaviors, bring about additional, and potentially even larger, bailouts in the future.

What are the implications of providing CSR payments to insurers?

Given the way in which many insurers and insurance regulators blindly assumed cost-sharing reduction payments would continue, despite the lack of an express appropriation in the law, some conservatives may be concerned that making CSR payments would exacerbate moral hazard. Specifically, when filing their rates for the 2017 plan year, insurers appear to have assumed they would receive over $7 billion in CSR payments—despite the uncertainty surrounding 1) the lack of a clear CSR appropriation in the statute; 2) the May 2016 court ruling calling the payments unconstitutional; 3) the unknown outcome of the 2016 presidential election; and 4) the apparent lack of a firm public commitment by either major candidate in the 2016 election to continue the CSR payments upon taking office in January 2017.

Some conservatives may therefore oppose rewarding this type of reckless behavior by granting them the explicit taxpayer subsidies they seek, for fear that it would only encourage additional irresponsible risk-taking by insurance companies—and raise the likelihood of an even larger taxpayer-funded bailout in the future.

How can Congress solve the larger issue of CSRs creating an unfunded mandate on insurance companies absent an explicit appropriation?

One possible way would involve elimination of Obamacare’s myriad insurance regulations, which have led to insurance premiums more than doubling in the individual market over the past four years.[23] Repealing these new and costly regulations would lower insurance premiums, reducing the need for cost-sharing reductions, and allowing Congress to consider whether to eliminate the CSR regime altogether.


[1] 42 U.S.C. 18071, as created by Section 1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148.
[2] 26 U.S.C. 36B, as created by Section 1401 of PPACA.
[3] Congressional Budget Office, January 2017 baseline for coverage provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51298-2017-01-healthinsurance.pdf, Table 2.
[4] Department of Health and Human Services Office of Planning and Evaluation, “Individual Market Premium Changes: 2013-2017,” ASPE Data Point May 23, 2017, https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/256751/IndividualMarketPremiumChanges.pdf.
[5] The House’s original complaint, filed November 21, 2014, can be found at https://jonathanturley.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/house-v-burwell-d-d-c-complaint-filed.pdf.
[6] Judge Collyer’s ruling on motions to dismiss, dated September 9, 2015, can be found at https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2014cv01967/169149/41.
[8] Links to the filings at the District Court level can be found at https://dockets.justia.com/docket/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2014cv01967/169149.
[9] Testimony of Mark Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, before the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee hearing on “Cost Sharing Reduction Investigation and the Executive Branch’s Constitutional Violations,” July 7, 2016, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/hearing-cost-sharing-reduction-investigation-executive-branchs-constitutional-violations/.
[10] House Energy and Commerce and House Ways and Means Committees, “Joint Congressional Investigative Report into the Source of Funding for the ACA’s Cost Sharing Reduction Program,” July 7, 2016, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20160707Joint_Congressional_Investigative_Report-2.pdf
[13] The statutory prohibition on executive branch employees occurs at 31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 1350 provides that any employee knowingly and willfully violating such provision “shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”
[14] Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
[15] Qualified Health Plan Agreement between issuers and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services for 2017 plan year, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/Plan-Year-2017-QHP-Issuer-Agreement.pdf, V.b, “Termination,” p. 6.
[16] Aetna Inc., Form 10-Q Securities and Exchange Commission filing for the second quarter of calendar year 2016, http://services.corporate-ir.net/SEC/Document.Service?id=P3VybD1hSFIwY0RvdkwyRndhUzUwWlc1cmQybDZZWEprTG1OdmJTOWtiM2R1Ykc5aFpDNXdhSEEvWVdOMGFXOXVQVkJFUmlacGNHRm5aVDB4TVRBMk5qa3hOQ1p6ZFdKemFXUTlOVGM9JnR5cGU9MiZmbj1BZXRuYUluYy5wZGY=
p. 44; Centene, Inc., Form 10-Q Securities and Exchange Commission filing for the second quarter of calendar year 2016, https://centene.gcs-web.com/static-files/23fd1935-32de-47a8-bc03-cbc2c4d59ea6, p. 42.
[17] Transcript of Anthem, Inc. quarterly earnings call for the first quarter of calendar year 2017, April 26, 2017, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjY3NTM5fENoaWxkSUQ9Mzc1Mzg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1, p. 5.
[19] Chris Jacobs, “What if the Next President Cuts Off Obamacare Subsidies to Insurers?” Wall Street Journal May 5, 2016, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/05/05/what-if-the-next-president-cuts-off-obamacare-subsidies/.
[20] Chris Jacobs, “Don’t Blame Trump When Obamacare Rates Jump,” Wall Street Journal June 16, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-blame-trump-when-obamacare-rates-jump-1497571813.
[21] Covered California response to Public Records Act request, August 25, 2017.
[22] Burgess Everett and Josh Dawsey, “Trump Suggested Scrapping Future Debt Ceiling Votes to Congressional Leaders,” Politico September 7, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/07/trump-end-debt-ceiling-votes-242429.
[23] HHS, “Individual Market Premium Changes: 2013-2017.”

Alexander-Murray Bill Funds Insurers’ Abortion Coverage

Amidst the rumored press reports about what the supposed “insurer stabilization bill” negotiated between Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee Chairman Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and Ranking Member Patty Murray (D-WA) may contain, one Twitter commenter made an astute observation: Unless the agreement contained explicit language forbidding it—language Murray likely would not endorse—the agreement will appropriate approximately $25-30 billion to subsidize insurance plans that cover abortion.

Follow the Money

Here’s some background regarding federal restrictions on abortion funding. The Hyde Amendment, named for former Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), prohibits federal funding of abortion, except in the cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother.

However, this restriction, first enacted in 1976 and renewed every year thereafter, only applies to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appropriations bill to which it is attached annually. If funding flows outside the HHS appropriations measure, those funds would not be subject to the Hyde restrictions, and could therefore subsidize abortion coverage.

Obamacare contained just such funds—for instance, the premium tax credits used to subsidize plans on insurance exchanges. While Obamacare includes a “segregation mechanism” designed to separate the portion of premium payments used to cover abortion, pro-life groups have recognized this mechanism as an accounting gimmick—one the Obama administration didn’t even bother to enforce.

Is Hyde Language Added?

When extending the community health center funding as part of a larger Medicare bill in spring 2015, Republican leaders recognized the lack of pro-life protections, and insisted on adding them to extend the mandatory health center funding. As a result, Section 221(c) of the bill (page 68 here) said that the same requirements that applied to other Public Health Service Act funding provisions—that is, the Hyde Amendment funding restrictions—would also apply to the community health center funding.

However, if Alexander does not explicitly add the Hyde Amendment protections to the “stabilization bill,” the cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers will be used to fund plans that cover abortion. There is little reason to believe Murray would endorse such a restriction. If the Hyde Amendment restrictions apply to the cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers, then in order to receive said payments, it is likely insurers would have to stop offering abortion coverage on exchanges—an outcome Murray, and Democrats, would not wish to countenance.

Massive Funding Amounts

The “stabilization bill” would likely seek to provide massive funding amounts to insurers—roughly $3 to $4 billion for the rest of this calendar year, and $10 to $11 billion for each of years 2018 and 2019, based on Congressional Budget Office spending estimates. These significant sums would surely represent the second-largest expansion of federal abortion funding, behind only Obamacare itself.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Budget Sequestration’s Impact on Obamacare Subsidies

A PDF of this Issue Brief is available on the Heritage Foundation website.

Many Americans could face a rude awakening when they discover that the subsidies they thought they were getting to offset their health care costs are less than what they were promised. Some claim that the Obamacare subsidies are exempt from the spending reductions established by the Budget Control Act (BCA), but that is only half right.[1]

The BCA exempts only the premium subsidies, not the cost-sharing subsidies, from upcoming cuts. Regrettably, the Obama Administration has not taken steps to inform the American people of this fact as they navigate coverage options in the government exchanges.

The Sequester’s Impact on Obamacare Subsidies

Obamacare provides two forms of subsidies:

  1. Premium subsidy. Section 1401 provides that individuals with incomes under 400 percent of the federal poverty level ($94,200 for a family of four) who do not have access to “affordable” employer-based coverage and meet other relevant criteria are eligible to receive refundable tax credits for coverage purchased in the exchanges.
  2. Cost-sharing subsidy. Section 1402 provides cost-sharing subsidies to reduce maximum out-of-pocket expenses for households with incomes below four times the federal poverty level. Other language in Section 1402 directs cost-sharing subsidies to increase the actuarial value—the average amount of expected health expenses paid by insurance—for households with incomes below 250 percent of the poverty level.

The BCA exempted the premium subsidies from sequestration—not explicitly but by definition. The sequester mechanism in the BCA was largely based on formulae developed by the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act of 1985, which exempts refundable tax credits under the Internal Revenue Code from any federal sequestration.[2] Because Obamacare structured the premium subsidies as refundable tax credits, they remain exempt from the BCA sequestration.

However, with regard to sequestration’s spending reductions, the cost-sharing subsidies under Section 1402 of Obamacare are distinct from the premium subsidies under Section 1401 of the law in at least two significant ways:

  1. The language authorizing Obamacare cost-sharing subsidies is included as part of the Public Health Service Act (Title 42 of the U.S. Code). The sequester exemption for refundable tax credits requires that they be “made pursuant to provisions of Title 26” of the Internal Revenue Code.[3]
  2. Obamacare specifically requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “make periodic and timely payments to the issuer” of the insurance policy reflecting the increased cost-sharing. The sequester exemption in Gramm–Rudman–Hollings for refundable tax credits provides that only “payments to individuals,” not to insurance companies, are exempt from sequester reductions.[4]

For these reasons, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has concluded that the cost-sharing subsidies under Section 1402 of Obamacare “appear to be fully sequestrable” under the BCA.[5]

Administration Confirms Cuts but Has No Plan

The Administration has likewise agreed that the cost-sharing subsidies are subject to sequestration spending reductions. An Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report issued in May 2013 categorized the cost-sharing subsidies as mandatory spending subject to sequestration.[6]

The report further estimated that a 7.2 percent cut in these subsidies, as required by sequestration, would reduce spending by $286 million in fiscal year 2014—a period that covers the first nine months of Obamacare’s coverage expansions, from January through September 2014.[7]

However, the Administration has not been similarly forthcoming about how the 7.2 percent spending reductions will be applied. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Administrator Marilyn Tavenner acknowledged that CMS had not communicated to officials who are operating exchanges, both federal and state, how this sequestration will be applied to the cost-sharing subsidies. However, she pledged to do so “before open enrollment, which starts on October 1, 2013.”[8] To date, no guidance has been released by either CMS or OMB.

Limited Options

It is impossible to predict how CMS intends to implement the required sequestration reductions. In the absence of clear guidance from the Administration about the impact of sequestration, one can envision two possible scenarios.

Scenario 1: Consumers Pay. Under this scenario, the individuals eligible for cost-sharing subsidies would face higher cost-sharing. Eligible individuals would face some combination of higher co-payments, higher deductibles, higher co-insurance, or the loss of some benefits to make up for the reduced cost-sharing subsidies.

The structure and requirements of sequestration place a high emphasis on regulatory guidance from CMS. The sequestration law requires that spending reductions “shall apply to all programs, projects, and activities within a budget account.”[9] But it remains unclear how the Administration will implement this requirement. For instance, CMS could decide to reduce all eligible individuals’ cost-sharing subsidies by an equal 7.2 percent. Alternatively, the Administration could try to implement the reductions on a sliding-scale basis so that households with lower incomes face a smaller-scale reduction.

However, because the Administration has not issued any form of guidance, the cost-sharing information currently published on the exchanges does not accurately reflect the impact of sequestration on the cost-sharing subsidies.[10] Thus, for those few individuals who have actually enrolled in subsidized health insurance on exchanges, their co-payments and cost-sharing may increase next year. Accurate information cannot exist until CMS publicly states how it intends to implement the required sequestration reductions.

Scenario 2: Insurers Pay. A second possible scenario would see insurers being forced to absorb the costs of the sequester reductions in cost-sharing subsidies themselves. CRS, examining Obamacare’s statutory requirements on insurers to provide cost-sharing reductions, considered this scenario a likely outcome:

The impact of sequestration is unclear. [Obamacare] entitles certain low-income exchange enrollees to coverage with reduced cost-sharing and requires the participating insurers to provide that coverage. Sequestration does not change that requirement. Insurers presumably will still have to provide required coverage to qualifying enrollees but they will not receive the full subsidy to cover their increased costs.[11]

This scenario would see insurers absorbing $286 million in losses in the law’s first nine months alone—losses that would grow over time. Citing estimates from the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation, CRS noted that the federal government is scheduled to spend $149 billion on cost-sharing subsidies between 2014 and 2023.[12] Given that sequestration is scheduled to remain in place through 2021, the reductions in cost-sharing subsidies under current law would likely total several billion dollars at a minimum.

The scale of the numbers at issue raises questions about whether and under what circumstances insurance companies would actually continue to offer exchange coverage, knowing they would be guaranteed to incur losses if they do so.

More Than a “Glitch”

While Obamacare’s defenders are fond of claiming that “glitches” are the only thing holding back the law’s implementation, the Administration’s failure to confront the impact of BCA cuts signed into law two years ago is no mere “glitch.” Either individuals who endure an arduous process to sign up for insurance on balky exchanges will face a “bait-and-switch,” with cost-sharing levels higher than advertised, or insurers will face the prospect of billions of dollars in losses. Neither option is acceptable.

The Administration that promised to be the “most transparent and accountable” in history has neglected to inform the American people about the impact of sequestration on its prized accomplishment.

 



[1]See, for instance, Ezra Klein, “Democrats Should Surrender on Taxes,” Bloomberg, October 16, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-16/democrats-should-surrender-on-taxes.html (accessed October 24, 2013).

[2]2 U.S. Code 905(d).

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]C. Stephen Redhead, “Budget Control Act: Potential Impact of Sequestration on Health Reform Spending,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 31, 2013, Table 4, p. 22, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42051.pdf (accessed October 24, 2013).

[6]Office of Management and Budget, Revised Sequestration Preview Report for Fiscal Year 2014, May 20, 2013, p. 23, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/fy14_preview_and_joint_committee_reductions_reports_05202013.pdf, (accessed October 24, 2013).

[7]Ibid.

[8]Marilyn Tavenner, “PPACA Pulse Check,” testimony before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, August 1, 2013, http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/ppaca-pulse-check (accessed October 24, 2013).

[9]2 U.S. Code 906(k)(2).

[10]Tavenner, “PPACA Pulse Check.”

[11]Redhead, “Budget Control Act,” p. 15.

[12]Ibid., Table 4, p. 23.

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 6983, Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act

Order of Business:  The bill is scheduled to be considered on Tuesday, September 23, under a motion to suspend the rules and pass.

Summary:  H.R. 6983 would amend the Internal Revenue Code, the Public Health Service Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to require equity in the provision of mental health disorder benefits for group health insurance plans that offer both mental health benefits and medical and surgical benefits.  Previously, the Mental Health Parity Act—first enacted in 1996, and extended in subsequent legislation—required only that plans choosing to offer both mental health and medical and surgical benefits must have equal annual and lifetime limits on coverage for both types of treatments.  Specific details of the federal mandates in the bill include the following:

Treatment Limits and Beneficiary Financial Requirements:  The bill would require group health plans to offer a financial benefit structure for mental and substance abuse disorders that is no more restrictive than the predominant requirements applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits.  The federal mandate would apply to overall coverage limits on treatment (e.g. number of days or visits) as well as deductibles, out-of-pocket limits, and similar beneficiary financial requirements.

Expansion of Definition:  The bill would expand the definition of “mental health benefits” subject to the federal mandate to include substance abuse and disorder treatments.

Medical Necessity:  The bill would permit plans to make coverage decisions for mental health and substance abuse disorders based on medical necessity criteria, but would require employers and insurers to disclose such criteria pursuant to regulations.

Out-of-Network Benefits:  The bill would mandate plans that offer out-of-network insurance coverage for medical and surgical benefits provide out-of-network coverage for mental health benefits in a manner consistent with the financial requirements listed above.

Increased Cost Exemption:  The bill would raise the level at which employers whose health insurance costs rise as a result of implementing mental health parity in benefits may claim an exemption from the federal mandate.  The bill would exempt employers whose costs due to mental health claims rise by more than 2% in the first year of implementation, and by more than 1% in subsequent years.  The more limited version of the Mental Health Parity Act first enacted in 1996 exempted employers whose claim costs rose 1%.  Employers with fewer than 50 workers would be exempt from federal mandates under the legislation, consistent with current law.

GAO Study:  The bill would require a study by the Government Accountability Office evaluating the law’s impact on the cost of health insurance coverage, access to mental health care, and related issues.

Worldwide Interest Allocation:  H.R. 6983 would delay by two years (from 2011 to 2013) the implementation of the worldwide allocation of interest, and reduces the first-year implementation of this rule.  In 2004, Congress gave taxpayers the option of using a liberalized rule for allocating interest expense between United States sources and foreign sources for the purposes of determining a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation.  This is a multi-billion-dollar tax increase on Americans, taking particular aim at people who have financial dealings abroad.

Additional Background—Differences from Earlier Legislation:  On March 5, 2008, the House by a 268-148 vote passed mental health parity legislation in the form of H.R. 1424.  Subsequent negotiations with the Senate made modifications to the House-passed language that incorporated several key provisions in bipartisan Senate legislation (S. 558), and removed some provisions objectionable to conservatives.  Specifically, the compromise language in H.R. 6983:

  • Retains ERISA pre-emption for the large employers (those with more than 50 employees) subject to the law—states would not have the option of enacting more stringent and conflicting laws and regulations, as was proposed in H.R. 1424;
  • Remains silent on codifying classes of mental disorders—the compromise language removes provisions included in H.R. 1424 requiring group health plans to offer coverage for all disorders under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, including psycho-sexual disorders many conservatives find objectionable;
  • Does not mandate an out-of-network coverage benefit—plans must offer out-of-network coverage for mental disorders only to the extent they do so for medical and surgical benefits; and
  • Includes language stating that mental health parity provisions do not affect the “terms and conditions” of insurance contracts to the extent they do not conflict with the bill language—permitting employers and carriers to continue making medical necessity and related determinations—while requiring plans to make information on these medical management practices transparent.

While some conservatives may still have concerns with the mandates imposed by mental health parity legislation and the way in which these mandates would increase health insurance premiums, some segments of the business community have embraced the compromise as a reasonable attempt to achieve the goal of both bills without eroding ERISA pre-emption or imposing undue restrictions on benefit plan design.

Additional Background on Benefit Mandates:  Since the 1960s, state legislatures have considered—and adopted—legislation requiring health insurance products sold within the state to cover various products and services.  These benefit mandates are frequently adopted at the behest of disease groups advocating for coverage of particular treatments (e.g. mammograms) or physician groups concerned that patients have access to specialists’ services (e.g. optometrists).

A recent survey by the Council for Affordable Health Insurance found that as of 2007, states had enacted a total of 1,961 mandates for benefits and services—an increase of 60 (more than one per state) when compared to the 2006 total.[1]  The number of state mandates varies from a low of 15 in Idaho to a high of 64 in Minnesota.  However, because employer-sponsored health insurance is pre-empted from state-based laws and regulations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), benefit mandates do not apply to employers who self-fund their health insurance plans—one reason why H.R. 6983 seeks to impose those mandates on group plans (as well as state-regulated individual plans) on the federal level.

The cost and impact of benefit mandates on health insurance premiums have been the subject of several studies in recent years.  For instance, the Heritage Foundation prepared an analysis suggesting that each individual benefit mandate could raise the cost of health insurance premiums by $0.75 monthly.[2]  Although the cost of a single mandate appears small, the aggregate impact—particularly given the recent growth of benefit mandates nationwide—can be significant: For instance, Massachusetts’ 43 benefit mandates would raise the cost of health insurance by more than $30 monthly under the Heritage analysis.

Although well-intentioned, some conservatives may view the groups who advocate for benefit mandates as operating from fundamentally flawed logic: that individuals should go without health insurance entirely rather than purchase coverage lacking the “consumer protection” of dozens of mandates.  In addition, some conservatives note that the prospect of increasing the number of uninsured due to rising premium costs resulting from benefit mandates may precipitate a “crisis” surrounding the uninsured, increasing calls for a government-run health system.  In short, many conservatives may believe individuals should have the “consumer protection” to purchase the insurance plan they desire—rather than the “protection” from being a consumer by a government which seeks to define their options, and raise the cost of health insurance in the process.

Committee Action:  None; the bill was introduced on September 22, 2008.

Possible Conservative Concerns:  Several aspects of H.R. 6983 may raise concerns for conservatives, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

  • Process.  Multiple sources and press reports indicate that numerous stakeholders involved in negotiating the bipartisan Senate compromise have concerns with the House’s consideration of stand-alone mental health parity legislation—as opposed to its inclusion in the tax extenders package.  As recently as Monday, September 22, House Democrat leadership indicated they would not attempt to pass the mental health parity provisions separately; however, the majority later switched course.  Some conservatives may be concerned by reports indicating that this separate House vote is intended to provide “political cover” for Blue Dogs who may oppose the tax extenders bill (with mental health parity included) because it does not include enough tax increases to offset extensions of existing tax relief.
  • Tax Increase.  In order to pay for the nearly $4 billion cost of mental health parity, H.R. 6983 would delay by a further two years a provision allowing taxpayers flexibility in allocating worldwide interest for the purposes of determining a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation.  Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision increases taxes on Americans in order to pay for H.R. 6983’s benefit mandates.
  • Increase Health Insurance Costs and Number of Uninsured.  As noted above, benefit mandates generally have the effect of increasing the cost of health insurance.  Moreover, some estimates suggest that every 1% increase in premium costs has a corresponding increase in the number of uninsured by approximately 200,000-300,000 individuals nationwide.[3]  Therefore, some conservatives may be concerned that H.R. 6983 will actually increase the number of uninsured Americans.
  • Private-Sector Mandates on Businesses; UMRA Violation.  As detailed above, the bill contains multiple new federal mandates on the private sector, affecting the design and structure of health insurance plans.  CBO has previously estimated that mental health parity would impose mandates on the private sector totaling $1.3 billion in 2008, rising to $3 billion in 2012, thus exceeding the annual threshold established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act or UMRA ($131 million in FY2007, adjusted annually for inflation).  These costs will ultimately be borne by employers offering health insurance and employees seeking to obtain coverage.

Administration Position:  Although the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) was not available, the Administration has previously supported the goal of mental health parity—and previously opposed the worldwide interest allocation provision used to pay for H.R. 6983.

Cost to Taxpayers:  A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score of H.R. 6983 was not available at press time.  However, CBO estimates of previously considered (H.R. 1424) mental health parity legislation noted that the bill would cost the federal government nearly $4 billion over ten years.  Direct federal outlays would increase by $820 million through increased Medicaid costs.  In addition, federal revenues would decline by more than $3.1 billion due to increases in the cost of health insurance, as employees with group coverage would exclude more of their income from payroll and income taxes.

The bill proposes to offset the costs outlined above by delaying by two years (from 2011 to 2013) the implementation of the worldwide allocation of interest, and reducing the first-year implementation of this rule. In 2004, Congress gave taxpayers, beginning in tax years after 2008, the option of using a liberalized rule for allocating interest expense between United States sources and foreign sources for the purposes of determining a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?:  Yes, the bill would impose new federal mandates with respect to health insurance coverage requirements.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?:  Yes, the bill would impose significant new mandates on private insurance carriers (and large employers who self-insure their workers) with respect to the structure and design of their benefit packages.  CBO has previously estimated that the direct costs of the private-sector mandates would total $1.3 billion in 2008, rising to $3 billion in 2012, significantly in excess of the annual threshold ($131 million in 2007, adjusted for inflation) established by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).

In addition, the bill would also impose an intergovernmental mandate as defined by UMRA by pre-empting some state laws in conflict with the bill, but CBO estimates that this mandate would impose no significant costs on state, local, or tribal governments.

However, costs to state, local, and tribal governments would increase under the bill, for two reasons.  First, a prior CBO cost estimate indicated that state spending for Medicaid would increase by $235 million between 2008-2012.  Second, while state, local, and tribal governments that self-insure their workers would be able to opt-out of H.R. 6983’s federal mandates, some governments that fully insure their workers (i.e. purchase coverage through an insurance carrier, as opposed to paying benefits directly) would see their costs rise under the legislation.  CBO has estimated that the bill would increase state, local, and tribal expenditures by $10 million in 2008, rising to $155 million by 2012.  However, because these increased costs result from mandate costs initially borne by the private sector and passed on to the governments while purchasing insurance, CBO did not consider them intergovernmental mandates as such.

Does the Bill Comply with House Rules Regarding Earmarks/Limited Tax Benefits/Limited Tariff Benefits?:  A Committee report citing compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI was unavailable.

Constitutional Authority:  A Committee report citing Constitutional authority was unavailable.

 

[1] Council for Affordable Health Insurance, “Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2008” and “Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2007,” available online at http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/HealthInsuranceMandates2008.pdf and http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatesInTheStates2007.pdf, respectively (accessed July 19, 2008).

[2] Michael New, “The Effect of State Regulations on Health Insurance Premiums: A Revised Analysis,” (Washington, Heritage Center for Data Analysis Paper CDA06-04, July 25, 2006), available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/upload/CDA_06-04.pdf (accessed July 19, 2008), p. 5.

[3] See, for instance, Todd Gilmer and Richard Kronick, “It’s the Premiums, Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured through 2013,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive April 5, 2008, available online at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.143/DC1 (accessed July 19, 2008), and Government Accountability Office, Impact of Premium Increases on Number of Covered Individuals is Uncertain (Washington, Report GAO/HEHS-98-203R, June 11, 1999), available online at http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/160930.pdf (accessed July 19, 2008), pp. 3-4.

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 758, Breast Cancer Patient Protection Act

Order of Business:  The bill is scheduled to be considered on Tuesday, September 23, 2008, under a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill.

Summary:   H.R. 758 would amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code to require group and individual health plans to meet certain minimum coverage requirements with respect to breast cancer surgeries.  Specifically, the bill would:

  • Require plans to have coverage for inpatient and radiation therapy with respect to breast cancer treatment;
  • Require plans to cover 48-hour hospital stays in the case of mastectomy or lumpectomy procedures, and 24-hour hospital stays in the case of lymph node dissections to treat breast cancer;
  • Prohibit plans from requiring pre-authorization for hospital stays within the time limits prescribed above;
  • Require plans to cover secondary consultations with specialists regarding the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, including cases with a negative initial diagnosis.  If no specialist is available within the plan’s network, the plan would be required to pay for out-of-network coverage, with any co-payments or co-insurance charged to the beneficiary limited to in-network levels. (NOTE: This mandate would apply to all cancer diagnoses, not just those related to breast cancer, as the bill’s title implies); and
  • Prohibit plans from offering financial inducements to providers or patients in an attempt to subvert the federal mandates imposed above.

In addition, H.R. 758 contains language regarding the rescission of insurance plans purchased in the individual market.  The bill would amend the Public Health Service Act to prohibit plans from rescinding policies except in the case of “intentional concealment of material facts regarding a health condition related to the condition for which coverage is being claimed.”  The bill also provides for a process of independent external review prior to the rescission or discontinuation of the insurance plan.

Additional Background:  Since the 1960s, state legislatures have considered—and adopted—legislation requiring health insurance products sold within the state to cover various products and services.  These benefit mandates are frequently adopted at the behest of disease groups advocating for coverage of particular treatments (e.g. mammograms) or physician groups concerned that patients have access to specialists’ services (e.g. optometrists).

A recent survey by the Council for Affordable Health Insurance found that as of 2007, states had enacted a total of 1,961 mandates for benefits and services—an increase of 60 (more than one per state) when compared to the 2006 total.[1]  The number of state mandates varies from a low of 15 in Idaho to a high of 64 in Minnesota.  However, because employer-sponsored health insurance is pre-empted from state-based laws and regulations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), benefit mandates do not apply to employers who self-fund their health insurance plans—one reason why H.R. 758 seeks to impose those mandates on group plans (as well as state-regulated individual plans) on the federal level.

The cost and impact of benefit mandates on health insurance premiums have been the subject of several studies in recent years.  For instance, the Heritage Foundation prepared an analysis suggesting that each individual benefit mandate could raise the cost of health insurance premiums by $0.75 monthly.[2]  Although the cost of a single mandate appears small, the aggregate impact—particularly given the recent growth of benefit mandates nationwide—can be significant: For instance, Massachusetts’ 43 benefit mandates would raise the cost of health insurance by more than $30 monthly under the Heritage analysis.

Although well-intentioned, some conservatives may view the groups who advocate for benefit mandates as operating from fundamentally flawed logic: that individuals should go without health insurance entirely rather than purchase coverage lacking the “consumer protection” of dozens of mandates.  In addition, some conservatives note that the prospect of increasing the number of uninsured due to rising premium costs resulting from benefit mandates may precipitate a “crisis” surrounding the uninsured, increasing calls for a government-run health system.  In short, many conservatives may believe individuals should have the “consumer protection” to purchase the insurance plan they desire—rather than the “protection” from being a consumer by a government which seeks to define their options, and raise the cost of health insurance in the process.

Committee Action:  H.R. 758 was introduced on January 31, 2007, and referred to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Education and Labor.  On September 17, 2008, the Committee on Energy and Commerce ordered the bill, as amended, reported by voice vote.

Cost to Taxpayers:  A CBO score for H.R. 758 was unavailable at press time.  However, the Congressional Budget Office has previously scored a mental health parity benefit mandate as costing nearly $4 billion over ten years.

Conservative Concerns:  Some conservatives may have concerns with H.R. 758, including but not limited to:

  • Increase Health Insurance Costs and Number of Uninsured.  As noted above, benefit mandates generally have the effect of increasing the cost of health insurance.  Moreover, some estimates suggest that every 1% increase in premium costs has a corresponding increase in the number of uninsured by approximately 200,000-300,000 individuals nationwide.[3]  Therefore, some conservatives may be concerned that H.R. 758 will actually increase the number of uninsured Americans.
  • Unfunded Private-Sector Mandates on Small and Large Businesses.  As detailed above, the bill contains multiple new federal mandates on the private sector, affecting the design and structure of health insurance plans.  Among other mandates, the bill would require plans to cover out-of-network specialist consultations for all types of cancer, even if the initial consultation resulted in a negative diagnosis.
  • Undermines Federalism; Democrat Hypocrisy.  In addition to imposing mandates on group health insurance plans generally regulated at the federal level under ERISA, H.R. 758 would also impose these same mandates on individual health insurance plans, which under the McCarran-Ferguson Act are regulated at the state level.  Some conservatives may be concerned by this attempt to undermine state authority and micro-manage health insurance plans.  In addition, some conservatives may note that Democrats who previously cited “state consumer protections” as one reason to oppose efforts to purchase health insurance across state lines now apparently find even these “protections” insufficient, and wish to impose additional layers of federal regulation on individual insurance plans.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?  Yes, the bill would create new federal insurance mandates related to cancer coverage and treatment.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?  Yes, the bill would require employers to comply with several new federal mandates related to cancer coverage and treatment.

Does the Bill Comply with House Rules Regarding Earmarks/Limited Tax Benefits/Limited Tariff Benefits?:  A Committee report citing compliance with Clause 9 of Rule XXI regarding earmarks was unavailable.

Constitutional Authority:  A Committee report citing constitutional authority was unavailable.

 

[1] Council for Affordable Health Insurance, “Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2008” and “Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2007,” available online at http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/HealthInsuranceMandates2008.pdf and http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatesInTheStates2007.pdf, respectively (accessed July 19, 2008).

[2] Michael New, “The Effect of State Regulations on Health Insurance Premiums: A Revised Analysis,” (Washington, Heritage Center for Data Analysis Paper CDA06-04, July 25, 2006), available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/upload/CDA_06-04.pdf (accessed July 19, 2008), p. 5.

[3] See, for instance, Todd Gilmer and Richard Kronick, “It’s the Premiums, Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured through 2013,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive April 5, 2008, available online at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.143/DC1 (accessed July 19, 2008), and Government Accountability Office, Impact of Premium Increases on Number of Covered Individuals is Uncertain (Washington, Report GAO/HEHS-98-203R, June 11, 1999), available online at http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/160930.pdf (accessed July 19, 2008), pp. 3-4.

Legislative Bulletin: Senate Amendments to H.R. 493, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act

Order of Business:  The Senate amendments to the bill are reportedly scheduled to be considered on Thursday, May 1, 2008, subject to a closed rule that provides for one hour of general debate on the Senate amendments and waives all points of order against the amendments (except those arising under PAYGO).

Summary:   H.R. 493 would prohibit the use of genetic information by employers in employment decisions and by health insurers and health plans in making enrollment determinations and setting insurance premiums.  The specific provisions of the bill as amended by the Senate are summarized below.

  • Amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage in connection with a group health plan, from the following:
    • Adjusting premium or contribution amounts for the group covered under the plan on the basis of genetic information;
    • Requiring an individual or a family member to undergo a genetic test;
    • Requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information for underwriting purposes; and
    • Requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information with respect to any individual prior to that individual’s enrollment under the plan or coverage in connection with their enrollment.

The bill allows for certain research exceptions to the above prohibitions.

  • Defines an individual or a family member for purposes of this Act as:
    • The fetus inside of a pregnant mother; and
    • Any embryo legally held by the individual or family member (with respect to assisted reproductive technology).
  • Defines genetic test as: “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”  The definition does not include the following:
    • “An analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes; or
    • “An analysis of proteins or metabolites that is directly related to a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that could reasonably be detected by a health care professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine involved.”
  • Imposes a penalty against any plan sponsor or group health plan for failure to meet requirements with respect to genetic information in connection with their health plan.  The penalty would be $100 each day in noncompliance with respect to each participant to whom such failure relates.  Under certain circumstances, the penalty could not be less than $15,000 per participant.  In addition, the Secretary could waive the penalty under certain circumstances.
  • Prohibits a health insurance issuer in the individual market from doing the following:
    • Establishing rules for the eligibility of any individual to enroll in individual health insurance coverage based on genetic information;
    • Adjusting premium or contribution amounts for an individual on the basis of genetic information concerning the individual or a family member;
    • Imposing any preexisting condition exclusion based on the basis of genetic information, with respect to their coverage;
    • Requesting or requiring an individual or family member to undergo a genetic test;
    • Requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information for underwriting purposes; and
    • Collecting genetic information with respect to any individual prior to the individual’s enrollment under the plan.
  • Prohibits an issuer of a Medicare supplemental policy from the following:
    • Denying or conditioning the issuance of a policy and from discriminating in the pricing of the policy of an individual on the basis of genetic information;
    • Requesting or requiring individuals to undergo genetic tests; and
    • Requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information during underwriting.
  • Directs the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to modify its NAIC model regulations to mirror the above prohibitions required by this Act.
  • Directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to revise the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) private regulations to be consistent with provisions in this Act, affecting the use of genetic information.
  • Prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from the following:
    • Refusing to hire an employee or discriminating against an employee because of genetic information related to that individual;
    • Limiting, segregating or classifying employees in any way that would deprive or adversely affect the status of the employee due to their genetic information; and
    • Requiring or purchasing genetic information, except in certain circumstances.
  • Requires employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to maintain any genetic information about employees or members as confidential, subject to certain exceptions.
  • Provides for remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against employers who engage in discriminatory employment practices with respect to their employees’ genetic information.

Additional Background on Senate Amendments:  On March 4, 2008, 11 Senators, led by Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), sent a letter to Majority Leader Reid and Senate HELP Committee Chairman Kennedy outlining remaining conservative concerns regarding passage of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA).  A summary of those concerns, along with the ways in which the compromise language addressed the issues raised in the March 4 letter, follows below.

  • Title I imposes requirements on health plans regarding insurance coverage, while Title II imposes requirements on employers regarding employment and related hiring decisions.  Earlier drafts of the bill did not include language clarifying that group health insurance plan sponsors may not be subjected to the more expansive remedies provided by Title II, which provides for rulemaking by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and remedies before the same body and, ultimately, federal courts.  This “firewall” provision was incorporated into the Senate agreement, which should ensure that the broader remedies available in Title II will be used only against employers who violate their employees’ civil rights, not for employees seeking to litigate group health plan disputes.
  • The Senate agreement maintained language in the original House-passed bill ensuring that entities covered under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy regulations can continue to communicate medical and genetic information consistent with the HIPAA statute without facing a separate and potentially conflicting regulatory regime under GINA.
  • The Senate agreement also includes clear language excluding “manifested” diseases from GINA’s provisions.  In general, health plans can receive information about whether an individual has a manifested disease, and these facts can be used during the underwriting process for individual and small group coverage in some states.  By maintaining current law clarity, the agreement’s language would maintain long-established underwriting processes for already-occurring health conditions—while providing protections for genetic information for diseases not yet manifest in patients.
  • Lastly, as a result of efforts by the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus, the Senate agreement maintained language in the House-passed bill extending GINA protections to any fetus carried by pregnant women or any embryos held by individuals or family members.  Maintaining this language ensures that families will not have an economic incentive to abort their unborn children, fearing that they could be discriminated against due to results from prenatal testing.  Groups such as Family Research Council and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops have endorsed the compromise Senate language for this reason. 

To the extent that concerns still remain regarding the GINA language, they revolve primarily around the strength of the “firewall” language, and the lack of a general-purpose “business necessity” exemption for companies that may find a legitimate need to utilize genetic information for a reason not expressly authorized within the statute.  Some business groups also question whether and to what extent genetic non-discrimination legislation is necessary, particularly as insurers are currently prohibited from such discrimination.  Nevertheless, the significant progress made on the concerns outlined by Sen. Coburn and his colleagues outweighed any lingering concerns, leading the Senate to approve the bill by a 95-0 vote.

Legislative History:  H.R. 493 was introduced on January 16, 2007, and referred to the House Committees on Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means.  The Education and Labor Committee held a mark-up and reported the bill, as amended, by voice vote on February 14, 2007.  The Energy and Commerce Committee held a mark-up and reported the bill, as amended, on March 23, 2007.  The Ways and Means Committee held a mark-up and reported the bill, as amended, by voice vote on March 21, 2007.  The bill was passed on April 25, 2007, by a vote of 420-3.  On April 24, 2008, the Senate passed the bill with an amendment by a 95-0 vote.

Cost to Taxpayers:  According to CBO, enacting H.R. 493 “would increase the number of individuals who obtain health insurance by about 600 people per year, nearly all of whom would obtain insurance in the individual market.  The bill would affect federal revenues because the premiums paid by some of those newly insured individuals would be tax-deductible.” As such, CBO estimates that the bill would reduce revenues by less than $500,000 in each year from 2008 through 2017, by $1 million over the 2008-2012 period, and by $2 million over the 2008 through 2017 period.

In addition, CBO states that “the bill’s requirements would apply to Medicare supplemental insurance, which would affect direct spending for Medicare.”  However, CBO estimates that the bill would have no significant effect on direct spending.  Finally, CBO estimates that H.R. 493 would result in discretionary costs of less than $500,000 in FY 2008, and $2 million over the FY 2008 through FY 2017 period.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?:  Yes, the bill grants authority to the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury to promulgate regulations and engage in enforcement activities with respect to the Title I provisions relating to health insurance coverage.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?:   Yes.  According to CBO, the bill would “preempt some state laws that establish confidentiality standards for genetic information, and would restrict how state and local governments use such information in employment practices and in the provision of health care to employees.”  In addition, CBO explains that the bill “contains private-sector mandates on health insurers, health plans, employers, labor unions, and other organizations.”  In both cases, however, CBO does not believe that the cost of the mandates would exceed thresholds established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ($66 million and $131 million in 2007, respectively, adjusted for inflation).