Waiver Wrap-Up

Two quick hits on the state waiver program proposed by the President yesterday, followed by a summary of stories in major dailies this morning regarding the announcement:

Medicaid Exempt from Waiver Program?  Administration officials claimed yesterday that the waiver program would “allow…states to move some of their Medicaid-eligible populations into the exchange.”  However, the text of the state waiver program does not appear to address Medicaid at all.  Section 1332(a)(2) of the law (page 98) lists the statutory requirements that the Secretary can waive under the innovation program:

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The requirements described in this paragraph with respect to health insurance coverage within the State for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, are as follows:

(A) Part I of subtitle D. [Essential health benefits package – but ONLY IF the coverage to be provided is “at least as comprehensive” as the essential benefits package propounded by the Secretary in rulemaking]

(B) Part II of subtitle D. [Requirements for Exchanges]

(C) Section 1402. [Cost-sharing subsidies in Exchanges]

(D) Sections 36B [Exchange subsidies], 4980H [Employer mandate], and 5000A [Individual mandate] of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

In other words, there is NOTHING in the waiver program that would allow states to opt-out of the new Medicaid mandate created in Section 2001 of the bill, release states from the unfunded mandates created by same, or allow low-income individuals to receive coverage other than that provided by Medicaid.  To be sure, it is possible that other sections of the law could be used to allow states to enroll their low-income Medicaid beneficiaries in Exchange coverage.  But given that the waiver section of the statute explicitly excludes the Medicaid mandate as a requirement from which states can receive an exemption, it appears implausible for the Administration to claim that the waiver program would grant states ANY flexibility in managing their Medicaid populations. (It’s also worth why asking Democrats’ health care law was drafted so that low-income Medicaid beneficiaries can’t participate in the state-based approaches under the innovation waiver program.)

Double-Standards on Block Grants?  Section 1332(a)(3) of the statute provides states participating in the waiver program the opportunity to receive a “pass through” of funding – in other words, states can receive the aggregate amount of insurance subsidies their eligible populations would have received had they been enrolled in Exchanges, and devote that funding to other coverage expansions.  For this reason the New York Times called the waiver concept a “block grant.”  But yet coming out of yesterday’s White House meeting, Administration officials “douse[d] cold water on the idea” of a block grant for Medicaid.

Likewise, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) last week published a paper criticizing a proposed Medicaid block grant as saying it would provide “inadequate federal funding” of Medicaid, because federal spending on the program would only be allowed to grow at the rate of economic (i.e., GDP) growth plus one percent.  Yet Section 3403 (page 413) of the health care law creates the EXACT SAME growth level for Medicare – GDP plus one percent.

All this raises obvious questions:

  • Why does the Administration support a block grant for Exchange subsidies but not for Medicaid?
  • Why does CBPP believe a GDP plus one percent growth level will provide “inadequate federal funding” for Medicaid but not Medicare?
  • Do these positions have something to do with the fact that Republican governors are the ones arguing for a Medicaid block grant?
  • Or is this inflexibility – to say nothing of potential hypocrisy – on Medicaid based on the belief that governors should not be allowed to innovate without meeting top-down, Washington-imposed standards?


Summary of Reactions to the President’s Waiver Proposal

Associated Press:  “[The President’s proposal] would be no change to the fundamental requirements of a federal law that has divided the nation and prompted about half the states to try to overturn it through lawsuits….‘I was disappointed,’ said Texas Gov. Rick Perry, chairman of the Republican Governors Association.  ‘Pretty much all he did was reset the clock on what many of us consider a ticking time bomb’ that could ‘crush our budgets’….The closer Republicans look at the details, the less flexibility they will see, said economist Douglas Holtz-Eakin, leading domestic policy adviser to 2008 GOP presidential candidate John McCain.  ‘If you can’t control eligibility or the benefits package, it’s like saying: “Here’s the bill, you go figure out how to pay for it,”’ he said….For his part, Obama showed no give on the law’s core elements. He said was convinced the law would cut costs, end insurance industry abuses and ‘cover everybody.’”

New York Times:  “Political calculations, as much as policy ones, were at work in the President’s announcement….While some Republican governors praised Mr. Obama for reaching out, they said the move did not address their underlying discomfort with the law or the major structural flaws facing state budgets….Many [Democrats] are convinced that it is not possible to expand health care coverage and achieve deficit reductions without the federal mandate….At the same time, the mandate, and the health care law more generally, is sure to be an issue in the President’s 2012 re-election campaign, which may be a reason he is offering the proposal now.  ‘It’s to his advantage to show that he wants to be more moderate on this…because the mandate is terribly unpopular politically and he doesn’t want to be saddled with that going into the next election.’”

Washington Post: “President Obama sought to defuse criticism of the new health care overhaul Monday by saying he is willing to give states an earlier opportunity to opt out of certain key requirements – but only if they can find their own ways to accomplish the law’s goals….Governors’ more immediate focus was on the potentially crushing burden of rising Medicaid costs….New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie said that on the question of Medicaid flexibility, the President ‘said some very nice things and he says them really nicely.’  But, he added, ‘I didn’t hear any real substance’ that would suggest the governors will get what they want….[Former HHS Secretary] Mike Leavitt…called Obama’s announcement ‘sort of a hollow victory,’ [claiming that] Obama was essentially telling states, ‘“We’ll give you permission to ask for permission sooner rather than later.”  What Republicans are saying is that we don’t want to have to ask for permission at all, because we can’t afford to build the system that you’ve laid out for us.’”

Wall Street Journal:  “Few states are expected to seek the health-law waivers, and the move did little to appease elected Republicans, who are overwhelmingly opposed to the law.  ‘That doesn’t help us any,’ said South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley, a Republican.  ‘They’d do us a favor if they let us opt out’ of the entire law….Vermont Gov. Peter Shumlin, a Democrat, said the change would make it easier for his state to develop a ‘single-payer’ plan, under which the state would be the central funder of health care.”

Secretary Leavitt Op-Ed on Medicare Reform

In case you hadn’t seen it, wanted to pass on this excellent op-ed by former HHS Secretary Leavitt in this morning’s Washington Post outlining why the Medicare trustees report presented an illusion of reform to that troubled entitlement program.  The article does a good job explaining the double-counting and unsustainable/unrealistic savings projections that underpin Democrats’ assertions regarding Medicare’s solvency, and then makes the trenchant observation that “the Medicare bureaucracy, even with the Independent Payment Advisory Board attached to it, does not have the capacity to engineer a more efficient health delivery system through complicated payment regulations.”

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 1256, Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

Order of Business: H.R. 1256 is being considered under a structured rule making in order certain amendments.  The legislation was introduced by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) on March 3, 2009, and was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, which on March 4, 2009, reported the bill by a 39-13 vote.

Under new PAYGO rules in the 111th Congress, savings from prior bills passed by the House may count towards meeting PAYGO requirements.  Because the Congressional Budget Office projects a $955 million revenue loss over ten years associated with H.R. 1256’s provisions regulating tobacco due to a 2% reduction in adult smoking after ten years, the majority intends to pass H.R. 1804 under suspension of the rules to offset this lost tax revenue prior to the consideration of H.R. 1256.  The rule for consideration of H.R. 1256 provides that, at the time of engrossment, the Clerk will add the text of H.R. 1804 to the end of H.R. 1256, in order to meet PAYGO.

Summary: H.R. 1256 would grant the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products—financed through a tax on tobacco companies—and increase federal regulation of tobacco advertising and marketing.  Highlights of the legislation include the following:

FDA Authority:  The bill grants the federal government authority to regulate tobacco products through a new Center for Tobacco Products created as part of the FDA; however, the bill limits FDA’s authority to the manufacture of tobacco products, as opposed to the growth of tobacco itself.  Some Members may be concerned by the implications of giving an agency charged with approving the safety of food and drugs the authority to regulate an inherently unsafe product, echoing the concerns of then-FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach, who in a statement to the Energy and Commerce Committee in 2007 stated that regulating tobacco products would dramatically alter the FDA’s mission, and not for the better: “Associating any agency whose mission is to promote public health with the approval of inherently dangerous products would undermine its mission and likely have perverse incentive effects.”

Some Members may also note the statements from many Congressional Democrats that the salmonella and other crises demonstrate that the FDA is not undertaking its current mission effectively, and question whether now is the appropriate time to be burdening the FDA with imposing a sizable new regulatory regime.  In addition, some Members may be concerned that the bill’s provisions expressly retaining the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to regulate the sale of tobacco products may result in duplicate and/or conflicting regulatory regimes at the federal level.

The bill contains definitions related to tobacco products.  Under the bill, an “adulterated” tobacco product consists of materials “injurious to health.”  Using this definition, some Members may question how the FDA will be able to distinguish adulterated from un-adulterated tobacco products, given that tobacco is inherently injurious to human health.

Labeling and Branding Disclosure:  H.R. 1256 places numerous restrictions on tobacco products to prevent their “misbranding.”  Under the bill language, tobacco products will be considered misbranded if (among other things) “any word, statement, or other information required…to appear on the label…is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness…as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual” or if the label excludes “a full description of the components of such tobacco product or the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such tobacco product.”  The bill also grants the FDA the authority to require prior approval of statements on tobacco labels.  Despite language in the bill prohibiting tobacco companies from making such claims, some Members may be concerned that members of the public may construe FDA regulation of tobacco products as the federal government’s “approval” of a product now deemed safe, when in reality tobacco products are inherently unhealthy.

H.R. 1256 requires tobacco manufacturers to disclose to FDA “a listing of all ingredients…substances, compounds, and additives that are…added by the manufacturer,” as well as “any or all documents (including underlying scientific information) relating to research activities, and research findings, conducted, supported, or possessed by the manufacturer” regarding tobacco products, their health risks (including any adverse events), and tobacco marketing.  The bill also requires FDA to compile publicly searchable databases of additives and potentially harmful components with respect to each brand of tobacco product.

Registration and Inspection:  The bill requires tobacco manufacturers to register their establishments with FDA and provides for inspections every two years to each registered establishment—including those located overseas.

Scope of Regulations:  The bill grants FDA the authority to impose restrictions “on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product” where the agency “determines that such regulation would be appropriate for the protection of the public health,” and also permits restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion.  Specifically, the bill requires FDA to promulgate regulations regarding remote (i.e. not face-to-face) sales of tobacco products, and regarding good manufacturing standards “to ensure the public health is protected.”

Product Standards; Menthol Loophole:  The bill prohibits most flavor additives in tobacco products following enactment, and gives the FDA the authority to adopt additional standards for tobacco products through a notice-and-comment process.  However, the bill expressly prohibits FDA from banning whole classes of tobacco products, or “requiring the reduction of nicotine yields of a tobacco product to zero…because of the importance” of such decision.

As noted above, the bill prohibits most tobacco flavor additives but expressly excludes menthol as the only “FDA approved” additive permitted to remain in tobacco products.  Some Members may echo the concerns of then-Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, who last year pointed out that this provision—by prohibiting the sale of clove and other flavored cigarettes manufactured overseas, while permitting the continued sale of menthol cigarettes manufactured in the United States—could violate international trade commitments, potentially sparking trade disputes and retaliatory action during a recession.

Studies confirm that African-Americans and other racial minorities comprise a disproportionate number of menthol smokers; Centers for Disease Control data indicate that 75% of African-American smokers use menthol cigarettes.  Some Members may also note that seven former Health and Human Services Secretaries wrote to Congress to criticize a menthol “loophole” that “caves to the financial interests of tobacco companies” by “send[ing] a message that African-American youngsters are valued less than white youngsters.”

Notification and Recalls:  The bill grants the FDA authority to make public notifications about tobacco products—through public service announcements and other means—if FDA believes the product “presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health,” and further grants FDA authority to recall defective tobacco products, subject to an informal hearing.

Pre-Approval of New Products:  The bill requires any new tobacco products introduced after February 15, 2007, or any substantially modifications of existing tobacco products, to complete a pre-approval process prior to their commercial introduction, and also grants FDA the authority to withdraw and/or suspend a prior issued approval of such new products on the basis of new information or non-compliance with the regulatory regime put in place by the bill.  H.R. 1256 also prohibits FDA to approve any new products if “there is a lack of a showing that permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.”

Modified Risk Products:  H.R. 1256 prohibits the sale of “modified risk” tobacco products—defined as those advertised as “less harmful than…other commercially marketed tobacco products,” including those labeled as “light” or “mild”—unless where expressly approved by the FDA.  The bill permits the commercial sale of modified risk products only where the FDA finds said products will “significantly reduce harm…to individual tobacco users; and benefit the health of the population as a whole.”  In cases where long-term epidemiological studies have yet to be conducted on modified risk products, the bill permits the FDA to grant authority to approve the products’ sale for a fixed but renewable term of up to five years, provided certain other requirements are met.  Some Members may be concerned that these burdensome restrictions—which effectively prohibit modified risk products unless expressly approved by federal authorities—may hinder the introduction and development of tobacco products that could reduce (but not eliminate) the adverse health consequences associated with tobacco consumption.

The bill also imposes additional marketing restrictions on modified risk products approved for sale, specifically regarding the quantitative comparisons of reduced levels of substances, and requires post-market surveillance of modified risk products—which relate to the FDA’s requirement to revoke approval in cases where additional research finds that the statements of modified risk no longer apply.

State and Local Authority; “Indian Country” Loophole:  The bill provides limited federal pre-emption of state and local laws with respect to product standards, labeling and branding, federal registration, and modified risk products; however, state and local governments retain authority in all other areas regarding “the sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to, advertising and promotion of or use of” tobacco products.

The bill requires FDA to contract with the states to carry out inspection of retailers to enforce its provisions.  However, the bill prohibits FDA from having its state contractors carry out inspections on Indian country lands “without the express written consent of the Indian tribe involved.”

Other Provisions:  The bill establishes a Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to evaluate technical evidence and make recommendations with respect to tobacco products and their effects.  The bill also contains provisions designed to accelerate the regulatory approval of certain smoking cessation and nicotine replacement products, and includes delays of up to five years in regulatory compliance and testing requirements for small tobacco product manufacturers (defined as those employing fewer than 350 employees).

“User Fees”:  H.R. 1256 imposes “user fees” on tobacco companies to finance the new Center for Tobacco Products within FDA.  Fees would total nearly $5.4 billion over ten years: $235 million in Fiscal Year 2010, rising to $712 million in Fiscal 2019 and all subsequent years.  Fees would be assessed to classes of tobacco products (i.e. cigarettes, cigars, etc.), and to individual companies within each class, in the same percentages applied to tobacco buyout legislation previously passed by Congress (P.L. 108-357) in October 2004.

Some Members may consider this “user fee” a tax on the tobacco industry, which manufacturers will pass on to their customers.  Some Members may also be concerned that tobacco taxes are among the most regressive forms of taxation, and that raising tobacco taxes still higher—on top of the 62-cent per-pack increase in taxes used to finance children’s health insurance legislation (P.L. 111-3)—will place additional burdens on working families during a recession.

Final Rule:  The bill would require the FDA to re-issue a 1996 rule (struck down by the Supreme Court as exceeding the agency’s authority in 2000) and would make several amendments to said final rule.  The original regulations would restrict tobacco advertising by, among other things, prohibiting billboards within 1,000 feet of schools and permitting only black-and-white advertising.  The amendments would prohibit the distribution of free tobacco products at all sporting or entertainment events, and would permit free samples only in a “qualified adult-only facility;” such facilities are specifically defined, and must include “a temporary structure…enclosed by a barrier that is constructed of, or covered with, an opaque material…[and] extends from no more than 12 inches above the ground or floor…to at least 8 feet above the ground or floor.”  However, the bill expressly strikes the preambles and findings to several FDA rules promulgated in 1995 and 1996 designed to regulate nicotine as a drug, and tobacco as a nicotine delivery device.  Some Members may be concerned at the level of prescriptive detail being written into law by these provisions—particularly as H.R. 1256 exempts the entire final rule from the provisions of the Congressional Review Act.

Retail Penalties:  The bill permits FDA to issue “no tobacco sale” orders against retailers that repeatedly violate the federal regulatory regime, subject to a hearing, and also imposes federal penalties for violations by retailers with respect to tobacco purchases.  A first offense would not be subject to a fine, provided the retailer has an “approved training program” in place; however, penalties would increase for additional incidents, such that a sixth (and subsequent) offense within a four-year period would warrant a fine of $10,000, regardless of whether the retailer participates in a training program.  The bill requires FDA to “consider” applicable state penalties for purposes of mitigating federal sanctions, but does not automatically reduce or eliminate federal sanctions where states have imposed their own (potentially higher) fines.

Advertising Warnings:  The bill imposes numerous new requirements on advertising for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and prohibits the sale or advertisement of any product not meeting the restrictions. Specifically, the bill requires labels carrying warnings in at least 17-point font or that comprise 70% of the label area, and requires advertisements to carry warnings of at least 20% of the total area (or, in the case of newspaper advertisements, a specific size font related to the overall size of the advertisement).  The bill gives the FDA the authority to change required statements through a notice-and-comment rulemaking process, pre-empts state or local activities only with respect to the content of tobacco advertising—permitting more stringent state and local regulations on the “time, place, and manner” of advertisements—and imposes a prohibition on television or radio advertisements for smokeless tobacco.

Some Members may be concerned that these prescriptive requirements exceed the voluntary restrictions that tobacco companies imposed upon themselves as part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with state attorneys general, infringing on companies’ First Amendment rights to promote a product which H.R. 1256 would expressly keep legal.  Some Members may also be concerned that the lack of federal pre-emption would permit states and localities to impose more onerous, and potentially conflicting, restrictions on companies’ constitutional right to market their products.

Trade in Tobacco Products:  The bill requires tobacco manufacturers to label their products as “sale only allowed in the United States,” and requires federal regulations related to record-keeping, tracking, and tracing tobacco products in order to combat illicit activities.

Cost: According to the Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 1256 would cost the FDA $2.1 billion to implement over five years and nearly $5.4 billion over ten.  These costs would be offset by “user fees” assessed on tobacco companies.

CBO also projects a $955 million revenue loss over ten years associated with H.R. 1256’s provisions regulating tobacco, as the budget estimate assumes a 2% reduction in adult smoking after ten years.

Under new PAYGO rules in the 111th Congress, savings from prior bills passed by the House may count towards meeting PAYGO requirements.  Because the Congressional Budget Office projects a $955 million revenue loss over ten years associated with H.R. 1256’s provisions regulating tobacco due to a 2% reduction in adult smoking after ten years, the majority intends to pass H.R. 1804 under suspension of the rules to offset this lost tax revenue.

Lastly, CBO notes that the “user fees” imposed on tobacco companies by H.R. 1256 would constitute a private-sector mandate for the purposes of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), and that other provisions associated with limited pre-emption of state tobacco laws would constitute an intergovernmental mandate under UMRA.  Some Members may be concerned by the impact of the billions of dollars in unfunded mandates placed on tobacco companies amount to a tax that will be passed on to consumers.

Amendment Made in Order Under the Rule:

Buyer (R-IN) Substitute:   Keeps FDA’s focus on its current mission by establishing a Tobacco Harm Reduction Center within the Department of Health and Human Services (but outside of FDA) to regulate tobacco products.  Requires Administrator of the new Center to assess the impact of proposed regulations having an economic impact greater than $50 million.  Pre-empts new state and local laws conflicting with the regulatory regime, and prohibits private rights of action.  Statutorily requires reduction in tar levels included in tobacco products, but defers prohibition of flavor additives or other chemicals to medical experts within the new Tobacco Harm Reduction Center.

Permits the introduction (without fixed-term time limits) of modified risk products, provided such products result in “measurable and substantial reductions in morbidity and mortality among individual tobacco users.”   Requires disclosure of tobacco product ingredients on product packaging.

Focuses tobacco efforts on youth smoking by reducing state substance abuse block grants by up to 40% in the case of states which have not enacted laws imposing civil penalties on sale or distribution of tobacco products to underage minors and restricting certain sales practices (e.g. self-service displays, licensing of tobacco vendors, etc.) to prevent the improper sale of tobacco products to minors.  Imposes penalties of up to one year imprisonment for willful violations of regulatory regime.  Reduces state substance abuse block grants by up to 40% for states which do not spend at least 20% of their Master Settlement Agreement funds on tobacco control programs.

Weekly Newsletter: September 15, 2008

Medicaid: More Spending Does Not Equal Reform

Today, Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt will be addressing a conference on Medicaid reform in Washington. The symposium comes at a time when some want Congress to pass legislation (H.R. 5268) providing more than $10 billion in Medicaid spending to states as a way to “fix” the program’s problems. However, many conservatives may believe that policy-makers should not use additional spending as a way to shirk from their duties to reform what is often an outmoded model of care.

In the past few years, several states have embarked upon novel and innovative reforms to improve the quality of care provided in the Medicaid program. Most recently, Rhode Island submitted a waiver application to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), asking for flexibility to revamp its program. Notable elements of this reform proposal include:

  • Incentives to promote wellness and prevention, including consumer-directed accounts and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs);
  • A shift to home and community-based care instead of a traditional nursing home setting for elderly populations;
  • Incentives to purchase long-term care insurance, so as to eliminate the need for Medicaid long-term care financing;
  • Competitive bidding for durable medical equipment; and
  • A novel financing model that ensures that total Medicaid expenses will rise by up to 5% per year.

    Many conservatives may support these and other similar reform initiatives proposed by states, as one way to slow the growth of health care costs and thereby reduce America’s unsustainable entitlement spending. Moreover, some conservatives may believe that time on the legislative calendar debating a Medicaid bailout should instead be used to discuss these types of comprehensive structural reforms to the program—so that the poorest beneficiaries are not subjected to more of the same from a government health system that does not work for many.

    The RSC has prepared a one-pager highlighting the need for comprehensive Medicaid reform based on examples from several states; the document can be found here.

    Cautionary Tales from Across the Pond

    This past week, a British think-tank published a paper that spoke the heretofore unthinkable: the policy group Reform advocated replacing the single-payer National Health Service with a voucher-based private health system. Under the proposal, individuals would receive a £2,000 voucher to purchase private insurance—injecting competition into a health system previously dominated by government, and bringing with it the potential to slow the growth of costs while achieving better value through improved care.

    The Reform proposal comes on the heels of several disturbing developments regarding the National Health Service last month. One survey found that a quarter of cancer specialists are purposely keeping their patients “in the dark” about treatment options—in order to avoid upsetting those patients when they find out the NHS will not pay for their treatments. Several weeks earlier, the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)—Britain’s comparative effectiveness institute—adopted a policy of refusing to pay for four kidney cancer drugs, even though the pharmaceuticals made “significant gains” in survival times, because NICE did not believe the drugs were cost-effective.

    Conservatives may not be surprised by any of these developments—as the rationing of care frequently leads to demands to reform or abolish the governmental bureaucracies that deny life-saving treatments to patients. Some conservatives may also believe that the type of changes advocated by Reform with respect to the National Health Service, if applied to Medicare, could allow seniors a wide range of options to receive their health care, while achieving cost-savings through competition that could slow the growth of skyrocketing health and entitlement costs.

    Read the BBC News article: “Doctors ‘Keep Cancer Drugs Quiet’”

    Article of Note: The Hospital-Industrial Complex

    An article in the Wall Street Journal last month revealed the continuance of a troubling trend: hospitals using their monopoly power to raise prices for consumers—helping to contribute to the growth in health care costs. Consolidations in recent decades—coupled with state certificate-of-need laws that provide government-sanctioned exclusivity in most states—have allowed regional hospitals to tighten their grip on many markets, and the Journal article tells the tale of Carilion Health System in southwest Virginia:

  • Colonoscopy prices four to 10 times higher than a local clinic;
  • Neck CT scans more than double the price of an imaging center;
  • A significant spike in regional health insurance premiums to the highest level in the state; and
  • Over $105 million in net income achieved by a non-profit hospital over the past five years.

One local businessman called the area a “one-market town…in terms of health care,” noting that the hospital “has the leverage”—and the article demonstrates that its impact on both physician practices and the insurance premiums paid by thousands of Virginians has been significant.

The piece comes at a time when the hospital industry is attempting to eradicate one of its few remaining sources of competition, by asking Congress to place a ban on the development of physician-owned specialty hospitals. Some conservatives may oppose this measure as a high-handed approach by Washington policy-makers to interfere with free markets, further solidifying existing hospitals’ monopolies, and stifling the type of innovation in health care that new entrants like specialty hospitals can create to slow the growth of health care costs.

Additionally, conservatives may note a letter from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Inspector General from this April, which publicly rebuked several hospital trade associations for making “several statements that misrepresent our findings and draw[ing] several conclusions that we did not make” in a white paper to Congressional policy-makers on the need for a specialty hospital ban. Some conservatives may therefore be highly skeptical of claims from self-interested parties exhibiting monopolistic tendencies, who have made deceptive and misleading statements to Congress to advance their claims—and apparently lack the integrity to apologize for doing so.

Read the article here: Wall Street Journal: “Non-profit Hospitals Flex Pricing Power

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 1108, Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

Order of Business:  The bill is scheduled to be considered under suspension of the rules on Wednesday, July 30, 2008.

Summary of Changes Made:  The latest draft text would make several substantive changes to the bill.  First, the revised text would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to contract with states to enforce the FDA-promulgated regulations with respect to tobacco products.  However, the bill would also prohibit the Secretary from contracting with states to enforce the tobacco regulations on Indian tribal lands—or directly engage in enforcement activity on tribal lands—without the express written consent of the tribe involved.  This last change was made to resolve a jurisdictional issue raised by the Natural Resources Committee, which has jurisdiction over Indian tribal matters.

Some conservatives may note that the language discussed above creates a significant loophole in the enforcement mechanism for tobacco products—namely, that Indian tribal areas could represent a “no-man’s land” with respect to tobacco enforcement.  Some conservatives may question whether this loophole could allow unregulated products to be bought and sold on tribal lands, effectively undermining the entire regulatory regime for tobacco products which H.R. 1108 is intended to establish.

The bill includes two new offsets to pay for federal tax revenue lost as a result of the projected 2% reduction in tobacco use, which the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates would cost $114 million over five years, and $446 over ten.  To offset this foregone revenue, the bill would incorporate the text of a measure (H.R. 6500) making changes to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) for federal workers.  That bill would require auto-enrollment of workers in the TSP, costing $225 million over five years, and $736 million over ten, due to revenue loss associated with additional employees making pre-tax TSP contributions.  However, H.R. 6500 (as incorporated into H.R. 1108) would result in a net revenue gain, due to an additional provision establishing an after-tax savings component (similar to the Roth IRA or Roth 401(k) options) in the TSP, which CBO estimates would generate $382 million in revenue over five years, and $2.0 billion over ten, resulting from employees substituting pre-tax TSP contributions with after-tax ones.

The second offset for the lost tobacco tax revenue would come from the elimination of unused sick leave in the calculation of survivors’ annuity benefits for participants in the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS).

Press reports indicate that further language may be added to the bill requiring a study of the so-called “menthol loophole;” however, such language was not available at press time.

Summary:  H.R. 1108 would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to grant new authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate tobacco products and advertising, and amend the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act to impose new restrictions on tobacco product labels and disclosure.  Specific bill provisions include the following:

Findings and Purpose.  The bill contains 13 pages of findings purporting the need to regulate tobacco products to protect the public health, and language designed to ensure that the bill does not affect the authorities of the Secretaries of Agriculture or Treasury.  The bill also includes severability language providing that judicial invalidation of one or more sections of the legislation will not result in the nullification of the entire regulatory regime proposed by the bill.

Regulatory Authority.  H.R. 1108 gives FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products, which are defined as “any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product” and establishes a new Center for Tobacco Products within the FDA to exercise regulatory authority.  The bill states that tobacco does not qualify as a drug or medical device for purposes of FDA regulation, and limits the FDA’s regulatory authority to tobacco leaf in the possession of tobacco manufacturers (thus excluding tobacco growers).

Adulterated and Misbranded Products.  The bill defines adulterated and misbranded tobacco products, defining the former to include products that “consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance,” and defining misbranded products to include those that are “false or misleading,” as well as those which do not adhere to the registration, labeling, and other regulatory regimes established under the bill.  The bill grants the FDA, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the right to pre-approve statements made on tobacco product labels.

Information Disclosure.  The bill requires all tobacco manufacturers to disclose to the Secretary the names and descriptions of all ingredients, components, and compounds in tobacco products, including the nicotine content of same.  The bill grants authority to the Secretary to obtain information from tobacco companies on the health effects of smoking and requires the Secretary to publish “a list of harmful and potentially harmful constituents” in tobacco products by brand.

Registration and Inspection.  H.R. 1108 requires all tobacco manufacturers to register their names and places of business with the Secretary and requires the Secretary to make such information public.  The bill also requires inspection of every domestic tobacco manufacturing establishment at least once every two years, and a requirement that overseas tobacco manufacturing establishments have “adequate and effective means” for the Secretary to ensure that tobacco products manufactured overseas should be refused entry into the United States.

General Authority.  The bill would permit the Secretary to restrict by regulation the sale, distribution, and advertising of tobacco products “if the secretary determines that such regulation would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.”  In exercising this authority, the Secretary may not 1) “prohibit the sale of any tobacco product in face-to-face transactions by a specific category of retail outlets;” 2) set an age limit on the sale of tobacco products higher than 18 years of age; or 3) require use of a physician’s prescription in order to obtain tobacco products.  However, the bill does require the Secretary to promulgate regulations addressing the sale, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products remotely so as to discourage the purchase of tobacco products by underage individuals.

Product Standards.  H.R. 1108 would ban all “artificial or natural flavors” except for menthol, and requires all tobacco products to meet domestic standards with respect to pesticide use.  The bill permits the Secretary to impose further restrictions should the regulations be in the interest of the public health.  However, “because of the importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a regulation” banning all cigarettes or reducing the level of nicotine permitted in tobacco products to zero, the bill explicitly prohibits the Secretary from taking either action.

Notification and Recalls.  The bill grants the Secretary the authority to order notification to the public, through public service announcements or other means, of tobacco products that “present an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health…and no more practicable means is available…to eliminate such risk.”  The bill also authorizes the Secretary to order recalls in the event that “there is a reasonable probability that a tobacco product contains a manufacturing or other defect not ordinarily contained in other tobacco products on the market that would cause serious, adverse health consequences or death.”

Record-Keeping.  H.R. 1108 requires tobacco companies to create and preserve records, as established by regulation, designed to determine that tobacco products are not adulterated or misbranded and to protect the public health, and to provide reports of any corrective action taken by tobacco manufacturers to remove products from the market for health reasons.  The bill language states that identities of any patients discussed in applicable records should remain confidential, unless disclosure is necessary “to determine risks to public health of a tobacco product.”

Review of New Tobacco Products.  The bill requires pre-market review for all new tobacco products introduced after February 15, 2007, unless the product is “substantially equivalent” to existing products.  The application for pre-market review requires full disclosure of the products’ components, and research of the health effects of same.  The bill would require the Secretary to reject such new tobacco products if “there is a lack of a showing that permitting such tobacco products to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health,” among other conditions necessary for approval.  The bill also permits the Secretary to withdraw pre-market approval, due to a company’s non-compliance with regulations or new information on the public health effects of a product, effectively removing the product from the marketplace.

Modified Risk Tobacco Products.  H.R. 1108 places restrictions on the introduction or marketing of modified risk tobacco products.  Specifically, the bill requires that any product marketed as modified risk must “significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users” and “benefit the health of the population as a whole,” including both tobacco users and non-users.  In the event that the Secretary cannot make such a determination without long-term epidemiological data that is not available, the Secretary may issue a temporary approval of not more than five years for the marketing of modified risk products, provided that “the reasonably likely overall impact of use of the product remains a substantial and measurable reduction in overall morbidity and mortality among individual tobacco users,” and the product is subject to annual post-market surveillance review.  The bill also places additional restrictions on the marketing, advertising, and comparative claims presented by modified risk tobacco products.

Judicial Review.  The bill provides a process for individuals adversely affected by regulations issued pursuant to the bill, or whose application for pre-market approval was denied, to seek judicial review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the party resides or has a principal place of business, subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Regulatory Requirements.  H.R. 1108 requires the Secretary to issue regulations within three years of enactment regarding tobacco product testing and disclosure of product constituents, and permits the Secretary to require label or advertising disclosure of tobacco product constituents.  The bill provides for delays of regulatory and testing requirements for “small tobacco product manufacturers,” defined as those employing fewer than 350 individuals.  The bill also clarifies that none of its provisions prohibit the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from regulating tobacco advertising or sales.

Limited Pre-Emption.  H.R. 1108 pre-empts state laws relating to tobacco product standards, mis-labeling, adulteration, labeling, and related product standards; according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this pre-emption language constitutes an intergovernmental mandate as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.  However, the bill retains states’ ability to enact more stringent standards with respect to tobacco advertising and promotion.

Scientific Advisory Committee.  The bill establishes the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to provide technical expertise and recommendations to the Secretary regarding the regulation of tobacco products.

Smoking Cessation.  The bill requires the Secretary to consider approving the extended use of nicotine replacement products “for the treatment of tobacco dependence.”

User Fee.  The bill assesses user fees on tobacco companies and funds FDA regulation of tobacco activities in the amount of $85 million in Fiscal Year 2008, increasing each year until reaching $712 million in Fiscal Year 2018 and each subsequent year.  The bill assesses user fees by class of tobacco products (e.g. cigarettes, cigars, etc.), and allocates them to companies within a class of tobacco products, based on the percentages outlined in tobacco buyout legislation (P.L. 108-357) passed in October 2004.

Restores 1996 Rule on Tobacco Advertising.  The bill requires the Secretary to publish within 180 days of the bill’s enactment a final rule on regulation of tobacco identical to regulations published on October 28, 1996, with an effective date of one year following the bill’s enactment.  The original regulations would restrict tobacco advertising by, among other things, prohibiting billboards within 1,000 feet of schools and permitting only black-and-white advertising.  The bill would modify the original regulation to permit the free distribution of smokeless tobacco only, and only in quantities of fewer than 15 grams (0.53 ounces) in certain “qualified adult-only facilities.”  The bill exempts the final rule, as modified, from review under the Congressional Review Act.

Nullifies Earlier Documents.  H.R. 1108 would nullify the precedent of certain documents issued by FDA during 1995-96 as they relate to a prior attempt to classify nicotine in tobacco products as a drug for purposes of FDA regulation. (H.R. 1108 would make tobacco subject to FDA regulation, but as a “tobacco product,” not a drug or medical device.)

New Penalties.  The bill would add failure to comply with the bill’s requirements as grounds for imposition of fines and/or criminal penalties, along with other offenses relating to counterfeiting tobacco products or “the charitable distribution of tobacco products.”  The bill also gives the Secretary the authority to impose a “no-tobacco sale order” against retail outlets and establishes a new system of federal fines against retail establishments selling tobacco products improperly, authorizing fines of up to $10,000 for establishments with six or more violations within a four-year period.

Studies.  The bill would require the Government Accountability Office to submit studies regarding youth smoking as well as cross-border trade and counterfeiting in tobacco products, and requires a specific study by HHS on raising the minimum age to purchase tobacco products, as well as an FTC report on concentration within the tobacco industry.

Labeling Requirements.  The bill requires all cigarettes and smokeless tobacco sold in the United States to bear clear warnings about the risks associated with tobacco use and prescribes the wording, typeface, and font size associated with such warnings. (Tobacco products manufactured domestically for international use are exempt from this requirement.)  H.R. 1108 further requires that all advertising, including matchbooks, contain language from the warning labels, and prescribes the proportions by which such labeling warning must relate to the overall size of the advertisement.  The bill gives the Secretary of HHS the authority to alter or increase the size of the labeling requirements, permits states to further regulate the type and manner, but not the content, of cigarette advertising, and extends a prohibition on television and radio advertising to smokeless tobacco products subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission.

Tar and Nicotine Disclosure.  The bill gives the Secretary the authority to conduct a rulemaking process to determine whether to require the disclosure of tar, nicotine, and other constituent levels in tobacco advertising, subject to a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Trade Commission.

Shipping Requirements.  H.R. 1108 requires that all packaging and shipping containers shall bear statements stating “sale only allowed in the United States” and requires the Secretary to issue regulations regarding the maintenance of records by entities manufacturing, transporting, or distributing tobacco products.  The bill also requires tobacco manufacturers and distributors to notify the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury upon obtaining information “which reasonably supports the conclusion” that tobacco products formerly held by the entity have circumvented payment of applicable taxes or “diverted for possible illicit marketing.”

Cost to Taxpayers:  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), H.R. 1108 would result in $2.1 billion in mandatory spending over five years, and $5.3 billion over ten, related to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of tobacco.  The bill would offset these costs by imposing a “fee” on tobacco companies to finance the FDA regulation.

CBO also estimates a decline in revenues of $114 million over five years, and $446 million over ten, related to a 2% reduction in overall smoking levels due to tobacco regulation, and loss of commensurate tobacco tax revenue.  In order to pay for this reduced revenue, H.R. 1108 incorporates provisions relating to the federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).  The bill would establish a system of auto-enrollment in TSP for all federal employees, causing a minor revenue loss, but would on balance generate additional tax revenue by establishing a new plan to permit after-tax TSP contributions, similar to a Roth IRA or the recently-established Roth 401(k) option.

Finally, CBO estimates a five-year increase in spending subject to appropriation of $3 million as a result of H.R. 1108’s enactment.

Committee Action:  The bill was introduced on February 15, 2007, and referred to the Energy and Commerce, which held a hearing and, on April 2, 2008, reported the bill as amended by a 38-12 vote.

Possible Conservative Concerns:  Numerous aspects of H.R. 1108 may raise concerns for conservatives, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

  • Process.  Some conservatives may be concerned that a 190-page bill seeking to establish new federal authority to regulate a multi-billion dollar industry is being considered under expedited procedures on the suspension calendar.
  • User Fee as Tax Increase.  The bill includes more than $5 billion in assessments on tobacco companies, ostensibly termed “user fees,” to finance the FDA’s work regulating tobacco products.
  • Restricts Free Speech Rights.  In addition to codifying federal restrictions, which tobacco companies agreed to in their 1998 settlement with state Attorneys General, H.R. 1108 places additional federal restrictions on tobacco advertising.  Some of the federal restrictions on advertising content in H.R. 1108 include the following specifications for the size of warning labels on tobacco products:

The text of such label statements shall be in a typeface pro rata to the following requirements: 45-point type for a whole-page broadsheet newspaper advertisement; 39-point type for a half-page broadsheet newspaper advertisement; 39-point type for a whole-page tabloid newspaper advertisement; 27-point type for a half-page tabloid newspaper advertisement; 31.5-point type for a double page spread magazine or whole-page magazine advertisement; 22.5-point type for a 28 centimeter by 3 column advertisement; and 15-point type for a 20 centimeter by 2 column advertisement.

Some conservatives may be concerned that the highly prescriptive restrictions described above, and elsewhere in H.R. 1108, constitute an undue intrusion on companies’ constitutional free speech rights to advertise a product that most Americans already know is unhealthy.

  • Hinders Introduction of Reduced Risk Tobacco Products.  H.R. 1108 places stringent restrictions on the introduction and marketing of new products that would reduce or modify the inherent risks associated with the consumption of tobacco.  The bill states that a reduced risk product may be marketed only if the product will “significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users” and also will “benefit the population as a whole,” including persons who do not consume tobacco products.  Some conservatives may be concerned that such onerous restrictions on the introduction of reduced risk tobacco products could have the effect of inhibiting the use of products that could reduce the risks associated with tobacco consumption while potentially serving as a barrier to entry for new market competitors.
  • FDA Improper Agency to Regulate Tobacco.  As FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach testified before the House Energy and Commerce Committee in October 2007, the FDA has heretofore been structured as an agency to promote and protect the public health.  In the Commissioner’s opinion, requiring FDA to “approve” tobacco products as a result of H.R. 1108 would dramatically change the agency’s focus: “Associating any agency whose mission is to promote public health with the approval of inherently dangerous products would undermine its mission and likely have perverse incentive effects.”

  • Other Important Priorities for FDA.  Energy and Commerce Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Bart Stupak (D-MI), in holding a hearing on FDA’s decision to approve an antibiotic despite receiving false clinical trial data, called the incident “a microcosm of the failure by all FDA stakeholders—FDA, pharmaceutical sponsors, and third-party monitors—to ensure the integrity of clinical trials used to support the safety and approval of new drug applications.”  On top of questions which Democrats themselves have raised regarding FDA’s competence, some conservatives may question whether the food safety concerns that have arisen in recent months make now an appropriate time significantly to expand the agency’s regulatory remit and mission.
  • Multiple Layers of Regulation.  While establishing FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, H.R. 1108 would also retain the FTC’s authority to regulate tobacco advertising and distribution on the federal level, and would provide only limited pre-emption of state laws, allowing more stringent state restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion.  Some conservatives may be concerned that these multiple layers of regulation will impose undue bureaucratic and logistical difficulties on tobacco manufacturers—even though H.R. 1108 would explicitly retain tobacco as a lawful product.
  • Little Impact on Tobacco Use.  The CBO estimate of H.R. 1108 notes that under its budgetary model, smoking by adults would decline by only 2% after 10 years.  Some conservatives may question whether this marginal reduction in smoking levels warrants the significant intrusion on free speech rights and government-run regulatory bureaucracy that would be created under the legislation.
  • Billions in Unfunded Mandates; UMRA Point of Order.  The Congressional Budget Office, in its score of H.R. 1108, calculates that the fee imposed in the bill would constitute an unfunded mandate on tobacco companies of $249.1 million in Fiscal Year 2009, and more than $2.3 billion over five years, greatly exceeding the threshold established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ($136 million in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation).   CBO also notes that the bill includes several unfunded mandates that would both pre-empt existing state tobacco regulations and require tribal governments manufacturing or distributing tobacco products to comply with the new federal regulatory regime.
  • Violates Trade Agreements.  HHS Secretary Leavitt, writing to Energy and Commerce Committee Ranking Member Barton on H.R. 1108, noted that the legislation could be viewed by foreign governments as a hostile trade action.  Because the bill bans clove and other flavored cigarettes—many of which are manufactured in foreign countries—while expressly permitting production of menthol cigarettes, Indonesia or other foreign governments could file complaints at the World Trade Organization claiming discrimination against their products.  Some conservatives may be concerned that passage of H.R. 1108 could ultimately result in retaliatory measures being taken against American-made products—and could lead to trade disputes with a negative effect on economic growth.
  • Menthol Loophole.  As noted above, H.R. 1108 would prohibit the use of all “artificial or natural” cigarette flavorings—with the exception of menthol, which is permitted under the bill.  Because data from the Centers for Disease Control indicate that 75% of African-American smokers consume menthol cigarettes, seven former Secretaries of Health and Human Services, representing both political parties, wrote to Congress to criticize a menthol “loophole” that “caves to the financial interests of tobacco companies” by “send[ing] a message that African-American youngsters are valued less than white youngsters.”

Because the bill is being considered under suspension of the rules, no amendments addressing the menthol issue can be considered.  Some conservatives may note that the House Democrat leadership would apparently rather retain the support of the major tobacco company (Philip Morris) supporting the legislation than permit a vote on amendments that seven former HHS Secretaries believe are in the best interests of African-Americans.

Administration Position:  Although a formal Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) was unavailable at press time, a letter from Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt to Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Barton indicated that the Administration “strongly opposes” H.R. 1108.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?:  Yes, the bill would grant new authority to the Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?:  Yes, the bill imposes new fees on tobacco companies, which CBO estimates would total $235 million in Fiscal Year 2009, $2.1 billion over five years, and nearly $5.4 billion over ten years, all greatly exceeding the thresholds established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ($136 million in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation).

Does the Bill Comply with House Rules Regarding Earmarks/Limited Tax Benefits/Limited Tariff Benefits?:  The Committee on Energy and Commerce, in House Report 110-762, reports that “H.R. 1108 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e) or 9(f) of rule XXI.”

Constitutional Authority:  The Committee on Energy and Commerce, in House Report 110-762, cites constitutional authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (relating to the regulation of interstate commerce) and Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (relating to legislation promoting the general welfare of the United States).

Weekly Newsletter: July 28, 2008

Tobacco Bill Coming Soon

This week the House could consider legislation (H.R. 1108) granting the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco, possibly under suspension of the rules. The bill would establish a new center within FDA to regulate tobacco products and assess tobacco companies more than $5 billion in “user fees” over the next ten years to pay for this regulation.

Some conservatives may be concerned by the regulatory regime the bill would establish, which would require an agency charged with promoting food and drug safety to regulate a product inherently unsafe and unhealthy. Some conservatives may also object to the multiple layers of regulation the bill would create, by leaving intact the Federal Trade Commission’s ability to regulate tobacco advertising and distribution and providing only limited pre-emption against additional state-based regulations and restrictions. Some conservatives may question whether the highly prescriptive restrictions in the bill— including advertising limitations on the use of color advertising and regulation of the font size of tobacco disclaimer warnings, all of which raise significant constitutional questions about their free-speech implications—constitute good public policy, particularly as the Congressional Budget Office estimates that H.R. 1108 will reduce smoking levels by only 2% over 10 years.

Lastly, some conservatives may object to provisions in the bill that could prompt an international trade dispute. Last week, HHS Secretary Leavitt wrote to Energy and Commerce Committee Ranking Member Barton about H.R. 1108, observing that, because the bill prohibits all tobacco flavorings except menthol, foreign countries which manufacture clove or other flavored cigarettes may take action against the United States for providing unfair and disparate treatment for a particular type of manufactured cigarette. As press reports indicate that H.R. 1108 may be considered under suspension of the rules, some conservatives may be concerned by the lack of procedural opportunities available to address this disparity, such that the United States can live up to its obligations under international free-trade agreements.

A Policy Brief on H.R. 1108 (as reported by the Energy and Commerce Committee) can be found here.

Democrats Ignore Medicare Funding Warning

Last week Democrats responded to the Medicare trustees’ finding that the Medicare program faces significant future funding shortfalls—by resolving to ignore the problem. The resolution concerned a provision inserted into the Medicare Modernization Act at the behest of the RSC, which provided for the President to submit, and Congress to consider under expedited procedures, legislation to remedy Medicare’s funding problems when the program is projected to consume more than 45% of its funding from general revenues (as opposed to the Medicare payroll tax and beneficiary premiums). The Democrat majority’s action turned off this funding “trigger” for the balance of the 110th Congress, preventing those who believe in entitlement reform from taking action to force a House floor vote on Medicare reform legislation.

Many conservatives may be disappointed by the actions of Congressional Democrats, which prevented the President’s reasonable and modest proposals for Medicare reform—means testing that would make wealthier individuals like Warren Buffett and George Soros pay $2 per day more in Part D prescription drug premiums and liability reform to reduce the costs associated with defensive medicine practices— from receiving a vote in Congress. Many conservatives may believe that solving Medicare’s $86 trillion in unfunded obligations—and a Hospital Trust Fund scheduled to be exhausted in little more than a decade—will not be helped by Democrats’ apparent eagerness to ignore the problem. However, when Democrats like Florida’s Alcee Hastings note that “the perceived problem with Medicare funding has already been addressed,” many conservatives may be concerned that this lack of awareness will only hasten the day when Medicare’s funding shortfalls jeopardize the viability of the program—and wonder what policy-makers will tell their senior constituents when it does.

There are RSC Policy Briefs related to the Medicare trigger: Legislative Background; Talking Points on Trigger; Questions for House Democrats; Size of Medicare Program; White House Trigger Bill; Medicare Trustees Report

Article of Note: Fuzzy Math

Last Wednesday the New York Times reported on the many financial discrepancies surrounding the health care plan of Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL). While Sen. Obama has been consistent in saying that his health plan would save every American family $2,500 per year, many observers have come to question the factual basis for a “best guess” assertion by his advisers early last year. Independent estimates, including those by the Congressional Budget Office, have questioned whether the savings from such initiatives as health information technology and chronic care management will materialize, particularly in the four-year timeline Sen. Obama has promised—such that even a statement by Obama’s own advisers backtracked from any assertions that the purported savings would materialize by a date certain.

Many conservatives may be skeptical of Sen. Obama’s claims, particularly as the liberal Commonwealth Fund released a report in December with a menu of options for savings that would by their estimates achieve a total reduction in spending of only 6% in 10 years. Some conservatives may also be concerned that, in an attempt to reduce health care costs—whether by 8%, 6%, or some lesser amount— Sen. Obama would rely first and foremost on imposing price controls on physicians, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and insurance companies, along with rationing care through a government-controlled comparative effectiveness institute. Many conservatives may believe that such bureaucratic restrictions would in the long run prove far more effective at growing the size of government than slowing the growth of health care costs.

Read the article here: New York Times: “Health Plan from Obama Sparks Debate

Certificate of Need Programs

History and Background:  In the 1960s, some health care policy makers began to believe that an excess supply of providers was having an inflationary impact on the price of health care.  As a result, several states, beginning with New York in 1964, enacted “certificate of need” (CON) laws giving state agencies the power to evaluate whether a new hospital or nursing home facility was needed prior to its construction.  Prompted in part by support from the American Hospital Association, 20 states enacted certificate of need laws by 1975.[1]

In January 1975, President Ford signed into law the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (P.L. 93-641), originally sponsored by Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA).  The Act provided incentives for states to enact approval mechanisms prior to the construction of major facilities. As a result, by 1980 all states but Louisiana had established CON programs.[2]  However, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 99-660) repealing the federal law in November 1986, which in time led 14 states to abolish their certificate of need programs.  Nevertheless, 36 states and the District of Columbia maintain some form of restriction on the construction of new medical facilities absent a determination of necessity.

Changes within the Hospital Industry:  In the more than four decades since the first certificate of need program was established, the hospital industry has undergone numerous changes and consolidations that may be seen as undermining the original rationale for the certificate of need mechanism.  At the time certificate of need laws were enacted, most hospitals received cost-based reimbursement for services from both the federal government and private insurers.  This payment mechanism, when coupled with a perceived lack of incentives for consumers to become cost-conscious about their health care expenditures, led policy-makers to impose external restrictions on providers’ growth (in an attempt to slow the growth of health expenditures) due to a belief that they would fail to compete on price grounds.[3]  However, the intervening decades have seen a move away from cost-based reimbursement and toward prospective payment for procedures, along with greater incentives—higher deductibles, Health Savings Accounts, co-insurance, etc.—for consumers to demonstrate price sensitivity in health care.  Thus the economic conditions which led regulators to impose certificate of need restrictions have changed appreciably for both consumers and providers, which may prompt a re-evaluation of their usefulness and efficacy.

In addition, a wave of consolidation within the hospital sector has attracted the attention of antitrust regulators, who have examined the impact of hospital mergers on health care.  As of 2001, nearly 54% of hospitals nationwide had joined a larger hospital system, with a further 12.7% working in looser affiliations.  Combined, two-thirds of hospitals nationwide (66.7%) participated in some form of network or system affiliation—more than double the 31% two decades previously, in 1979.[4]

In 2004, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a series of fact-finding hearings that culminated in a joint study analyzing the antitrust implications of health care policy, which featured several chapters specifically devoted to the changes within the hospital industry.[5]  Reports submitted to the panel cited the “extensive consolidation” within the health care industry, “at times creating virtual monopolies in geographic submarkets” that allowed hospitals to “exert greater leverage in managed care contract negotiations” while pressuring physicians to join a particular system.[6]  Other witnesses noted the way in which hospital systems attempt to include at least one “must have” hospital in each geographic market, which will allow the system to demand price increases.[7]

Both the FTC-DOJ report and other independent studies have noted the link between high levels of consolidation within the hospital industry and higher prices.  Best estimates indicate that hospital mergers tend to increase prices from 5-40%—while also resulting in decreases in quality.[8]  A National Bureau of Economic Research working paper found that, by resulting in a loss of consumer surplus of $42.2 billion over a decade (most of which went to providers), hospital mergers had the net effect of raising insurance premiums 3-5%, thus increasing the number of uninsured by almost 5.5 million life-years from 1990 through 2003.[9]

Effect of CON on Competition, Price, and Quality:  Conservatives who believe in free markets may not object to consolidation within the hospital industry, or any other industry, provided that no other external factor interferes with the operation of the economic market.  However, if the market has been distorted through public policy actions by legislators—as in the case of the 36 states and the District of Columbia with certificate of need laws—some conservatives may view such laws with caution, due to the potential negative implications which a state-granted oligopoly for existing providers may have on the ability of new entrants to improve the health care marketplace through innovative practices and techniques.

The same FTC-DOJ report that noted the correlation between hospital consolidation and rising prices also criticized the state certificate of need model as anticompetitive and not in consumers’ best interest.  Witnesses testified that the barriers to entry presented by certificate of need requirements impeded rapid implementation of new health care technologies, with significant adverse effects on overall health care spending—rising prices due to more limited access to care, and/or re-directing spending to other areas of health care (i.e. a restriction on development of new beds leading to increased investment in radiological or other equipment).[10]  The report concluded:

The Agencies believe that CON programs are generally not successful in containing health care costs and that they can pose anticompetitive risks….CON programs risk entrenching oligopolists and eroding consumer welfare.  The aim of controlling costs is laudable, but there appear to be other, more effective means of achieving this goal that do not pose anticompetitive risks.[11]

Because of the “serious competitive concerns” that outweighed the purported benefits, the agencies advised states to re-evaluate whether their certificate of need programs in fact serve the public good.

In addition to the impact of certificate of need programs on price and market penetration, the stubbornly high rates of medical errors and hospital-acquired infections may be symptomatic of quality control difficulties rooted in a lack of competition.  The 1999 Institute of Medicine study To Err Is Human estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die annually in hospitals due to preventable medical errors, creating a total economic cost of as much as $29 billion, and a November 2006 report utilizing data from a new infection-reporting regime in Pennsylvania found 19,154 cases of hospital-acquired infections in 2005 alone, representing an infection incident rate of more than 1 in 100 hospitalizations.[12]  With consolidation having eroded the breadth of competing hospitals in some markets, and state certificate of need programs presenting a significant barrier for potential new entrants, the prime driver of quality improvement within the hospital sector may be fear of litigation—a process which some conservatives may find economically inefficient and poor public policy.

The impact of certificate of need programs on quality improvements was illustrated in data from an October 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study examining physician-owned specialty hospitals.  According to GAO, 83% of all specialty hospitals—and all specialty hospitals then under development—were located in states without certificate of need requirements.[13]  The FTC-DOJ study also cited the example of a Florida law enacted in 2003, which barred single-practice specialty hospitals while simultaneously eliminating certificate of need requirements for various cardiac programs at general hospitals.[14]  Some conservatives may therefore be concerned first that the innovation and quality improvements which physician-owned specialty hospitals have introduced are being denied to residents in many states due to certificate of need restrictions, and second that this archaic and bureaucratic mechanism has become a political football that existing facilities attempt to manipulate in order to maintain existing oligopolies.[15]

Security Impact:  The September 11 attacks and subsequent concerns regarding incidents of mass terrorism, bioterrorism, or pandemic outbreaks have raised the prominence of the need for “surge capacity” in the event of a major public health disaster.  Although such surge capacity need not be located within the confines of a hospital, specialized medical centers may play a significant role in any response to a large-scale incident.

On May 5 and 7, 2008, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held hearings regarding a potential lack of hospital surge capacity.[16]  Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA) attempted to assert that the implementation of several proposed Medicaid anti-fraud regulations would compel hospitals to reduce or eliminate trauma centers whose services would be needed in the event of a major terror incident.  In response, Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt noted that the need for proper public health capacity to respond to terrorist incidents should not impede the Administration from enacting reasonable controls to ensure that the Medicaid program meets its statutory goal of providing health care to low-income individuals, as opposed to serving as a bioterror response agency.

In addition to agreeing with the Secretary’s assertion that the distinction between public health preparedness and implementation of Medicaid anti-fraud regulations saving $42 billion over a decade is a false dichotomy, some conservatives may also believe that a better way to increase “surge capacity” in 36 states and the District of Columbia would involve a repeal of certificate of need restrictions.  Rather than maintaining bureaucratic regulations that prevent construction of health care facilities of critical importance in a mass-casualty incident—or jeopardizing existing physician-owned trauma centers by enacting new restrictions on physician ownership, as House Democrats have proposed—conservatives may believe that a better alternative would allow free markets to innovate and create new medical centers should capacity for trauma units or other segments of care be lacking in a particular market.

Conclusion:  Proposals to expand the government’s role in health care have frequently been criticized by conservatives as the first step towards rationed care.  However, some conservatives may use the certificate of need model to argue that 36 states and the District of Columbia already ration health care, by limiting the ability of new entrants to provide medical services to their citizens.  For instance, the recent decision of the Michigan Certificate of Need Commission to limit the number of new radiation facilities in the state may have an adverse impact on cancer patients seeking access to a novel form of treatment.[17]

With a McKinsey group study noting that hospitals account for 50% of the excess spending in American health care relative to other countries, some conservatives may argue that the hospital industry in particular warrants the additional innovation and reduced costs which new entrants can provide.[18]  Congress itself recognized this fact in 1980 by passing legislation (P.L. 96-499) making ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) eligible for Medicare reimbursement, believing that new ASCs could perform certain medical procedures more cost-effectively than general hospitals.[19]  Yet the exhaustive FTC-DOJ study, as well as related literature, have documented the ways in which state-based certificate of need laws have undermined market-based efforts at cost control—by resulting in less competition, higher prices, and a diminished emphasis on quality that new market entrants can elicit.  In addition, the changed environment of a post-9/11 world raises questions as to whether states with certificate of need programs are denying to their citizens facilities that could be of critical importance in a public health crisis.  Viewed from these perspectives, the certificate of need model may look less like an effective mechanism to contain the growth of health care costs than an outdated shibboleth that ultimately harms the citizens whom it was designed to protect.

Some conservatives may believe that the nearly 100,000 deaths annually due to preventable medical errors constitute proof positive that the certificate of need model should be permanently dismantled, and that the billions of dollars in hospital expenditures made by the federal government may warrant a federal role in persuading recalcitrant states to do so.  This fiscal year alone, the federal government will spend at least $27.1 billion on payments to hospitals not directly attributable to patient care—including Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments, and graduate and indirect medical education costs.[20]  Some conservatives may therefore support policies intended to link some or all of these payments to states’ repeal of certificate of need laws, in the belief that the abolition of such measures will improve competition, drive down prices, and enhance the quality of health care nationwide.


[1] “Certificate of Need State Laws 2008,” (Washington, DC, National Council of State Legislatures, updated May 8, 2008), available online at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/cert-need.htm (accessed May 11, 2008).

[2] Cited in Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (Washington, DC, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Joint Report, July 2004), available online at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008), p. 301.

[3] Ibid., pp. 302-303.

[4] Ibid., pp. 133-134.

[5] Background information, agendas, and transcripts for the hearings can be found online at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/research/healthcarehearing.htm (accessed May 12, 2008).

[6] Cara Lesser and Paul Ginsburg, “Back to the Future?: New Cost and Access Challenges Emerge,” (Washington, DC, Center for Studying Health System Change Issue Brief No. 35, February 2001), available online at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/295/ (accessed May 11, 2008).

[7] Cited in Dose of Competition, p. 138.

[8] William Vogt and Robert Town, “How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality of Hospital  Care?” (Princeton, NJ, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Research Synthesis Project No. 9, February 2006), available online at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no9_researchreport.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008), pp. 8-10.

[9] Robert Town et al., “The Welfare Consequences of Hospital Mergers,” (Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12244), available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12244.pdf?new_window=1 (accessed May 13, 2008), Tables 8-10, pp. 48-50.

[10] See ibid., pp. 301-306.

[11] Ibid., p. 306.

[12] Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, summary available online at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/4/117/ToErr-8pager.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008); Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Hospital Acquired Infections in Pennsylvania, available online at http://www.phc4.org/reports/hai/05/docs/hai2005report.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008).

[13] “Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided, and Financial Performance,” (Washington, Government Accountability Office, Report GAO-04-167), available online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04167.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008), pp. 20-21.

[14] Cited in Dose of Competition, p. 146, note 116.

[15] The Center for Responsive Politics notes that from 1998 through March 2008, the hospital and nursing home industry spent more than $610 million on federal lobbying alone, placing it ninth among 121 industry categories.  Data available online at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i (accessed May 12, 2008).

[16] Information about the hearings can be found at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1929 (accessed May 10, 2008).

[17] Andrew Pollack, “States Limit Costly Sites for Cancer Radiation,” New York Times May 1, 2008, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/01/technology/01proton.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&8br=&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1210543656-RJG4oNSF434Dh4b52KfeFA&pagewanted=print (accessed May 11, 2008).

[18] Cited in Regina Herzlinger, Who Killed Health Care? America’s $2 Trillion Medical Problem—and the Consumer Driven Cure (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2007), p. 62.

[19] Cited in Dose of Competition, p. 148.

[20] Congressional Budget Office March 2008 baselines for Medicare and Medicaid, available online at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/factsheets/2008b/medicare.pdf and http://www.cbo.gov/budget/factsheets/2008b/medicaidBaseline.pdf, respectively  (accessed May 12, 2008).

Weekly Newsletter: May 5, 2008

Democrat Attacks on HSAs Miss the Mark

This past week, Democrats attempted to use a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to cast aspersions on Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). The Democrats who requested the GAO report—which analyzed data from HSA contributions made in 2005—asserted that the study proved that HSAs are nothing more than a tax shelter for wealthy individuals.

However, some conservatives may be strongly skeptical of these conclusions, particularly as the report utilized tax data from a year when the number of HSA policy-holders was one-sixth its current level. In addition, many conservatives may applaud the data demonstrating that individuals are building real savings in their HSA accounts to use for health expenses—money that consumers, not insurance companies or government bureaucrats, can control and spend for health care needs.

What is clear is that HSAs have proved tremendously popular in the four years since their introduction. America’s Health Insurance Plans reported Wednesday that more than 6.1 million individuals are covered by HSA-eligible insurance, and that enrollment in HSA plans had increased by 35% during 2007 alone. Given the widespread adoption of this new consumer-directed product, and its impact on reducing the growth of health care costs, many conservatives may object to any Democrat proposals to eliminate HSAs or make them unattractive through unnecessary bureaucratic regulations.

The RSC Policy Brief summarizing the HSA reports can be found here.

Leavitt Speech Highlights Need for Entitlement Reform

Last Wednesday, Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt used a speech at the Newseum to advance the cause of Medicare reform, outlining some over-arching principles to guide policy-makers looking to curb the spiraling growth of federal entitlements. In his speech—and a subsequent briefing before RSC Members and staff—he compared the federal government’s looming entitlement obligations as a whirlpool threatening to consume growing amounts of the economy, and advocated for increased competition in Medicare Parts A and B as one measure to stem the spiraling costs.

Many conservatives will support Secretary Leavitt’s call for comprehensive reform, and seek an immediate solution to the problems plaguing Medicare. This year’s Medicare trustees report placed the program’s total unfunded obligations at $86 trillion—which will provide some conservatives with a strong impetus to use all available legislative mechanisms to advance the cause of Medicare reform.

The RSC has released Policy Briefs highlighting the Medicare “trigger,” the President’s proposed legislation, and other options for comprehensive entitlement reform.

Genetic Non-Discrimination Act Passes Overwhelmingly

Last Thursday, the House by a 414-1 vote passed the Senate amendments to the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (H.R. 493), sending the bill to the President’s desk. The compromise language negotiated between Senate sponsors and Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) had previously passed the Senate on a 95-0 vote.

The compromise language corrects several issues of concern to conservatives. Insurers and employers will be prohibited from discriminating against individuals on the basis of fetal genetic information, ensuring that individuals will not feel pressured into aborting their unborn children. In addition, existing policies on insurance underwriting for diseases already manifest in individuals will be maintained, and entities subject to existing privacy regulations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) will not be subject to a new regulatory regime. Lastly, the compromise language improved a conservative concern that employers will not be subject to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) tribunals or lawsuits for decisions they make in their capacity as an insurer for their employees.

The RSC Legislative Bulletin on the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act can be found here.

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 5613, Protecting the Medicaid Safety Net Act

Order of Business:  The bill is scheduled to be considered on Tuesday, April 22nd, under a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill.

Summary:  H.R. 5613 would extend certain existing moratoria on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), prohibiting the agency from promulgating rules related to the integrity of the Medicaid program until April 1, 2009.  In particular, the bill would extend moratoria on proposed regulations placing restrictions on intergovernmental transfers and restricting payments for graduate medical education; the prohibitions were first enacted as part of last year’s supplemental wartime appropriation (P.L. 110-28) and are scheduled to expire on May 25, 2008.  The bill would also extend prohibitions on CMS regulations relating to rehabilitation services, as well as school-based administrative and transportation services; these prohibitions were first enacted in Medicare physician payment legislation (P.L. 110-173) last December, and are scheduled to expire on June 30, 2008.

In addition, H.R. 5613 would impose additional new moratoria on CMS relating to other proposed Medicaid regulations, also until April 2009.  Specifically, the bill would prohibit the Secretary of Health and Human Services from imposing additional restrictions with respect to targeted case management payments, the definition of outpatient hospital services, and Medicaid provider taxes (with certain exceptions).

The bill also appropriates an additional $25 million per year to CMS for the purposes of anti-fraud enforcement activity within the Medicaid program.

H.R. 5613 includes two reports to Congress on the proposed regulations.  By July 1, 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will report on its justification and authority for proposing the regulations.  The bill also includes $5 million in appropriations for HHS to hire an independent contractor to produce a report by March 1, 2009, on the proposed regulations and their impact on states.

H.R. 5613 also extends a web-based asset verification system to all 50 states, effective by the end of fiscal year 2013.  This provision would expand the Social Security Administration’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pilot program, giving states a new tool for verifying the assets of Medicaid recipients.  Currently, such a system only exists as a demonstration project in three states: California, New Jersey, and New York.

Additional Background on Changes Made in Committee:  During consideration in the Energy and Commerce Committee, Chairman Dingell and Ranking Member Joe Barton (R-TX) reached agreement on several modifications to the legislation.  The revised language incorporated at Subcommittee narrowed the scope of the proposed moratoria to permit CMS to engage in outreach activities with states.  Over the past several years, CMS has used various state-level audits to reach agreements with state Medicaid agencies to curtail abusive and/or questionable financing tactics.  The revised language in H.R. 5613 would permit CMS to continue these individual consent agreements with states, while maintaining the moratoria on CMS’ ability to enact regulations prohibiting these activities permanently.

In addition, the substitute language adopted in Committee included the additional $25 million per year in anti-fraud enforcement, as well as an independent study assessing the need for the regulations and their potential impact on states.  The Committee substitute also incorporated the web-based asset verification system to pay for the moratorium; the Administration had previously suggested that this program be extended as a savings mechanism to finance portions of the farm bill.

Additional Background on Proposed Regulations:  During the past year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has attempted to move forward on several proposed regulations addressing specific issues and service areas within the Medicaid program.  Many of these regulations respond to Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies and reports by the HHS Inspector General highlighting areas where the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program needed improvement.  A brief summary of each rule that would be halted by H.R. 5613 follows:

Intergovernmental Transfers:  This rule would limit reimbursement for publicly-owned health providers to costs incurred, narrow the definition of unit of government, and require providers to retain all Medicaid payments, in order to restrain intergovernmental transfers designed primarily to maximize states’ federal Medicaid payments.  A final rule was issued on May 29, 2007; the moratorium currently in place expires on May 25, 2008.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores this regulation as saving $9.0 billion in federal outlays over five years, and $22.0 billion over a decade.

Graduate Medical Education:  This rule would eliminate Medicaid reimbursement for graduate medical education, on the grounds that reimbursements for medical training are outside the statutory scope of the Medicaid program.  A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was issued on May 23, 2007; the current moratorium expires May 25, 2008.  Five year estimated savings are $0.8 billion, and ten year estimated savings are $1.9 billion.

School-Based Administrative and Transportation Services:  This rule would prohibit federal Medicaid payments for administrative activities performed by schools and transportation of children to and from school.  In some instances, school districts bill Medicaid for transporting students to and from school, even though this is an educational expense, not a reimbursable medical expense.  In addition, HHS audits found that schools were claiming capital and debt service as “administrative services” subject to Medicaid reimbursement.  The proposed rule would not alter the current policy of reimbursing schools for bona fide medical expenses incurred on school property, such as speech therapy.  A final rule was issued December 28, 2007; the current moratorium expires June 30, 2008.  Five year estimated savings are $4.2 billion, and ten year savings are estimated at $10.2 billion.

Rehabilitation Services:  This rule would restrict the scope of rehabilitation services subject to the federal Medicaid match and eliminate coverage of day habilitation services for individuals with developmental disabilities.  In many instances, CMS has found that states have billed therapeutic foster care as a “bundled” payment, resulting in federal payments for activities related to foster care as opposed to direct medical expenses.  In other cases, state plans for reimbursable expenses include recreational or social activities not directly related to rehabilitative goals.  An NPRM was issued on August 13, 2007; the current moratorium expires on June 30, 2008.  CBO scores this change as saving $1.4 billion over five years, and $3.5 billion over a decade.

Outpatient Hospital Services:  This rule would restrict the scope of Medicaid outpatient hospital services and clarify the upper payment classification for outpatient services to align more closely with the Medicare definition of outpatient services.  An NPRM was issued on September 28, 2007; no moratorium is currently in place.  Five year savings are estimated at $0.3 billion, and ten year savings are estimated at $0.7 billion.

Targeted Case Management:  This rule would restrict the scope of targeted case management services, and specify that Medicaid will not reimburse states for services where another third party is liable for payment.  In many cases, HHS audits have found a lack of documentation related to targeted case management claims, or state plans for reimbursement that fall outside the scope of the Medicaid program’s focus on medical services.  A final rule was issued December 4, 2007, subject to an implementation date of March 3, 2008.  The change would save an estimated $1.5 billion over five years, and $3.3 billion over ten.

Provider Taxes:  This rule would reduce the permissible level of Medicaid provider taxes, as included in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432), and would also clarify the hold harmless provision for provider taxes with respect to the positive correlation between the level of provider taxes imposed by states and direct or indirect Medicaid payments from states back to providers.  A final rule was issued February 22, 2008, subject to a compliance date of October 1, 2008.  Five and ten year savings are estimated at $0.6 billion.

In total, the proposed regulations are collectively projected to result in approximately $16-18 billion in savings to the federal government over the next five fiscal years, and more than $42 billion over a decade.[1]  By point of comparison, these savings would constitute just over 1% of total federal spending on Medicaid, which over the next five years is estimated to total more than $1.2 trillion.[2]

Additional Background on GAO Reports of Medicaid Abuses:  Since 1994, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has compiled more than a dozen reports highlighting problems with Medicaid financing, and specifically the ways in which state governments attempt to “game” Medicaid reimbursement policies in order to maximize the amount of federal revenue funding state health care programs.  The persistent shortcomings in federal oversight of these state funding schemes prompted GAO to add the Medicaid program to its list of federal entities at high risk of mismanagement, waste, and abuse in 2003.

Several of the GAO reports discuss state reimbursement efforts for several of the services CMS proposes to change in its new regulations.  For instance, testimony in June 2005 analyzed the ways in which 34 states—up from 10 in 2002—employed contingency-fee consultants to maximize federal Medicaid payments.  The report found that from 2000-2004, Georgia obtained $1.5 billion in additional reimbursements, and Massachusetts $570 million.[3]  The report concluded that the states’ claims for targeted case management “appear to be inconsistent with current CMS policy” and claims for rehabilitation services “were inconsistent with federal law.”[4]

In other areas, GAO found potentially inappropriate behavior—higher reimbursements for school-based health and administrative services that were not fully passed on to the relevant school districts, and questionable administrative costs, such as a 100% claim on a Massachusetts state official’s salary as a Medicaid administrative cost, even though the official worked on unrelated projects for other states designed to increase their own Medicaid reimbursements.[5]

The GAO reports also demonstrate states’ use of intergovernmental transfers to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements.  In these schemes, local-government health facilities transfer funds to the state Medicaid agency.  The Medicaid agency in turn transfers funds back to the local-government facility—but not before filing a claim with CMS to obtain federal reimbursement.  Although permissible under current law in many cases, GAO found that these schemes “are inconsistent with Medicaid’s federal-state partnership and fiscal integrity.”[6]

Many of the GAO reports over the past decade—whose titles are listed at the bottom of this bulletin—have included calls for additional federal oversight around various state Medicaid reimbursement initiatives, particularly the need for clear and consistently applied guidance from CMS about the permissiveness of various financing arrangements.[7]  Several of CMS’ proposed regulations attempt to remedy this problem, and restore clarity and fiscal integrity to the Medicaid program.

Additional Background on Medicaid Waste and Fraud: Although much of the debate surrounding the proposed CMS regulations has centered on the proper scope and limits of covered services within the Medicaid program, it is also worth noting the considerable amount of waste and criminal fraud present within some state Medicaid programs.  An extensive investigation published by The New York Times in July 2005 revealed several examples of highly questionable activity within the New York Medicaid program:

  • A Brooklyn dentist who billed Medicaid for performing 991 procedures in a single day;
  • One physician who wrote 12% of all the prescriptions purchased by New York Medicaid for an AIDS-related drug to treat wasting syndrome—allegedly so the steroid could be re-sold on the black market to bodybuilders;
  • Over $300 million—far more than any other state Medicaid program—in spending on transportation services, some of which involved rides for seniors mobile enough to rely on public transportation and other services which investigators believe may not have been performed at all; and
  • A school administrator in Buffalo who in a single day recommended that 4,434 students receive speech therapy funded by Medicaid—part of $1.2 billion in improper spending by the state on speech services, according to a federal audit.

A former state investigator of Medicaid abuse estimated that fraudulent claims totaled approximately 40% of all Medicaid spending in New York—nearly $18 billion per year, which may help explain why New York’s Medicaid expenditures greatly exceed California’s, despite a smaller overall population and fewer Medicaid beneficiaries.[8]

However, other audits emphasize that in some cases, providers can be victims of state efforts to reclaim additional federal Medicaid dollars.  A 2004 report from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Inspector General found that New York state required a nursing home to return more than half of its Medicaid revenues to the state, resulting in net revenues to the nursing home that were $20 million less than its operating costs.  The report noted:

The state’s upper-payment-limit funding approach benefited the state and the county more than the nursing home.  The state received $20 million more than it expended for the nursing home’s Medicaid residents without effectively contributing any money, and the county was reimbursed 100 percent for its upper-payment-limit contribution.  We are concerned that the federal government in effect provided almost all of the nursing home’s Medicaid funding, contrary to the principle that Medicaid is a shared responsibility of the federal and state governments.

The audit went on to note that the high level of Medicaid payments the nursing home was required to return to the state—and the operating losses the nursing home incurred on its Medicaid patients as a result—led to significant levels of understaffing that may have affected the quality of care provided to patients.[9]

Other HHS audits reflect Medicaid reimbursement submissions by states that either lack appropriate documentation for the claims or represent inappropriate use of Medicaid resources.  For example, one May 2003 claim for Medicaid targeted case management reimbursement included the following notation from the case manager explaining her contact with the beneficiary:

Phone call with mother.  Discussed the outstanding warrant for [name redacted].  She does not know where he is.  She will call police when he shows up.

While it may represent good public policy for this type of contact—which attempted to locate a juvenile for whom an outstanding arrest warrant existed—some conservatives would argue that such actions lie outside the scope of the Medicaid program’s intent and represent a far-from-ideal expenditure of federal matching dollars.

Committee Action:  On March 13, 2008, the bill was introduced and referred to the Energy and Commerce Committee.  On April 16, 2008, the full Energy and Commerce Committee reported the bill to the full House by a vote of 46-0.

Possible Conservative Concerns:  Numerous aspects of this legislation may raise concerns for conservatives, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

  • Process.  H.R. 5613 is being brought to the House floor under suspension of the rules, a procedure generally reserved for minor authorizations and smaller pieces of legislation, such as the naming of post offices.  Some conservatives may be concerned that a bill costing over a billion dollars is being rushed through House floor consideration under expedited procedures.
  • Budgetary Gimmick.  In order to comply with PAYGO rules, H.R. 5613 would impose a moratorium on CMS action until April 2009—and the legislation contains provisions offsetting the cost to the federal government for all savings not realized through that date.  However, staff for Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Dingell have publicly stated that H.R. 5613 is intended to delay the implementation of the Medicaid rules just long enough so that a future Administration can withdraw them.  Because withdrawing the regulations would result in approximately $16-18 billion in lost savings to the federal government over five years, and because action taken by a future Administration would not be subject to PAYGO, some conservatives may believe that H.R. 5613’s sponsors intend to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the PAYGO requirement under House rules.
  • Undermine Previous Republican Efforts to Reform Medicaid.  In December 2005, 212 Members of Congress—all Republicans—voted for legislation (P.L. 109-171) that generated less than $4.8 billion in savings from the Medicaid program as a first attempt to restore its fiscal integrity.  However, if the moratoria remain intact, those modest reductions in Medicaid’s growth rate would be more than exceeded by the $16-18 billion in foregone savings associated with the regulations’ repeal.
  • Encourage State Efforts to “Game” the Medicaid Program.  As highlighted above, nearly three dozen states have in recent years hired contingency fee consultants designed to maximize the portion of Medicaid costs paid for by the federal government.  Blocking regulations designed to respond to funding mechanisms which states and their consultants have established—and more than a dozen GAO reports over nearly 15 years have criticized—may only further encourage states to take steps that increase federal costs and  undermine Medicaid’s fiscal integrity.
  • Harm Hospitals and Other Providers.  As explained above, HHS Inspector General reports have revealed that various funding mechanisms designed to increase federal Medicaid revenues for states have often had the ancillary effect of reducing net payments to providers.  H.R. 5613, by blocking regulations designed to ensure that payments to Medicaid providers do not become ensnared in various schemes by states to increase federal Medicaid spending, may prevent some providers from seeing their net Medicaid payments rise when the proposed regulations take effect.

Administration Position:  Although the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) was not available at press time, Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt has previously written to Energy and Commerce Chairman Dingell and Ranking Member Barton indicating that the Administration strongly opposes H.R. 5613 and would recommend a Presidential veto.

Cost to Taxpayers:  A final score of the bill was not available at press time.  However, a preliminary CBO estimate indicated that H.R. 5613’s moratorium through April 2009 on the issuance of seven proposed regulations would cost taxpayers $1.65 billion over five and ten years.  However, as noted above, this score presumes the full implementation of the regulations in April 2009 under a new Administration.  Outright repeal of the regulations would cost $16.5 billion over five years—ten times the cost of H.R. 5613.

Additional mandatory spending—both $25 million annually for CMS anti-fraud enforcement activity with respect to Medicaid, and $5 million for an independent study on the proposed regulations—would cost $129 million over five years, and $254 million over ten.

H.R. 5613 would pay for this spending by extending an asset verification pilot program currently operating in three states to all 50 states, saving $1.0 billion over five years and $4.5 billion over ten.  The bill would also make adjustments to the Physician Assistance and Quality Improvement (PAQI) fund to comply with five-year PAYGO scoring rules, and deposit the additional savings over and above the ten-year cost of the moratoria.  Reports indicate that the $2.6 billion in additional ten-year savings will be withdrawn from the PAQI fund later this year to help finance Medicare physician reimbursement legislation.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?:  Yes, the bill would prohibit CMS from taking administrative actions (which are already built into CBO’s budgetary baseline) to prevent states from expanding the scope of the Medicaid program.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?:  No.

Does the Bill Comply with House Rules Regarding Earmarks/Limited Tax Benefits/Limited Tariff Benefits?:  A Committee report citing compliance with House earmark disclosure rules was unavailable at press time.

Constitutional Authority:  A Committee report citing constitutional authority was unavailable at press time.


[1] Because CMS proposals with respect to rehabilitation services (estimated savings of $1.4 billion over five years), graduate medical education ($0.8 billion estimated savings), and the definition of outpatient hospital services ($0.3 billion estimated savings) are at the proposed rulemaking stage, CBO assigns a baseline weighting factor of 50% to the proposed regulations, reflecting the uncertainties of the rulemaking process.  Thus, while CBO estimates a total of $17.8 billion in savings over five years if all rules were implemented as currently issued, a permanent prohibition on these seven rules would require $16.5 billion in savings under House PAYGO rules.

[2] Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/spec.pdf (accessed April 1, 2008), p. 383.

[3] Government Accountability Office, “Medicaid Financing: States’ Use of Contingency Fee Consultants to Maximize Federal Reimbursements Highlights Need for Increased Federal Oversight,” (Washington, Report GAO-05-748, June 2005) available online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05748.pdf (accessed March 31, 2008), p. 4.

[4] Ibid., p. 19.

[5] Ibid., pp. 27-29.

[6] Ibid., p. 24.

[7] See ibid., p. 30.

[8] Clifford Levy and Michael Luo, “Medicaid Fraud May Reach into Billions,” The New York Times 18 July 2005, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/18/nyregion/18medicaid.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (accessed March 29, 2008).

[9] “Adequacy of Medicaid Payments to Albany County Nursing Home,” (Washington, DC, Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General Report #A-02-02-01020), available online at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region2/20201020.pdf (accessed April 20, 2008), pp. 6-7.