Why Republicans Get No Points for Opposing Democrats’ $3 Trillion Coronavirus Bill

On May 15, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) will bring to the floor of the House a sprawling, 1,815-page bill. Released mere days ago, the bill would spend roughly $3 trillion—down from the $4 trillion or more that lawmakers on her socialist left wanted to allocate to the next “stimulus” package.

Most House Republicans will oppose this bill, which contains a massive bailout for states and numerous other provisions on every leftist wish list for years. But should anyone give them credit for opposing the legislation? In a word, no.

Conservatives shouldn’t give Republican lawmakers any credit for opposing bills that have no chance of passage to begin with—bills they never should vote for anyway. I didn’t go out and rob a bank yesterday. Should I get a medal for that? Of course not. You don’t get credit for doing the things you’re supposed to do.

Conservatives should demand more than the soft bigotry of low expectations that Republican lawmakers’ miserable track record on spending has led them to expect. For starters, instead of “just” voting no on the Pelosi bill’s additional $3 trillion in spending, why not come up with a plan to pay for the $3 trillion Congress has already spent in the past several months?

Yes, government needs to spend money responding to coronavirus, not least because government shut down large swathes of the economy as a public health measure. But that doesn’t mean Congress can or should avoid paying down this debt—not to mention our unsustainable entitlements—starting soon.

Decades of ‘Conservative’ Grifters

Two examples show how far Republican lawmakers stray from their rhetoric. In July 2017, former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) said of his prior rhetoric regarding Obamacare, from defunding the law to “repeal-and-replace”: “I never believed it.” Of course, he waited to make this admission until he had left office and taken a lucrative job at an investment bank.

Cantor’s comments confirmed conservatives’ justifiable fears: That Republican lawmakers constantly play them for a bunch of suckers, making promises they don’t believe to win power, so they can leverage that power to cash in for themselves.

Perhaps the classic example of the “all hat and no cattle” mentality comes via former House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.). Notwithstanding Ryan’s reputation as a supposed fiscal hawk, consider his actions while in House leadership:

  • Instead of reforming entitlements, Ryan led the charge to repeal the first-ever cap on entitlement spending. He could have nixed Obamacare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board, a group of unelected officials charged with slowing the growth of Medicare spending, while keeping the spending cap. Instead, he got Congress to repeal the board and the spending cap that went with it—worsening our entitlement shortfalls.
  • For years, Ryan proposed various reforms to the tax treatment of health insurance, because economists on both the left and the right agree it encourages the growth of health-care costs. But as speaker, Ryan supported delays of a policy included in Obamacare that, while imperfect, at least moved in the right direction towards lowering health care costs. The delays allowed Congress to repeal the policy outright late last year, in a massive spending bill that shifted both spending and health-care costs the wrong way.
  • As chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Ryan gave then-House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) the political cover he needed to pass a Medicare physician payment bill that increased the deficit and Medicare premiums for seniors. The legislation did include some entitlement reforms, but at a high cost—and didn’t even permanently solve the physician payment problem.

Ryan’s “accomplishments” on spending as a member of leadership echo his prior votes as a backbench member of Congress. Ryan voted for the No Child Left Behind Act; for the Medicare Modernization Act, which created a new, unpaid entitlement costing $7.8 trillion over the long term; and for the infamous Troubled Asset Relief Program Wall Street bailout.

Over his 20-year history in Congress, I can’t think of a single instance where Ryan took a “tough vote” in which he defied the majority of his party. Instead, he always supported Republicans’ big-spending agenda. In that sense, tagging Ryan as a RINO—a Republican in Name Only—lacks accuracy, because it implies that most Republican lawmakers have a sense of fiscal discipline that only Ryan lacks.

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to draw the line from Ryan’s brand of “leadership” to Donald Trump. The latter spent most of his 2016 campaign illustrating how Republican elected officials failed to deliver on any of their promises, despite talking up their plans for years.

Stand for Principle, or Stand for Nothing

When Republicans enter the House chamber on Friday to cast their votes against Pelosi’s bill, they should take a moment to contemplate her history. In the 2010 elections, Pelosi lost the speakership in no small part because of Obamacare. One scientific study concluded that the Obamacare vote alone cost Democrats 13 seats in the House that year.

Pelosi did not relinquish the speakership gladly; few would ever do that. But she proved willing to lose the speakership to pass the law—and would do so again, if forced to make such a binary choice.

I know not on what policy grounds, if any, Republicans would willingly sacrifice their majorities in the way Pelosi and the Democrats did to pass Obamacare. (Reforming entitlements? Tax cuts? Immigration?) That in and of itself speaks to the Republican Party’s existential questions, and the ineffective nature of the party’s “leadership.”

It also provides all the reason in the world that House Republicans should not trumpet their votes against the Pelosi legislation on Friday.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Medicare Trustees Report Exposes Sanders’ Socialist Delusions

Many of the left’s policy proposals come with the same design flaw: While sounding great on paper, they have little chance of working in practice. Monday brought one such type of reality check to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and supporters of single-payer health care, in the form of the annual Medicare trustees report.

The report once again demonstrates Medicare’s shaky financial standing, as the retirement of 10,000 Baby Boomers every day continues to tax the program’s limited resources. So why would Sanders and Democrats raid this precariously funded program to finance their government takeover of health care?

Medicare’s Ruinous Finances

Before even dissecting the report itself, one major caveat worth noting: The trustees report assumes that many of the Medicare payment reductions, and tax increases, included in Obamacare can be used “both” to “save Medicare” and fund Obamacare. In practice, however, sheer common sense suggests the impossibility of this scenario—as not even the federal government can spend the same dollars twice.

The last trustees report prior to these Obamacare gimmicks, in 2009, predicted that the Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) Trust Fund would become insolvent in 2017—two years ago. To put it another way, under a more accurate accounting mechanism, Medicare has already become functionally insolvent. Obamacare’s accounting gimmicks just allowed politicians (including President Trump) to continue to ignore Medicare’s funding shortfalls, thus making them worse by failing to act.

Even despite the double-counting created by Obamacare, the Part A Trust Fund faces significant obstacles. Monday’s report reveals that the trust fund suffered a $1.6 billion loss in 2018. This loss comes on the heels of a total of $132.2 billion in trust fund deficits from 2008 through 2015, as payroll tax revenues dropped dramatically during the Great Recession.

Worse yet, the trustees report that trust fund deficits will continue forever. Deficits will continue to rise, and by 2026—within the decade—the Trust Fund will become insolvent, and unable to pay all of its bills.

Replacing One Decrepit Program with an Even Worse One

In 2003, House conservatives included this mechanism in the Medicare Modernization Act, which requires the trustees to make an annual assessment of the program’s funding. If general revenues—as opposed to the payroll tax revenues that largely cover the costs of the Part A program—are projected to exceed 45 percent of total program outlays, this provision seeks to prompt a debate about Medicare’s long-term funding.

Compare this provision, which triggers whenever general revenues (i.e., those not specifically dedicated to Medicare) approach half of total program spending, with single payer. As these pages have previously noted, here’s what Section 701(d) both the House and Senate single payer bills would do to Medicare:

(d) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—Any amounts remaining in the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund under section 1817 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395i) or the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund under section 1841 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395t) after the payment of claims for items and services furnished under title XVIII of such Act have been completed, shall be transferred into the Universal Medicare Trust Fund under this section.

Both bills would liquidate both of the current Medicare trust funds—and abolish the current Medicare program—to pay for the new single-payer plan. But how do Democrats propose to pay for the rest of the estimated $32 trillion cost of their program? Sanders referenced a list of potential tax increases (not drafted as legislative language), but the House sponsors didn’t even bother to go that far.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Ocasio-Cortez Wants Congress to Stop Pretending to Pay for Its Spending

Get used to reading more storylines like this over the next two years: The left hand doesn’t know what the far-left hand is doing.

On Wednesday, incoming House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) faced a potential revolt from within her own party. Rep.-elect Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and several progressive allies threatened to vote against the rules package governing congressional procedures on the first day of the new Congress Thursday, because of proposed changes they believe would threaten their ability to pass single-payer health care.

What’s Going On?

Ocasio-Cortez and her allies object to Pelosi’s attempt to reinstate Pay-as-You-Go (PAYGO) rules for the new 116th Congress. Put simply, those rules would require that any legislation the House considers not increase the deficit over five- and ten-year periods. In short, this policy would mean that any bill proposing new mandatory spending or revenue reductions must pay for those changes via offsetting tax increases and/or spending cuts—hence the name.

Under Republican control, the House had a policy requiring spending increases—but not tax cuts—to be paid for. Pelosi would overturn that policy and apply PAYGO to both the spending and the revenue side of the ledger.

Progressives object to Pelosi’s attempt to constrain government spending, whether in the form of additional fiscal “stimulus” or a single-payer health system.

However, Pelosi’s spokesman countered with a statement indicating that the progressives’ move “is a vote to let Mick Mulvaney make across-the-board cuts.” Mulvaney heads the Office of Management and Budget, which would implement any sequester under statutory PAYGO.

Regardless of what the new House decides regarding its own procedures for considering bills, Pay-as-You-Go remains on the federal statute books. Democrats re-enacted it in 2010, just prior to Obamacare’s passage. If legislation Congress passed  violates those statutory PAYGO requirements (as opposed to any internal House rules), it will trigger mandatory spending reductions via the sequester—the “across-the-board cuts” to which Pelosi’s spokesman referred.

To Pay for Spending—Or Not?

Progressives think reinstituting PAYGO would impose fiscal constraints hindering their ability to pass massive new spending legislation. However, the reality does not match the rhetoric from Ocasio-Cortez and others. Consider, for instance, just some of the ways a Democratic Congress “paid for” the more than $1.8 trillion in new spending on Obamacare:

  • A CLASS Act that even some Democrats called “a Ponzi scheme of the first order, the kind of thing Bernie Madoff would have been proud of,” and which never went into effect because the Obama administration could not implement it in a fiscally sustainable manner;
  • Double counting the Medicare savings in the legislation as “both” improving the solvency of Medicare and paying for the new spending in Obamacare;
  • Payment reductions that the non-partisan Medicare actuary considers extremely unlikely to be sustainable, and which could cause more than half of hospitals and nursing homes to become unprofitable within a generation;
  • Tax increases that Congress has repeatedly delayed, and which could end up never going into effect.

A Bipartisan Spending Addiction

An external observer weighing the Part D and Obamacare examples would find it difficult to determine the less dishonest approach to fiscal policy. It reinforces that America’s representatives have a bipartisan addiction to more government spending, and a virtually complete unwillingness to make tough choices now, instead bequeathing massive (and growing) amounts of debt to the next generation.

In that sense, Ocasio-Cortez and her fellow progressives should feel right at home in the new Congress. Republicans may criticize her for proposing new spending, but the difference between her and most GOP members represents one of degree rather than of kind. Therein lies the problem: In continuing to spend with reckless abandon, Congress is merely debating how quickly to sink our country’s fiscal ship.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Mixed Messages on Paul Ryan’s Entitlement Record

Upon news of House Speaker Paul Ryan’s retirement Wednesday, liberals knew to attack him, but didn’t know exactly why. Liberal Politico columnist Michael Grunwald skewered Ryan’s hypocrisy on fiscal discipline:

Ryan’s support for higher spending has not been limited to defense and homeland security. He supported Bush’s expansion of prescription drug benefits, as well as the auto bailout and Wall Street bailout during the financial crisis…Ryan does talk a lot about reining in Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security, for which he’s routinely praised as a courageous truth-teller. But he’s never actually made entitlement reform happen. Congress did pass one law during his tenure that reduced Medicare spending by more than $700 billion, but that law was Obamacare, and Ryan bitterly opposed it.

For the record, Ryan opposed Obamacare because, as he repeatedly noted during the 2012 campaign, the law “raided” Medicare to pay for Obamacare. (Kathleen Sebelius, a member of President Obama’s cabinet, admitted the law used Medicare spending reductions to both “save Medicare” and “fund health care reform.”)

Compare that with a Vox article, titled “Paul Ryan’s Most Important Legacy is Trump’s War on Medicaid”: “[Paul] Ryan’s dreams are alive and well. Through work requirements and other restrictions, President Donald Trump could eventually oversee the most significant rollback of Medicaid benefits in the program’s 50-year history.” It goes on to talk about how the administration “is carrying on Ryan’s Medicaid-gutting agenda.”

Which is it? On fiscal discipline, is Ryan an incompetent hypocrite, or a slash-and-burn maniac throwing poor people out on the streets? As in most cases, reality contains nuance. Several caveats are in order.

First, Ryan’s budgets always contained “magic asterisks.” As the Los Angeles Times noted in 2012, “the budget resolutions he wrote would have left that Medicare ‘raid’ in place”—because Republicans could only achieve the political goal of a balanced budget within ten years by retaining Obamacare’s tax increases and Medicare reductions.” The budgets generally repealed the Obamacare entitlements, thus allowing the Medicare reductions to bolster that program rather than financing Obamacare. The budgets served as messaging documents, but generally lacked many of the critical details to transform them from visions into actual policy.

Second, to the best of my recollections, Ryan never took on the leadership of his party on a major policy issue. Former GOP House Speaker John Boehner famously never requested an earmark during a quarter-century in Congress. Sen. John McCain’s “Maverick” image came from his fight against fellow Republicans on campaign finance reform.

But whether as a backbencher or a committee chair, Ryan rarely bucked the party line. That meant voting for the Bush administration’s big-spending bills like the Medicare Modernization Act and TARP—both of which the current vice president, Mike Pence, voted against while a backbench member of Congress.

Third, particularly under this president, Republicans do not want to reform entitlements. As I noted during the 2016 election, neither presidential candidate made an issue of entitlement reform, or Medicare’s impending insolvency. In fact, both went out of their way to avoid the issue. Any House speaker would have difficulty convincing this president to embrace substantive entitlement reforms.

In general, one can argue that, contrary to his image as a leader on fiscal issues, Ryan too readily followed. Other Republicans would support his austere budgets, which never had the force of law, but he would support their big-spending bills, many of which made it to the statute books.

On one issue, however, Ryan did lead—and in the worst possible way. As I wrote last fall, Ryan brought to the House floor legislation repealing Obamacare’s cap on Medicare spending. This past February, that repeal became law.

Ryan could have sought to retain that cap while discarding the unelected, unaccountable board Obamacare created to enforce it. As a result, Ryan’s “legacy” on entitlement reform will consist of his role as the first speaker to repeal a cap on entitlement spending.

Primum non nocere—first, do no harm. Ryan may not have had the power to compel Republicans to reform entitlements, but he did have the power—if he had had the courage—to prevent his own party from making the problem any worse. He did not.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Yes, Obamacare Really Does Disadvantage Individuals with Disabilities

My article last week regarding disability groups’ political and policy views prompted some comments and criticisms on Twitter. Rather than trying to explain detailed subjects in bursts of 140-character tweets, I considered it best to compile them into a longer-form article.

To summarize my prior work: Obamacare provides states with a greater incentive to expand Medicaid to able-bodied adults than to cover services for individuals with disabilities. States receive a 95 percent match this year (declining to 90 percent in 2020 and all future years) to cover the able-bodied, but a match ranging from 50-75 percent to cover individuals with disabilities, while more than half a million are on waiting lists to receive home or attendant care.

Many of the responses I discuss in greater detail below attempt to obscure two separate and distinct issues: The question of the amount of funding for programs versus the priorities within those programs.

As a conservative, I’m likely to disagree with liberals on the ideal size of many government programs, but I thought I would at least agree with them that individuals with disabilities should receive precedence within those programs. However, Obamacare actually tilted Medicaid’s preference away from individuals with disabilities, which makes disability groups’ silence on that front surprising.

There Is No Correlation Between Waiting Lists and Medicaid Expansion

The timeliest rebuttal comes from a story on a long-term care report none other than AARP released yesterday. Susan Reinhard with that organization—no right-wing conservative group, by any stretch—said that

Many states have struggled to expand home- and community-based options for Medicaid enrollees needing long-term care because that is an optional benefit. Nursing homes are mandatory under federal law. While states focus on Medicaid coverage for children and families — as well as non-disabled adults covered by the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act — adults with disabilities have received less attention. ‘Long-term care is a stepchild of the program and not a top focus for states,’ she said. (emphasis mine.)

That statement notwithstanding, several people cited two different analyses that compare states’ decisions on expansion to the able-bodied and their waiting lists for home-based care for individuals with disabilities. But each of those “studies” (based on only one year of data available) take an overly simplistic approach, and therefore don’t get at the core issue of the extent to which the skewed incentives Obamacare created have encouraged states to prioritize the able-bodied over those with disabilities.

A state’s decision to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied, or reduce its waiting lists for individuals with disabilities, depends on myriad factors. For instance:

  • A wealthy state with a greater tax base would have more resources both to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied and to reduce its waiting list of individuals with disabilities, while a poorer state with a smaller tax base might not have resources to do either;
  • A state with “bad” demographics (e.g., an older and sicker population), or higher costs for health and personal care services, might have more difficulty reducing their Medicaid waiting lists;
  • A state may face other fiscal pressures—controversy over school funding, a natural disaster, a pension crisis—that could affect overall Medicaid spending.

Numerous variables affect states’ budget choices, and therefore their Medicaid waiting lists. The “studies” controlled for exactly none of them. They examined whether a state expanded Medicaid and the total number of people on a state’s waiting list, and that’s it.

Moreover, under Obamacare, all states receive the same (higher) federal match to cover able-bodied adults—another change in policy (prior to Obamacare, all Medicaid match rates were based on states’ relative income) skewing the balance in favor of wealthier expansion states. Yet, as noted above, the analyses claiming no correlation between expansion and Medicaid waiting lists didn’t even attempt to control for these variables—or any other.

Therefore, in the absence of a quality study examining the issue, I’ll go with something far simpler: Common sense. If you’re a state that wants to spend more money on Medicaid, and you can do something (i.e., cover the able-bodied) that gives you 95 cents on the dollar, or something (i.e., reduce waiting lists for individuals with disabilities) that gives you 50 cents on the dollar, which are you going to do first?

I thought so. The incentives in Obamacare strongly favor coverage of the able-bodied over coverage for individuals with disabilities. And no number of crude analyses attempting to provide retroactive justification for this bad policy can hide that fact.

Waiting Lists Are Worst In Two Non-Expansion States

This comment reinforces the crudeness of the analysis being cited. All else being equal, as the second- and third-largest states in the Union, Texas and Florida would be expected to have a larger number of people on its waiting lists for home- and community-based services than a smaller expansion state like Connecticut. All else isn’t equal, of course, but did the analysts attempt to control for these kinds of factors? Nope. They examined raw waiting list numbers, rather than waiting lists as a percentage of the population.

But just suppose for a second that the commenters above are correct, and there is no correlation between expansion to the able-bodied and waiting lists for home-based care. That means that the greater incentives Obamacare gives to states to cover the able-bodied—and while the advocacy community might not want to admit it, Obamacare clearly does give states greater incentives to cover the able-bodied—didn’t affect state behavior, or decisions about whether to reduce disability waiting lists at all.

In that case, why has the disability community expressed such outrage about the impact of per capita caps or block grants on Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities? If states make decisions without considering federal incentives—the point of the claims that there is no correlation between expanding Medicaid to the able-bodied and longer waiting lists for individuals with disabilities—then why also claim that “cost-shifting to states will force massive cuts in Medicaid services?” Why wouldn’t states shift around resources to protect individuals with disabilities—what the disability community claims that states did to reduce waiting lists even while expanding Medicaid under Obamacare?

There are really only two credible possibilities:

  • States are affected by incentives, therefore Obamacare—by giving states a higher match to cover the able-bodied—encouraged discrimination against individuals with disabilities; or
  • States are not affected by incentives, and therefore the per capita caps—which generate a comparatively small amount of savings in the House repeal bill—will have little impact, because states will re-prioritize their budgets to protect the most vulnerable.

It’s therefore worth asking why some appear to be trying to argue both sides of this question, and doing so in a way that neatly lines up with partisan lines—trying to ignore Obamacare’s skewed incentives, while roundly castigating the House Republican bill for incentives that will “force massive cuts in Medicaid.”

Republicans’ Bill Would Cut Program Helping People Live at Home

This is a true statement: Section 111(2) of the American Health Care Act, House Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” bill, would sunset the enhanced match for the Community First Choice program on January 1, 2020. That option provides states with a 6 percent increase in their federal match for home- and community-based services, including to individuals with disabilities. But here again, raising this issue demonstrates the inherent disconnect between the incentives being offered to states, and the disability community’s responses to those incentives.

  • Obamacare provides states with a match ranging from 20-45 percentage points higher to cover the able-bodied than individuals with disabilities: “No correlation between expansion and waiting lists for individuals with disabilities!”
  • Obamacare provides states with a 6 percentage point increase for home-based services: A “huge change to improve HCBS [home and community-based services] care.”
  • The Republican alternative to Obamacare would reduce Medicaid spending for traditional (i.e., non-expansion) populations by a comparatively small amount: “Massive cuts to Medicaid services.”

Isn’t there a slight contradiction in these responses—both in their tone and in their logic? And isn’t it worth noting that these contradictions all happen to align perfectly with the natural partisan response to each of these issues?

This Is A Political Problem, Not a Policy Problem

Claiming that the greater federal match to cover able-bodied adults than individuals with disabilities stems from a “political history problem” deliberately obscures its roots. This “history” did not take place half a century ago, at Medicaid’s creation, it took place in the past few years, as part of Obamacare.

When crafting that legislation, Democrats could have come up with other policy solutions that expanded Medicaid to the able-bodied without discriminating against individuals with disabilities in the process. They could have proposed increasing the federal match for coverage of individuals with disabilities, in exchange for states covering the able-bodied at the existing federal match rates. Congress enacted a similar type of “swap” in the Medicare Modernization Act. The federal government took over the prescription drug cost of Medicare-Medicaid “dual eligibles” in exchange for a series of “clawback” payments from states.

Democrats in Congress could have considered other ways to expand Medicaid without giving states a greater match to cover the able-bodied than individuals with disabilities. To the best of my knowledge, they chose not to do so. President Obama could have insisted on a more equitable Medicaid formula, but he chose not to do so. And the disability community could have pointed out this disparity to the president and leaders in Congress, but chose not to do so.

Agree or disagree with them, these were deliberate policy choices, not a mere historical accident.

How Can You Support Lower Funding While Complaining About Access?

The argument about lower funding levels misses several points. First, while the Congressional Budget Office has not released estimates of how much the per capita caps (as opposed to changes associated with scaling back Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion) will reduce federal spending, multiple estimates suggest a comparatively small amount of savings from this particular change—at most 1 or 2 percent of spending on traditional Medicaid populations over the coming decade.

Second, if given sufficient flexibility from Washington, states can reduce their Medicaid spending, rendering the discussion of “cuts” under the caps moot. Rhode Island’s Global Compact Waiver, approved in January 2009, actually resulted in a year-on-year decline of Medicaid spending per beneficiary. Moreover, the non-partisan Lewin Group concluded that Rhode Island’s waiver reduced that spending by improving beneficiary access and care, not by denying medical services.

Third, if caps on Medicaid are so harmful and damaging, then why did Obamacare cap spending on Medicare—and why did disability groups remain silent about it? Current law imposes a per capita cap on Medicare spending, one enforced by Obamacare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) of unelected bureaucrats.

What’s more, Obamacare imposes an annual inflation adjustment (gross domestic product growth plus 1 percent) likely to be lower than the inflation adjustment for disabled populations included in the House-passed bill (medical inflation plus 1 percent). Yet a critique of the Medicare payment caps or IPAB appears nowhere in the disability community’s 14 pages of comments regarding the bill that became Obamacare.

So the question to the disability community is obvious: Why does a Democratic proposal to impose per capita caps on Medicare raise no objections, but a Republican proposal to impose (potentially higher) per capita caps on Medicaid guaranteed to prompt “massive cuts in Medicaid services?”

Let’s Just Pay More for Everyone

This comment attempts to obscure the distinction between the amount of funding and the priorities for that funding. I might disagree with liberals about the overall level of funding for the program—not least because efforts like that in Rhode Island demonstrate the potential for Medicaid to become more efficient—but I should agree with them about the need to prioritize care for the most vulnerable. Unfortunately, Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion goes in the opposite direction.

In thinking about the important distinction between overall program funding and priorities within a program, I’m often reminded of a speech that former House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) gave on the House floor in September 2009: “At some point in time, my friends, we have to buck up our courage and our judgment and say, if we take care of everybody, we won’t be able to take care of those who need us most. That’s my concern. If we take care of everybody…then we will not be able to take care of those most in need in America.”

Yes, Hoyer’s speech discussed Medicare, not Medicaid, and he voted for Obamacare (and its Medicaid expansion) six months after giving it. But the speech raises an important point about the need to prioritize entitlements, one that the notion of giving higher reimbursement rates to all populations ignores.

That’s what’s wrong with focusing solely on the question on the amount of funding for a program. Reasonable people can (and will) disagree about where to draw the funding line, but it has to be drawn somewhere. “Solving” the question of funding priorities by increasing reimbursements for all populations—the equivalent of promising everyone a pony—will, by failing to choose wisely now, cause even tougher fiscal choices for generations to come.

Disability Groups Have More Important Priorities

Yes, I have worked with disability groups. For one, in 2013, I served on the Commission on Long-Term Care Congress created in the wake of the CLASS Act’s failure and repeal. We took many hours of public testimony from disability groups and others, and received dozens of other written comments—many from dedicated and passionate parents or caregivers of individuals with disabilities, and all of which I made a point to read. I won’t claim to have made disability policy my life’s work, but my jobs over the years have intersected with the disability community on several occasions.

By claiming that disability groups have “way more priorities than comparing their FMAP [i.e., their federal match rate],” this comment actually makes my point for me. The January 2010 letter by the Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) setting out priorities for what became Obamacare was 14 pages in length, amounted to over 5,500 words, and included (by my count) 73 separate bulleted recommendations regarding the legislation. All that, and yet not one word on the bill prioritizing coverage of the able-bodied over individuals with disabilities? Frankly, the issue seems quite conspicuous by its absence.

Just Interview Someone From This Consortium

I received a series of tweetsculminating in a dramatic “Shame on you”—attacking me for not having contacted any members of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) prior to writing my piece. It is correct that I didn’t reach out to any CCD member groups before printing the article. I didn’t need to because I had already spent years working with them.

The charge that I never spoke to “ONE SINGLE CCD MEMBER” is false—and demonstrably so. For nearly four years, from the spring of 2004 until the end of 2007, I worked as a lobbyist for the National Association of Disability Representatives (NADR). During that time, I spent many hours in CCD task force meetings, interacting both directly and indirectly with CCD members. The commenter’s accusation that if I had reached out to CCD members, I would know about the lengthy adjudication process for many Social Security disability claims holds no small amount of irony—I handled those issues over a decade ago.

In reality, my time working with CCD members while representing the disability representatives prompted me to write my article last week. While attending CCD meetings, I saw firsthand how some meeting participants—several of which remain in their current positions and active in CCD activities—made offhand comments of a rather partisan nature. Not everyone joined in the political commentary, but several felt comfortable enough to make clear their partisan affiliations in open discussions, even if I and others did not.

Similarly, I recall how the disability community fought against George W. Bush’s idea for personal accounts within Social Security almost uniformly, and even before Congress and the administration had an opportunity to fully develop their proposals. At the time, my client, the National Association of Disability Representatives, took an agnostic view towards the personal account concept, focusing more on the specifics of whether and how it could work for the disability community.

For instance, NADR wanted to ensure that any personal account proposal would hold the Social Security Disability Trust Fund (separate from the Old Age and Survivors Trust Fund) harmless, and that people who spent time receiving disability benefits would not be financially harmed (e.g., lack the opportunity to save wage earnings in a personal account, yet have their retirement benefits reduced) for having done so.

By contrast, most CCD members opposed the proposal from the get-go, often coordinating with Nancy Pelosi, Sander Levin, and other Democrats for events and strategy meetings. Archives on the disability coalition’s website from that era appear incomplete, but a 2005 August recess “Action Alert: Efforts to Privatize Social Security Continue!” gives a sense of the message coming from most CCD members, and the organization as a whole.

At this point any liberals still reading might applaud the disability community for having come out so strongly against the Bush proposal. But that idea focused on the Social Security retirement system, not the disability program, and the Bush administration and Republicans in Congress wanted to engage with disability groups to ensure any reforms held the disability community harmless. So how did failing to engage them—choosing instead to oppose from the outset—help the disability community?

In truth, early and vocal opposition to personal accounts may have put the disability community at greater risk had the personal account proposal been enacted without disability groups’ technical expertise on how best to structure it. And given both the partisan comments I heard from at least some CCD members at CCD meetings, it’s worth asking whether partisan or ideological concerns—separate and distinct from the interests of the disability community—unduly or improperly influenced the organization’s collective judgment back then.

Their inherent contradictions in the current debate—remaining silent about Obamacare’s unfair Medicaid match rate disparity and Medicare payment caps, while strenuously objecting to Republican attempts to impose payment caps on Medicaid—reinforce those concerns about undue partisanship.

It isn’t always easy stating inconvenient truths—pointing out that laws one doesn’t like should be enforced along with every other law, or where policies proposed by lawmakers with whom one might ordinarily be aligned fall woefully short. But such truth-telling remains an essential ingredient to authenticity and credibility. As I argued last week, I don’t think the disability community has done that in this case. I wish they had.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Testimony on Risk Corridors and the Judgment Fund

A PDF of this testimony is available at the House Judiciary Committee website.

Testimony before the House Judiciary

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice

 

Hearing on “Oversight of the Judgment Fund”

March 2, 2017

 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Cohen, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to testify. My name is Chris Jacobs, and I am the Founder of Juniper Research Group, a policy and research consulting firm based in Washington. Much of my firm’s work focuses on health care policy, a field in which I have worked for over a decade—including more than six years on Capitol Hill. Given my background and work in health care, I have been asked to testify on the use of the Judgment Fund as it pertains to one particular area: Namely, the ongoing litigation regarding risk corridor payments to insurers under Section 1342 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).

The risk corridor lawsuits provide a good example of a problematic use of the Judgment Fund, and not just due to the sums involved—literally billions of dollars in taxpayer funds are at issue. Any judgments paid out to insurers via the Judgment Fund would undermine the appropriations authority of Congress, in two respects. First, Congress never explicitly appropriated funds to the risk corridor program—either in PPACA or any other statute. Second, once the Obama Administration sent signals indicating a potential desire to use taxpayer dollars to fund risk corridors, notwithstanding the lack of an explicit appropriation, Congress went further, and enacted an express prohibition on such taxpayer funding. Utilizing the Judgment Fund to appropriate through the back door what Congress prohibited through the front door would represent an encroachment by the judiciary and executive on Congress’ foremost legislative power—the “power of the purse.”

Though past precedents and opinions by the Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, and Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel should provide ample justification for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to deny the risk corridor claims made by insurers when it considers pending appeals of their cases, Congress can take additional action to clarify its prerogatives in this sphere. Specifically, Congress could act to clarify in the risk corridor case, and in any other similar case, that it has “otherwise provided for” funding within the meaning of the Judgment Fund when it has limited or restricted expenditures of funds.

 

Background on Risk Corridors

PPACA created risk corridors as one of three programs (the others being reinsurance and risk adjustment) designed to stabilize insurance markets in conjunction with the law’s major changes to the individual marketplace.  Section 1342 of the law established risk corridors for three years—calendar years 2014, 2015, and 2016. It further prescribed that insurers suffering losses during those years would have a portion of those losses reimbursed, while insurers achieving financial gains during those years would cede a portion of those profits.[1]

Notably, however, the statute did not provide an explicit appropriation for the risk corridor program—either in Section 1342 or elsewhere. While the law directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a risk corridor program,[2] and make payments to insurers,[3] it does not provide a source for those payments.

 

History of Risk Corridor Appropriations

The lack of an explicit appropriation for risk corridors was not an unintentional oversight by Congress. The Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee included an explicit appropriation for risk corridors in its health care legislation marked up in 2009.[4] Conversely, the Senate Finance Committee’s version of the legislation—the precursor to PPACA—included no appropriation for risk corridors.[5] When merging the HELP and Finance Committee bills, Senators relied upon the Finance Committee’s version of the risk corridor language—the version with no explicit appropriation.

Likewise, the Medicare Modernization Act’s risk corridor program for the Part D prescription drug benefit included an explicit appropriation from the Medicare Prescription Drug Account, an account created by the law as an offshoot of the Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund.[6] While PPACA specifically states that its risk corridor program “shall be based on the program for regional participating provider organizations under” Medicare Part D, unlike that program, it does not include an appropriation for its operations.[7]

As the Exchanges began operations in 2014, Congress, noting the lack of an express appropriation for risk corridors in PPACA, questioned the source of the statutory authority for HHS to spend money on the program. On February 7, 2014, then-House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) and then-Senate Budget Committee Ranking Member Jeff Sessions (R-AL) wrote to Comptroller General Gene Dodaro requesting a legal opinion from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the availability of an appropriation for the risk corridors program.[8]

In response to inquiries from GAO, HHS replied with a letter stating the Department’s opinion that, while risk corridors did not receive an explicit appropriation in PPACA, the statute requires the Department to establish, manage, and make payments to insurers as part of the risk corridor program. Because risk corridors provide special benefits to insurers by stabilizing the marketplace, HHS argued, risk corridor payments amount to user fees, and the Department could utilize an existing appropriation—the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Program Management account—to make payments.[9] GAO ultimately accepted the Department’s reasoning, stating the Department had appropriation authority under the existing appropriation for the CMS Program Management account to spend user fees.[10]

The GAO ruling came after Health and Human Services had sent a series of mixed messages regarding the implementation of the risk corridor program. In March 2013, the Department released a final rule noting that “the risk corridors program is not statutorily required to be budget neutral. Regardless of the balance of payments and receipts, HHS will remit payments as required under Section 1342 of” PPACA.[11] However, one year later, on March 11, 2014, HHS reversed its position, announcing the Department’s intent to implement the risk corridor program in a three-year, budget-neutral manner.[12]

Subsequent to the GAO ruling, and possibly in response to the varying statements from HHS, Congress enacted in December 2014 appropriations language prohibiting any transfers to the CMS Program Management account to fund shortfalls in the risk corridor program.[13] The explanatory statement of managers accompanying the legislation, noting the March 2014 statement by HHS pledging to implement risk corridors in a budget neutral manner, stated that Congress added the new statutory language “to prevent the CMS Program Management account from being used to support risk corridor payments.”[14] This language was again included in appropriations legislation in December 2015, and remains in effect today.[15]

 

Losses Lead to Lawsuits

The risk corridor program has incurred significant losses for 2014 and 2015. On October 1, 2015, CMS revealed that insurers paid $387 million into the program, but requested $2.87 billion. As a result of both these losses and the statutory prohibition on the use of additional taxpayer funds, insurers making claims for 2014 received only 12.6 cents on the dollar for their claims that year.[16]

Risk corridor losses continued into 2015. Last September, without disclosing specific dollar amounts, CMS revealed that “all 2015 benefit year collections [i.e., payments into the risk corridor program] will be used towards remaining 2014 benefit year risk corridors payments, and no funds will be available at this time for 2015 benefit year risk corridors payments.”[17]

In November, CMS revealed that risk corridor losses for 2015 increased when compared to 2014. Insurers requested a total of $5.9 billion from the program, while paying only $95 million into risk corridors—all of which went to pay some of the remaining 2014 claims.[18] To date risk corridors face a combined $8.3 billion shortfall for 2014 and 2015—approximately $2.4 billion in unpaid 2014 claims, plus the full $5.9 billion in unpaid 2015 claims. Once losses for 2016 are added in, total losses for the program’s three-year duration will very likely exceed $10 billion, and could exceed $15 billion.

Due to the risk corridor program losses, several insurers have filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking payment via the Judgment Fund of outstanding risk corridor claims they allege are owed. Thus far, two cases have proceeded to judgment. On November 10, 2016, Judge Charles Lettow dismissed all claims filed by Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Company, an insurance co-operative created by PPACA that shut down operations in July 2016.[19] Notably, Judge Lettow did not dismiss the case for lack of ripeness, but on the merits of the case themselves. He considered HHS’ decision to implement the program in a budget-neutral manner reasonable, using the tests in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, and concluded that neither an explicit nor implicit contract existed between HHS and Land of Lincoln.[20]

Conversely, on February 9, 2017, Judge Thomas Wheeler granted summary judgment in favor of Moda Health Plan, an Oregon health insurer, on its risk corridor claims.[21] Judge Wheeler held that PPACA “requires annual payments to insurers, and that Congress did not design the risk corridors program to be budget-neutral. The Government is therefore liable for Moda’s full risk corridors payments” under the law.[22] And, contra Judge Lettow, Judge Wheeler concluded that an implied contract existed between HHS and Moda, which also granted the insurer right to payment.[23]

 

Congress “Otherwise Provided For” Risk Corridor Claims

The question of whether or not insurers have a lawful claim on the United States government is separate and distinct from the question of whether or not the Judgment Fund can be utilized to pay those claims. CMS, on behalf of the Department of Health and Human Services, has made clear its views regarding the former question. In announcing its results for risk corridors for 2015, the agency stated that the unpaid balances for each year represented “an obligation of the United States Government for which full payment is required,” and that “HHS will explore other sources of funding for risk corridors payments, subject to the availability of appropriations. This includes working with Congress on the necessary funding for outstanding risk corridors payments.”[24]

But because insurers seek risk corridor payments from the Judgment Fund, that fund’s permanent appropriation is available only in cases where payment is “not otherwise provided for” by Congress.[25] GAO, in its Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, describes such circumstances in detail:

Payment is otherwise provided for when another appropriation or fund is legally available to satisfy the judgment….Whether payment is otherwise provided for is a question of legal availability rather than actual funding status. In other words, if payment of a particular judgment is otherwise provided for as a matter of law, the fact that the defendant agency has insufficient funds at that particular time does not operate to make the Judgment Fund available. The agency’s only recourse in this situation is to seek additional appropriations from Congress, as it would have to do in any other deficiency situation.[26]

In this circumstance, GAO ruled in September 2014 that payments from insurers for risk corridors represented “user fees” that could be retained in the CMS Program Management account, and spent from same using existing appropriation authority. However, the prohibition on transferring taxpayer dollars to supplement those user fees prevents CMS from spending any additional funds on risk corridor claims other than those paid into the program by insurers themselves.

Given the fact pattern in this case, the non-partisan Congressional Research Service concluded that the Judgment Fund may not be available to insurers:

Based on the existence of an appropriation for the risk corridor payments, it appears that Congress would have “otherwise provided for” any judgments awarding payments under that program to a plaintiff. As a result, the Judgment Fund would not appear to be available to pay for such judgments under current law. This would appear to be the case even if the amounts available in the “Program Management” account had been exhausted. In such a circumstance, it appears that any payment to satisfy a judgment secured by plaintiffs seeking recovery of damages owed under the risk corridors program would need to wait until such funds were made available by Congress.[27]

Because the appropriations power rightly lies with Congress, the Judgment Fund cannot supersede the legislature’s decision regarding a program’s funding, or lack of funding. Congress chose not to provide the risk corridor program with an explicit appropriation; it further chose explicitly to prohibit transfers of taxpayer funds into the program. To allow the Judgment Fund to pay insurers’ risk corridor claims would be to utilize an appropriation after Congress has explicitly declined to do so.

The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has previously upheld the same principle that an agency’s inability to fund judgments does not automatically open the Judgment Fund up to claims:

The Judgment Fund does not become available simply because an agency may have insufficient funds at a particular time to pay a judgment. If the agency lacks sufficient funds to pay a judgment, but possesses statutory authority to make the payment, its recourse is to seek funds from Congress. Thus, if another appropriation or fund is legally available to pay a judgment or settlement, payment is “otherwise provided for” and the Judgment Fund is not available.[28]

The OLC memo reinforces the opinions of both CRS and the GAO: The Judgment Fund is a payer of last resort, rather than a payer of first instance. Where Congress has provided another source of funding, the Judgment Fund should not be utilized to pay judgments or settlements. Congress’ directives in setting limits on appropriations to the risk corridor program make clear that it has “otherwise provided for” risk corridor claims—therefore, the Judgment Fund should not apply.

 

Judgment Fund Settlements

Even though past precedent suggests the Judgment Fund should not apply to the risk corridor cases, a position echoed by at least one judge’s ruling on the matter, the Obama Administration prior to leaving office showed a strong desire to settle insurer lawsuits seeking payment for risk corridor claims using Judgment Fund dollars. In its September 9, 2016 memo declaring risk corridor claims an obligation of the United States government, CMS also acknowledged the pending cases regarding risk corridors, and stated that “we are open to discussing resolution of those claims. We are willing to begin such discussions at any time.”[29] That language not only solicited insurers suing over risk corridors to seek settlements from the Administration, it also served as an open invitation for other insurers not currently suing the United States to do so—in the hope of achieving a settlement from the executive.

Contemporaneous press reports last fall indicated that the Obama Administration sought to use the Judgment Fund as the source of funding to pay out risk corridor claims. Specifically, the Washington Post reported advanced stages of negotiations regarding a settlement of over $2.5 billion—many times more than the $18 million in successful Judgment Fund claims made against HHS in the past decade—with over 175 insurers, paid using the Judgment Fund “to get around a recent congressional ban on the use of Health and Human Services money to pay the insurers.”[30]

When testifying before a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee hearing on September 14, 2016, then-CMS Acting Administrator Andy Slavitt declined to state the potential source of funds for the settlements his agency had referenced in the memo released the preceding week.[31] Subsequent to that hearing, Energy and Commerce requested additional documents and details from CMS regarding the matter; that request is still pending.[32]

Even prior to this past fall, the Obama Administration showed a strong inclination to accommodate insurer requests for additional taxpayer funds. A 2014 House Oversight and Government Reform Committee investigative report revealed significant lobbying by insurers regarding both PPACA’s risk corridors and reinsurance programs.[33] Specifically, contacts by insurance industry executives to White House Senior Advisor Valerie Jarrett during the spring of 2014 asking for more generous terms for the risk corridor program yielded changes to the program formula—raising the profit floor from three percent to five percent—in ways that increased payments to insurers, and obligations to the federal government.[34]

Regardless of the Administration’s desire to accommodate insurers, as evidenced by its prior behavior regarding risk corridors, past precedent indicates that the Judgment Fund should not be accessible to pay either claims or settlements regarding risk corridors. A prior OLC memo indicates that “the appropriate source of funds for a settled case is identical to the appropriate source of funds should a judgment in that case be entered against the government.”[35] If a judgment cannot come from the Judgment Fund—and CRS, in noting that Congress has “otherwise provided for” risk corridor claims, believes it cannot—then neither can a settlement come from the Fund.

Given these developments, in October 2016 the Office of the House Counsel, using authority previously granted by the House, moved to file an amicus curiae brief in one of the risk corridor cases, that filed by Health Republic.[36] The House filing, which made arguments on the merits of the case that the Justice Department had not raised, did so precisely to protect Congress’ institutional prerogative and appropriations power—a power Congress expressed first when failing to fund risk corridors in the first place, and a second, more emphatic time when imposing additional restrictions on taxpayer funding to risk corridors.[37] The House filing made clear its stake in the risk corridor dispute:

Allegedly in light of a non-existent ‘litigation risk,’ HHS recently took the extraordinary step of urging insurers to enter into settlement agreements with the United States in order to receive payment on their meritless claims. In other words, HHS is trying to force the U.S. Treasury to disburse billions of dollars of taxpayer funds to insurance companies, even though DOJ [Department of Justice] has convincingly demonstrated that HHS has no legal obligation (and no legal right) to pay these sums. The House strongly disagrees with this scheme to subvert Congressional intent by engineering a massive giveaway of taxpayer money.[38]

The amicus filing illustrates the way in which the executive can through settlements—or, for that matter, failing vigorously to defend a suit against the United States—undermine the intent of Congress by utilizing the Judgment Fund appropriation to finance payments the legislature has otherwise denied.

 

Conclusion

Both the statute and existing past precedent warrant the dismissal of the risk corridor claims by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress spoke clearly on the issue of risk corridor funding twice: First when failing to provide an explicit appropriation in PPACA itself; and second when enacting an explicit prohibition on taxpayer funding. Opinions from Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, and Office of Legal Counsel all support the belief that, in taking these actions, Congress has “otherwise provided for” risk corridor funding, therefore prohibiting the use of the Judgment Fund. It defies belief that, having explicitly prohibited the use of taxpayer dollars through one avenue (the CMS Program Management account), the federal government should pay billions of dollars in claims to insurers via the back door route of the Judgment Fund.

However, in the interests of good government, Congress may wish to clarify that, in both the risk corridor cases and any similar case, lawmakers enacting a limitation or restriction on the use of funds should constitute “otherwise provid[ing] for” that program as it relates to the Judgment Fund. Such legislation would codify current practice and precedent, and preserve Congress’ appropriations power by preventing the executive and/or the courts from awarding judgments or settlements using the Judgment Fund where Congress has clearly spoken.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I look forward to your questions.

 

 

[1] Under the formulae established in Section 1342(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148), plans with profit margins between 3 percent and 8 percent pay half their profit margins between those two points into the risk corridor program, while plans with profit margins exceeding 8 percent pay in 2.5 percent of profits (half of their profits between 3 percent and 8 percent), plus 80 percent of any profit above 8 percent. Payments out to insurers work in the inverse manner—insurers with losses below 3 percent absorb the entire loss; those with losses of between 3 and 8 percent will have half their losses over 3 percent repaid; and those with losses exceeding 8 percent will receive 2.5 percent (half of their losses between 3 and 8 percent), plus 80 percent of all losses exceeding 8 percent. 42 U.S.C. 18062(b).

[2] Section 1342(a) of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. 18062(a).

[3] Section 1342(b) of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. 18062(b).

[4] Section 3106 of the Affordable Health Choices Act (S. 1679, 111th Congress), as reported by the Senate HELP Committee, established the Community Health Insurance Option. Section 3106(c)(1)(A) created a Health Benefit Plan Start-Up Fund “to provide loans for the initial operations of a Community Health Insurance Option.” Section 3106(c)(1)(B) appropriated “out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated an amount necessary as requested by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to,” among other things, “make payments under” the risk corridor program created in Section 3106(c)(3).

[5] Section 2214 of America’s Healthy Future Act (S. 1796, 111th Congress), as reported by the Senate Finance Committee, created a risk corridor program substantially similar to (except for date changes) that created in PPACA. Section 2214 did not include an appropriation for risk corridors.

[6] Section 101(a) of the Medicare Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173) created a program of risk corridors at Section 1860D—15(e) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w—115(e). Section 101(a) of the MMA also created a Medicare Prescription Drug Account within the Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund at Section 1860D—16 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w—116. Section 1860D—16(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w—116(c)(3), “authorized to be appropriated, out of any moneys of the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,” amounts necessary to fund the Account. Section 1860D—16(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 1395w—116(b)(1)(B), authorized the use of Account funds to make payments under Section 1860D—15, the section which established the Part D risk corridor program.

[7] Section 1342(a) of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. 18062(a).

[8] Letter from House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton and Senate Budget Committee Ranking Member Jeff Sessions to Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, February 7, 2014.

[9] Letter from Department of Health and Human Services General Counsel William Schultz to Government Accountability Office Assistant General Counsel Julie Matta, May 20, 2014.

[10] Government Accountability Office legal decision B-325630, Department of Health and Human Services—Risk Corridor Program, September 30, 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666299.pdf.

[11] Department of Health and Human Services, final rule on “Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014,” Federal Register March 11, 2013, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-03-11/pdf/2013-04902.pdf, p. 15473.

[12] Department of Health and Human Services, final rule on “Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2015,” Federal Register March 11, 2014, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-11/pdf/2014-05052.pdf, p. 13829.

[13] Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, P.L. 113-235, Division G, Title II, Section 227.

[14] Explanatory Statement of Managers regarding Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Congressional Record December 11, 2014, p. H9838.

[15] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113, Division H, Title II, Section 225.

[16] Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, memorandum regarding “Risk Corridors Proration Rate for 2014,” October 1, 2015, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Premium-Stabilization-Programs/Downloads/RiskCorridorsPaymentProrationRatefor2014.pdf.

[17] Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, memorandum regarding “Risk Corridors Payments for 2015,” September 9, 2016, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Premium-Stabilization-Programs/Downloads/Risk-Corridors-for-2015-FINAL.PDF.

[18] Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, memorandum regarding “Risk Corridors Payment and Charge Amounts for the 2015 Benefit Year,” https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/2015-RC-Issuer-level-Report-11-18-16-FINAL-v2.pdf.

[19] Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Company v. United States, Court of Federal Claims No. 16-744C, ruling of Judge Charles Lettow, November 10, 2016, https://ecf.cofc.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2016cv0744-47-0.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Moda Health Plan v. United States, Court of Federal Claims No. 16-649C, ruling of Judge Thomas Wheeler, February 9, 2017, https://ecf.cofc.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2016cv0649-23-0.

[22] Ibid., p. 2.

[23] Ibid., pp. 34-39.

[24] CMS, “Risk Corridors Payments for 2015.”

[25] 31 U.S.C. 1304(a)(1).

[26] Government Accountability Office, 3 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 14-39, http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203470.pdf.

[27] Congressional Research Service, memo to Sen. Marco Rubio on the risk corridor program, January 5, 2016, http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1dc92ef8-c340-4cfd-95c0-67369a557f1e/2AA5EF8F125279800BFABC8B8BA37072.05.24.2016-crs-rubio-memo-risk-corridors-1-5-16-1-redacted.pdf.

[28] Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel, “Appropriate Source for Payment of Judgment and Settlements in United States v. Winstar Corp.,” July 22, 1998, Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 22, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1998/07/31/op-olc-v022-p0141.pdf, p. 153.

[29] CMS, “Risk Corridors Payments for 2015.”

[30] Amy Goldstein, “Obama Administration May Use Obscure Fund to Pay Billions to ACA Insurers,” Washington Post September 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-may-use-obscure-fund-to-pay-billions-to-aca-insurers/2016/09/29/64a22ea4-81bc-11e6-b002-307601806392_story.html?utm_term=.361888177f81.

[31] Testimony of CMS Acting Administrator Andy Slavitt before House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee Hearing on “The Affordable Care Act on Shaky Ground: Outlook and Oversight,” September 14, 2016, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20160914/105306/HHRG-114-IF02-Transcript-20160914.pdf, pp. 84-89.

[32] Letter from House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton et al. to Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell regarding risk corridor settlements, September 20, 2016, https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/letters/letter-hhs-regarding-risk-corridors-program.

[33] House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, staff report on “Obamacare’s Taxpayer Bailout of Health Insurers and the White House’s Involvement to Increase Bailout Size,” July 28, 2014, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/WH-Involvement-in-ObamaCare-Taxpayer-Bailout-with-Appendix.pdf.

[34] Ibid., pp. 22-29.

[35] OLC, “Appropriate Source of Payment,” p. 141.

[36] H.Res. 676 of the 113th Congress gave the Speaker the authority “to initiate or intervene in one or more civil actions on behalf of the House…regarding the failure of the President, the head of any department or agency, or any other officer or employee of the executive branch, to act in a manner consistent with that official’s duties under the Constitution and the laws of the United States with respect to implementation of any provision of” PPACA. Section 2(f)(2)(C) of H.Res. 5, the opening day rules package for the 114th Congress, extended this authority for the duration of the 114th Congress.

[37] Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae on behalf of the United States House of Representatives, Health Republic Insurance Company v. United States, October 14, 2016, http://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/documents/2016.10.13%20-%20Motion%20-%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf?Source=GovD.

[38] Ibid., p. 2.

Repealing “Son of Obamacare”

The election of Donald Trump brings conservatives an opportunity to repeal a misguided piece of health care legislation that cost hundreds of billions of dollars, will blow a major whole in our deficit, has led to thousands of pages of regulations, and will further undermine the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship.

Think I’m talking about Obamacare?

I am — but I’m not just talking about Obamacare.

I’m also talking about the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which passed last year (with a surprising level of Republican support) and contains many of the same flaws as Obamacare itself.

Just as Republicans are preparing legislation to repeal and replace Obamacare, they also need to figure out how to undo MACRA.

Last month, the Obama administration released a 2,398-page final regulation — let me say that again: a 2,398-page regulation — implementing MACRA’s physician reimbursement regime.

In the new Congress, Republicans can and should use the Congressional Review Act to pass a resolution of disapproval revoking this massive new regulation. They can then set about making the changes to Medicare that both Paul Ryan and Donald Trump have discussed: getting government out of the business of 1) fixing prices and 2) micro-managing the practice of medicine.

MACRA’S FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED, STATIST APPROACH

Since the administration released its physician-payment regulations — nearly as long as Obamacare itself – some commentary has emphasized (rightly) the burdensome nature of the new federal regulations and mandates.

But the more fundamental point, rarely made, is that we need more than mere tweaks to free doctors from an ever-tightening grip exercised by federal overseers. After more than a half century of failed attempts at government price-setting and micro-management of medical practice, it’s time to get Washington out of the business of playing “Dr. Sam” once and for all.

In fact, even liberals tend to acknowledge this occasionally. In a May 2011 C-SPAN interview, Noam Levey of the Los Angeles Times asked then-administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Donald Berwick why he thought the federal government could use Medicare as it exists to reform the health-care system:

In nearly half a century of federal-government oversight, the federal government hasn’t succeeded in two really important things: Number one, Medicare costs are still growing substantially more quickly than the economy; and number two, that fragmented [health care] system . . . has persisted in Medicare for 46 years now. . . . Why should the public, when it hears you, when it hears the President say, “Don’t worry, this time we’re going to make it better, we’re going to give you a more efficient, higher-quality health care system,” why should they believe that the federal government can do now what it essentially hasn’t really been able to do for close to half a century? [Emphasis added] 

Dr. Berwick didn’t really answer the question: He claimed that fragmented care issues “are not Medicare problems — they’re health system problems.” But in reality, liberal organizations like the Commonwealth Fund often argue Medicare can be leveraged as a model to reform the entire health care system — and that is exactly what MACRA, in defiance of historical precedent, tries to do.

When a 2012 Congressional Budget Office report examined the history of various Medicare payment demonstrations, it concluded that most had not saved money. A seminal study undertaken by MIT’s Amy Finkelstein concluded that the introduction of Medicare, and specifically its method of third-party payment, was one of the primary drivers of the growth in health-care spending during the second half of the 20th century.

After five decades of failed government control and rising costs driven by the existing Medicare program, the solution lies not in more tweaks and changes to the same program.

The answer lies in replacing that program with a system of premium support that gets the federal government out of the price-fixing business entirely.

The notion that the federal government can know the right price for inhalation therapy in Birmingham or the appropriate reimbursement for a wart removal in Boise is a fundamentally flawed and arrogant premise — one that conservatives should whole-heartedly reject.

Unfortunately, most critics of MACRA have not fully grasped this. A law that prompts the federal bureaucracy to issue a sprawling regulation of nearly 2,400 pages cannot on any level be considered conceptually sound.

Believing otherwise echoes Margaret Thatcher’s famous maxim about consensus politicians and conviction politicians: Some analysts, seeking a consensus among their fellow technocrats, push for changes to make the 2,400-page rule more palatable. But our convictions should have us automatically reject any regulation with this level of micro-management and government-enforced minutiae.

THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM

It bears worth repeating that, in addition to perpetuating the statist nature of Medicare, MACRA raised the deficit by over $100 billion in its first ten years — and more thereafter — while not fundamentally solving the long-term problem of Medicare physician-payment levels.

More than a decade ago, after President Bush and a Republican Congress passed the costly Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), creating the Part D prescription-drug entitlement, conservatives argued even after the law’s passage that the new entitlement should not take effect. If the MMA was “no Medicare reform” for including only a premium-support demonstration project, conservatives should likewise reject MACRA, which includes nothing – not even a demonstration project — to advance the premium-support reform Medicare truly needs.

Any efforts focused on building a slightly better government health-care mousetrap distract from the ultimate goal: removing the mousetrap entirely. In his 1964 speech A Time for Choosing, Reagan rejected the idea “that a little intellectual elite in a far distant capital can plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves” — and Republicans should do the same today.

In the context of health care, this means not debating the details of MACRA but replacing it, sending power back to where it belongs — with the people themselves.

Last week’s election results give the new Congress an opportunity to do just that, by disapproving the MACRA rule and moving to enact comprehensive Medicare reform in its place. After more than five decades of the same statist health care policies, it’s finally time for a new approach. Here’s hoping Congress agrees.

This post was originally published at National Review.

The Case for Testing Medicare Premium Support

The House-Senate budget conference report released last Wednesday included several interesting nuggets. Among the most surprising was the lack of explicit language endorsing the concept of premium support reforms to Medicare. Conservatives have voiced support for premium support for years—most notably in the entitlement reform proposals from then-House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan—but legislative progress has been limited.

More than a decade ago, Section 241 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 established a comparative cost-adjustment program for Medicare to allow privately run Medicare Advantage plans to compete directly against traditional government-run Medicare. The demonstration allowed Part B premiums for seniors enrolled in traditional Medicare to vary: If private Medicare Advantage plans bid below the cost of traditional Medicare in an area, Part B premiums would rise; but if traditional Medicare could provide care more efficiently than private Medicare Advantage plans, Part B premiums would fall. The statute limited the variation to 5% of the Part B premium, and the demonstration to no more than six metropolitan regions. It was designed to encourage seniors to choose the most efficient coverage, regardless of whether that option was private or government-run—generating premium savings for seniors and budgetary savings to the federal government.

Congress intended to start the demonstration in January 2010, with the experiment running through December of 2015. But the Obama administration never attempted to implement the program, and Section 1102(f) of the reconciliation bill used to pass Obamacare in March 2010 repealed the program.

While the recent “doc fix” legislation included an expansion of Medicare means-testing and other modest reforms, there were no provisions regarding premium support. A demonstration such as that passed in 2003—but never implemented—might point the way toward greater long-term structural impact on Medicare, even if it generated paltry short-term savings. There is policy and political value to testing its potential for success—and dampening hyperbolic rhetoric.

With premium support something of a political lightning rod, the lack of legislative proposals to test it—or otherwise—suggests an unwillingness to engage. Those who voted for past budget plans that included it are likely to take flak regardless; there are benefits to taking steps to make the policy case.

This post was originally published at the Wall Street Journal Think Tank blog.

Medicare’s Corporate Welfare

On Friday, the Washington Post published a lengthy front-page expose regarding the billions of dollars Medicare spent on anti-anemia drugs that studies eventually determined had “wildly overstated” benefits and “potentially lethal side effects, such as cancer and strokes.”  The story reads like a case study of the influence of the healthcare-industrial complex in putting its own interests ahead of patients:

Unlike medications that a patient picks up at the store, drugs administered by a physician, as these were, can yield a profit for doctors if there is a “spread” — a difference between the price they pay for the drug and the price they charge patients.

In this case, drugmakers worked diligently to make sure that doctors had an incentive to give large doses — that the spread was large.  They offered discounts to practices that dispensed the drug in big volumes.  They overfilled vials, adding as much as 25 percent extra, allowing doctors to further widen profit margins.  Most critical, however, was the company’s lobbying pressure, under which Congress and Medicare bureaucrats forged a system in which doctors and hospitals would be reimbursed more for the drug than they were paying for it.

The markup that doctors, clinics and hospitals received on the drugs given to Medicare patients reached as high as 30 percent, according to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, a group that advises Congress.

In other words, high-priced lobbyists, drugmakers, and physicians gamed the political system in order to perpetuate their gravy train of fat profits at taxpayers’ expense.  The story continues:

The industry’s success at beating back attacks by the Medicare bureaucrats to rein in costs would be repeated again and again.  It wasn’t just the drugmakers who were advocating for the drugs, either.  On Capitol Hill, the nation’s dialysis clinics, which were receiving as much as 25 percent of their revenue from using the drugs, were sometimes a key ally of the drugmakers.

One of the nation’s largest dialysis chains, in fact, in 2004 offered bonuses to its chief medical officer if he blocked efforts to reform the payment system.  According to a financial filing, Charles J. McAllister, chief medical officer of DaVita, the dialysis company, was to receive a $200,000 bonus if the rules for the drugs’ use being considered by regulators were dropped or delayed.  He was to receive an additional $100,000 if the then-new legislation, known as the Medicare Modernization Act, didn’t cut into the company’s revenue.  The Medicare proposal was “deeply flawed,” DaVita spokesman Skip Thurman said in a recent statement, because it limited dosing levels “without regard to the patient.”

At times, the companies would even enlist the patients to lobby on their behalf.  For example, in what may have been the drugmakers’ largest lobbying push, the companies sought to undo a Medicare proposal in May 2007 to restrict the use of the drugs in cancer patients.  The company spent millions trying to turn back this effort, including developing a Web site, Protectcancerpatients.org, that solicited testimonials from patients and instructed them on how to contact officials.  Johnson & Johnson set up a similar one called Voiceforcancerpatients.com.

Amgen lobbying expenditures and political efforts jumped that year.  The company ranked as the largest contributor to the campaign of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), which got $42,050.

Eventually, research proving the anti-anemia drugs produced serious side effects was enough to force regulators to limit the use of the drugs; Congress eventually stepped in to modify Medicare payment rules in a way that eliminated hefty price markups.

But the real scandal here involves far more than anti-anemia drugs.  It’s about the system that allowed this fiasco to happen for years – a system which Obamacare did very little to change.  Friday’s story was entirely predictable – Harvard’s Regina Herzlinger predicted it in a work five years ago, in fact.  And Herzlinger and others have identified the real culprit: Third party payment empowers bureaucrats, not patients.  In Medicare’s case, it gives federal officials at CMS, Members of Congress – and the high-priced lobbyists that try to influence both – a disproportionate impact on the health care decisions of millions of seniors.

Obamacare does nothing to change this government-centric culture; all it does is set up yet another board of bureaucrats to oversee the same centralized health system.  In the wake of Friday’s news story, liberals argued that the law’s new board of bureaucrats will succeed in wringing these kinds of abuses out of Medicare.  It’s a predictable response from the Left – government created the problem, so more government will “fix” it.  But any system fundamentally controlled by government is almost by definition subject to the political and lobbying pressures that created the scandal profiled by the Post.  The real solution is to empower patients, not bureaucrats.

President Obama continues to make clear that he wants no part of a solution that empowers patients.  So the story in Friday’s Post is likely to be repeated yet again, with another scandal costing taxpayers money, and harming more patients.  It’s not a question of if, but when.  And this broken-down, government-centric health care system is not change, and it’s not something the American people should believe in.

White House Budget Summary

Overall, the budget:

  • Proposes $362 billion in savings, yet calls for $429 billion in unpaid-for spending due to the Medicare physician reimbursement “doc fix” – thus resulting in a net increase in the deficit. (The $429 billion presumes a ten year freeze of Medicare physician payments; however, the budget does NOT propose ways to pay for this new spending.)
  • Proposes few structural reforms to Medicare; those that are included – weak as they are – are not scheduled to take effect until 2017, well after President Obama leaves office.  If the proposals are so sound, why the delay?
  • Requests just over $1 billion for program management at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, of which the vast majority – $864 million – would be used to implement the health care law.
  • Requests more than half a billion dollars for comparative effectiveness research, which many may be concerned could result in government bureaucrats imposing cost-based limits on treatments.
  • Includes mandatory proposals in the budget that largely track the September deficit proposal to Congress, with a few exceptions.  The budget does NOT include proposals to reduce Medicare frontier state payments, even though this policy was included in the September proposal.  The budget also does not include recovery provisions regarding Medicare Advantage payments to insurers; however, the Administration has indicated they intend to implement this provision administratively.
  • Does not include a proposal relating to Medicaid eligibility levels included in the September submission, as that proposal was enacted into law in November (P.L. 112-56).

 

Discretionary Spending

When compared to Fiscal Year 2012 appropriated amounts, the budget calls for the following changes in discretionary spending by major HHS divisions (tabulated by budget authority):

  • $12 million (0.5%) increase for the Food and Drug Administration – along with a separate proposed $643 million increase in FDA user fees;
  • $138 million (2.2%) decrease for the Health Services and Resources Administration;
  • $116 million (2.7%) increase for the Indian Health Service;
  • $664 million (11.5%) decrease for the Centers for Disease Control;
  • No net change in funding for the National Institutes of Health;
  • $1 billion (26.2%) increase for the discretionary portion of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services program management account; and
  • $29 million (5.0%) increase for the discretionary Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control fund.

With regard to the above numbers for CDC and HRSA, note that these are discretionary numbers only.  The Administration’s budget also would allocate additional $1.25 billion in mandatory spending from the new Prevention and Public Health “slush fund” created in the health care law, likely eliminating any real budgetary savings (despite the appearance of same above).

Other Health Care Points of Note

Tax Credit:  The Treasury Green Book proposes expanding the small business health insurance tax credit included in the health care law.   Specifically, the budget would expand the number of employers eligible for the credit to include all employers with up to 50 full-time workers; firms with under 20 workers would be eligible for the full credit.  (Currently those levels are 25 and 10 full-time employees, respectively.)  The budget also changes the coordination of the two phase-outs based on a firm’s average wage and number of employees, with the changes designed to make more companies eligible for a larger credit.  According to OMB, these changes would cost $14 billion over ten years.  Many may view this proposal as a tacit admission that the credit included in the law was a failure, because its limited reach and complicated nature – firms must fill out seven worksheets to determine their eligibility – have deterred American job creators from receiving this subsidy.

Comparative Effectiveness Research:  The budget proposes a total of $599 million in funding for comparative effectiveness research.  Only $78 million of this money comes from existing funds included in the health care law – meaning the Administration has proposed discretionary spending of more than $500 million on comparative effectiveness research.  Some have previously expressed concerns that this research could be used to restrict access to treatments perceived as too costly by federal bureaucrats.  It is also worth noting that this new $520 million in research funding would NOT be subject to the anti-rationing provisions included in the health care law.  Section 218 of this year’s omnibus appropriations measure included a prohibition on HHS using funds to engage in cost-effectiveness research, a provision which this budget request would presumably seek to overturn.

Obamacare Implementation Funding and Personnel:  As previously noted, the budget includes more than $1 billion in discretionary spending increases for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which the HHS Budget in Brief claims would be used to “continue implementing [Obamacare], including Exchanges.”  This funding would finance 256 new bureaucrats within CMS, many of whom would likely be used to implement the law.  Overall, the HHS budget proposes an increase of 1,393 full-time equivalent positions within the bureaucracy.

Specific details of the $1 billion in implementation funding include:

  • $290 million for “consumer support in the private marketplace;”
  • $549 million for “general IT systems and other support,” including funding for the federally-funded Exchange, for which the health law itself did not appropriate funding;
  • $18 million for updates to healthcare.gov;
  • $15 million to oversee the medical loss ratio regulations; and
  • $30 million for consumer assistance grants.

Exchange Funding:  The budget envisions HHS spending $1.1 billion on Exchange grants in 2013, a $180 million increase over the current fiscal year.  The health care law provides the Secretary with an unlimited amount of budget authority to fund state Exchange grants through 2015.  However, other reports have noted that the Secretary does NOT have authority to use these funds to construct a federal Exchange, in the event some states choose not to implement their own state-based Exchanges.

Abstinence Education Funding:  The budget proposes eliminating the abstinence education funding program, and converting those funds into a new pregnancy prevention program.

Medicare Proposals (Total savings of $292.2 Billion)

Bad Debts:  Reduces bad debt payments to providers – for unpaid cost-sharing owed by beneficiaries – from 70 percent down to 25 percent over three years, beginning in 2013.  The Fiscal Commission had made similar recommendations in its final report.  Saves $35.9 billion.

Medical Education Payments:  Reduces the Indirect Medical Education adjustment paid to teaching hospitals by 10 percent beginning in 2014, saving $9.7 billion.  Previous studies by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) have indicated that IME payments to teaching hospitals may be greater than the actual costs the hospitals incur.

Rural Payments:  Reduces critical access hospital payments from 101% of costs to 100% of costs, saving $1.4 billion, and prohibits hospitals fewer than 10 miles away from the nearest hospital from receiving a critical access hospital designation, saving $590 million.  The budget does NOT include a proposal to end add-on payments for providers in frontier states, which was included in the President’s September deficit proposal.

Post-Acute Care:  Reduces various acute-care payment updates (details not specified) during the years 2013 through 2022, saving $56.7 billion – a significant increase compared to the $32.5 billion in savings under the President’s September deficit proposal.  Equalizes payment rates between skilled nursing facilities and inpatient rehabilitation facilities, saving $2 billion.  Increases the minimum percentage of inpatient rehabilitation facility patients that require intensive rehabilitation from 60 percent to 75 percent, saving $2.3 billion.  Reduces skilled nursing facility payments by up to 3%, beginning in 2015, for preventable readmissions, saving $2 billion.

Pharmaceutical Price Controls:  Expands Medicaid price controls to dual eligible and low-income subsidy beneficiaries participating in Part D, saving $155.6 billion according to OMB.  Some have expressed concerns that further expanding government-imposed price controls to prescription drugs could harm innovation and the release of new therapies that could help cure diseases.

Anti-Fraud Provisions:  Assumes $450 million in savings from various anti-fraud provisions, including limiting the discharge of debt in bankruptcy proceedings associated with fraudulent activities.

EHR Penalties:  Re-directs Medicare reimbursement penalties against physicians who do not engage in electronic prescribing beginning in 2020 back into the Medicare program.  The “stimulus” legislation that enacted the health IT provisions had originally required that penalties to providers be placed into the Medicare Improvement Fund; the budget would instead re-direct those revenues into the general fund, to finance the “doc fix” and related provisions.  OMB now scores this proposal as saving $590 million; when included in last year’s budget back in February, these changes were scored as saving $3.2 billion.

Imaging:  Reduces imaging payments by assuming a higher level of utilization for certain types of equipment, saving $400 million.  Also imposes prior authorization requirements for advanced imaging; no savings are assumed, a change from the September deficit proposal, which said prior authorization would save $900 million.

Additional Means Testing:  Increases means tested premiums under Parts B and D by 15%, beginning in 2017.  Freezes the income thresholds at which means testing applies until 25 percent of beneficiaries are subject to such premiums.  Saves $27.6 billion over ten years, and presumably more thereafter, as additional seniors would hit the means testing threshold, subject them to higher premiums.

Medicare Deductible Increase:  Increases Medicare Part B deductible by $25 in 2017, 2019, and 2021 – but for new beneficiaries only; “current beneficiaries or near retirees [not defined] would not be subject to the revised deductible.”  Saves $2 billion.

Home Health Co-Payment:  Beginning in 2017, introduces a home health co-payment of $100 per episode for new beneficiaries only, in cases where an episode lasts five or more visits and is NOT proceeded by a hospital stay.  MedPAC has previously recommended introducing home health co-payments as a way to ensure appropriate utilization.  Saves $350 million.

Medigap Surcharge:  Imposes a Part B premium surcharge equal to about 15 percent of the average Medigap premium – or about 30 percent of the Part B premium – for seniors with Medigap supplemental insurance that provides first dollar coverage.  Applies beginning in 2017 to new beneficiaries only.  A study commissioned by MedPAC previously concluded that first dollar Medigap coverage induces beneficiaries to consume more medical services, thus increasing costs for the Medicare program and federal taxpayers.  Saves $2.5 billion.

Lower Caps on Medicare Spending:  Section 3403 of the health care law established an Independent Payment Advisory Board tasked with limiting Medicare spending to the growth of the economy plus one percentage point (GDP+1) in 2018 and succeeding years.  The White House proposal would reduce this target to GDP+0.5 percent.  This approach has two potential problems:

  • First, under the Congressional Budget Office’s most recent baseline, IPAB recommendations would not be triggered at all – so it’s unclear whether the new, lower target level would actually generate measurable budgetary savings.  (In August 2010, CBO concluded an IPAB with an overall cap of GDP+1 would yield $13.8 billion in savings through 2020 – not enough to make a measurable impact on a program spending $500 billion per year.)
  • Second, the Medicare actuary has previously written that the spending adjustments contemplated by IPAB and the health care law “are unlikely to be sustainable on a permanent annual basis” and “very challenging” – problems that would be exacerbated by utilizing a slower target rate for Medicare spending growth.

According to the budget, this proposal would NOT achieve additional deficit savings.

Medicaid and Other Health Proposals (Total savings of $70.4 Billion)

Medicaid Provider Taxes:  Reduces limits on Medicaid provider tax thresholds, beginning in 2015; the tax threshold would be reduced over a three year period, to 3.5 percent in 2017 and future years.  State provider taxes are a financing method whereby states impose taxes on medical providers, and use these provider tax revenues to obtain additional federal Medicaid matching funds, thereby increasing the federal share of Medicaid expenses paid while decreasing the state share of expenses.  The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, enacted by a Republican Congress, capped the level of Medicaid provider taxes, and the Bush Administration proposed additional rules to reform Medicaid funding rules – rules that were blocked by the Democrat-run 110th Congress.  However, there is bipartisan support for addressing ways in which states attempt to “game” the Medicaid system, through provider taxes and other related methods, to obtain unwarranted federal matching funds – the liberal Center for Budget and Policy Priorities previously wrote about a series of “Rube Goldberg-like accounting arrangements” that “do not improve the quality of health care provided” and “frequently operate in a manner that siphons extra federal money to state coffers without affecting the provision of health care.”  This issue was also addressed in the fiscal commission’s report, although the commission exceeded the budget proposals by suggesting that Congress enact legislation “restricting and eventually eliminating” provider taxes, saving $44 billion.  OMB scores this proposal as saving $21.8 billion.

Blended Rate:  Proposes “replac[ing]…complicated federal matching formulas” in Medicaid “with a single matching rate specific to each state that automatically increases if a recession forces enrollment and state costs to rise.”  Details are unclear, but the Administration claims $17.9 billion in savings from this proposal – much less than the $100 billion figure bandied about in previous reports last summer.  It is also worth noting that the proposal could actually INCREASE the deficit, if a prolonged recession triggers the automatic increases in the federal Medicaid match referenced in the proposal.  On a related note, the budget once again ignores the governors’ multiple requests for flexibility from the mandates included in the health care law – unfunded mandates on states totaling at least $118 billion.

Transitional Medical Assistance/QI Program:  Provides for temporary extensions of the Transitional Medical Assistance program, which provides Medicaid benefits for low-income families transitioning from welfare to work, along with the Qualifying Individual program, which provides assistance to low-income seniors in paying Medicare premiums.  The extensions cost $815 million and $1.7 billion, respectively.

Limit Durable Medical Equipment Reimbursement:  Caps Medicaid reimbursements for durable medical equipment (DME) at Medicare rates, beginning in 2013.  The health care law extended and expanded a previous Medicare competitive bidding demonstration project included in the Medicare Modernization Act, resulting in savings to the Medicare program.  This proposal, by capping Medicaid reimbursements for DME at Medicare levels, would attempt to extend those savings to the Medicaid program.  OMB now scores this proposal as saving $3 billion; when included in the President’s budget last year, these changes were scored as saving $6.4 billion.

Rebase Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments:  In 2021 and 2022, reallocates Medicaid DSH payments to hospitals treating low-income patients, based on states’ actual 2020 allotments (as amended and reduced by the health care law).  Saves $8.3 billion.

Medicaid Anti-Fraud Savings:  Assumes $3.2 billion in savings from a variety of Medicaid anti-fraud provisions, largely through tracking and enforcement of various provisions related to pharmaceuticals.  Included in this amount are proposals that would remove exceptions to the requirement that Medicaid must reject payments when another party is liable for a medical claim.

Flexibility on Benchmark Plans:  Proposes some new flexibility for states to require Medicaid “benchmark” plan coverage for non-elderly, non-disabled adults – but ONLY those with incomes above 133 percent of the federal poverty level (i.e., NOT the new Medicaid population obtaining coverage under the health care law).  No savings assumed.

“Pay-for-Delay:”  Prohibits brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers from entering into arrangements that would delay the availability of new generic drugs.  Some Members have previously expressed concerns that these provisions would harm innovation, and actually impede the incentives to generic manufacturers to bring cost-saving generic drugs on the market.  OMB scores this proposal as saving $11 billion.

Follow-on Biologics:  Reduces to seven years the period of exclusivity for follow-on biologics.  Current law provides for a twelve-year period of exclusivity, based upon an amendment to the health care law that was adopted on a bipartisan basis in both the House and Senate (one of the few substantive bipartisan amendments adopted).  Some Members have expressed concern that reducing the period of exclusivity would harm innovation and discourage companies from developing life-saving treatments.  OMB scores this proposal as saving $3.8 billion.

FEHB Contracting:  Proposes streamlining pharmacy benefit contracting within the Federal Employee Health Benefits program, by centralizing pharmaceutical benefit contracting within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).  Some individuals, noting that OPM is also empowered to create “multi-state plans” as part of the health care overhaul, may be concerned that these provisions could be part of a larger plan to make OPM the head of a de facto government-run health plan.  OMB scores this proposal as saving $1.7 billion.

Prevention “Slush Fund:”  Reduces spending by $4 billion on the Prevention and Public Health Fund created in the health care law.  Some Members have previously expressed concern that this fund would be used to fund projects like jungle gyms and bike paths, questionable priorities for the use of federal taxpayer dollars in a time of trillion-dollar deficits.

State Waivers:  Accelerates from 2017 to 2014 the date under which states can submit request for waivers of SOME of the health care law’s requirements to HHS.  While supposedly designed to increase flexibility, even liberal commentators have agreed that under the law’s state waiver programcritics of Obama’s proposal have a point: It wouldn’t allow to enact the sorts of health care reforms they would prefer” and thatconservatives can’t do any better – at least not under these rules.”  The proposal states that “the Administration is committed to the budget neutrality of these waivers;” however, the plan allocates $4 billion in new spending “to account for the possibility that CBO will estimate costs for this proposal.”

Implementation “Slush Fund:”  Proposes $400 million in new spending for HHS to implement the proposals listed above.