Bill Cassidy’s New Health Plan Is Obamacare on Steroids

On Tuesday, Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) released a policy white paper with ideas he claimed would “make health care affordable again.” By and large, however, the plan would do no such thing.

Some of the plan’s ideas—promoting consumer transparency in health care, for instance, promoting primary care, and cracking down on monopolistic practices that impede competition—have merit, although people can quibble with the extent to which Washington can, or should, solve those problems.

Fake Flexibility

Cassidy bases his plan on a state-based block-grant funding model, similar to the legislation he and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) developed last fall. Cassidy cites various state experimental programs to argue that a block-grant approach would allow more room for innovation.

However, the last sentence of the proposal undermines the rest of the discussion: “Flexibility to states would not jeopardize protections for individuals with pre-existing conditions.” That phrase implies that Cassidy believes, as the Graham-Cassidy bill indicated, that Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements regarding pre-existing conditions should remain in place.

That sentence belies the idea that states would get true flexibility to construct their insurance markets however they like. Instead, the Cassidy plan would represent a variation on Obamacare, whose state waiver program essentially lets them add more requirements and more government to their insurance markets, but not take requirements away. Put another way, the Cassidy plan would give states the “flexibility” to do what Bill Cassidy wants them to do, and only what Bill Cassidy wants them to do. That isn’t flexibility at all.

Costly Requirements Remain in Place

For instance, loosening Obamacare’s essential health benefits while keeping the pre-existing condition requirements will encourage insurers to stop covering treatments like chemotherapy. Because they must continue to accept all sick patients, and charge them the same rates as healthy ones, insurers will try to limit their losses by not covering cancer drugs, thereby discouraging cancer patients from applying for coverage.

The combination of these two policy dilemmas could result in the worst of all possible worlds, from both a political and policy standpoint: A plan that does not reduce premiums appreciably—because it keeps the most costly federal insurance requirements intact—yet still encourages insurers to discriminate against the sick.

Throwing Money at the Problem

Rather than trying to solve the problems Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements have caused, as I previously suggested, Cassidy’s plan goes to great lengths to avoid them. He endorses the health insurance “stability” (read: bailout) measure proposed by Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) earlier this year. Rather than lowering premiums by removing the federal insurance requirements, that plan would lower premiums—albeit only temporarily—by throwing more taxpayer funds at insurers.

Moreover, the need for more federal funding belies Cassidy’s claim that his plan would “make health care affordable again.” States should not need any more funding to encourage insurance enrollment, particularly if they receive sufficient flexibility from federal requirements to bring down premiums. Cassidy knows that any flexibility will prove illusory. As with a “stability” package, he proposes making coverage more “affordable” by throwing other people’s money at the problem.

Neither Repeal Nor Reform

I wrote last April, well before lawmakers ever contemplated the Graham-Cassidy measure, that “Republicans have a choice: They can either retain the ban on pre-existing condition discrimination—and the regulations and subsidies that go with it—or they can fulfill their promise to repeal Obamacare.” Judging from the ideas in his policy paper, Cassidy has made his choice: He supports Obamacare.

But more of the same—more spending to finance the same costly insurance because of the same costly federal insurance requirements—doesn’t constitute a repeal of Obamacare. It doesn’t even come close. Would that Cassidy, and his colleagues in Congress, actually thought about keeping their word and enacting the repeal they promised.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Does the Heritage Health Plan Include Taxpayer Funding of Abortion?

When lawmakers write legislation, little details matter—a lot. In the case of a health plan that the Heritage Foundation and former Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) are reportedly preparing to release in the coming days, a few words indicate the plan has not considered critically important details—like how Senate procedure intertwines with abortion policy—necessary to any substantive policy endeavor.

A few short words in a summary of the Heritage plan leave the real possibility that the plan, if enacted as described, could lead to taxpayer funding of abortion coverage. Either Heritage and Santorum—both known opponents of abortion—have undertaken dramatic changes in their pro-life positions over the past few months, or they have failed to think through the full import of the policies they will release very shortly.

However, multiple individuals participating in the Heritage meetings told me that the concepts and policies Spiro’s document discusses align with Heritage discussions. Spiro may have created that document based on verbal descriptions given to him of the Heritage plan (just as the New York Times’ list of questions Robert Mueller wants to ask President Trump likely came via Trump’s attorneys and not Mueller). But regardless of who created it, people in the Heritage group told me it accurately outlined the policy proposals under discussion.

What Cost-Sharing Reductions Do

The summary describes many policies, but one in particular stands out: Under “Short-term stabilization/premium relief,” the plan “Adopts the [Lamar] Alexander and [Susan] Collins appropriation for CSRs [cost-sharing reductions] and state reinsurance/high risk pool programs for 2019 and 2020.”

On one level, this development should not come as a surprise. Party leaders often incorporate recalcitrant members’ pet projects (or, in the old days, earmarks) into a bill to obtain their votes: “See, we included the language that you wanted—you have to vote for our bill now!” Given that Collins as of last week had not even heard about the Heritage-led effort, one might think she would need some incentive to support the measure, which attaching her “stability” language might provide.

About the Hyde Amendment and Byrd Rule

The reference to CSRs takes on more importance because of the way Congress would consider Heritage’s plan. As with the Graham-Cassidy bill and other “repeal-and-replace” bills considered last year, the Senate would enact them using expedited budget reconciliation procedures.

Those procedures theoretically allow all 51 Senate Republicans to circumvent a Democratic filibuster and pass a reconciliation bill on a party-line vote. However, as I outlined last year, the reconciliation process comes with procedural restrictions (i.e., the “Byrd rule”) to prevent senators from attaching “extraneous” and non-budgetary matter to a bill that cannot be filibustered.

“Hyde amendment” restrictions—which prevent federal funding of abortion coverage, except in the cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—represent a textbook example of the “Byrd rule,” because they have a fiscal impact “merely incidental” to the policy changes proposed. Former Senate Parliamentarian Bob Dove said as much about abortion restrictions Congress considered in 1995:

The Congressional Budget Office determined that it was going to save money. But it was my view that the provision was not there in order to save money. It was there to implement social policy. Therefore I ruled that it was not in order and it was stricken.

After pushing for a vote for months, Collins suddenly backed off and didn’t force the issue on the Senate floor. She knew she didn’t have the votes—everyone knew she didn’t have the votes—because Democrats wouldn’t support a measure that restricted taxpayer funding of abortion coverage. Exactly nothing has changed that dynamic since Congress considered the issue in March.

Why We Can’t Fund CSRs

Republicans recognize the problems the abortion funding issue creates, and the Graham-Cassidy bill attempted to solve them by providing subsidies via a block grant to states. Graham-Cassidy funneled the block grant through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), largely because the SCHIP statute includes the following language: “Funds provided to a state under this title shall only be used to carry out the purposes of this title, and any health insurance coverage provided with such funds may include coverage of abortion only if necessary to save the life of the mother or if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.”

Because SCHIP already contains full Hyde protections on taxpayer funding of abortion, Graham-Cassidy ran the block grant program through SCHIP. Put another way, Graham-Cassidy borrowed existing Hyde amendment protections because any new protections would get in a budget reconciliation bill. It did the same thing for a “stability” fund for reinsurance or other mechanisms intended to lower premiums by subsidizing insurers, also referred to in Spiro’s document.

Creating a pot of money elsewhere in law—for instance, through the SCHIP statute, which does contain Hyde protections—and using that money to compensate insurers for reducing cost-sharing would prove just as unrealistic. The CSR payments reimburse insurers for discrete, specific discounts provided to discrete, specific low-income individuals.

If the subsidy pool gave money to all insurers equally, regardless of the number of low-income enrollees they reduced cost-sharing for, then insurers would have a ready-built incentive to avoid attracting poor people, because enrolling low-income individuals would saddle them with an unfunded (or only partially funded) mandate. If the subsidy pool gave money to insurers based on their specific obligations under the Obamacare cost-sharing reduction requirements, then the parliamentarian would likely view this language as an attempt to circumvent the Byrd rule restrictions and strike it down.

Not Ready for Prime Time

Four participants in the Heritage meetings told me the group has discussed appropriating funds for CSR payments to insurers as part of the plan. Not a single individual said the Senate’s “Byrd rule” restrictions—which make enacting pro-life protections for such CSR payments all-but-impossible—came up when discussing an appropriation for cost-sharing payments to insurers.

That silence signals one or more potential problems: A lack of regard for pro-life policy; an ignorance of Senate procedure, and its potential ramifications on the policies being considered; or a willingness to fudge details—allowing people to believe what they want to believe. Regardless, it speaks to the unformed nature of the proposal, despite meetings that have continued since the last time “repeal-and-replace” collapsed” nearly eight months ago.

Earlier this month, Santorum claimed in an interview that while the original “Graham-Cassidy was a rush…this time we have the opportunity to get the policy better.” But any serious attempt to “get the policy better” wouldn’t have major lingering questions about tens of billions of dollars in “stability” funding, and whether such funds would subsidize abortion coverage, mere days before its public release. In this case, eight months of deliberations may not lead to a deliberative and coherent policy product.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Republicans Omit Obamacare Bailout from Omnibus — DO NOT CONGRATULATE

Congressional leaders finally released the massive, 2,232-page omnibus spending bill late Wednesday, a measure they want Congress to pass within 24 hours. The version released Wednesday night omits language of an Obamacare “stability” package that Republican lawmakers released separately on Monday.

But, to borrow a phrase echoing throughout the Capitol since a Washington Post story appeared Tuesday night, “DO NOT CONGRATULATE” Republicans for leaving the bailout provisions out of the draft. On both process and on substance, congressional leaders did not cover themselves in glory. Far from it.

Republicans Bad on Substance…

A cynic would question why Republican leaders found this particular issue non-negotiable. After all, Republicans ran for four straight election cycles—in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016—on repealing Obamacare, only to turn around and propose more than $60 billion in spending to prop it up. From Democrats’ perspective, since Republicans did a complete 180 on repealing Obamacare, why not expect the GOP to perform a similar U-turn on taxpayer funding of abortion?

…And Just as Bad on Process

In general, the process surrounding the omnibus—as with most appropriations legislation, and most major legislation in general—stinks. After completing a secretive drafting process among a small group of staff behind closed doors—the swamp personified—leaders now will turn to ramming the legislation through Congress.

Facing a potential government shutdown at midnight on Friday, they will rush through the massive bill spending trillions of dollars in a matter of hours, well before members of Congress or their staff will have time to read, let alone digest and understand, its contents.

One specific issue stands out: As I previously wrote, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) wants to grant Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) a separate vote on bailing out Obamacare. He apparently will attempt to do so despite the fact that:

  1. Other Republican senators never agreed to give Collins a vote. McConnell spoke only for himself in his colloquy with Collins last December.
  2. Collins demonstrably moved the goalposts on the size of her bailout. McConnell agreed to support $5 billion in reinsurance funds in December, while now she has demanded more than six times as much, or more than $30 billion.
  3. McConnell literally shut down the federal government rather than grant Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) a vote on his amendment to an appropriations bill just last month—and Paul’s colleagues publicly trashed his attempts to obtain a vote as a “stunt” and “utterly pointless.”

To most individuals outside Washington, Republicans moving to bail out Obamacare, and attempting to pass 2,200-plus page bills in mere hours, signifies a degree of insanity. Unfortunately, however, Congress seems to engage in these types of activities (at least) every year, raising the specter of the trite saying that defines insanity as doing the same thing over and over while expecting different results.

This week’s spectacle should raise one obvious question: How many more of these sorry affairs will it take before conservatives summon the will to end it, once and for all?

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Mitch McConnell’s Amendment Dilemma

Mitch McConnell has a problem entirely of his own making. The Senate majority leader promised a vote on Obamacare “stability” legislation to Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME). Collins wants a vote on the package as a Senate floor amendment to the omnibus appropriations legislation (that is, if and when congressional leaders emerge from their smoke-filled rooms and actually release an omnibus package for Congress to vote on).

Except that not six weeks ago, McConnell literally let the federal government shut down rather than grant his fellow Kentuckian Sen. Rand Paul a floor vote on his amendment to appropriations legislation.

It’s a fun choice McConnell gets to make—and he’s running out of time to do it.

Shutdown Showdown

Lest anyone forget what transpired a few short weeks ago, Paul asked for a clean vote on his amendment to budget and spending legislation, to preserve strict spending caps enacted as part of the Budget Control Act. (When it passed in 2011, McConnell said the Budget Control Act spending caps would slow down the “big government freight train”—a freight train that he now apparently wants to put into hyperdrive.)

McConnell and the Senate leadership refused to give Paul an up-or-down vote on his amendment. As Senate Republican Whip John Cornyn (R-TX) put it, “Why reward bad behavior?” Because under Senate rules Paul could speak for an extended period of time, and because Senate leadership did not allow enough time for a full floor debate on the legislation—apparently thinking it appropriate for the Senate to consider and pass in mere hours a 652-page bill allocating trillions of dollars—the federal government briefly shut down.

Susan Collins’ Precious Bailout

Enter Collins, who along with Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN) has been pushing for a bailout of Obamacare insurers for months now. Collins claims she has a commitment from McConnell to support an insurer “stability” package. Alexander said he would demand a vote, asking for senators “to be accountable” for their positions on the issue, because he thinks bailing out Obamacare will lower premiums for 2019 (it won’t).

However, as I noted just last week, Collins has moved the goalposts on the bailout package significantly. Whereas she initially requested “only” $5 billion in reinsurance funds, according to her December colloquy with McConnell, the new bill she and Alexander introduced this week contains more than $30 billion in spending on reinsurance—a sixfold increase. Because Collins has demonstrably walked away from her side of whatever bargain McConnell made with her, Senate leadership should have no qualms about doing the same.

Different Treatment?

However, the McConnell office appears inclined to give Collins her way, with multiple reports saying that McConnell was “open” to such an amendment vote to the appropriations bill. Compare that to the reactions Paul received from his colleagues last month, when he wanted an amendment vote to an appropriations bill. Congressmen called it an “utterly pointless” “stunt” that “doesn’t make any d-mn sense.” One unnamed Senate Republican aide called it “the stupidest thing to happen to Congress in three weeks….This is even stupider than the kid who didn’t recognize Justin Timberlake at the Super Bowl.”

Conservatives should watch with intense interest how the Senate floor debate plays out. If McConnell moves heaven and earth to get Collins a vote on her precious bailout, after moving heaven and earth to deny Paul a vote on retaining spending caps that McConnell himself used to support, they should neither quickly forgive, nor easily forget, the double standards created by Senate leadership.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Legislative Bulletin: Updated Summary of Obamacare “Stability” Legislation

On Monday, Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and others introduced their latest version of an Obamacare “stability” bill. In general, the bill would appropriate more than $60 billion in funds to insurance companies, propping up and entrenching Obamacare rather than repealing it.

Also on Monday, the Congressional Budget Office released its analysis of the updated legislation. In CBO’s estimate, the bill would increase the deficit by $19.1 billion, while marginally increasing the number of insured Americans (by fewer than 500,000 per year).


Stability Fund
: Provides $500 million in funding for fiscal year 2018, and $10 billion in funding for each of fiscal years 2019, 2020, and 2021, for invisible high-risk pools and reinsurance payments. The $500 million this year would provide administrative assistance to states to establish such programs, with the $10 billion in each of the following three years maintaining them.

Grants the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the authority to allocate the funds to states—which some conservatives may be concerned gives federal bureaucrats authority to spend $30.5 billion wherever they choose.

Includes a provision requiring a federal fallback for 2019 (and only 2019) in states that choose not to establish their own reinsurance or invisible high-risk program. Moreover, these federal fallback dollars must be used “for market stabilization payments to issuers.” Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision—which, like the rest of the $30 billion in “stability funds,” did not appear in the original Alexander-Murray legislation—undermines state flexibility, by effectively forcing states to bail out insurers, whether they want to or not.

Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments: The bill appropriates roughly $30-35 billion in cost-sharing reduction (CSR) payments to insurers, which subsidizes their provision of discounts on deductibles and co-payments to certain low-income individuals enrolled on insurance exchanges.

Last October, President Trump announced he would halt the payments to insurers, concluding the administration did not have authority to do so under the Constitution. As a result, the bill includes an explicit appropriation, totaling roughly $3-4 billion for the final quarter of 2017, and $9-10 billion for each of years 2019, 2020, and 2021, based on CBO spending estimates. This language represents a change from the original Alexander-Murray bill, which appropriated payments for 2018 and 2019 only.

For 2018, the bill appropriates CSRs only for 1) states choosing the Basic Health plan option (which gives states a percentage of Obamacare subsidies as a block grant to cover low-income individuals) and 2) insurers for which HHS determines, in conjunction with state insurance commissioners, that the insurer assumed the payment of CSRs when setting rates for the 2018 plan year. This language represents a change from the original Alexander-Murray bill, which set up a complicated system of rebates that would have allowed insurers potentially to pocket billions of dollars by retaining “extra” CSR payments for 2018.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, because insurers understood for well over a year that a new administration could terminate these payments in 2017, the agreement would effectively subsidize their flawed assumptions. Some conservatives may be concerned that action to continue the flow of payments would solidify the principle that Obamacare, and therefore insurers, are “too big to fail,” which could only encourage further risky behavior by insurers in the future.

Hyde Amendment: With respect to the issue of taxpayer dollars subsidizing federal insurance plans covering abortion, the bill does not apply the Hyde Amendment protections retrospectively to the 2017 CSR payments, or to the (current) 2018 plan year. With respect to 2019 through 2021, the bill prohibits federal funding of abortions, except in the case of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. However, the bill does allow states to use state-only dollars to fund other abortions, as many state Medicaid managed care plans do currently.

According to the pro-abortion Guttmacher Institute, with respect to coverage of abortions in state Medicaid plans:

  • 32 states and the District of Columbia follow the federal Hyde Amendment standard, funding abortion only in the cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother;
  • One state provides abortion only in the case of life endangerment; and
  • 17 states provide coverage for most abortions—five voluntarily, and 12 by court order.

State Waiver Processes: The bill would streamline the process for approving state innovation waivers, authorized by Section 1332 of Obamacare. Those waivers allow states to receive their state’s exchange funding as a block grant, and exempt themselves from the individual mandate, employer mandate, and some (but not all) of Obamacare’s insurance regulations.

Specifically, the bill would:

  • Extend the waivers’ duration, from five years to six, with unlimited renewals possible;
  • Prohibit HHS from terminating waivers during their duration (including any renewal periods), unless “the state materially failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the waiver”;
  • Require HHS to release guidance to states within 60 days of enactment regarding waivers, including model language for waivers—a change from the 30 days included in the original Alexander-Murray bill;
  • Shorten the time for HHS to consider waivers from 180 days to 120—a change from 90 days in the original Alexander-Murray bill;
  • Allow a 45-day review for 1) waivers currently pending; 2) waivers for areas “the Secretary determines are at risk for excessive premium increases or having no health plans offered in the applicable health insurance market for the current or following plan year”; 3) waivers that are “the same or substantially similar” to waivers previously approved for another state; and 4) waivers related to invisible high-risk pools or reinsurance, as discussed above. These waivers would initially apply for no more than three years, with an extension possible for a full six-year term;
  • Allow governors to apply for waivers based on their certification of authority, rather than requiring states to pass a law authorizing state actions under the waiver—a move that some conservatives may be concerned could allow state chief executives to act unilaterally, including by exiting a successful waiver on a governor’s order.

State Waiver Substance: On the substance of innovation waivers, the bill would rescind regulatory guidance the Obama administration issued in December 2015. Among other actions, that guidance prevented states from using savings from an Obamacare/exchange waiver to offset higher costs to Medicaid, and vice versa.

While supporting the concept of greater flexibility for states, some conservatives may note that, as this guidance was not enacted pursuant to notice-and-comment, the Trump administration can revoke it at any time—indeed, should have revoked it last year. Additionally, the bill amends, but does not repeal, the “guardrails” for state innovation waivers. Under current law, Section 1332 waivers must:

  • “Provide coverage that is at least as comprehensive as” Obamacare coverage;
  • “Provide coverage and cost-sharing protections against excessive out-of-pocket spending that are at least as affordable” as Obamacare coverage;
  • “Provide coverage to at least a comparable number of [a state’s] residents” as under Obamacare; and
  • “Not increase the federal deficit.”

Some conservatives have previously criticized these provisions as insufficiently flexible to allow for conservative health reforms like Health Savings Accounts and other consumer-driven options.

The bill allows states to provide coverage “of comparable affordability, including for low-income individuals, individuals with serious health needs, and other vulnerable populations” rather than the current language in the second bullet above. It also clarifies that deficit and budget neutrality will operate over the lifetime of the waiver, and that state innovation waivers under Obamacare “shall not be construed to affect any waiver processes or standards” under the Medicare or Medicaid statutes for purposes of determining the Obamacare waiver’s deficit neutrality.

The bill also makes adjustments to the “pass-through” language allowing states to receive their exchange funding via a block grant. For instance, the bill adds language allowing states to receive any funding for the Basic Health Program—a program states can establish for households with incomes of between 138-200 percent of the federal poverty level—via the block grant.

Some conservatives may view the “comparable affordability” change as a distinction without a difference, as it still explicitly links affordability to Obamacare’s rich benefit package. Some conservatives may therefore view the purported “concessions” on the December 2015 guidance, and on “comparable affordability” as inconsequential in nature, and insignificant given the significant concessions to liberals included elsewhere in the proposed legislative package.

Catastrophic Plans: The bill would allow all individuals to purchase “catastrophic” health plans, beginning in 2019. The legislation would also require insurers to keep those plans in a single risk pool with other Obamacare plans—a change from current law.

Catastrophic plans—currently only available to individuals under 30, individuals without an “affordable” health plan in their area, or individuals subject to a hardship exemption from the individual mandate—provide no coverage below Obamacare’s limit on out-of-pocket spending, but for “coverage of at least three primary care visits.” Catastrophic plans are also currently subject to Obamacare’s essential health benefits requirements.

Outreach Funding: The bill requires HHS to obligate $105.8 million in exchange user fees to states for “enrollment and outreach activities” for the 2019 and 2020 plan years—a change from the original legislation, which focused on the 2018 and 2019 plan years. Currently, the federal exchange (healthcare.gov) assesses a user fee of 3.5 percent of premiums on insurers, who ultimately pass these fees on to consumers.

In a rule released in December 2016, the outgoing Obama administration admitted that the exchange is “gaining economies of scale from functions with fixed costs,” in part because maintaining the exchange costs less per year than creating one did in 2013-14. However, the Obama administration rejected any attempt to lower those fees, instead deciding to spend them on outreach efforts. The agreement would re-direct portions of the fees to states for enrollment outreach.

Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision would create a new entitlement for states to outreach dollars. Moreover, some conservatives may object to this re-direction of funds that ultimately come from consumers towards more government spending. Some conservatives may support taking steps to reduce the user fees—thus lowering premiums, the purported intention of this “stabilization” measure—rather than re-directing them toward more government spending, as the agreement proposes.

The bill also requires a series of biweekly reports from HHS on metrics like call center volume, website visits, etc., during the 2019 and 2020 open enrollment periods, followed by after-action reports regarding outreach and advertising. Some conservatives may view these myriad requirements first as micro-management of the executive, and second as buying into the liberal narrative that the Trump administration is “sabotaging” Obamacare, by requiring minute oversight of the executive’s implementation of the law.

Cross-State Purchasing: Requires HHS to issue regulations (in consultation with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners) within one year regarding health care choice compacts under Obamacare. Such compacts would allow individuals to purchase coverage across state lines.

However, because states can already establish health care compacts amongst themselves, and because Obamacare’s regulatory mandates would still apply to any such coverage purchased through said compacts, some conservatives may view such language as insufficient and not adding to consumers’ affordable coverage options.

Consumer Notification: Requires states that allow the sale of short-term, limited duration health coverage to disclose to consumers that such plans differ from “Obamacare-approved” qualified health plans. Note that this provision does not codify the administration’s proposed regulations regarding short-term health coverage; a future Democratic administration could (and likely will) easily re-write such regulations again to eliminate the sale of short-term plans, as the Obama administration did in 2016.

CBO Analysis of the Legislation

As noted above, CBO believes the legislation would increase the deficit by $19.1 billion, while increasing the number of insured Americans marginally. In general, while CBO believed that changes to Obamacare’s state waivers program would increase the number of states applying for waivers, they would not have a net budgetary impact.

However, the bill does include one particular change to Obamacare Section 1332 waivers allowing existing waiver recipients to request recalculation of their funding formula. According to CBO, only Minnesota qualifies under the statutory definition, and could receive $359 million in additional funding between 2018 and 2022. Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision represents a legislative earmark that by definition can only affect one state.

With respect to the invisible high-risk pools and reinsurance, CBO believes the provisions would raise spending by a net of $26.5 billion, offset by higher revenues of $7 billion. The budget office estimated that the entire country would be covered by the federal fallback option in 2019, because “it would be difficult for other states [that do not have waivers currently] to establish a state-based program in time to affect premiums.”

For 2020 and 2021, CBO believes that 60 and 80 percent of the country, respectively, would be covered by state waivers; “the remainder of the population in those years would be without a federally-funded reinsurance program or invisible high-risk pool.” The $7 billion in offsetting savings referenced in CBO’s score comes from lower premiums, and thus lower spending on federal premium subsidies. In 2019, CBO believes “about 60 percent of the federal cost for the default federal reinsurance program would be offset by other sources of savings.”

CBO believes that, under the bill, premiums would be 10 percent lower in 2019, and 20 percent lower in 2020 and 2021, compared to current law. Some conservatives may note that lower premiums relative to current law does not equate to lower premiums relative to 2018 levels. Particularly because CBO expects elimination of the individual mandate tax will raise premiums by 10 percent in 2019, many conservatives may doubt that premiums will go down in absolute terms, notwithstanding the sizable spending on insurer subsidies under the bill.

CBO noted that premium changes would largely affect unsubsidized individuals—i.e., families with incomes more than four times the federal poverty level ($100,400 for a family of four in 2018)—a small portion of whom would sign up for coverage as a result of the reductions. However, “in states that did not apply for a waiver, premiums would be the same under current law as under the legislation starting in 2020.”

Moreover, even in states with a reinsurance waiver, CBO believes that insurers will “tend to set premiums conservatively to hedge against uncertainty” regarding the reinsurance programs—meaning that CBO “expect[s] that total premiums would not be reduced by the entire amount of available federal funding.”

As noted in prior posts, CBO is required by law to assume full funding of entitlement spending, including cost-sharing reductions. Therefore, the official score of the bill included no net budget impact for the CSR appropriation. However, Alexander received a supplemental letter from CBO indicating that, compared to a scenario where the federal government did not make CSR payments, appropriating funds for CSRs would result in a notional deficit reduction of $29 billion.

The notional deficit reduction arises because, in the absence of CSR payments, insurers would “load” the cost of reducing cost-sharing on to health insurance premiums—thus raising premium subsidies for those who qualify for them. CBO believes these higher subsidies would entice more families with incomes between two and four times the federal poverty definition ($50,200-$100,400 for a family of four in 2018) to sign up for coverage. Compared to a “no-CSR” baseline, appropriating funds for CSRs, as the bill would do, would reduce spending on premium subsidies, but it would also increase the number of uninsured by 500,000-1,000,000, as some families receiving lower subsidies would drop coverage.

Lastly, the expanded sale of catastrophic plans, coupled with provisions including those plans in a single risk pool, would slightly improve the health of the overall population purchasing Obamacare coverage. While individuals cannot receive federal premium subsidies for catastrophic coverage, enticing more healthy individuals to sign up for coverage will improve the exchanges’ overall risk pool slightly, lowering federal spending on those who do qualify for exchange subsidies by $849 million.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

“Stability” Bill Supporters’ Flawed Premium Study

One week after a flawed premium study tried to make the case that premiums would nearly double over the next three years, another study claims that a “stability” bill in Congress would lower premiums by “more than 40 percent.” Or so claimed Republican Sens. Susan Collins and Lamar Alexander.

As with many things Alexander claims, however, there’s more to this story than meets the eye. In reality, the study itself admits that most of the supposed premium “reduction” for 2019 likely will not materialize — and most if not all of the remainder would be offset by the effects of repealing the individual mandate while keeping Obamacare’s onerous regulatory regime.

However, in the very next paragraph, Oliver Wyman called its own assumptions unrealistic, conceding that most states will not have time to enact their own reinsurance proposals for 2019:

In our modeling, we are presuming that states will take advantage of these pass-through savings in 2019. In reality, states that have not already begun working on a waiver will be challenged to get a 1332 waiver filed and approved under the current regulatory regime in time to impact 2019 premiums.

Oliver Wyman went on to point out that applying for such waivers currently requires states to pass their own laws, undergo a 30-day public comment period at the state level, and then navigate a federal approval process that can last nearly eight months. While Collins and Alexander might argue in reply that one potential element of “stability” legislation could speed the waiver approval process, it remains far from certain that all states 1) even have an interest in this type of reinsurance proposal, 2) have the authority they need to establish such a program, and 3) could get federal approval in time to affect the plan year that starts with open enrollment on November 1 — under eight months from now.

If states don’t request a 1332 reinsurance waiver to supplement the federal insurance dollars, or can’t get one approved in time for the 2019 plan year, a likely scenario for many states — what does Oliver Wyman think would happen? “We estimate that premium [sic] would decline by more than 20 percent” — 10 percent from funding of cost-sharing reductions, and 10 percent coming from reinsurance.

But keep in mind that President Trump cancelled the cost-sharing reductions just last October, and Congress repealed Obamacare’s individual mandate, while keeping its costly regulations — a combination of decisions which, all else equal, will raise premiums. In other words, even after dumping tens of billions into bailouts for insurers, premiums could well end up right about where they were last year — and, after taking medical inflation into account, even increase.

Why would Oliver Wyman, let alone Collins and Alexander, put out such shoddy work? Politico got at the issue Tuesday morning: “Oliver Wyman often does analysis for insurers.” Which might explain why the actuaries there put out a headline premium number that by their own admission relies on unrealistic and fanciful assumptions. The analysts seem to have searched for the largest possible premium reduction number they could find, and then made up assumptions to match.

It also explains the statement by Collins and Alexander. If Oliver Wyman takes money from health insurers on a regular basis, as Politico noted, so too does Alexander. So much so that Alexander — who called reinsurance the “Great Obamacare Heist” not eighteen months ago, and pledged to get taxpayers’ billions back from health insurers — now instead wants to shovel more of your hard-earned dollars to insurers’ corporate welfare payments.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Binary Choice Paul Ryan Doesn’t Want to Face

This time last year, House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) spoke to all who would listen about the health care legislation that Republican leadership crafted: “This is the closest we will ever get to repealing and replacing Obamacare. It really comes down to a binary choice.” Now, however, Ryan faces a binary choice himself — one that he and his leadership colleagues seem intent on deflecting.

Ryan can support an Obamacare bailout, or he can support the pro-life movement. He cannot support both.

The deafening silence emanating from Republican leaders on the life issue speaks volumes to both their knowledge of the problem, and their intent of how to handle it. Ryan desperately wants to bail out Obamacare, going so far as to promote a ridiculous budgetary gimmick that should make Ryan, in his former role as Budget Committee Chairman, laugh out loud in its absurdity.

If Republican leaders considered the life issue a red line they cannot, and will not, cross, to pass an Obamacare bailout, they would have said so months ago. By and large, they have not done so, instead issuing only mealy-mouthed statements that “we have been working on it.”

Such statements constitute, in plain English, a cop-out. When the issue presents a binary choice, as here, Congress has little to “work on”—the Hyde amendment either appears in the bill, or it doesn’t. A cynic might argue that the “we have been working on it” statement means that Republican leaders consider the life issue a political problem to game their way around, rather than a moral principle that they must uphold first, last, and always.

But executive action cannot trump the statute itself. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said the week Obamacare passed that the law “forces taxpayers to pay for abortions,” and only another law will change that dynamic.

As Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner observed in March 2010:

This bill expands abortion funding to the greatest extent in history. I have heard that the president is contemplating an executive order to try to limit this. Members should not be fooled. Executive orders cannot override the clear intent of a statute. … If an executive order moves the abortion funding in this bill away from where it is now, it will be struck down as unconstitutional because executive orders cannot constitutionally do that.

Republican leaders may also embrace the political tactic of a “headpat vote.” This gambit would bring to the floor two separate bills — one containing the Obamacare “stability” funding, and a separate, stand-alone bill codifying pro-life protections for that funding. While that concept might sound reasonable at first blush, the pro-life community would find the outcome unacceptable — the Obamacare funding would remain on a “must-pass” bill headed straight to the president’s desk, while the pro-life restrictions would die in the Senate by failing to get the 60 votes needed to break a filibuster.

This procedural gimmick would represent the worst of the Washington “swamp,” allowing Republican politicians to echo John Kerry in 2004 by taking both sides of an issue: “I actually voted for the $87 billion before I voted against it.” Moreover, it would demonstrate that, when the chips are down, Republican leaders view the life issue and community as something to be bargained away, or appeased through meaningless political tokenism, rather than as a moral imperative and matter of first principles.

In the end, the pro-life community has witnessed enough political double-talk, most notably by Democrats attempting to claim Obamacare does not fund abortion coverage, to see through any procedural gimmicks Republican leaders might propose. The question of whether Republicans support taxpayer funding of abortion coverage in Obamacare really does come down to a binary choice. Here’s hoping that Republicans choose the side of life.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Who Really Proposed the Obamacare Bailout in the Trump Budget?

Maybe it was Colonel Mustard in the conservatory with the revolver. Or Professor Plum in the library with the candlestick.

The story behind the Obamacare bailout proposed in last week’s budget has taken on a mysterious tone, akin to a game of Clue. My Thursday story focusing on the role played by White House Domestic Policy Council Chair Andrew Bremberg prompted pushback from some quarters about the actual perpetrator of the proposal. As a result, I spent a good chunk of Friday afternoon trying to gather more facts—and found definitive ones hard to come by.

As to the accuracy of my initial theory, people I trust and respect arrived at strikingly different views. However, I found surprising unanimity on one count: No one—but no one—wants to take credit for inserting the proposal to pay $11.5 billion in risk corridor claims. As someone told me: “You raise a valid question. If Andrew Bremberg didn’t insert the proposal into the budget”—and this person didn’t think he did—“then how did it get in there?”

Therein lies a huge problem. To call the inclusion of a $11.5 billion proposal in the president’s budget that no one in the administration seemed to know about, or wants to take credit for, a prime example of managerial incompetence would put it mildly. Either career staff inserted it in the budget, and the political staff did not have the antennae or bandwidth to understand its consequences and take it out, or a few political appointees and career staff hijacked the budget process, with most other individuals unaware of the situation until the budget’s public release.

To borrow a politically loaded phrase, someone—or a group of someones—colluded to get this language included in the budget. Its inclusion could cost federal taxpayers literally billions of dollars.

Why It Matters

By submitting a budget proposal to “request mandatory appropriations for the risk corridors program,” the White House completely undermined and undercut the arguments its own Justice Department had made in court a few short weeks ago, that the federal government owes insurers nothing.

In other words, whomever inserted this policy U-turn into the budget, just as the judges ponder a ruling in the insurer lawsuits, may have effectively “tanked” the government’s case. Either by leading to an adverse ruling, or by prompting the Justice Department to settle the case at a much higher cost, this move could cost taxpayers billions.

A Pro-Life Administration, Or Not?

Unfortunately, it gets worse. While the budget did include new funds for insurers, including the controversial risk corridors bailout described above, it did not include a single word proposing that such funds prevent taxpayer dollars from going to plans that cover abortion.

There’s a reason for the deafening silence: Republicans know that any legislation that funds insurers and provides robust pro-life protections will not pass. Democrats will object to its inclusion. Given the choice between passing up on an Obamacare bailout or abandoning their pro-life principles, Republicans have given every expectation that they will choose the latter course. (They shouldn’t bail out Obamacare regardless, but that’s a separate story.)

Regardless of who proposed these, it doesn’t take a detective to understand how a policy reversal that could cost taxpayers billions and a pending U-turn by Republicans to fund abortion coverage represent a major one-two punch against conservatives. But the mysterious origins and mangled management of the risk corridor proposal adds a further layer of insult to injury, a triple whammy of a tough week for the administration.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The White House’s Plan to Bail Out Obamacare AND Fund Abortion Coverage

The White House released its budget proposal this morning. Apart from the fact that the budget abandons any attempt to get to balance within ten years (or ever), a footnote buried deep in the document hides key proposals: Bailing out Obamacare health insurers to the tune of tens of billions of dollars, and taxpayer funding of abortion coverage.

On page 141, footnote 6 of Table S-6, showing the president’s policy proposals, includes the following admission: “The Budget requests mandatory appropriations for the risk corridors program and for cost-sharing reduction payments.”

There you have it: At least $11.5 billion in corporate welfare payments to insurers for risk corridors, and more for cost-sharing reductions.

About Risk Corridors

While risk corridors have faded in the public debate over the past two years, they remain a potent issue for health insurers. See a full explanation of the issue, but here’s a summary.

To prevent the Obama administration from using funds from elsewhere to subsidize corporate welfare to insurers, Congress enacted restrictions prohibiting the use of taxpayer funds to bail out risk corridors. Under these restrictions, insurers with losses could only receive as much money from the risk corridor program as insurers with gains paid into the program.

In Obamacare’s first few years, most insurers suffered massive losses, so the money coming in to the risk corridor program by no means equaled the requests for funds from the program. As a result, several insurers sued in the Court of Federal Claims, requesting payment from the Judgment Fund of the Treasury for their unpaid risk corridor obligations. Many of those cases remain on appeal.

While both the White House and HHS budgets include few details about this proposal, it appears that they would pre-emptively surrender the pending legal cases by paying insurers more than $11.5 billion in risk corridor obligations that insurers claim they are owed. The budget further proposes making these payments exempt from the budget sequester.

About Cost-Sharing Reductions

The White House’s proposal on CSRs looks downright conservative, however, compared to the budget gimmick being contemplated by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan (R-WI). The White House budget indicates that spending on CSRs would have no deficit effect, because the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute requires budgetary agencies to assume full funding of entitlements (including CSR payments) when developing their fiscal baselines.

Ryan, however, finds this legal requirement an inconvenient truth. He wants to direct the budget agencies to raise the spending baseline artificially, so Congress can then “lower” the spending baseline right back to where it is now—and spend the phony “savings” from this gimmick on more corporate welfare to insurers.

Forcing Taxpayers to Fund Abortion Coverage

Another point of note: Passing either one of these proposals would by definition result in taxpayer funding of plans that cover abortion. The administration did not include any language prohibiting the use of CSR or risk corridor funds for plans that cover abortion. Therefore the White House presumably endorses federal taxpayer funding of abortion coverage.

The budget proposal means Trump administration is now actively working to codify not one but two Obamacare bailouts that a Republican Congress denied to the Obama administration—doing liberals’ bidding for them. Moreover, the failure to include any pro-life protections on these bailouts represents at best a massive managerial oversight, and at worst an insult to the pro-life community. For those who thought that last week’s budget deal represented the nadir for conservative principles among this administration, think again.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Lamar Alexander Wants to Bail Out Regulators Who Misjudged Billions

When a state’s insurance market stands on the verge of collapse, as Tennessee Insurance Commissioner Julie Mix McPeak claimed in 2016, why would she and her colleagues fail to consider another potential change that could precipitate a full-on implosion? Congress should analyze this question as it examines Obamacare’s health insurance markets.

Unfortunately, however, Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander seems more interested in stuffing the coffers of the insurance industry than in conducting robust oversight of McPeak’s regulatory debacle.

A recent public records request confirms that when health insurers filed their 2017 rates in the summer of 2016, Tennessee’s Department of Insurance failed to contemplate that the incoming presidential administration could cancel the cost-sharing payments. As a result, Tennessee insurers will incur their share of the $1.75 billion in losses insurers face nationally this year. The department’s lack of planning and preparation left Tennessee consumers—to say nothing of health insurers themselves—exposed.

Tennessee Should Have Seen This Coming

McPeak cannot say she was not warned about the vulnerability of insurers’ cost-sharing subsidies. In May 2016, federal court Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled the payments unconstitutional, because Obamacare did not include an explicit appropriation for them. While Collyer stayed her ruling as the Obama administration appealed, I noted that month that the incoming president could easily concede the lawsuit and halt the payments unilaterally—exactly what President Trump did in October.

As one insurance expert noted recently, the “hand grenade” of stopping the cost-sharing reduction payments, “if it was thrown in January or February of this year, would have forced a lot of carriers to do midyear exits and it would have destroyed the exchanges in some states.” Yet the recent public records request revealed that Tennessee regulators did not send so much as a single e-mail considering whether this “hand grenade” would explode—taking the state’s exchange down with it—before approving insurance rates for 2017 last fall.

Senators Seem to Prefer Bailouts to Accountability

Tennessee’s Alexander has played a leading role in ignoring insurance commissioners’ questionable behavior. In September, Alexander convened a hearing of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee he chairs to take testimony from insurance commissioners, including McPeak, about state insurance markets. At no point did Alexander or any other senator ask McPeak or her fellow commissioners why they failed to consider, let alone predict, the withdrawal of the cost-sharing payments last year.

Instead of examining the regulatory failures of commissioners like McPeak, Alexander has dedicated his energies toward solving the problem McPeak’s ignorance helped to create. His legislation would appropriate approximately $25 billion in taxpayer funds for the cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers.

Unfortunately, Alexander’s legislation would result in a major windfall for health insurers, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Because insurers have already raised their premiums for 2018 to compensate for the loss of the cost-sharing reduction payments, Alexander’s bill would effectively pay them twice. While the CBO believes insurers will rebate some—not all, but only some—of these “extra” payments back to the government, insurers could pocket between $4-6 billion in additional windfall profits thanks to Alexander’s legislation.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.