Legislative Bulletin: Summary of Revised Graham-Cassidy Legislation

A PDF version of this document is available on the Texas Public Policy Foundation website.

Summary of CBO Score

On Monday evening, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a preliminary estimate of the Graham-Cassidy bill. CBO concluded that the bill would comply with reconciliation parameters—namely, that it would reduce the deficit by at least as much as the underlying reconciliation vehicle (the House-passed American Health Care Act), reduce the deficit by at least $1 billion in each of its two titles in its first ten years, and not increase the deficit overall in any of the four following decades.

Although it did not include any specific coverage or premium numbers, CBO did conclude that the bill would likely decrease coverage by millions compared to the current policy baseline. The report estimated that the bill’s block grant would spend about $230 billion less than current law—a 10 percent reduction overall (an average 30 percent reduction for Medicaid expansion states, but an average 30 percent increase for non-expansion states). Moreover, CBO believes at least $150 billion in block grant funding would not be spent by the end of the ten-year budget window.

CBO believes that “most states would eventually make changes in the regulations for their non-group market in order to stabilize it and would use some funds from the block grants to facilitate those changes.” Essentially, current insurance regulations mean that markets would become unstable without current law subsidies, such that states would use a combination of subsidies and changes in regulations to preserve market stability.

CBO believes that most Medicaid expansion states would attempt to use block grant funding to create Medicaid-like programs for their low-income residents. However, the analysis concludes that by 2026, those states’ block grants would roughly equal the projected cost of their current Medicaid expansion—forcing them to choose between “provid[ing] similar benefits to people in a [Medicaid] alternative program and extend[ing] support to others” further up the income scale. In those cases, CBO believes “most of those states would then choose to provide little support to people in the non-group market because doing so effectively would be the more difficult task.”

Overall, CBO believes that the bill would reduce insurance coverage, because of its repeal of the subsidies, Medicaid expansion, and the individual mandate. The budget office believes that states with high levels of coverage under Obamacare would not receive enough funds under the revised block grant to match their current coverage levels, while states with lower levels of coverage would spend the money slowly, in part because they lack the infrastructure (i.e., technology, etc.) to distribute subsidies easily. CBO also believes that employment-based coverage would increase under the bill, because some employers would respond to changes in the individual market by offering coverage to their workers.

With respect to the Medicaid reforms in the bill, CBO concludes that most “states would not have substantial additional flexibility” under the per capita caps. Some states with declining populations might choose the block grant option, but the grant “would not be attractive in most states experiencing population growth, as the fixed block grant would not be adjusted for such growth.” States could reduce their spending by reducing provider payment rates; optional benefit categories; limiting eligibility; improving care delivery; or some combination of the approaches.

For the individual market, CBO expresses skepticism about the timelines in the bill. Specifically, its analysis found that states’ initial options would “be limited,” because implementing new health programs by 2020 would be “difficult:”

To establish its own system of subsidies for coverage in the nongroup market related to people’s income, a state would have to enact legislation and create a new administrative infrastructure. A state would not be able to rely on any existing system for verifying eligibility or making payments. It would need to establish a new system for enrolling people in nongroup insurance, verify eligibility for tax credits or other subsidies, certify insurance as eligible for subsidies, and ultimately ensure that the payments were correct. Those steps would be challenging, particularly if the state chose to simultaneously change insurance market regulations.

While CBO believes that states that expanded Medicaid would be likely to create programs for populations currently eligible for subsidies (i.e., those households with incomes between one and four times poverty), it notes that such states “would be facing large reductions in funding compared with the amounts under current law and thus would have trouble paying for a new program or subsidies for those people.”

CBO believes that without subsidies, and with current insurance regulations in place, a “death spiral” would occur, whereby premiums would gradually increase and insurers would drop out of markets. (However, “if a state required individuals to have insurance, some healthier people would enroll, and premiums would be lower.”) To avoid this scenario, CBO believes that “most states would eventually modify various rules to help stabilize the non-group market,” thereby increasing coverage take-up when compared to not doing so. However, “coverage for people with pre-existing conditions would be much more expensive in some of those states than under current law.”

While widening age bands would “somewhat increase insurance coverage, on net,” CBO notes that “insurance covering certain services not included in the scope of benefits to become more expensive—in some cases, extremely expensive.” Moreover, some medically underwritten individuals (i.e., subject to premium changes based on health status) would become uninsured, while others would instead obtain employer coverage.

Finally, CBO estimated that the non-coverage provisions of the bill would increase the deficit by $22 billion over ten years. Specific estimates for those provisions are integrated into the summary below.

Summary of Changes Made

On Sunday evening, the bill’s sponsors released revised text of their bill. Compared to the original draft, the revised bill:

  • Strikes language repealing sections of Obamacare related to eligibility determinations (likely to comply with the Senate’s “Byrd rule” regarding budget reconciliation);
  • Changes the short-term “stability fund” to set aside 5 percent of funds for “low-density states,” which some conservatives may view as a carve-out for certain states similar to that included in July’s Better Care Reconciliation Act;
  • Re-writes waiver authority, but maintains (and arguably strengthens) language requiring states to “maintain access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions,” which some conservatives may view as imposing limiting conditions on states that wish to reform their insurance markets;
  • Requires states to certify that they will “ensure compliance” with sections of the Public Health Service Act relating to: 1) the under-26 mandate; 2) hospital stays following births; 3) mental health parity; 4) re-constructive surgery following mastectomies; and 5) genetic non-discrimination;
  • Strikes authority given to the Health and Human Services Secretary in several sections, and replaces it with authority given to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Administrator;
  • Includes a new requirement that at least half of funds provided under the Obamacare replacement block grant must be used “to provide assistance” to households with family income between 50 and 300 percent of the poverty level;
  • Requires CMS Administrator to adjust block grant spending upward for a “low-density state” with per capita health care spending 20 percent higher than the national average, increasing allocation levels to match the higher health costs—a provision some conservatives may consider an earmark for specific states;
  • Imposes new requirement on CMS Administrator to notify states of their 2020 block grant allocations by November 1, 2019—a timeline that some may argue will give states far too little time to prepare and plan for major changes to their health systems;
  • Slows the transition to the new Obamacare replacement block grant formula outlined in the law, which now would not fully take effect until after 2026—even though the bill does not appropriate block grant funds for years after 2026;
  • Gives the Administrator the power not to make an annual adjustment for risk in the block grant;
  • Strikes the block grant’s annual adjustment factor for coverage value;
  • Delays the block grant’s state population adjustment factor from 2020 until 2022—but retains language giving the CMS Administrator to re-write the entire funding allocation based on this factor, which some conservatives may view as an unprecedented power grab by federal bureaucrats;
  • Re-writes rules re-allocating unspent block grant allocation funds;
  • Prohibits states from receiving more than a 25 percent year-on-year increase in their block grant allocations;
  • Makes other technical changes to the block grant formula;
  • Changes the formula for the $11 billion contingency fund provided to low-density and non-expansion states—25 percent ($2.75 billion) for low-density states, 50 percent ($5.5 billion) for non-Medicaid expansion states, and 25 percent ($2.75 billion) for Medicaid expansion states;
  • Includes a $750 million fund for “late-expanding” Medicaid states (those that did not expand Medicaid under Obamacare prior to December 31, 2016), which some conservatives may consider an earmark, and one that encourages states to embrace Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied;
  • Includes $500 million to allow pass-through funding under Section 1332 Obamacare waivers to continue for years 2019 through 2023 under the Obamacare replacement block grant;
  • Strikes language allowing for direct primary care to be purchased through Health Savings Accounts, and as a medical expense under the Internal Revenue Code;
  • Strikes language reducing American territories’ Medicaid match from 55 percent to 50 percent;
  • Restores language originally in BCRA allowing for “late-expanding Medicaid states” to select a shorter period for their per capita caps—a provision that some conservatives may view as an undue incentive for certain states that expanded Medicaid under Obamacare;
  • Restores language originally in BCRA regarding reporting of data related to Medicaid per capita caps;
  • Strikes language delaying Medicaid per capita caps for certain “low-density states;”
  • Includes new language perpetually increasing Medicaid match rates on the two highest states with separate poverty guidelines issued for them in 2017—a provision that by definition includes only Alaska and Hawaii, which some conservatives may view as an inappropriate earmark;
  • Strikes language allowing all individuals to purchase Obamacare catastrophic coverage beginning in 2019;
  • Strikes language clarifying enforcement provisions, particularly regarding abortion;
  • Allows states to waive certain provisions related to insurance regulations, including 1) essential health benefits; 2) cost-sharing requirements; 3) actuarial value; 4) community rating; 5) preventive health services; and 6) single risk pool;
  • Requires states to describe its new insurance rules to the federal government, “except that in no case may an issuer vary premium rates on the basis of sex or on the basis of genetic information,” a provision that some conservatives may view as less likely to subject the rules to legal challenges than the prior language; and
  • Retains language requiring each waiver participant to receive “a direct benefit” from federal funds, language that some conservatives may view as logistically problematic.

Full Summary of Bill (as Revised)

Last week, Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) introduced a new health care bill. The legislation contains some components of the earlier Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA), considered by the Senate in July, with some key differences on funding streams. A full summary of the bill follows below, along with possible conservative concerns where applicable. Cost estimates are included below come from prior Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores of similar or identical provisions in BCRA.

Of particular note: It is unclear whether this legislative language has been fully vetted with the Senate Parliamentarian. When the Senate considers budget reconciliation legislation—as it would do should the Graham-Cassidy measure receive floor consideration—the Parliamentarian advises whether provisions are budgetary in nature and can be included in the bill (which can pass with a 51-vote simple majority), and which provisions are not budgetary in nature and must be considered separately (i.e., require 60 votes to pass).

As the bill was released prior to issuance of a CBO score, it is entirely possible the Parliamentarian has not fully vetted this draft—which means provisions could change substantially, or even get stricken from the bill, due to procedural concerns as the process moves forward.

Title I

Revisions to Obamacare Subsidies:             Beginning in 2018, changes the definition of a qualified health plan, to prohibit plans from covering abortion other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may eventually be eliminated under the provisions of the Senate’s “Byrd rule.” (For more information, see these two articles.)

Eliminates provisions that limit repayment of subsidies for years after 2017. Subsidy eligibility is based upon estimated income, with recipients required to reconcile their subsidies received with actual income during the year-end tax filing process. Current law limits the amount of excess subsidies households with incomes under 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL, $98,400 for a family of four in 2017) must pay. This provision would eliminate that limitation on repayments, which may result in fewer individuals taking up subsidies in the first place. Saves $11.7 billion over ten years—$8.5 billion in spending, and $3.2 billion in revenue.

Repeals the subsidy regime entirely after December 31, 2019.

Small Business Tax Credit:             Repeals Obamacare’s small business tax credit, effective in 2020. Disallows the small business tax credit beginning in 2018 for any plan that offers coverage of abortion, except in the case of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother—which, as noted above, some conservatives may believe will be stricken during the Senate’s “Byrd rule” review. Saves $6 billion over ten years.

Individual and Employer Mandates:             Sets the individual and employer mandate penalties to zero, for all years after December 31, 2015. The individual mandate provision cuts taxes by $38 billion, and the employer mandate provision cuts taxes by $171 billion, both over ten years.

Stability Fund:          Creates two state-based funds intended to stabilize insurance markets—the first giving funds directly to insurers, and the second giving funds to states. The first would appropriate $10 billion each for 2018 and 2019, and $15 billion for 2020, ($35 billion total) to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to “fund arrangements with health insurance issuers to address coverage and access disruption and respond to urgent health care needs within States.” Instructs the CMS Administrator to “determine an appropriate procedure for providing and distributing funds.” Does not require a state match for receipt of stability funds. Some conservatives may be concerned this provision provides excessive authority to unelected bureaucrats to distribute $35 billion in federal funds as they see fit.

Includes new language setting aside 5 percent of stability fund dollars for “low-density states”—a provision which some conservatives may oppose as an earmark for Alaska and other similar states.

Market-Based Health Care Grant Program:       Creates a longer-term stability fund for states with a total of $1.176 trillion in federal funding from 2020 through 2026—$146 billion in 2020 and 2021, $157 billion in 2022, $168 billion in 2023, $179 billion in 2024, and $190 billion in 2025 and 2026. Eliminates BCRA provisions requiring a state match. States could keep their allotments for two years, but unspent funds after that point could be re-allocated to other states. However, all funds would have to be spent by December 31, 2026.

Expands BCRA criteria for appropriate use of funds by states, to include assistance for purchasing individual insurance, and “provid[ing] health insurance coverage for individuals who are eligible for” Medicaid, as well as the prior eligible uses under BCRA: to provide financial assistance to high-risk individuals, including by reducing premium costs, “help stabilize premiums and promote state health insurance market participation and choice,” provide payments to health care providers, or reduce cost-sharing.

However, states may spend no more than 15 percent of their resources on the Medicaid population (or up to 20 percent if the state applies for a waiver, and the Department of Health and Human Services concludes that the state is using its funds “to supplement, and not supplant,” the state Medicaid match). In addition, states must spend at least half of their funds on “provid[ing] assistance” to families with incomes between 50 and 300 percent of the federal poverty level. Some conservatives may believe these restrictions belie the bill’s purported goal of giving states freedom and flexibility to spend the funds as they see fit.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, by doling out nearly $1.2 trillion in spending, the bill does not repeal Obamacare, so much as it redistributes Obamacare funds from “blue states” to “red states,” per the formulae described below. Some conservatives may also be concerned that the bill creates a funding cliff—with spending dropping from $190 billion in 2026 to $0 in 2027—that will leave an impetus for future Congresses to spend massive new amounts of money in the future.

Grant Formula:         Sets a complex formula for determining state grant allocations, tied to the overall funding a state received for Medicaid expansion, the basic health program under Obamacare, and premium and cost-sharing subsidies provided to individuals in insurance Exchanges. Permits states to select any four consecutive fiscal quarters between September 30, 2013 and January 1, 2018 to establish the base period. (The bill sponsors have additional information regarding the formula calculations here.)

Intends to equalize grant amounts, with a phase-in of the new methodology for years 2021 through 2026. Ideally, the bill would set funding to a state’s number of low-income individuals when compared to the number of low-income individuals nationwide. Defines the term “low-income individuals” to include those with incomes between 50 and 138 percent of the federal poverty level (45-133% FPL, plus a 5 percent income disregard created by Obamacare). In 2017, those numbers total $12,300-$33,948 for a family of four.

Adjusts state allocations (as determined above) according to additional factors:

  1. Risk Adjustment:      The bill would phase in risk adjustment over four years (between 2023 and 2026), and limit the risk adjustment modification to no more than 10 percent of the overall allotment. Risk adjustment would be based on clinical risk factors for low-income individuals (as defined above). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Administrator could cancel the risk adjustment factor in the absence of sufficient data.
  2. Population Adjustment:              Permits (but does not require) the Administrator to adjust allocations for years after 2022 according to a population adjustment factor. Requires CMS to “develop a state specific population adjustment factor that accounts for legitimate factors that impact the health care expenditures in a state”—such as demographics, wage rates, income levels, etc.—but as noted above, does not require CMS to adjust allocations based upon those factors.

Notwithstanding the above, states could not receive a year-on-year increase in funding of more than 25 percent.

Requires the Administrator to adjust block grant spending upward for a “low-density state” with per capita health care spending 20 percent higher than the national average, increasing allocation levels to match the higher health costs—a provision some conservatives may consider an inappropriate earmark for Alaska. Imposes new requirement on the Administrator to notify states of their 2020 block grant allocations by November 1, 2019—a timeline that some may argue will give states far too little time to prepare and plan for major changes to their health systems.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, despite the admirable intent to equalize funding between high-spending and low-spending states, the bill gives excessive discretion to unelected bureaucrats in Washington to determine the funding formulae. Some conservatives may instead support repealing all of Obamacare, and allowing states to decide for themselves what they wish to put in its place, rather than doling out federal funds from Washington. Finally, some may question why the bill’s formula criteria focus so heavily on individuals with incomes between 50-138 percent FPL, to the potential exclusion of individuals and households with slightly higher or lower incomes.

Provides $750 million for “late-expanding” Medicaid states—those that did not expand Medicaid under Obamacare prior to December 31, 2015—which some conservatives may consider an earmark, one that encourages states that have embraced Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied. Also includes $500 million to allow pass-through funding under Section 1332 Obamacare waivers to continue for years 2019 through 2023.

Grant Application:  Requires states applying for grant funds to outline the intended uses of same. Specifically, the state must describe how it “shall maintain access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions,” along with “such other information as necessary for the Administrator to carry out this subsection”—language that could be used by a future Democratic Administration, or federal courts, to undermine the waiver program’s intent.

Explicitly requires states to “ensure compliance” with several federal insurance mandates:

  1. Coverage of “dependents” under age 26;
  2. Hospital stays following deliveries;
  3. Mental health parity;
  4. Reconstructive surgery following mastectomies; and
  5. Genetic non-discrimination.

Some conservatives may note that these retained federal mandates belie the notion of state flexibility promised by the legislation.

Contingency Fund:               Appropriates a total of $11 billion—$6 billion for calendar year 2020, and $5 billion for calendar 2021—for a contingency fund for certain states. Half of the funding ($5.5 billion total) would go towards states that had not expanded Medicaid as of September 1, 2017, with the remaining one-quarter ($2.75 billion) going towards “low-density states”—those with a population density of fewer than 15 individuals per square mile—and another one-quarter ($2.75 billion) going towards states that did expand Medicaid.

Implementation Fund:        Provides $2 billion to implement programs under the bill. Costs $2 billion over ten years.

Repeal of Some Obamacare Taxes:             Repeals some Obamacare taxes:

  • Restrictions on use of Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Arrangements to pay for over-the-counter medications, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $5.6 billion;
  • Increased penalties on non-health care uses of Health Savings Account dollars, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $100 million;
  • Medical device tax, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $19.6 billion; and
  • Elimination of deduction for employers who receive a subsidy from Medicare for offering retiree prescription drug coverage, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $1.8 billion.

Some conservatives may be concerned that the bill barely attempts to reduce revenues, repealing only the smallest taxes in Obamacare—and the ones that corporate lobbyists care most about (e.g., medical device tax and retiree prescription drug coverage provision).

Health Savings Accounts:  Increases contribution limits to HSAs, raising them from the current $3,400 for individuals and $6,750 for families in 2017 to the out-of-pocket maximum amounts (currently $6,550 for an individual and $13,100 for a family), effective January 2018. Allows both spouses to make catch-up contributions to the same Health Savings Account. Permits individuals who take up to 60 days to establish an HSA upon enrolling in HSA-eligible coverage to be reimbursed from their account for medical expenses. Lowers revenues by a total of $19.2 billion over ten years.

Allows for Health Savings Account funds to be used for the purchase of high-deductible health plans, but only to the extent that such insurance was not purchased on a tax-preferred basis (i.e., through the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, or through Obamacare insurance subsidies).

Allows HSA dollars to be used to reimburse expenses for “dependents” under age 27, effectively extending the “under-26” provisions of Obamacare to Health Savings Accounts. Prohibits HSA-qualified high deductible health plans from covering abortions, other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—an effective prohibition on the use of HSA funds to purchase plans that cover abortion, but one that the Senate Parliamentarian may advise does not comport with procedural restrictions on budget reconciliation bills. No separate cost estimate provided for the revenue reduction associated with allowing HSA dollars to be used to pay for insurance premiums.

Federal Payments to States:             Imposes a one-year ban on federal funds flowing to certain entities. This provision would have the effect of preventing Medicaid funding of certain medical providers, including Planned Parenthood, so long as Planned Parenthood provides for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother). CBO believes this provision would save a total of $225 million in Medicaid spending, while increasing spending by $79 million over a decade, because 15 percent of Planned Parenthood clients would lose access to services, increasing the number of births in the Medicaid program by several thousand. Saves $146 million over ten years.

Medicaid Expansion:           Phases out Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied, effective January 1, 2020. After such date, only members of Indian tribes who reside in states that had expanded Medicaid—and who were eligible on December 31, 2019—would qualify for Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion. Indians could remain on the Medicaid expansion, but only if they do not have a break in eligibility (i.e., the program would be frozen to new enrollees on January 1, 2020).

Repeals the enhanced federal match (currently 95 percent, declining slightly to 90 percent) associated with Medicaid expansion, effective in 2020. Also repeals provisions regarding the Community First Choice Option, eliminating a six percent increase in the Medicaid match rate for some home and community-based services. Saves $19.3 billion over ten years.

Retroactive Eligibility:       Effective October 2017, restricts retroactive eligibility in Medicaid from three months to two months. These changes would NOT apply to aged, blind, or disabled populations, who would still qualify for three months of retroactive eligibility. Saves $800 million over ten years.

Eligibility Re-Determinations:             Permits—but unlike the House bill, does not require—states, beginning October 1, 2017, to re-determine eligibility for individuals qualifying for Medicaid on the basis of income every six months, or at shorter intervals. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match rate for states that elect this option. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Work Requirements:           Permits (but does not require) states to, beginning October 1, 2017, impose work requirements on “non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant” beneficiaries. States can determine the length of time for such work requirements. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match for state expenses attributable to activities implementing the work requirements.

States may not impose requirements on pregnant women (through 60 days after birth); children under age 19; the sole parent of a child under age 6, or sole parent or caretaker of a child with disabilities; or a married individual or head of household under age 20 who “maintains satisfactory attendance at secondary school or equivalent,” or participates in vocational education. Adds to existing exemptions (drafted in BCRA) provisions exempting those in inpatient or intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment and full-time students from Medicaid work requirements. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Provider Taxes:        Reduces permissible Medicaid provider taxes from 6 percent under current law to 5.6 percent in fiscal year 2021, 5.2 percent in fiscal year 2022, 4.8 percent in fiscal year 2023, 4.4 percent in fiscal year 2024, and 4 percent in fiscal year 2025 and future fiscal years—a change from BCRA, which reduced provider taxes to 5 percent in 2025 (0.2 percent reduction per year, as opposed to 0.4 percent under the Graham-Cassidy bill). Some conservatives may view provider taxes as essentially “money laundering”—a game in which states engage in shell transactions solely designed to increase the federal share of Medicaid funding and reduce states’ share. More information can be found here. CBO believes states would probably reduce their spending in response to the loss of provider tax revenue, resulting in lower spending by the federal government. Saves $13 billion over ten years.

Medicaid Per Capita Caps:              Creates a system of per capita spending caps for federal spending on Medicaid, beginning in fiscal year 2020. States that exceed their caps would have their federal match reduced in the following fiscal year.

The cap would include all spending on medical care provided through the Medicaid program, with the exception of DSH payments and Medicare cost-sharing paid for dual eligibles (individuals eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare).

While the cap would take effect in fiscal year 2020, states could choose their “base period” based on any eight consecutive quarters of expenditures between October 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017. The CMS Administrator would have authority to make adjustments to relevant data if she believes a state attempted to “game” the look-back period. Late-expanding Medicaid states could choose a shorter period (but not fewer than four) quarters as their “base period” for determining per capita caps—a provision that some conservatives may view as improperly incentivizing states that decided to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied.

Creates four classes of beneficiaries for whom the caps would apply: 1) elderly individuals over age 65; 2) blind and disabled beneficiaries; 3) children under age 19; and 4) all other non-disabled, non-elderly, non-expansion adults (e.g., pregnant women, parents, etc.). Excludes State Children’s Health Insurance Plan enrollees, Indian Health Service participants, breast and cervical cancer services eligible individuals, and certain other partial benefit enrollees from the per capita caps. Exempts declared public health emergencies from the Medicaid per capita caps—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency—but such exemption may not exceed $5 billion.

For years before fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to medical inflation for children and all other non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation plus one percentage point for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to overall inflation for children and non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries—a change from BCRA, which set the caps at overall inflation for all enrollees beginning in 2025.

Eliminates provisions in the House bill regarding “required expenditures by certain political subdivisions,” which some had derided as a parochial New York-related provision.

Provides a provision—not included in the House bill—for effectively re-basing the per capita caps. Allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to increase the caps by between 0.5% and 3% (a change from BCRA, which set a 2% maximum increase) for low-spending states (defined as having per capita expenditures 25% below the national median), and lower the caps by between 0.5% and 2% (unchanged from BCRA) for high-spending states (with per capita expenditures 25% above the national median). The Secretary may only implement this provision in a budget-neutral manner, i.e., one that does not increase the deficit. However, this re-basing provision shall NOT apply to any state with a population density of under 15 individuals per square mile.

Requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce states’ annual growth rate by one percent for any year in which that state “fails to satisfactorily submit data” regarding its Medicaid program. Permits HHS to adjust cap amounts to reflect data errors, based on an appeal by the state, increasing cap levels by no more than two percent. Requires new state reporting on inpatient psychiatric hospital services and children with complex medical conditions. Requires the HHS Inspector General to audit each state’s spending at least every three years.

For the period including calendar quarters beginning on October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2019, increases the federal Medicaid match for certain state expenditures to improve data recording, including a 100 percent match in some instances.

Home and Community-Based Services:             Creates a four-year, $8 billion demonstration project from 2020 through 2023 to expand home- and community-based service payment adjustments in Medicaid, with such payment adjustments eligible for a 100 percent federal match. The 15 states with the lowest population density would be given priority for funds.

Medicaid Block Grants:      Creates a Medicaid block grant, called the “Medicaid Flexibility Program,” beginning in Fiscal Year 2020. Requires interested states to submit an application providing a proposed packet of services, a commitment to submit relevant data (including health quality measures and clinical data), and a statement of program goals. Requires public notice-and-comment periods at both the state and federal levels.

The amount of the block grant would total the regular federal match rate, multiplied by the target per capita spending amounts (as calculated above), multiplied by the number of expected enrollees (adjusted forward based on the estimated increase in population for the state, per Census Bureau estimates). In future years, the block grant would be increased by general inflation.

Prohibits states from increasing their base year block grant population beyond 2016 levels, adjusted for population growth, plus an additional three percentage points. This provision is likely designed to prevent states from “packing” their Medicaid programs full of beneficiaries immediately prior to a block grant’s implementation, solely to achieve higher federal payments.

In a change from BCRA, the bill removes language permitting states to roll over block grant payments from year to year—a move that some conservatives may view as antithetical to the flexibility intended by a block grant, and biasing states away from this model. Reduces federal payments for the following year in the case of states that fail to meet their maintenance of effort spending requirements, and permits the HHS Secretary to make reductions in the case of a state’s non-compliance. Requires the Secretary to publish block grant amounts for every state every year, regardless of whether or not the state elects the block grant option.

Permits block grants for a program period of five fiscal years, subject to renewal; plans with “no significant changes” would not have to re-submit an application for their block grants. Permits a state to terminate the block grant, but only if the state “has in place an appropriate transition plan approved by the Secretary.”

Imposes a series of conditions on Medicaid block grants, requiring coverage for all mandatory populations identified in the Medicaid statute, and use of the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) standard for determining eligibility. Includes 14 separate categories of services that states must cover for mandatory populations under the block grant. Requires benefits to have an actuarial value (coverage of average health expenses) of at least 95 percent of the benchmark coverage options in place prior to Obamacare. Permits states to determine the amount, duration, and scope of benefits within the parameters listed above.

Applies mental health parity provisions to the Medicaid block grant, and extends the Medicaid rebate program to any outpatient drugs covered under same. Permits states to impose premiums, deductibles, or other cost-sharing, provided such efforts do not exceed 5 percent of a family’s income in any given year.

Requires participating states to have simplified enrollment processes, coordinate with insurance Exchanges, and “establish a fair process” for individuals to appeal adverse eligibility determinations. Allows for modification of the Medicaid block grant during declared public health emergencies—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency.

Exempts states from per capita caps, waivers, state plan amendments, and other provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act while participating in Medicaid block grants.

Performance Bonus Payments:             Provides an $8 billion pool for bonus payments to state Medicaid and SCHIP programs for Fiscal Years 2023 through 2026. Allows the Secretary to increase federal matching rates for states that 1) have lower than expected expenses under the per capita caps and 2) report applicable quality measures, and have a plan to use the additional funds on quality improvement. While noting the goal of reducing health costs through quality improvement, and incentives for same, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision—as with others in the bill—gives near-blanket authority to the HHS Secretary to control the program’s parameters, power that conservatives believe properly resides outside Washington—and power that a future Democratic Administration could use to contravene conservative objectives. CBO believes that only some states will meet the performance criteria, leading some of the money not to be spent between now and 2026. Costs $3 billion over ten years.

Inpatient Psychiatric Services:             Provides for optional state Medicaid coverage of inpatient psychiatric services for individuals over 21 and under 65 years of age. (Current law permits coverage of such services for individuals under age 21.) Such coverage would not exceed 30 days in any month or 90 days in any calendar year. In order to receive such assistance, the state must maintain its number of licensed psychiatric beds as of the date of enactment, and maintain current levels of funding for inpatient services and outpatient psychiatric services. Provides a lower (i.e., 50 percent) match for such services, furnished on or after October 1, 2018; however, in a change from BCRA, allows for higher federal match rates for certain services and individuals to continue if they were in effect prior to September 30, 2018. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Medicaid and Indian Health Service:             Makes a state’s expenses on behalf of Indians eligible for a 100 percent match, irrespective of the source of those services. Current law provides for a 100 percent match only for services provided at an Indian Health Service center. Costs $3.5 billion over ten years.

Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments:     Adjusts reductions in DSH payments to reflect shortfalls in funding for the state grant program described above. For fiscal years 2021 through 2025, states receiving grant allocations that do not keep up with medical inflation will have their DSH reductions reduced or eliminated; in fiscal year 2026, states with grant shortfalls will have their DSH payments increased. Costs $17.9 billion over ten years.

High-Poverty States:            Provides for a permanent increase in the federal Medicaid match for two states, based on poverty guidelines established for 2017. Specifically, provides for a 25 percent increase to the state with the “highest separate poverty guideline for 2017,” and a 15 percent increase to the state with the “second highest separate poverty guideline for 2017”—provisions that by definition would apply only to Alaska and Hawaii, respectively. Some conservatives may be concerned first that these provisions represent inappropriate earmarks, and further that they would change federal spending in perpetuity based on poverty determinations made for a single year. Costs $7.2 billion over ten years.

Title II

Prevention and Public Health Fund:             Eliminates funding for the Obamacare prevention “slush fund,” and rescinds all unobligated balances, beginning in Fiscal Year 2019. Saves $7.9 billion over ten years.

Community Health Centers:             Increases funding for community health centers by $422 million for Fiscal Year 2018—money intended to offset reductions in spending on Planned Parenthood affiliates (see “Federal Payments to States” above). Spends $422 million over ten years.

Cost-Sharing Subsidies:      Repeals Obamacare’s cost-sharing subsidies, effective December 31, 2019, and does not appropriate funds for cost-sharing subsidy claims for plan years through 2019. The House of Representatives filed suit against the Obama Administration (House v. Burwell) alleging the Administration acted unconstitutionally in spending funds on the cost-sharing subsidies without an explicit appropriation from Congress. The case is currently on hold pending settlement discussions between the Trump Administration and the House.

Grant Conditions:    Sets additional conditions for the grant program established in Title I of the bill. States may submit applications waiving certain provisions currently in federal statute:

  1. Essential health benefits;
  2. Cost-sharing requirements;
  3. Actuarial value requirements, including plan metal tiers (e.g., bronze, silver, gold, and platinum);
  4. Community rating—although states may not be able to vary premiums based on health status, due to contradictory language in this section;
  5. Preventive health services; and
  6. Single risk pool.

Requires states to submit their revised rules to the federal government, “except that in no case may an issuer vary premium rates on the basis of sex or on the basis of genetic information.” Some conservatives may view this language as less likely to spark new legal challenges than the prior wording, which prohibited insurance changes based on “membership in a protected class.” However, some conservatives may also find that the mutually contradictory provisions over whether and how states can vary insurance rates may spark other legal challenges.

The waivers only apply to an insurer receiving funding under the state program, and “to an individual who is receiving a direct benefit” from the grant—which does not include reinsurance. In other words, each individual must receive some direct subsidy, rather than just general benefits derived from the broader insurance pool. Some conservatives may be concerned that, by tying waiver of regulations so closely to receipt of federal grant funds, this provision would essentially provide limited regulatory relief. Furthermore, such limited relief would require states to accept federal funding largely adjudicated and doled out by unelected bureaucrats.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, while well-intentioned, these provisions do not represent a true attempt at federalism—one which would repeal all of Obamacare’s regulations and devolve health insurance oversight back to the states. It remains unclear whether any states would actually waive Obamacare regulations under the bill; if a state chooses not to do so, all of the law’s costly mandates will remain in place there, leaving Obamacare as the default option.

Some conservatives may view provisions requiring anyone to whom a waiver applies to receive federal grant funding as the epitome of moral hazard—ensuring that individuals who go through health underwriting will receive federal subsidies, no matter their level of wealth or personal circumstances. By requiring states to subsidize bad actors—for instance, an individual making $250,000 who knowingly went without health coverage for years—with federal taxpayer dollars, the bill could actually raise health insurance premiums, not lower them. Moreover, some conservatives may be concerned that—because the grant program funding ends in 2027, and because all individuals subject to waivers must receive grant funding—the waiver program will effectively end in 2027, absent a new infusion of taxpayer dollars.

Gov. Jindal Op-Ed: Supreme Court Decision Is Not the End of the Debate

As a matter of law, the Court’s decision upholding subsidies for states participating in the federally run insurance exchange, healthcare.gov, violates the plain text of Obamacare. The statute expressly restricted insurance subsidies to those individuals purchasing coverage through an “Exchange established by the state.” But just as Chief Justice Roberts three years ago decreed that the individual mandate functioned as a tax, even though both Congress and President Barack Obama stated that it wasn’t, the Court decided that “Exchange established by the state” meant any type of Exchange, whether established by states or by Washington.

It’s a sad outcome for the rule of law — and the English language. But when it comes to the political debate surrounding Obamacare, the Court’s ruling ultimately decides little. Of course, Obama, who took an entirely predictable victory lap yesterday, would have you believe otherwise. But we’ve seen his triumphalism before — and have seen it come crashing back to reality.

Three years ago, Obama stated he wouldn’t “refight old battles,” mere hours after seven Supreme Court justices — including his own former solicitor general — struck down the law’s mandatory Medicaid expansion as unconstitutional “economic dragooning” of the states. On election night 2012, the president promised to “move forward” — months before at least 4.7 million Americans received insurance cancellation notices thanks to Obamacare. And this April, the president arrogantly declared that “the repeal debate is and should be over” — mere weeks before his native state of Hawaii shut its failed insurance exchange, an effort the federal government spent more than $200 million funding.

So, much as the President would like the debate on Obamacare to be over, it isn’t. The debate persists in large part because the law has singularly failed in its prime objective: Containing health care costs. Consider why this Supreme Court case mattered so much to the administration in the first place. The law spends over $1.7 trillion on subsidized coverage to make insurance more “affordable,” largely to offset the new mandates and regulations that have raised the price of insurance.

And with myriad insurers proposing double-digit premium increases for next year — some as high as 50% — candidate Obama’s 2008 promise to lower insurance premiums by $2,500 per family is further away then ever. No wonder the law remains singularly unpopular. When it comes to winning the debate on Obamacare, there is still all to play for.

But in order to win, we conservatives first have to play. That means outlining our alternative vision for health care: How we would restore freedom and choice to a health care sector currently lacking for both — and most importantly, how we would slow, and hopefully reverse, the trend of skyrocketing health care costs.

As I write this, I stand as the sole major declared presidential candidate (with the possible exception of Bernie Sanders) to put forward my vision on health care, and an alternative to Obamacare. As proud as I am of my plan, that is a boast I wish I were not able to make. Because Republicans, from the top down, must outline a clear and coherent vision for health care to win the trust of the American people to repeal this President’s health law.

While we should be shouting our vision from the rooftops, many of my fellow candidates have managed barely a whisper about how exactly they would repeal Obamacare, or what they would do to tackle the main issue plaguing our health care system: rising costs. Sen. Mike Lee recently stated that lack of an Obamacare replacement plan should be a disqualifier for any conservative presidential candidate. He’s absolutely right. We owe it to the American people to release our plans well before November 2016, and to have a robust debate within our party about what should come after Obamacare.

Because, contrary to this President’s self-proclaimed edicts, yesterday’s Supreme Court decision is not the end of the debate on Obamacare.

Now that the Supreme Court has ruled, the debate shifts back to the elected branches of government — the ones that caused our health care mess in the first place. It is there that conservatives can complete our work to repeal Obamacare.

This post was originally published at Time.

In California’s Health Exchange Cuts, A Preview of Other States’ Woes?

The Supreme Court is expected to rule soon on the legality of insurance subsidies in 37 states that use the federal HealthCare.gov site. Some states have discussed creating their own exchanges in the wake of the court’s decision, but those may not be fiscally sustainable.

The Los Angeles Times reported last week that Covered California, the Golden State’s exchange, “is preparing to go on a diet,” cutting its budget 15% for the fiscal year beginning July 1 because of lower-than-expected enrollment. Earlier this month, Hawaii’s state exchange prepared plans to shut down this fall amid funding shortfalls. Hawaii’s exchange had technical problems that have impeded signups since its launch, but Covered California has had relatively few computer glitches. During the HealthCare.gov rollout problems in 2013, columnist Paul Krugman held up California as a model of efficiency:

What would happen if we unveiled a program that looked like Obamacare, in a place that looked like America, but with competent project management that produced a working website? Well, your wish is granted. Ladies and gentlemen, I give you California.

Mr. Krugman called California “an especially useful test case,” saying that “it’s huge: if a system can work for 38 million people, it can work for America as a whole.”

But that model has run into financial distress. After slashing its spending, Covered California achieved a balanced budget for next year by utilizing $100 million in federally provided start-up funds. The Department of Health and Human Services’ inspector general and at least two U.S. senators have questioned whether exchanges are using start-up funds to plug holes in their budgets—a practice prohibited by law and one the senators called a “short term fix” in a letter to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Using federal funds may help Covered California next year—but it will leave a multi-million-dollar hole in its budget the following year, leading to another round of belt-tightening.

The spending cuts—particularly a 33% reduction to marketing and outreach next year—will have an impact. As one report noted, “With enrollment growing more slowly than expected, a big cut in marketing might result in continued difficulties reaching target markets.” In other words, a spending cut next year could result in lower-than-expected enrollment—and budget crunches—in future years. Covered California could raise the $13.95 per policy monthly fee to generate more revenue—but that would also raise premiums, potentially driving away customers.

Before the exchanges opened, some worried about a disproportionate number of sick patients driving up premiums–and driving out healthy enrollees. A related phenomenon could be happening in state-run exchanges: in which few sign-ups result in a combination of cuts to outreach programs and/or higher monthly fees, discouraging enrollment and starting another round of the spiral. It’s possible that California’s experience could be a useful test case of that proposition—and a cautionary tale for those states contemplating their own exchanges.

This post was originally published at the Wall Street Journal Think Tank blog.

46 Reasons to Repeal an Unconstitutional Law NOW

46 50 Reasons to Repeal ALL of Obamacare NOW

Today the Supreme Court struck down portions of Obamacare as unconstitutional – states cannot be “dragooned” into expanding their Medicaid programs according to the law’s dictates. However, a list of 50 particularly onerous or egregious provisions in Obamacare (with sections from the statute duly noted) reveals just how much of this bad law remains. By the most generous interpretation, the Court struck down only four of the 50 egregious policies, illustrating why Congress should immediately repeal the entire measure once and for all. Among many other bad policies, the law:

  1. Imposes $800 billion in tax increases, including no fewer than 12 separate provisions breaking candidate Obama’s “firm pledge” during his campaign that he would not raise “any of your taxes” (Sections 9001-9016)
  2. Forces Americans to purchase a product for the first time ever (Section 1501)
  3. Creates a board of 15 unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats to make binding rulings on how to reduce Medicare spending (Section 3403)
  4. Pays over $800 billion in subsidies straight to health insurance companies (Sections 1401, 1402, and 1412)
  5. Requires all individuals to buy government-approved health insurance plans, imposing new mandates that will raise individual insurance premiums by an average of $2,100 per family (Section 1302)
  6. Forces seniors to lose their current health care, by enacting Medicare Advantage cuts that by 2017 will cut enrollment in half, and cut plan choices by two-thirds (Section 3201)
  7. Imposes a 40 percent tax on health benefits, a direct contradiction of Barack Obama’s campaign promises (Section 9001)
  8. Relies upon government bureaucrats to “issue guidance on best practices of plain language writing” (Section 1311(e)(3)(B))
  9. Provides special benefits to residents of Libby, Montana – home of Max Baucus, the powerful Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who helped write the law even though he says he hasn’t read it (Section 10323)
  10. Imposes what a Democrat Governor called the “mother of all unfunded mandates” – new, Washington-dictated requirements of at least $118 billion – at a time when states already face budget deficits totaling a collective $175 billion (Section 2001)
  11. Imposes reductions in Medicare spending that, according to the program’s non-partisan actuary, would cause 40 percent of all Medicare providers to become unprofitable, and could lead to their exit from the program (Section 3401)
  12. Raises premiums on more than 17 million seniors participating in Medicare Part D, so that Big Pharma can benefit from its “rock-solid deal” struck behind closed doors with President Obama and Congressional Democrats (Section 3301)
  13. Creates an institute to undertake research that, according to one draft Committee report prepared by Democrats, could mean that “more expensive [treatments] will no longer be prescribed” (Section 6301)
  14. Creates a multi-billion dollar “slush fund” doled out solely by federal bureaucrats, which has already been used to fund things like bike paths (Section 4002)
  15. Subjects states to myriad new lawsuits, by forcing them to assume legal liability for delivering services to Medicaid patients for the first time in that program’s history (Section 2304)
  16. Permits taxpayer dollars to flow to health plans that fund abortion, in a sharp deviation from prior practice under Democrat and Republican Administrations (Section 1303)
  17. Empowers bureaucrats on a board that has ruled against mammograms and against prostate cancer screenings to make binding determinations about what types of preventive services should be covered (Sections 2713 and 4104)
  18. Precludes poor individuals from having a choice of health care plans by automatically dumping them in the Medicaid program (Section 1413(a))
  19. Creates a new entitlement program that one Democrat called “a Ponzi scheme of the first order, the kind of thing that Bernie Madoff would have been proud of” – a scheme so unsustainable even the Administration was forced to admit it would not work (Section 8002)
  20. Provides $5 billion in taxpayer dollars to a fund that has largely served to bail out unions and other organizations who made unsustainable health care promises to retirees that they cannot afford (Section 1102)
  21. Creates a tax credit so convoluted it requires seven different worksheets to determine eligibility (Section 1421)
  22. Imposes multiple penalties on those who marry, by reducing subsidies (and increasing taxes) for married couples when compared to two individuals cohabiting together (Sections 1401-02)
  23. Extends the Medicare “payroll tax” to unearned income for the first time ever, including new taxes on the sale of some homes (Section 1402)
  24. Impedes state flexibility by requiring Medicaid programs to offer a specific package of benefits, including benefits like family planning services (Sections 2001(a)(2), 2001(c), 1302(b), and 2303(c))
  25. Requires individuals to go to the doctor and get a prescription in order to spend their own Flexible Spending Account money on over-the-counter medicines (Section 9003)
  26. Expands the definition of “low-income” to make 63 percent of non-elderly Americans eligible for “low-income” subsidized insurance (Section 1401)
  27. Imposes a new tax on the makers of goods like pacemakers and hearing aids (Section 9009)
  28. Creates an insurance reimbursement scheme that could result in the federal government obtaining Americans’ medical records (Section 1343)
  29. Permits states to make individuals presumptively eligible for Medicaid for unlimited 60-day periods, thus allowing any individual to receive taxpayer-funded assistance ad infinitum (Section 2303(b))
  30. Allows individuals to purchase insurance on government exchanges – and to receive taxpayer-funded insurance subsidies – WITHOUT verifying their identity as American citizens (Section 1411)
  31. Gives $300 million in higher Medicaid reimbursements to one state as part of the infamous “Louisiana Purchase” – described by ABC News as “what…it take[s] to get a wavering senator to vote for health care reform” (Section 2006)
  32. Raises taxes on firms who cannot afford to buy coverage for their workers (Section 1513)
  33. Forces younger Americans to pay double-digit premium increases so that older workers can pay slightly less (Section 1201)
  34. Prohibits states from modifying their Medicaid programs to include things like modest anti-fraud protections (Section 2001)
  35. Includes a special provision increasing federal payments just for Tennessee (Section 1203(b))
  36. Allows individuals to purchase health insurance across state lines – but only if politicians and bureaucrats agree to allow citizens this privilege (Section 1333)
  37. Allows the HHS Secretary and federal bureaucrats to grant waivers exempting people from Obamacare’s onerous mandates, over half of which have gone to members of union plans (Section 1001)
  38. Creates a pseudo-government-run plan overseen by the federal government (Section 1334)
  39. Removes a demonstration project designed to force government-run Medicare to compete on a level playing field with private plans (Section 1102(f))
  40. Gives the Secretary of HHS an UNLIMITED amount of federal funds to spend funding state insurance Exchanges (Section 1311(a))
  41. Creates a grant program that could be used by liberal groups like ACORN or AARP to conduct “public education activities” surrounding Obamacare (Section 1311(i))
  42. Applies new federal mandates to pre-Obamacare insurance policies, thus proving that you CAN’T keep the insurance plan you had – and liked – before the law passed (Sections 2301 and 10103)
  43. Prohibits individuals harmed by federal bureaucrats from challenging those decisions, either in court or through regulatory processes (Sections 3001, 3003, 3007, 3008, 3021, 3022, 3025, 3133, 3403, 5501, 6001, and 6401)
  44. Earmarks $100 million for “construction of a health care facility,” a “sweetheart deal” inserted by a Democrat Senator trying to win re-election (Section 10502)
  45. Puts yet another Medicaid unfunded mandate on states, by raising payments to primary care physicians, but only for two years, forcing states to come up with another method of funding this unsustainable promise when federal funding expires (Section 1202)
  46. Imposes price controls that have had the effect of costing jobs in the short time since they were first implemented (Section 1001)
  47. Prohibits individuals from spending federal insurance subsidies outside government-approved Exchanges (Section 1401(a))
  48. Provides a special increase in federal hospital payments just for Hawaii (Section 10201(e)(1))
  49. Imposes new reporting requirements that will cost businesses millions of dollars, and affect thousands of restaurants and other establishments across the country (Section 4205)
  50. Codifies 159 new boards, bureaucracies, and programs

The Supreme Court may have struck some of these onerous provisions, but the only way to ensure that ALL these provisions are eliminated – and never return – is to repeal ALL of this unconstitutional law immediately.

208 Things in Obamacare that Obama and Democrats Support

Last week, former HELP Committee staffer John McDonough wrote a list of “50 provisions I ask the media to ask Romney et al. if they are committed to repealing as President.”  McDonough noted that “there are [Obamacare] provisions opponents could pick out to create an alternative list for elimination.”

We here at RPC know a challenge when we hear one; our list is submitted below, with sections from the statute duly noted.  Remember when reading this list:  We KNOW that President Obama and Democrats all support these provisions in Obamacare – because they all voted to enact them into law.  So members of the media can readily ask President Obama and Democrat Members of Congress why they supported a law that…

  1. Imposes $800 billion in tax increases, including no fewer than 12 separate provisions breaking candidate Obama’s “firm pledge” during his campaign that he would not raise “any of your taxes” (Sections 9001-9016)?
  2. Forces Americans to purchase a product for the first time ever (Section 1501)?
  3. Creates a board of 15 unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats to make binding rulings on how to reduce Medicare spending (Section 3403)?
  4. Pays over $800 billion in subsidies straight to health insurance companies (Sections 1401, 1402, and 1412)?
  5. Requires all individuals to buy government-approved health insurance plans, imposing new mandates that will raise individual insurance premiums by an average of $2,100 per family (Section 1302)?
  6. Forces seniors to lose their current health care, by enacting Medicare Advantage cuts that by 2017 will cut enrollment in half, and cut plan choices by two-thirds (Section 3201)?
  7. Imposes a 40 percent tax on health benefits, a direct contradiction of Barack Obama’s campaign promises (Section 9001)?
  8. Relies upon government bureaucrats to “issue guidance on best practices of plain language writing” (Section 1311(e)(3)(B))?
  9. Provides special benefits to residents of Libby, Montana – home of Max Baucus, the powerful Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who helped write the law even though he says he hasn’t read it (Section 10323)?
  10. Imposes what a Democrat Governor called the “mother of all unfunded mandates” – new, Washington-dictated requirements of at least $118 billion – at a time when states already face budget deficits totaling a collective $175 billion (Section 2001)?
  11. Imposes reductions in Medicare spending that, according to the program’s non-partisan actuary, would cause 40 percent of all Medicare providers to become unprofitable, and could lead to their exit from the program (Section 3401)?
  12. Raises premiums on more than 17 million seniors participating in Medicare Part D, so that Big Pharma can benefit from its “rock-solid deal” struck behind closed doors with President Obama and Congressional Democrats (Section 3301)?
  13. Creates an institute to undertake research that, according to one draft Committee report prepared by Democrats, could mean that “more expensive [treatments] will no longer be prescribed” (Section 6301)?
  14. Creates a multi-billion dollar “slush fund” doled out solely by federal bureaucrats, which has already been used to fund things like bike paths (Section 4002)?
  15. Subjects states to myriad new lawsuits, by forcing them to assume legal liability for delivering services to Medicaid patients for the first time in that program’s history (Section 2304)?
  16. Permits taxpayer dollars to flow to health plans that fund abortion, in a sharp deviation from prior practice under Democrat and Republican Administrations (Section 1303)?
  17. Empowers bureaucrats on a board that has ruled against mammograms and against prostate cancer screenings to make binding determinations about what types of preventive services should be covered (Sections 2713 and 4104)?
  18. Precludes poor individuals from having a choice of health care plans by automatically dumping them in the Medicaid program (Section 1413(a))?
  19. Creates a new entitlement program that one Democrat called “a Ponzi scheme of the first order, the kind of thing that Bernie Madoff would have been proud of” – a scheme so unsustainable even the Administration was forced to admit it would not work (Section 8002)?
  20. Provides $5 billion in taxpayer dollars to a fund that has largely served to bail out unions and other organizations who made unsustainable health care promises to retirees that they cannot afford (Section 1102)?
  21. Creates a tax credit so convoluted it requires seven different worksheets to determine eligibility (Section 1421)?
  22. Imposes multiple penalties on those who marry, by reducing subsidies (and increasing taxes) for married couples when compared to two individuals cohabiting together (Sections 1401-02)?
  23. Extends the Medicare “payroll tax” to unearned income for the first time ever, including new taxes on the sale of some homes (Section 1402)?
  24. Impedes state flexibility by requiring Medicaid programs to offer a specific package of benefits, including benefits like family planning services (Sections 2001(a)(2), 2001(c), 1302(b), and 2303(c))?
  25. Requires individuals to go to the doctor and get a prescription in order to spend their own Flexible Spending Account money on over-the-counter medicines (Section 9003)?
  26. Expands the definition of “low-income” to make 63 percent of non-elderly Americans eligible for “low-income” subsidized insurance (Section 1401)?
  27. Imposes a new tax on the makers of goods like pacemakers and hearing aids (Section 9009)?
  28. Creates an insurance reimbursement scheme that could result in the federal government obtaining Americans’ medical records (Section 1343)?
  29. Permits states to make individuals presumptively eligible for Medicaid for unlimited 60-day periods, thus allowing any individual to receive taxpayer-funded assistance ad infinitum (Section 2303(b))?
  30. Allows individuals to purchase insurance on government exchanges – and to receive taxpayer-funded insurance subsidies – WITHOUT verifying their identity as American citizens (Section 1411)?
  31. Gives $300 million in higher Medicaid reimbursements to one state as part of the infamous “Louisiana Purchase” – described by ABC News as “what…it take[s] to get a wavering senator to vote for health care reform” (Section 2006)?
  32. Raises taxes on firms who cannot afford to buy coverage for their workers (Section 1513)?
  33. Forces younger Americans to pay double-digit premium increases so that older workers can pay slightly less (Section 1201)?
  34. Prohibits states from modifying their Medicaid programs to include things like modest anti-fraud protections (Section 2001)?
  35. Includes a special provision increasing federal payments just for Tennessee (Section 1203(b))?
  36. Allows individuals to purchase health insurance across state lines – but only if politicians and bureaucrats agree to allow citizens this privilege (Section 1333)?
  37. Allows the HHS Secretary and federal bureaucrats to grant waivers exempting people from Obamacare’s onerous mandates, over half of which have gone to members of union plans (Section 1001)?
  38. Creates a pseudo-government-run plan overseen by the federal government (Section 1334)?
  39. Removes a demonstration project designed to force government-run Medicare to compete on a level playing field with private plans (Section 1102(f))?
  40. Gives the Secretary of HHS an UNLIMITED amount of federal funds to spend funding state insurance Exchanges (Section 1311(a))?
  41. Creates a grant program that could be used by liberal groups like ACORN or AARP to conduct “public education activities” surrounding Obamacare (Section 1311(i))?
  42. Applies new federal mandates to pre-Obamacare insurance policies, thus proving that you CAN’T keep the insurance plan you had – and liked – before the law passed (Sections 2301 and 10103)?
  43. Prohibits individuals harmed by federal bureaucrats from challenging those decisions, either in court or through regulatory processes (Sections 3001, 3003, 3007, 3008, 3021, 3022, 3025, 3133, 3403, 5501, 6001, AND 6401)?
  44. Earmarks $100 million for “construction of a health care facility,” a “sweetheart deal” inserted by a Democrat Senator trying to win re-election (Section 10502)?
  45. Puts yet another Medicaid unfunded mandate on states, by raising payments to primary care physicians, but only for two years, forcing states to come up with another method of funding this unsustainable promise when federal funding expires (Section 1202)?
  46. Imposes price controls that have had the effect of costing jobs in the short time since they were first implemented (Section 1001)?
  47. Prohibits individuals from spending federal insurance subsidies outside government-approved Exchanges (Section 1401(a))?
  48. Provides a special increase in federal hospital payments just for Hawaii (Section 10201(e)(1))?
  49. Imposes new reporting requirements that will cost businesses millions of dollars, and affect thousands of restaurants and other establishments across the country (Section 4205)?

And instead of including a 50th item on our list, we’re going to include 159 separate items.  These are the 159 new boards, bureaucracies, and programs created by Obamacare.  You can find the list below, or here.

No matter which way you look at it, this list provides 208 easy reasons why the American people still continue to reject Democrats’ unpopular 2700-page health care law.

 

Obamacare’s 159 New Boards, Bureaucracies, Commissions, and Programs

  1. Grant program for consumer assistance offices (Section 1002, p. 37)
  2. Grant program for states to monitor premium increases (Section 1003, p. 42)
  3. Committee to review administrative simplification standards (Section 1104, p. 71)
  4. Demonstration program for state wellness programs (Section 1201, p. 93)
  5. Grant program to establish state Exchanges (Section 1311(a), p. 130)
  6. State American Health Benefit Exchanges (Section 1311(b), p. 131)
  7. Exchange grants to establish consumer navigator programs (Section 1311(i), p. 150)
  8. Grant program for state cooperatives (Section 1322, p. 169)
  9. Advisory board for state cooperatives (Section 1322(b)(3), p. 173)
  10. Private purchasing council for state cooperatives (Section 1322(d), p. 177)
  11. State basic health plan programs (Section 1331, p. 201)
  12. State-based reinsurance program (Section 1341, p. 226)
  13. Program of risk corridors for individual and small group markets (Section 1342, p. 233)
  14. Program to determine eligibility for Exchange participation (Section 1411, p. 267)
  15. Program for advance determination of tax credit eligibility (Section 1412, p. 288)
  16. Grant program to implement health IT enrollment standards (Section 1561, p. 370)
  17. Federal Coordinated Health Care Office for dual eligible beneficiaries (Section 2602, p. 512)
  18. Medicaid quality measurement program (Section 2701, p. 518)
  19. Medicaid health home program for people with chronic conditions, and grants for planning same (Section 2703, p. 524)
  20. Medicaid demonstration project to evaluate bundled payments (Section 2704, p. 532)
  21. Medicaid demonstration project for global payment system (Section 2705, p. 536)
  22. Medicaid demonstration project for accountable care organizations (Section 2706, p. 538)
  23. Medicaid demonstration project for emergency psychiatric care (Section 2707, p. 540)
  24. Grant program for delivery of services to individuals with postpartum depression (Section 2952(b), p. 591)
  25. State allotments for grants to promote personal responsibility education programs (Section 2953, p. 596)
  26. Medicare value-based purchasing program (Section 3001(a), p. 613)
  27. Medicare value-based purchasing demonstration program for critical access hospitals (Section 3001(b), p. 637)
  28. Medicare value-based purchasing program for skilled nursing facilities (Section 3006(a), p. 666)
  29. Medicare value-based purchasing program for home health agencies (Section 3006(b), p. 668)
  30. Interagency Working Group on Health Care Quality (Section 3012, p. 688)
  31. Grant program to develop health care quality measures (Section 3013, p. 693)
  32. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Section 3021, p. 712)
  33. Medicare shared savings program (Section 3022, p. 728)
  34. Medicare pilot program on payment bundling (Section 3023, p. 739)
  35. Independence at home medical practice demonstration program (Section 3024, p. 752)
  36. Program for use of patient safety organizations to reduce hospital readmission rates (Section 3025(b), p. 775)
  37. Community-based care transitions program (Section 3026, p. 776)
  38. Demonstration project for payment of complex diagnostic laboratory tests (Section 3113, p. 800)
  39. Medicare hospice concurrent care demonstration project (Section 3140, p. 850)
  40. Independent Payment Advisory Board (Section 3403, p. 982)
  41. Consumer Advisory Council for Independent Payment Advisory Board (Section 3403, p. 1027)
  42. Grant program for technical assistance to providers implementing health quality practices (Section 3501, p. 1043)
  43. Grant program to establish interdisciplinary health teams (Section 3502, p. 1048)
  44. Grant program to implement medication therapy management (Section 3503, p. 1055)
  45. Grant program to support emergency care pilot programs (Section 3504, p. 1061)
  46. Grant program to promote universal access to trauma services (Section 3505(b), p. 1081)
  47. Grant program to develop and promote shared decision-making aids (Section 3506, p. 1088)
  48. Grant program to support implementation of shared decision-making (Section 3506, p. 1091)
  49. Grant program to integrate quality improvement in clinical education (Section 3508, p. 1095)
  50. Health and Human Services Coordinating Committee on Women’s Health (Section 3509(a), p. 1098)
  51. Centers for Disease Control Office of Women’s Health (Section 3509(b), p. 1102)
  52. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Office of Women’s Health (Section 3509(e), p. 1105)
  53. Health Resources and Services Administration Office of Women’s Health (Section 3509(f), p. 1106)
  54. Food and Drug Administration Office of Women’s Health (Section 3509(g), p. 1109)
  55. National Prevention, Health Promotion, and Public Health Council (Section 4001, p. 1114)
  56. Advisory Group on Prevention, Health Promotion, and Integrative and Public Health (Section 4001(f), p. 1117)
  57. Prevention and Public Health Fund (Section 4002, p. 1121)
  58. Community Preventive Services Task Force (Section 4003(b), p. 1126)
  59. Grant program to support school-based health centers (Section 4101, p. 1135)
  60. Grant program to promote research-based dental caries disease management (Section 4102, p. 1147)
  61. Grant program for States to prevent chronic disease in Medicaid beneficiaries (Section 4108, p. 1174)
  62. Community transformation grants (Section 4201, p. 1182)
  63. Grant program to provide public health interventions (Section 4202, p. 1188)
  64. Demonstration program of grants to improve child immunization rates (Section 4204(b), p. 1200)
  65. Pilot program for risk-factor assessments provided through community health centers (Section 4206, p. 1215)
  66. Grant program to increase epidemiology and laboratory capacity (Section 4304, p. 1233)
  67. Interagency Pain Research Coordinating Committee (Section 4305, p. 1238)
  68. National Health Care Workforce Commission (Section 5101, p. 1256)
  69. Grant program to plan health care workforce development activities (Section 5102(c), p. 1275)
  70. Grant program to implement health care workforce development activities (Section 5102(d), p. 1279)
  71. Pediatric specialty loan repayment program (Section 5203, p. 1295)
  72. Public Health Workforce Loan Repayment Program (Section 5204, p. 1300)
  73. Allied Health Loan Forgiveness Program (Section 5205, p. 1305)
  74. Grant program to provide mid-career training for health professionals (Section 5206, p. 1307)
  75. Grant program to fund nurse-managed health clinics (Section 5208, p. 1310)
  76. Grant program to support primary care training programs (Section 5301, p. 1315)
  77. Grant program to fund training for direct care workers (Section 5302, p. 1322)
  78. Grant program to develop dental training programs (Section 5303, p. 1325)
  79. Demonstration program to increase access to dental health care in underserved communities (Section 5304, p. 1331)
  80. Grant program to promote geriatric education centers (Section 5305, p. 1334)
  81. Grant program to promote health professionals entering geriatrics (Section 5305, p. 1339)
  82. Grant program to promote training in mental and behavioral health (Section 5306, p. 1344)
  83. Grant program to promote nurse retention programs (Section 5309, p. 1354)
  84. Student loan forgiveness for nursing school faculty (Section 5311(b), p. 1360)
  85. Grant program to promote positive health behaviors and outcomes (Section 5313, p. 1364)
  86. Public Health Sciences Track for medical students (Section 5315, p. 1372)
  87. Primary Care Extension Program to educate providers (Section 5405, p. 1404)
  88. Grant program for demonstration projects to address health workforce shortage needs (Section 5507, p. 1442)
  89. Grant program for demonstration projects to develop training programs for home health aides (Section 5507, p. 1447)
  90. Grant program to establish new primary care residency programs (Section 5508(a), p. 1458)
  91. Program of payments to teaching health centers that sponsor medical residency training (Section 5508(c), p. 1462)
  92. Graduate nurse education demonstration program (Section 5509, p. 1472)
  93. Grant program to establish demonstration projects for community-based mental health settings (Section 5604, p. 1486)
  94. Commission on Key National Indicators (Section 5605, p. 1489)
  95. Quality assurance and performance improvement program for skilled nursing facilities (Section 6102, p. 1554)
  96. Special focus facility program for skilled nursing facilities (Section 6103(a)(3), p. 1561)
  97. Special focus facility program for nursing facilities (Section 6103(b)(3), p. 1568)
  98. National independent monitor pilot program for skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities (Section 6112, p. 1589)
  99. Demonstration projects for nursing facilities involved in the culture change movement (Section 6114, p. 1597)
  100. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (Section 6301, p. 1619)
  101. Standing methodology committee for Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (Section 6301, p. 1629)
  102. Board of Governors for Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (Section 6301, p. 1638)
  103. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (Section 6301(e), p. 1656)
  104. Elder Justice Coordinating Council (Section 6703, p. 1773)
  105. Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation (Section 6703, p. 1776)
  106. Grant program to create elder abuse forensic centers (Section 6703, p. 1783)
  107. Grant program to promote continuing education for long-term care staffers (Section 6703, p. 1787)
  108. Grant program to improve management practices and training (Section 6703, p. 1788)
  109. Grant program to subsidize costs of electronic health records (Section 6703, p. 1791)
  110. Grant program to promote adult protective services (Section 6703, p. 1796)
  111. Grant program to conduct elder abuse detection and prevention (Section 6703, p. 1798)
  112. Grant program to support long-term care ombudsmen (Section 6703, p. 1800)
  113. National Training Institute for long-term care surveyors (Section 6703, p. 1806)
  114. Grant program to fund State surveys of long-term care residences (Section 6703, p. 1809)
  115. CLASS Independence Fund (Section 8002, p. 1926)
  116. CLASS Independence Fund Board of Trustees (Section 8002, p. 1927)
  117. CLASS Independence Advisory Council (Section 8002, p. 1931)
  118. Personal Care Attendants Workforce Advisory Panel (Section 8002(c), p. 1938)
  119. Multi-state health plans offered by Office of Personnel Management (Section 10104(p), p. 2086)
  120. Advisory board for multi-state health plans (Section 10104(p), p. 2094)
  121. Pregnancy Assistance Fund (Section 10212, p. 2164)
  122. Value-based purchasing program for ambulatory surgical centers (Section 10301, p. 2176)
  123. Demonstration project for payment adjustments to home health services (Section 10315, p. 2200)
  124. Pilot program for care of individuals in environmental emergency declaration areas (Section 10323, p. 2223)
  125. Grant program to screen at-risk individuals for environmental health conditions (Section 10323(b), p. 2231)
  126. Pilot programs to implement value-based purchasing (Section 10326, p. 2242)
  127. Grant program to support community-based collaborative care networks (Section 10333, p. 2265)
  128. Centers for Disease Control Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  129. Health Resources and Services Administration Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  130. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  131. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  132. Food and Drug Administration Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  133. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of Minority Health (Section 10334, p. 2272)
  134. Grant program to promote small business wellness programs (Section 10408, p. 2285)
  135. Cures Acceleration Network (Section 10409, p. 2289)
  136. Cures Acceleration Network Review Board (Section 10409, p. 2291)
  137. Grant program for Cures Acceleration Network (Section 10409, p. 2297)
  138. Grant program to promote centers of excellence for depression (Section 10410, p. 2304)
  139. Advisory committee for young women’s breast health awareness education campaign (Section 10413, p. 2322)
  140. Grant program to provide assistance to provide information to young women with breast cancer (Section 10413, p. 2326)
  141. Interagency Access to Health Care in Alaska Task Force (Section 10501, p. 2329)
  142. Grant program to train nurse practitioners as primary care providers (Section 10501(e), p. 2332)
  143. Grant program for community-based diabetes prevention (Section 10501(g), p. 2337)
  144. Grant program for providers who treat a high percentage of medically underserved populations (Section 10501(k), p. 2343)
  145. Grant program to recruit students to practice in underserved communities (Section 10501(l), p. 2344)
  146. Community Health Center Fund (Section 10503, p. 2355)
  147. Demonstration project to provide access to health care for the uninsured at reduced fees (Section 10504, p. 2357)
  148. Demonstration program to explore alternatives to tort litigation (Section 10607, p. 2369)
  149. Indian Health demonstration program for chronic shortages of health professionals (S. 1790, Section 112, p. 24)*
  150. Office of Indian Men’s Health (S. 1790, Section 136, p. 71)*
  151. Indian Country modular component facilities demonstration program (S. 1790, Section 146, p. 108)*
  152. Indian mobile health stations demonstration program (S. 1790, Section 147, p. 111)*
  153. Office of Direct Service Tribes (S. 1790, Section 172, p. 151)*
  154. Indian Health Service mental health technician training program (S. 1790, Section 181, p. 173)*
  155. Indian Health Service program for treatment of child sexual abuse victims (S. 1790, Section 181, p. 192)*
  156. Indian Health Service program for treatment of domestic violence and sexual abuse (S. 1790, Section 181, p. 194)*
  157. Indian youth telemental health demonstration project (S. 1790, Section 181, p. 204)*
  158. Indian youth life skills demonstration project (S. 1790, Section 181, p. 220)*
  159. Indian Health Service Director of HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment (S. 1790, Section 199B, p. 258)*

 

*Section 10221, page 2173 of H.R. 3590 deems that S. 1790 shall be deemed as passed with certain amendments.

A Reading Guide to Obamacare’s Backroom Deals

“I think the health care debate as it unfolded legitimately raised concerns not just among my opponents, but also amongst supporters that we just don’t know what’s going on. And it’s an ugly process and it looks like there are a bunch of back room deals.”

— President Obama, interview with ABC’s Diane Sawyer, January 25, 2010[i]

 

The White House recently enacted its health “reform” agenda by signing the 2,733 page legislation (H.R. 3590) that passed the Senate in December.[ii] While the Administration touts its removal of the “Nebraska FMAP provision” that saw 49 other states funding Nebraska’s Medicaid largesse (known as the “Cornhusker Kickback”), it did not address other deals negotiated by Democrats in the Senate legislation. Many other backroom agreements are included in the legislation the President has now enacted into law:

Page 428—Section 2006, known as the “Louisiana Purchase,” provides an extra $300 million in Medicaid funding to Louisiana.[iii]

Page 2132—Section 10201(e)(1) provides an increase in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments for Hawaii, meaning 49 other states will pay more in taxes so that Hawaii can receive this special benefit.

Page 2203—Section 10317 amends provisions in Medicare so that hospitals in Michigan and Connecticut can receive higher payments.

Page 2222—Section 10323 makes certain individuals exposed to environmental hazards eligible for Medicare coverage. The definition used in the bill ensures the only individuals eligible will be those living in Libby, Montana.

Page 2237—Section 10324 increases Medicare payments by $2 billion in “frontier states.”[iv]

Page 2354— Section 10502 spends $100 million on “debt service of, or direct construction of, a health care facility,” language which the sponsors intended to benefit Connecticut.[v]

Page 2395—Section 10905(d) exempts Medigap supplemental insurance plans from the new tax on health insurance companies; press reports indicate this provision was inserted to benefit an insurer headquartered in Nebraska.[vi]

Even after the public outrage from the “Cornhusker Kickback,” Democrats used separate legislation designed to “fix” this particular provision (H.R. 4872) to add yet more deals behind closed doors.[vii] For instance, page 71 (Section 1203(b)) of the “fixer” bill provided an increase in Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments just for Tennessee. And Section 2213 (page 145) of the original version of the “fixer” bill[viii] included a sweetheart deal making the Bank of North Dakota the only financial facility in the country exempted from Democrats’ government takeover of student loans—a backroom deal so egregious that it was removed within hours once the bill was finally revealed to the American public.[ix]

These specific agreements and provisions also do not display the full scope of the White House’s legislative deal-making. For instance, the head of the pharmaceutical industry said the Administration approached him to negotiate a deal with his industry: “We were assured, ‘We need somebody to come in first.  If you come in first, you will have a rock-solid deal.’”[x] And former Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean publicly admitted at a town hall forum that “The reason that tort reform is not in the [health care] bill is because the [Democrat Members] who wrote it did not want to take on the trial lawyers.”[xi]

The many pages of backroom deals included in the health care takeover legislation raise several questions: If the bill itself was so compelling, why did Democrats need billions of dollars in “sweeteners” negotiated in secret in order to vote for it? If President Obama was so concerned about the public perceptions created by the backroom dealing, why did he not propose to strike all the special agreements? Does he believe that this pork-barrel spending is the only reason why Democrats voted to pass his government takeover of health care in the first place?

 

[i] Full interview transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9659064.

[ii] Senate-passed bill text available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3590/text.

[iii] “Dems Protect Backroom Deals,” Politico February 4, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32499.html.

[iv] Congressional Budget Office, score of H.R. 3590 including Manager’s Amendment, December 19, 2009, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10868/12-19-Reid_Letter_Managers_Correction_Noted.pdf.

[v] “Dodd Primes Pump in Bid to Survive,” Politico December 22, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30881.html.

[vi] “How Nebraska’s Insurance Companies Stand to Profit from Ben Nelson’s Compromises in Health Care Bill,” Huffington Post 21 December 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/21/how-nebraskas-insurance-c_n_400080.html.

[vii] Senate-passed bill (H.R. 3590) text available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3590/text; reconciliation bill (H.R. 4872) text available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h4872/text.

[viii] House Rules Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, http://docs.house.gov/rules/hr4872/111_hr4872_amndsub.pdf.

[ix] “Conrad Wants Controversial Carve-Out Axed,” Roll Call March 18, 2010, http://www.rollcall.com/news/44368-1.html. The provision was stripped by the Rules Committee prior to full House consideration of H.R. 4872.

[x] Quoted in “White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost,” New York Times August 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/health/policy/06insure.html?_r=3&scp=8&sq=kirkpatrick&st=cse.

[xi] Exchange at Town Hall forum in Reston, VA, August 25, 2009, available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdpVY-cONnM.

McCain Amendment (#3570) Striking “Sweetheart Deals”

Senator McCain has offered an amendment (#3570) to strike the “sweetheart deals” included in the health care law and the reconciliation bill.
Summary:
  • The amendment repeals the following “sweetheart deals” included in the health care law and the reconciliation bill:

1. Increase in Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments just for Tennessee (Section 1203, page 71 of H.R. 4872);
2. Increase in Medicaid DSH payments just for Hawaii (Section 10201, page 2132 of H.R. 3590);
3. The “Louisiana Purchase” to increase Medicaid funding just for Louisiana (Section 2006, page 428 of H.R. 3590);
4. Increased Medicare reimbursement just for frontier states (Section 10324, page 2237 of H.R. 3590);
5. Medicare coverage just for Libby, Montana residents exposed to environmental hazards (Section 10323, page 2222 of H.R. 3590);
6. A $100 million hospital funding provision intended to benefit Connecticut (Section 10502, page 2354 of H.R. 3590); and
7. Extension of Section 508 hospital reimbursement provisions just to Michigan and Connecticut (Section 10905, pages 2205-06 of H.R. 3590)

Arguments in Favor:
  • Citizens in other states should not be asked to see their taxpayer dollars funding special “backroom deals” for certain locales.
  • The public outrage over the “Cornhusker Kickback” included in H.R. 3590 may lead many to believe it is long past time for Congress to strip out ALL of the “backroom deals” included in the Senate bill – rather than using the reconciliation measure to add more of them.
  • Given President Obama’s campaign promises of transparency – including his famous pledge to televise negotiations on C-SPAN – the American people deserve action consistent with Democrats’ rhetoric.
  • If Democrats support this government takeover of health care, they should be willing to support the legislation on its own merits – without the need to add on extraneous “backroom deals” in order to win votes.

A Reading Guide to the Senate Bill’s Backroom Deals

“I think the health care debate as it unfolded legitimately raised concerns not just among my opponents, but also amongst supporters that we just don’t know what’s going on. And it’s an ugly process and it looks like there are a bunch of back room deals.”

— President Obama, interview with ABC’s Diane Sawyer, January 25, 2010[i]

 

The White House recently released its own health care proposal[ii] in the form of changes to the 2,733 page legislation (H.R. 3590) that passed the Senate in December.[iii] While the proposal purports to remove the “Nebraska FMAP provision” that saw 49 other states funding Nebraska’s Medicaid largesse (known as the “Cornhusker Kickback”), it does not address other deals negotiated by Democrats in the Senate legislation. Many other backroom agreements are included in the Senate bill, which the White House has now endorsed as the platform for Democrats to enact “health reform” into law:

Page 428—Section 2006, known as the “Louisiana Purchase,” provides an extra $300 million in Medicaid funding to Louisiana.[iv]

Page 878—Section 3201(g), known as the “Gator Aid” provision, shields certain Florida residents from Medicare Advantage cuts. In December, 57 Senate Democrats voted not to extend this special deal to all Medicare beneficiaries.[v]

Page 2132—Section 10201(e)(1) provides an increase in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments for Hawaii, meaning 49 other states will pay more in taxes so that Hawaii can receive this special benefit.

Page 2222—Section 10323 makes certain individuals exposed to environmental hazards eligible for Medicare coverage. The definition used in the bill ensures the only individuals eligible will be those living in Libby, Montana.

Page 2237—Section 10324 increases Medicare payments by $2 billion in “frontier states.”[vi]

Page 2354— Section 10502 spends $100 million on “debt service of, or direct construction of, a health care facility,” language which the sponsors intended to benefit Connecticut.[vii]

Page 2394—Section 10905(c) includes language exempting Nebraska Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Michigan Blue Cross/Blue Shield from the new tax on health insurance companies, despite an Administration report calling Michigan Blue Cross/Blue Shield’s rate increases “disturbing.”[viii]

Page 2395—Section 10905(d) exempts Medigap supplemental insurance plans from the new tax on health insurance companies; press reports indicate this provision was inserted to benefit an insurer headquartered in Nebraska.[ix]

These specific agreements and provisions also do not display the full scope of the White House’s legislative deal-making. For instance, the head of the pharmaceutical industry said the Administration approached him to negotiate a secret arrangement with his industry: “We were assured, ‘We need somebody to come in first.  If you come in first, you will have a rock-solid deal.’”[x] And former Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean publicly admitted at a town hall forum that “The reason that tort reform is not in the [health care] bill is because the [Democrat Members] who wrote it did not want to take on the trial lawyers.”[xi]

The many pages of backroom deals included in the Senate legislation raises several questions: If the bill itself is so compelling, why did Senate Democrats need billions of dollars in “sweeteners” negotiated in secret in order to vote for it? If President Obama is so concerned about the public perceptions created by the backroom dealing, why did he not propose to strike all the special agreements? Is he worried that this pork-barrel spending is the only reason why Democrats would vote to pass his government takeover of health care in the first place?

 

[i] Full interview transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9659064.

[ii] White House plan available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary-presidents-proposal.pdf

[iii] Senate-passed bill text available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3590/text.

[iv] “Dems Protect Backroom Deals,” Politico February 4, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32499.html.

[v] Senate Record Vote 370 on McCain motion to commit, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00370.

[vi] Congressional Budget Office, score of H.R. 3590 including Manager’s Amendment, December 19, 2009, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10868/12-19-Reid_Letter_Managers_Correction_Noted.pdf.

[vii] “Dodd Primes Pump in Bid to Survive,” Politico December 22, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30881.html.

[viii] White House Office of Health Reform, report on insurance company practices, February 2010, http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/insuranceprospers/insuranceprofits.pdf.

[ix] “How Nebraska’s Insurance Companies Stand to Profit from Ben Nelson’s Compromises in Health Care Bill,” Huffington Post 21 December 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/21/how-nebraskas-insurance-c_n_400080.html.

[x] Quoted in “White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost,” New York Times August 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/health/policy/06insure.html?_r=3&scp=8&sq=kirkpatrick&st=cse.

[xi] Exchange at Town Hall forum in Reston, VA, August 25, 2009, available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdpVY-cONnM.

Weekly Newsletter: June 29, 2009

Government-Run Health Care and Cancer Outcomes

Two stories in the past week from Great Britain provide an interesting backdrop to the Democrat-proposed creation of a government-run health plan to “compete” with private sector coverage.  In the first, a new report released found that up to 15,000 lives could be saved every year if patients in Britain’s National Health Service received the same type of quality care that patients in the United States obtain.  The report prompted complaints from patient advocates that senior citizens receive sub-standard care, as the government rations access to health services for older patients on cost grounds; one activist found it “appalling that people over 75 are not getting the care they need…it is scandalous that not everyone is getting” access to treatment.  In its coverage of the report, the BBC relayed the story of one 74-year old ovarian cancer patient, who according to her daughter had to travel to Iran in order to receive a proper diagnosis:

Mum started to have bleeding early in 2007.  She went to the [general practitioner], but they just took her off her [hormone replacement therapy] and sent her to a gynaecologist.  He said it was probably just stress.  It was only when she went back to visit family in Iran and saw a doctor there that she was diagnosed.  They did a scan and found a large lump in her fallopian tube.  When she came back to the UK, doctors found the cancer had spread to one of her lymph glands.  It was the size of a tennis ball.  She then had a six-week wait before having a hysterectomy and then chemo.  Her treatment was very good, but the diagnosis was abysmal.  If it had been found 18 months earlier, it could have been removed easily and she wouldn’t have needed a hysterectomy or chemo.”

Today the British Government plans to announce plans to give patients the “right” to see a cancer specialist within two weeks of diagnosis—a “right” that significant numbers of patients currently lack.  Coupled with the lack of tools to diagnose cancer promptly in the first instance, some Members may be concerned that the government-run health plan envisioned by many Democrats could lead to worse outcomes for patients—because, as senior Obama Administration official Sherry Glied has previously admitted, government-run health plans will end up under-funded.

A “Firm Pledge” Falls by the Wayside

During last year’s presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama made very clear that he would not raise taxes on the middle class in order to pay for an expansion of government-run health care.  His most famous iteration of this promise came at a rally in Dover, New Hampshire, on September 12, 2008:

“I can make a firm pledge.  Under my plan, no family making less than $250,000 a year will see any form of tax increase.  Not your income tax, not your payroll tax, not your capital gains taxes, not any of your taxes.”

Yesterday, however, senior Administration advisor David Axelrod backtracked from the “firm pledge” made repeatedly during the campaign.  Given multiple opportunities to reiterate the campaign promise, Axelrod backtracked, saying merely that “there are a number of formulations and we’ll wait and see” whether a middle-class tax increase is one of them.

Some Members may be concerned by this message—but not altogether surprised, given the “flexibility” the President has already exhibited from his campaign positions in opposition to an individual mandate to purchase insurance and taxing health benefits.  In addition to questioning how raising taxes in the middle of a recession will help strengthen the economy, some Members may further question how tax increases will help slow the growth of health care costs—purportedly the Administration’s prime goal for any health reform legislation.

Democrats Finally Discover the “Crowd-Out” Phenomenon

For the better part of the past two weeks, Democrats in the Senate have been working to pare back the cost of their health care overhaul, after a Finance Committee discussion draft reportedly weighed in with a price tag of $1.6 trillion over ten years.  Much of the reason for the high spending came from subsidies to families making as much as $88,200—subsidies which, according to the Congressional Budget Office, would merely encourage these individuals to drop their current coverage and enroll in the government-run health insurance Exchange.  Senate Budget Committee Chairman Conrad was quoted in the New York Times as being “particularly concerned about the possibility that people who now have employer-provided coverage would drop it in favor of government-subsidized coverage, raising the cost to taxpayers.”

Some Members may not be surprised by this development, as many Members made the exact same point during debate over reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).  Just last October, officials in Hawaii abandoned their Keiki Care program to expand government-run health coverage to children, because as one official noted, “People who were already able to afford health care began to stop paying for it so they could get it for free” from the federal government.  Some Members may hope that, having finally discovered the “crowd-out” phenomenon and its significant impact on the federal budget, Democrats will shift course from their attempted expansions of government programs as one way to “reform” American health care.

Legislative Bulletin: Senate Amendments to H.R. 2, Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act

Order of Business: On February 14, 2009, the Senate amendments to H.R. 2 are expected to be considered on the floor under a closed rule, requiring a majority vote for passage.  The rule is expected to waive all points of order against the bill, except those arising under clauses 10 of rule XXI (PAYGO), and provide for one hour of debate, equally divided between the Majority and the Minority.

This legislation was introduced by Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ) on January 13, 2009, and originally passed by the House by a vote of 289-139 on January 14, 2009.  The Senate passed its version of the bill by a vote of 66-32 on January 29, 2009.

Summary of Senate Changes Made: During consideration of H.R. 2 in the Senate, several changes were made to the legislation; those changes will be voted on by the House.  Among the more important changes, the Senate bill:

  • Accelerates the phase-out of childless adults from September 30, 2010 to December 31, 2009;
  • Removes a requirement that parents provide a signature on documents allowing their children to be enrolled by “Express Lane” agencies, as outlined below.  Some Members may be concerned that removing the signature requirement would further increase the risk of fraud associated with the new “Express Lane” procedures;
  • Expands States’ ability to cover legal aliens in Medicaid and SCHIP, permitting coverage for all children under age 21, instead of permitting coverage for all children under age 19 as in the original House bill;
  • Permits States to establish dental-only supplemental “wrap-around” SCHIP coverage for children enrolled in group health insurance coverage;
  • Establishes a new Medicaid Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), similar to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).  Some Members may be concerned that this provision first would establish a new federal bureaucracy, and second that both its membership—which will include consumer and advocacy groups—and its stated purpose—which focuses on maintaining access—will result in a primary focus on expanding the scope and reach of federal Medicaid spending, rather than restoring the program’s fiscal integrity and improving its quality of care;
  • Removes restrictions on physician-owned specialty hospitals originally contained in the House legislation; and
  • Raises the amount of the tobacco tax increase from 61 cents to 62 cents per pack (which would increase total federal tobacco taxes from 39 cents to $1.01).  Some Members may be concerned that this further increase would place additional tax burdens on working families during an economic downturn.

Summary: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), established under the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, is a state-federal partnership originally designed to provide low-income children with health insurance—specifically, those children under age 19 from families with incomes under 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), or $42,400 for a family of four in 2008.  Funds are provided to states on the basis of capped allotments, and states receive an “enhanced” federal match greater than the federal Medicaid matching rate in order to enroll covered children.  SCHIP received nearly $40 billion in funding over ten years as part of BBA, and legislation passed by Congress in December 2007 (P.L. 110-173) extended the program through March 2009, while providing additional SCHIP funds for states.

H.R. 2 would reauthorize and expand the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), as follows:

Funding and Allotments: The bill would maintain the current capped allotment method of SCHIP financing but would increase the allotments over the four and a half year period of the reauthorization (through September 30, 2013).  Including funding for the first half of the current fiscal year (i.e. through March 30, 2009) already provided under P.L. 110-173, the bill would include total SCHIP funding of nearly $69 billion—an increase of almost $44 billion in SCHIP outlays when compared to the statutory baseline.

The bill increases funding levels for the five fiscal years covered in the program—a total of $10.6 billion in FY09, $12.5 billion in FY10, $13.5 billion in FY11, and nearly $15 billion in FY12.  For Fiscal Year 2013, the bill includes a total of $17.4 billion in funding.  However, this funding would be delivered in two installments—one appropriation of $14.55 billion in October 2012, and a second six-month appropriation of $2.85 billion in March 2013.  Some Members may be concerned that this funding “cliff”—which presumes a 66% reduction in SCHIP expenses, from $17.4 billion in FY13 to $5.7 billion in FY14—is a budgetary gimmick designed primarily to mask the true costs of an SCHIP expansion.

The bill shortens from three years to two years the amount of time states have to utilize their allotment funding and provides that unused state allotments would be redirected to states projected to have allotment shortfalls after that period.  The bill rebases state allotments every two years to reflect actual state expenditures and provides that state allotments will increase annually to reflect increases in health care expenditures and the growth of child populations within each state.  The bill language would permit states to obtain increases in their allotments to reflect planned future expansions of SCHIP coverage and would allow certain states to receive the enhanced SCHIP federal matching rate (if funds are available from the state’s allotment) for Medicaid coverage of children in families with incomes above 133% FPL ($28,196 for a family of four in 2008).

Child Enrollment Contingency Fund: The bill would establish a new contingency fund within the U.S. Treasury for states that exceed their allotments, while also increasing enrollment at a rate that exceeds the states’ child population growth by at least 1%.  The money within the contingency fund would be carved out from the SCHIP allotments described above and could not exceed 20% of overall SCHIP funding.  Some Members may be concerned that the fund—which does not include provisions making additional payments contingent on enrolling the low-income children­ for which the program was designed—will therefore help to subsidize wealthier children in states which have expanded their programs to higher-income populations, diverting SCHIP funds from the program’s original purpose.

Performance Bonus Payments: The bill creates a new performance bonus payment mechanism to offset state costs associated with enrollment outreach and retention activities.  States which increase coverage of eligible low-income children in Medicaid by at least 2% will be eligible for bonuses of up to 15% of each beneficiary’s projected costs, and states which exceed their targets for enrolling eligible children by at least 10% will become eligible for additional bonus payments of up to 62.5%.

Funding for the performance bonus system under the bill totals at least $3.3 billion, which would be increased by any allotments not obligated to the states or any state allotments not expended or redistributed to other states.  State eligibility for the performance bonuses would remain contingent on states’ use of several practices designed to increase ease of enrollment, including continuous eligibility for at least 12 months, eliminating or liberalizing asset tests associated with enrollment applications, automatic administrative renewal, presumptive eligibility for children, and participation in the “Express Lane” process outlined below.

As there are no provisions linking payment of performance bonuses to the enrollment of low-income children, some Members may be concerned that these performance bonuses may provide an inducement to instead enroll children from wealthier families, diverting the program from its original intent.  Some Members may also be concerned that the provision linking performance bonuses to the adoption of at least four so-called best practices for enrollment—including the “Express Lane” process—will provide a strong financial incentive for states not to scrutinize the eligibility of certain applicants.

Coverage of Pregnant Women: The bill adds new language permitting states to utilize SCHIP funding to cover low-income, pregnant women.  The bill imposes several requirements on states seeking to use SCHIP funds to cover pregnant women, including a minimum eligibility threshold of at least 185% FPL (and not below the Medicaid eligibility threshold) for pregnant women only after covering all children under and 200% FPL without a waiting list or other enrollment cap to limit children’s participation in the program.  The provision provides that children born to certain low-income pregnant women participating in SCHIP will automatically be enrolled in the program for the child’s first year.

Coverage of Childless Adults: The bill prohibits the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from approving further waivers to cover childless adults under the SCHIP program and phases out SCHIP coverage of childless adults effective December 31, 2009.  The bill also allows states to apply for a Medicaid waiver to continue to cover childless adults but at the lower Medicaid matching rate instead of the enhanced SCHIP rate.  Some Members may be concerned that the bill would permit the continued coverage of childless adults within SCHIP for nearly a year—and for indefinite periods beyond that using the lower Medicaid match rate—diverting its focus from the targeted low-income children for whom it was created.

Coverage of Low-Income Parents: The bill also prohibits the issuance of new SCHIP waivers permitting the coverage of low-income parents and phases out parent coverage.  States may request an automatic two-year extension to cover low-income parents, and may continue coverage of low-income parents through the length of the authorization legislation (i.e. until October 2013), provided the state does not increase its income eligibility thresholds for parent coverage.  Some Members may be concerned that the bill would permit the continued coverage of low-income adults within SCHIP for at least five years, diverting its focus from the targeted low-income children for whom it was created.

Coverage of Higher-Income Children: The bill places certain restrictions on states’ matching rate for coverage of children in families with “effective family income” higher than 300% FPL—$63,600 for a family of four in 2008—to the lower Medicaid match rate, rather than the enhanced SCHIP federal match.  Specifically, the bill would prohibit states from using a “general exclusion of a block of income that is not determined by type of expense or type of income.”  This provision is designed to address an issue related by New Jersey’s SCHIP program, which disregards all income between 200-350% FPL for purposes of eligibility—thus making children in families with incomes up to $74,200 eligible for federal health benefits.

However, the bill expressly retains states’ ability to disregard unlimited amounts of income by type of income (i.e. salary, capital gains) or type of expense (i.e. disregard all housing-related expenses)—thus permitting states to continue to use “income disregards” effectively to ignore some or all of a family’s income for purposes of determining whether the family income falls below the 300% FPL threshold.  And the bill grandfathers in states (i.e. New Jersey) that already have programs in place using blanket income disregards.

Some Members may be concerned first that this provision does not prohibit states from expanding their Medicaid programs to families with incomes above $64,000, and second that the provisions allowing continued use of “income disregards” will only encourage states to use such mechanisms to expand their SCHIP programs to wealthier families—rather than covering poor children first.

Crowd-Out Provisions: The bill does not contain provisions to reduce “crowd-out”—that is, individuals leaving private coverage in order to join a government program—included in both versions of SCHIP legislation (H.R. 976, H.R. 3963) in 2007.  Those provisions included several studies about the extent to which crowd-out occurs within SCHIP, best practices on how to reduce crowd-out, and authority for the Secretary to reduce payments to states enrolling too many children above 300% FPL.  Some Members may be concerned that removal of these provisions will remove the last disincentive for states to enroll large numbers of children in families with incomes above $64,000—and possibly well above that threshold.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the bill would result in 2.4 million individuals dropping private health insurance coverage to enroll in government programs—a higher level of crowd-out in both number and percentage terms than the first SCHIP bill (H.R. 976) presented to President Bush in 2007.

Outreach and Enrollment Provisions: The bill includes $100 million in new mandatory funding for grants to various entities—including states, localities, elementary and secondary schools, and other non-profit or faith-based organizations—to conduct outreach and enrollment activities, including 10% for a national enrollment campaign and an additional 10% set-aside for the Indian Health Service.  The bill also provides a minimum 75% Medicaid and SCHIP match for translation or interpretation services under the two programs.

“Express Lane” Enrollment Option: The bill permits states to use eligibility determinations from “Express Lane” agencies as a means to facilitate enrollment in Medicaid and SCHIP, including renewals and re-determinations of coverage.  Agencies—including but not limited to those which determine eligibility for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, federal school lunch programs, Head Start, and federal housing assistance—may not deem children ineligible for coverage based solely on an initial adverse determination with respect to income eligibility.

Under the program, states may establish an income threshold 30 percentage points above the Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility limit (i.e. if the SCHIP eligibility limit is 300% FPL, the state may establish a threshold of 330% FPL for purposes of Express Lane determinations).  States may also temporarily enroll children in SCHIP if the child in question “appears eligible” (criteria undefined) based on the Express Lane agency’s income determination, subject to a “prompt follow up” (time limit undefined) by the State as to whether or not the child actually qualifies.  The bill also allows states to “initiate and determine eligibility” for Medicaid or SCHIP “without a program application from, or on behalf of” children based on data from other sources, and only requires parental consent through “affirmation in writing, by telephone, orally, through electronic signature, or through any other means” the Secretary may provide.  Some Members may be concerned that removal of the written signature requirement in the original House bill will increase the risk of fraudulent enrollments in Medicaid and SCHIP.

The bill provides for a annual sample audit of Express Lane cases to establish whether or not the eligibility determinations made comport with eligibility determinations made using the full Medicaid review process and provides for state remedial actions (and eventually payment reductions) if the error rate for such audits exceeds 3%.  The bill sunsets the Express Lane option at the end of the authorization and includes $5 million for a report on its effectiveness.

Some Members may be concerned first that the streamlined verification processes outlined above will facilitate individuals who would not otherwise qualify for Medicaid or SCHIP, due either to their income or citizenship, to obtain federally-paid health benefits.

Citizenship Verification: Current law applies citizenship verification requirements differently to state SCHIP programs, depending upon the nature of the program.  The BBA permitted states to establish separate SCHIP programs, utilize Medicaid expansions to cover eligible populations, or some combination of the two.  The eight states and the District of Columbia that chose Medicaid expansions, along with Medicaid beneficiaries of the 24 states that chose combination programs, must comply with citizenship verification provisions enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA, P.L. 109-171) in 2006.  These procedures—which include verification of citizenship and nationality by presenting any of a variety of documents (e.g. birth certificate, passport, etc.)—were prompted in part by a July 2005 Inspector General report, which found that 47 states (including the District of Columbia) often relied on an applicant’s self-attestation of citizenship to determine Medicaid eligibility and that 27 of these states undertook no effort to determine whether the self-attestation was accurate.  Beneficiaries in the 18 states with separate SCHIP programs are not subject to the DRA verification requirements with respect to either citizenship or nationality.

The bill provides an alternative to the Medicaid citizenship verification process enacted in DRA—and extends this process to beneficiaries in stand-alone SCHIP programs—for children up to age 21 by allowing states to verify applicants’ citizenship through a name and Social Security number match.  If the Social Security Administration finds an invalid match, the state must make “a reasonable effort to identify and address the causes of such invalid match;” in the event the state cannot resolve the discrepancy, it must dis-enroll the individual within 120 days, during which time the individual in question has 90 days to respond and present satisfactory evidence to resolve the mis-match.

States will be required to submit data for each applicant to determine the states’ invalid match rates, but errors will only include cases where the individual has been dis-enrolled by the state after having received SCHIP benefits.  The bill provides that states with error rates above 3% will be required to pay back funds used to pay for ineligible individuals in excess of the 3% threshold—except that the Secretary may waive such a return requirement “if the state is unable to reach the allowable error rate despite a good faith effort.”

Some Members may echo the concerns of Social Security Commissioner Michael Astrue, who in a September 2007 letter stated that the verification process proposed in the bill would not keep ineligible individuals from receiving federal benefits—since many applicants would instead submit another person’s name and Social Security number to qualify.  Some Members may believe the bill, by laying out a policy of “enroll and chase,” will permit ineligible individuals, including illegal aliens, to obtain federally-paid health coverage for at least four months during the course of the verification process.  Finally, some Members may be concerned that the bill, by not taking remedial action against states for enrolling illegal aliens—which can be waived entirely at the Secretary’s discretion—until states’ error rate exceeds 3%, effectively allows states to provide benefits to illegal aliens.

Coverage of Legal Aliens: The bill would permit states to cover pregnant women and children under 21 who are legal aliens within Medicaid and SCHIP without imposing the five-year waiting period for most legal aliens to receive federal welfare benefits established as part of the welfare reform law (P.L. 104-196) signed by President Clinton in 1996.  For decades, Medicare has maintained a five-year residency requirement for legal aliens to obtain access to benefits; this waiting period was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976, when Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court in the case of Mathews v. Diaz, held that “it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens.”

Some Members may be concerned that permitting states to cover legal aliens without imposing waiting periods will override the language of bipartisan welfare reform legislation passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democrat President, conflict with decades-long practices in other federally-sponsored entitlement health programs (i.e. Medicare), and encourage migrants to travel to the United States for the sole or primary purpose of receiving health benefits paid for by federal taxpayers.

Premium Assistance: The bill permits states to establish premium assistance programs—which provide state and federal funds to finance employer-sponsored health insurance.  The bill provides that employers must pay at least 40% of premium costs in order for the policy to qualify for premium assistance but prohibits high-deductible policies associated with Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) from qualifying under any circumstances.

The bill changes the current premium assistance criteria within SCHIP, such that rather than requiring the cost of covering the entire family through the employer policy be less than the costs to enroll a child in government-run coverage, states should instead use an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the marginal costs of covering the applicable child (or children) when compared to enrolling the child in SCHIP. The bill also permits states to “wrap-around” coverage to supplement the employer policy if the latter does not meet appropriate SCHIP benchmark standards, and to establish a purchasing pool for small employers (i.e. those with fewer than 250 employees) with low-income workers to provide workers options to utilize premium assistance to enroll their families.

The bill requires states that have created premium assistance programs to inform SCHIP applicants of the program and includes provisions regarding coordination with employer coverage and outreach to workers to inform them of premium assistance.  However, the bill does not require states to establish premium assistance programs.  Some Members may therefore be concerned that the bill does not ensure that all children with access to employer-sponsored coverage will be able to maintain their current coverage.

Quality Measures: The bill requires CMS to develop an initial set of child health quality measures for state Medicaid and SCHIP programs, including those administered by managed care organizations, and establish programs allowing states to report such measures and disseminate information to the states on best practices.  The bill includes further requirements for the Department to create a second pediatric quality measures program “to improve and strengthen the initial core child health care quality measures” and authorizes grants and contracts to develop and disseminate evidence-based quality care measures for children’s health.

The bill requires states to report annually on state-specific health quality measures adopted by their Medicaid and/or SCHIP plans and authorizes up to 10 grants for demonstration projects related to improved children’s health care and the promotion of health information technology.  The bill also authorizes (subject to appropriation) $25 million for a demonstration project to reduce childhood obesity by awarding grants to eligible local governments, educational or public health institutions, or community-based organizations.

The bill establishes a program to develop a model electronic health record for Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiaries and authorizes a study on pediatric health quality measures.  These and the other quality programs addressed above would be funded through mandatory appropriations totaling $45 million per fiscal year.

Lastly, the bill applies certain quality provisions to the managed care organizations with whom states contract to provide SCHIP benefits—including marketing restrictions, required disclosures to beneficiaries, and access and quality standards both for the managed care organizations and the state agencies overseeing them.  The bill also requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on whether the rates paid to SCHIP managed care plans are actuarially sound.

Enhanced Benefits: The bill requires state SCHIP plans to have access to dental benefits, and mandates that those dental plans resemble a) coverage provided to children under the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program (FEHBP), b) “a dental benefits plan that is offered and generally available to state employees,” or c) the largest commercially-available dental plan in the state based on the number of covered lives.  States would also be permitted to offer “wrap-around” SCHIP dental benefits packages to supplement children’s employer-sponsored coverage.

The bill includes language requiring mental health parity in state SCHIP benefits, specifically that “financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to such…benefits” are no more restrictive than those applied to medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan and establishes a prospective payment system for federally qualified health centers receiving Medicaid reimbursements.  The bill also requires that states impose a grace period of at least 30 days on beneficiaries for non-payment of any applicable premiums due before terminating the beneficiaries’ coverage; under current law, such premiums generally only apply to individuals with family incomes above 150% FPL.

Other Provisions: The bill includes language stating that “nothing in this Act allows federal payment for individuals who are not legal residents.”  However, as noted above, the bill provisions allow states to verify SCHIP eligibility without document verification and provide no financial penalties to states enrolling illegal aliens until those errors (which in the case of “Express Lane” applications will be derived from sample audits, not scrutiny of each application) exceed 3%—and these penalties may be waived in the Secretary’s sole discretion.

The bill establishes a new Medicaid Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), similar to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), and requires the new Commission to submit two annual reports to Congress.  The bill requires the Commission to examine both payment policies for the two programs as well as the program’s impact on “access to covered items and services,” including creation of an “early warning system” designed to draw attention to any “problems that threaten access to care” for beneficiaries.  Some Members may be concerned that this provision first would establish a new federal bureaucracy, and second that both its membership—which will include consumer and related advocacy groups—and its stated purpose on maintaining access will result in a primary focus on expanding the scope and reach of federal Medicaid spending, rather than restoring the program’s fiscal integrity and improving its quality of care.

The bill includes language prohibiting the Department of Health and Human Services from approving any new state Health Opportunity Account demonstrations under the program established in DRA.  Some Members may be concerned that the prohibition on this innovative—and entirely voluntary—program for beneficiaries may hinder beneficiaries’ ability to choose the health plan that best meets their needs.

The bill would disregard any “significantly disproportionate employer pension or insurance fund contribution” when calculating a state’s per capita income for purposes of establishing the federal Medicaid matching percentage for that state.  According to CMS, only one state would benefit from this provision—Michigan.  The bill would also increase Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) allotments for Tennessee and Hawaii and would clarify the treatment of a regional medical center in such a manner that the Congressional Budget Office, in its score of the bill, identified the provision as specifically benefiting the Memphis Regional Medical Center.  Some Members therefore may view these provisions as constituting authorizing earmarks.

Tobacco Tax Increase; Pay-Fors: The bill would increase by 62 cents—from 39 cents to $1.01—the federal per-pack tobacco tax and place similar increases on cigars, cigarette papers and tubes, and smokeless and pipe tobacco products.  Some Members may be concerned that an increase in the tobacco tax, which is highly regressive, would place an undue and unnecessary burden on working families during an economic downturn and could encourage the production of counterfeit cigarettes by criminal organizations and other entities.

Lastly, the bill increases the percentage of payment of certain corporate estimated taxes in the last fiscal quarter of 2013 by 0.5%, and reduces the next applicable estimated tax payment in the first fiscal quarter of 2014 by a similar amount.

Cost: A final CBO score of the Senate amendments was not available at press time.  However, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the original House-passed bill would increase direct spending by a total of $39.4 billion between Fiscal Year 2009 and Fiscal Year 2014, and $73.3 billion over the FY09-FY19 period.  Most of the spending in the first five years of the budget window ($34.3 billion) would be derived from the SCHIP expansion; and Medicaid spending in the latter five years would rise, as the score notes that children enrolled in SCHIP would be shifted to the Medicaid program upon SCHIP’s expiration.  However, both the Medicaid and SCHIP scores are contingent upon provisions in the bill cutting SCHIP spending from $17.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2013 to $5.7 billion in Fiscal Year 2014.  To the extent that Members believe this 66% reduction in SCHIP expenses will not take place, they may be concerned that the funding “cliff” is a budgetary gimmick designed to mask the true costs of the bill’s expansion of health care benefits.

The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the increase in tobacco taxes would generate $38.8 billion through Fiscal Year 2014, and $72 billion from Fiscal Years 2009-2018.  The bill also increases revenues by $1.6 billion through Fiscal Year 2018 as a result of individuals dropping private health insurance in order to enroll in the SCHIP program, as employees with group health insurance would have less of their income sheltered from payroll and income taxes.

The JCT score on the tobacco tax notes that the tax provisions would generate $7.2 billion in FY10 (the first full year the tax increase would take effect), but only $6.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2019—a decrease of more than 10%.  Some Members may be concerned that expansions of the SCHIP program would rely on a declining source of revenue.