Republicans’ Mixed Messages on Federalism

Care to take a guess how many Republican senators are willing to take a stand over federalism? Would you believe just two?

On Monday night, when the Senate considered legislation sponsored by Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) about “gag clauses” in pharmaceutical contracts, only Utah’s Mike Lee and Kentucky’s Rand Paul voted no. Lee and Paul do not believe the federal government has any business providing for blanket regulation of the health-care sector.

Gag Clauses, Explained

I have experienced the distorted ways the drug pricing system currently operates. When looking to refill a prescription for one of my antihistamines, my insurance benefit quoted me a charge of $170 for a 90- to 100-day supply. But when I went online to GoodRX.com, I found online coupons that could provide me the same product, in the same quantities, for a mere $70-80, depending on the pharmacy I chose.

I found even greater discounts by purchasing in bulk. I ended up buying a nearly one year’s supply of my maintenance medication for $210—little more than the price for a 90-100 day supply originally quoted to me by my insurer. Had I used my insurance card, and refilled the prescription repeatedly, I would have paid approximately $300 more over the course of a year. Because my Obamacare insurance is junk, I have little chance of reaching my deductible this year, short of getting hit by a bus, so it made perfect sense for me to pay with cash instead.

In theory, anyone can go to GoodRX.com (with which I have no relationship except as a satisfied consumer), or other similar websites, to find the cash price of prescription drugs and compare them to the prices quoted by their insurers. But in practice, few try to shop around for prescription drugs.

Why Federalism Matters

In general, conservatives would support efforts to increase transparency within the health-care marketplace, and prohibiting “gag clauses” would do just that. However, some conservatives would also note that the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1947 devolves the business of regulating insurance, including health insurance, to the states, and that the states could take the lead on whether or not to eliminate “gag clauses” in insurance contracts. Indeed, a majority of states—26 in total—have already done so, including no fewer than 15 state laws passed just this year.

Lee’s office reached out to me several weeks ago for technical assistance in drafting an amendment designed to limit the scope of federal legislation on “gag clauses” to those types of insurance where the federal government already has a regulatory nexus. Lee ultimately offered such an amendment, which prohibited “gag clauses” only for self-insured employer plans—regulated by the federal government under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

Unfortunately, only 11 senators—all Republicans—voted for this amendment, which would have prevented yet another intrusion by the federal government on states’ affairs. Of those 11, only Lee and Paul voted against final passage of the bill, due to the federalism concerns.

More Federalism Violations Ahead?

One of the prime sponsors of the discussion draft? None other than Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA), the author of legislation introduced last year that he claimed would “give states significant latitude over how [health care] dollars are used to best take care of the unique…needs of the patients in each state.”

The contradiction between Cassidy’s rhetoric then and his actions now raise obvious questions: How can states get “significant latitude over” their health care systems if Washington-based politicians like Cassidy are constantly butting in with new requirements, like the “surprise medical bill” regulation? Or, to put it another way, why does Cassidy think states are smart enough to manage nearly $1.2 trillion in Obamacare funding, but too stupid to figure out how to solve problems like drug price “gag clauses” and “surprise bills?”

Politics Versus Principle

The widely inconsistent behavior of people like Cassidy raises the possibility that, to some, federalism represents less of a political principle to follow than a political toy to manipulate. When Washington lawmakers want to punt a difficult decision—like how to “repeal” Obamacare while “replacing” it with an alternative that covers just as many people—they can hide behind federalism to defer action to the states.

Reagan had another axiom that applies in this case: That there is no limit to what a person can do if that person does not mind who gets the credit. Lawmakers in literally dozens of states have acted on “gag clauses,” but that matters little to Collins, who wants the federal government to swoop in and take the credit—and erode state autonomy in the process.

It may seem novel to most of official Washington, but if lawmakers claim to believe in federalism, they should stick to that belief, even when it proves inconvenient.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Senate Republicans’ Attempt to Entrench Obamacare

Earlier this month, I wrote about how when Republicans talk about the “need to govern,” they normally mean the “need to govern like liberals.” Last week, a group of ten Senate Republicans perfectly illustrated that axiom.

The Republicans, led by Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC), introduced “legislation to protect Americans with pre-existing conditions.” Their bill would codify as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements that insurers accept all applicants, regardless of health, and do not vary premiums based upon health conditions.

Democrats have used the pending lawsuit to mount political attacks on pre-existing conditions. For instance, last week Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) attempted to offer an amendment directing the Senate’s legal counsel to intervene in the lawsuit to defend Obamacare, which some Republicans viewed as a politically difficult vote. Hence Tillis’ bill, which gave the ten Senate Republicans political cover to oppose Manchin’s amendment while still claiming to protect pre-existing conditions.

Although likely a messaging exercise, the Tillis bill sends at least four messages to voters about Republican views on health policy—none of them positive.

Senators Don’t Want to Repeal Obamacare

Last spring, I wrote that Republicans had a choice: They could either retain Obamacare’s pre-existing condition provisions, or they could fulfill their promise to repeal the law. They keep trying to do both, but as a policy matter, they cannot.

The premium increases caused by those regulations necessitated requirements to purchase coverage, and for businesses to offer coverage, to try and keep healthy people purchasing (more costly) insurance. They necessitated Obamacare’s insurance subsidies—to make coverage “affordable.” And the premium increases caused by the regulations required Obamacare’s taxes and Medicare reductions to finance those federal subsidies.

The pre-existing condition provisions stand as the foundation stone of Obamacare. Conservatives who want a true alternative to the law have other policy options for people with pre-existing conditions than merely retaining Obamacare’s federal regulations. But if Republican senators want to codify that provision elsewhere, then, as a practical matter, they want to retain the law.

Republicans Once Again Oppose Federalism

Among others, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) sponsored Tillis’ legislation. Last year, of course, Graham stood as one of the prime co-sponsors of the Graham-Cassidy bill, which sought to devolve most of Obamacare’s health spending to the states via a block grant. Graham’s website retains press releases talking about how he supports a “state-centric” system that would “return power” outside of Washington.

The sharp contrast between Graham’s rhetoric on state-centered solutions, and his actions supporting a Washington-centered health-care system, show that he and his colleagues either do not understand the principles of federalism, or they discard those principles when they find them politically inconvenient.

Effectively Taxes the American People

Multiple analyses have discussed how Obamacare’s high deductibles make coverage feel meaningless to exchange enrollees. As an example, this year I will pay nearly $3,500 for a Bronze Obamacare policy with a $6,200 deductible—a deductible I have little chance of meeting unless I get run over by the proverbial bus, or suffer some other catastrophic incident.

I do have some pre-existing conditions, including mild asthma and a foot condition that required reconstructive surgery some years ago. Between these and the general randomness of life, the risk of a major medical condition that causing me to exceed my deductible remains greater than zero. But I doubt it warrants a $3,500 premium either.

Lawmakers don’t like talking about this “tax.” Wouldn’t you know it, few liberal organizations have attempted to quantify how much of a “tax” the average healthy person pays in state exchanges, although they’re quick to quantify the individuals with pre-existing conditions “at risk.” But this forcible redistribution of wealth exists nonetheless, and the Republican lawmakers just endorsed it.

Liberals Always Find Republican Concessions Insufficient

Hours after Tillis introduced his bill, liberal analysts already had outlined reasons to call it insufficient. According to them, the Tillis legislation would prohibit insurers from rejecting applications from people with pre-existing conditions outright, but they could still impose exclusions on specific conditions.

Therein lies Republicans’ problem: The more they concede, the more the Left demands. When the next wave of greater government control of health care comes along, don’t say I didn’t warn you—and don’t say that Republicans acted to protect you, either.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Bill Cassidy’s “Monkey Business”

Last we checked in with Louisiana Republican Sen. Bill Cassidy, he was hard at work adding literally dozens of new federal health care requirements to a Republican “repeal-and-replace” bill. This week comes word that Cassidy continues to “monkey around” in health care — this time quite literally.

STAT reports: “Sen. Bill Cassidy is trying to help hundreds of chimpanzees enjoy an easy retirement in his home state of Louisiana. The Republican is pushing for an amendment to a major appropriations bill winding its way through Congress this week that would force the National Institutes of Health to make good on a 2015 promise to move all its chimps out of research facilities.”

Don’t get me wrong: I oppose animal cruelty as much as the next person. If NIH lacks a compelling scientific justification to conduct research on chimpanzees, or any other animal, then it should cease the research and provide alterative accommodations for the creatures affected.

But on at least three levels, Cassidy’s amendment demonstrates exactly what’s wrong with Washington D.C.

Problem 1: Skewed Priorities

The federal debt is at more than $21 trillion and rising — more than double its $10.6 trillion size not ten years ago, on the day Barack Obama took office. American troops remain stationed in Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world. Russia still looks to undermine American democracy and to meddle in this year’s midterm elections. The situation with North Korea remains tenuous, as the North Koreans continue to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technologies and their nuclear program.

So why is Cassidy trying to consume Senate floor time with a debate and vote on the chimpanzee amendment, after having already sent a letter to NIH on the subject? On a list of America’s top policy issues and concerns, the fate of 272 chimpanzees wouldn’t register in the top 100, or even in the top 1,000. So why should members of Congress (to say nothing of their staffs) spend so much time on such a comparatively inconsequential issue?

Problem 2: Cassidy Doesn’t Want to Repeal Obamacare

Rather than spending time on a chimpanzee amendment, Cassidy — like his Senate Republican colleagues — should focus on keeping the promise they made to their voters for the past four election cycles that they would repeal Obamacare. But unfortunately, many of the people who made that promise never believed it in the first place.

Based on his record, Cassidy stands as one of those individuals opposed to Obamacare repeal. As I noted in June, Cassidy does not want to repeal the federal system of regulations that lies at the heart of the health care law. In fact, a health care plan released earlier this summer seemed designed primarily to give lawmakers like Cassidy political cover not to repeal Obamacare’s most onerous regulations — even though a study by the Heritage Foundation indicates those regulations are the prime driver of premium increases since the law passed.

Problem 3: Cassidy Just Voted to Entrench Obamacare

Earlier this month, I noted some Republicans in the Senate would likely vote to allow the District of Columbia to tax individuals who do not purchase health insurance, after having voted to repeal that mandate in last year’s tax bill. After I wrote that story, Cassidy became one of five Senate Republicans to do just that, by voting to table (or kill) an amendment defunding Washington’s new individual mandate.

Because Cassidy voted to keep the mandate in place in D.C., he voted to allow District authorities to seize and sell individuals’ property if they do not purchase “government-approved” health coverage. Rather than voting to repeal Obamacare, Cassidy and his colleagues voted to entrench Obamacare in the nation’s capital — for which they have sovereign jurisdiction under the Constitution.

Even apart from Cassidy’s flip-flopping on repeal of Obamacare and its individual mandate, the contrast with the letter to NIH raises its own questions. In that letter, Cassidy emphasized that former research chimpanzees should have “the opportunity to live in mixed-sex groups and … daily access to nesting materials.”

This all sounds well and good, but why does Cassidy seemingly care so much about giving freedom to chimpanzees and so little about giving freedom to District of Columbia residents to buy (or not buy) the health coverage they wish to purchase?

Congress, Stop Monkeying Around

Five years ago, Democratic Rep. Frank Pallone famously called a congressional hearing on the healthcare.gov debacle a “monkey court.” Five years later, the Cassidy amendment on chimpanzee research demonstrates how Congress continues to “monkey around.”

Republicans should stop the primate-related sideshows and focus on things that really matter. Like sticking to the promise they made to voters for eight years to repeal Obamacare.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Summary of Health Care “Consensus” Group Plan

Tuesday, a group of analysts including those at the Heritage Foundation released their outline for a way to pass health-care-related legislation in Congress. Readers can find the actual health plan here; a summary and analysis follow below.

What Does the Health Plan Include?

The plan includes parameters for a state-based block grant that would combine funds from Obamacare’s insurance subsidies and its Medicaid expansion into one pot of money. The plan would funnel the block grant funds through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), using that program’s pro-life protections. In general, states using the block grant would:

  • Spend at least half of the funds subsidizing private health coverage;
  • Spend at least half of the funds subsidizing low-income individuals (which can overlap with the first pot of funds);
  • Spend an unspecified percentage of their funds subsidizing high-risk patients with high health costs;
  • Allow anyone who qualifies for SCHIP or Medicaid to take the value of their benefits and use those funds to subsidize private coverage; and
  • Not face federal requirements regarding 1) essential health benefits; 2) the single risk pool; 3) medical loss ratios; and 4) the 3:1 age ratio (i.e., insurers can charge older customers only three times as much as younger customers).

Is That It?

Pretty much. For instance, the plan remains silent on whether to support an Obamacare “stability” (read: bailout) bill intended to 1) keep insurance markets intact during the transition to the block grant, and 2) attract the votes of moderate Republicans like Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski and Maine Sen. Susan Collins.

As recently as three weeks ago, former Sen. Rick Santorum was telling groups that the proposal would include the Collins “stability” language. However, as I previously noted, doing so would likely lead to taxpayer funding of abortion coverage, because there are few if any ways to attach pro-life protections to Obamacare’s cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers under the special budget reconciliation procedures the Senate would use to consider “repeal-and-replace” legislation.

What Parts of Obamacare Would the Plan Retain?

In short, most of them.

Taxes and Medicare Reductions: By retaining all of Obamacare’s spending, the plan would retain all of Obamacare’s tax increases—either that, or it would increase the deficit. Likewise, the plan says nothing about undoing Obamacare’s Medicare reductions. By retaining Obamacare’s spending levels, the plan would maintain the gimmick of double-counting, whereby the law’s payment reductions are used both to “save Medicare” and fund Obamacare.

Insurance Regulations: The Congressional Research Service lists 22 separate new federal requirements imposed on health insurance plans under Obamacare. The plan would retain at least 14 of them:

  1. Guaranteed issue of coverage—Section 2702 of the Public Health Service Act;
  2. Non-discrimination based on health status—Section 2705 of the Public Health Service Act;
  3. Extension of dependent coverage—Section 2714 of the Public Health Service Act;
  4. Prohibition of discrimination based on salary—Section 2716 of the Public Health Service Act (only applies to employer plans);
  5. Waiting period limitation—Section 2708 of the Public Health Service Act (only applies to employer plans);
  6. Guaranteed renewability—Section 2703 of the Public Health Service Act;
  7. Prohibition on rescissions—Section 2712 of the Public Health Service Act;
  8. Rate review—Section 2794 of the Public Health Service Act;
  9. Coverage of preventive health services without cost sharing—Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act;
  10. Coverage of pre-existing health conditions—Section 2703 of the Public Health Service Act;
  11. Summary of benefits and coverage—Section 2715 of the Public Health Service Act;
  12. Appeals process—Section 2719 of the Public Health Service Act;
  13. Patient protections—Section 2719A of the Public Health Service Act; and
  14. Non-discrimination regarding clinical trial participation—Section 2709 of the Public Health Service Act.

Are Parts of the Health Plan Unclear?

Yes. For instance, the plan says that “Obamacare requirements on essential health benefits” would not apply in states receiving block grant funds. However, Section 1302 of Obamacare—which codified the essential health benefits requirement—also included two other requirements, one capping annual cost-sharing (Section 1302(c)) and another imposing minimum actuarial value requirements (Section 1302(d)).

Additionally, the plan on two occasions says that “insurers could offer discounts to people who are continuously covered.” House Republicans offered a similar proposal in their American Health Care Act last year, one that imposed penalties on individuals failing to maintain continuous coverage.

However, the plan includes no specific proposal on how insurers could go about offering such discounts, as the plan states that the 3:1 age rating requirement—and presumably only that requirement—would not apply for states receiving block grant funds. It is unclear whether or how insurers would have the flexibility under the plan to offer discounts for continuous coverage if all of Obamacare’s restrictions on premium rating, save that for age, remain.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Are the Heritage Foundation’s Politics Betraying Its Policy?

When Ronald Reagan used the axiom “Trust but verify,” he meant conservatives should closely monitor organizations and individuals to ensure that their deeds comport with their words. This axiom should apply to a health-care plan that a group the Heritage Foundation leads will unveil this week. While the group’s website claims its plan would “restore a properly functioning market in the health care sector to lower costs,” Heritage’s own policy analysis suggests otherwise.

Specifically, the Heritage plan would in no way alter what Heritage research describes as the biggest drivers of Obamacare’s “seismic effects on insurance markets.” Nor does the Graham-Cassidy health care bill, the legislative basis for the new effort. In fact, a recent version of the bill further undermines the purported “flexibility” that Graham-Cassidy promises to states, making it even less consistent with the federal principles Heritage invokes in lauding the measure.

Pre-Existing Condition Rules Drive Premium Increases

The largest effect on premiums consists of a cluster of [Obamacare] insurance access requirements—specifically the guaranteed issue requirement and the prohibitions on medical underwriting and applying coverage exclusions for pre-existing medical conditions under any circumstances. This cluster of regulations collectively accounts for the largest share of premium increases.

The paper discusses at length how these provisions “appear to have had the greatest effect on premiums,” raising rates for the young and healthy to subsidize the sick. While Obamacare supporters hoped the individual mandate would compel enough healthy individuals to offset those costs, high numbers of people chose to pay the mandate tax or received exemptions from the tax.

“The net result was a constellation of rules that repelled relatively healthy people and attracted those who could reasonably expect their medical bills to exceed their premiums—which Obamacare’s individual mandate simply failed to counteract,” Heritage’s report says.

Rhetoric versus Reality on Graham-Cassidy

After analyzing how the pre-existing conditions provisions proved the prime driver of premium increases, the March Heritage paper claims Graham-Cassidy provides the solution, calling it “a conceptual framework for empowering states to repair or ameliorate much of the market dislocation resulting from Obamacare.”

Leaving all those regulatory requirements in place might sound good, but—just as the March Heritage paper noted—it causes major policy problems:

Insurance companies are required to sell ‘just-in-time’ policies even if people wait until they are sick to buy coverage. That’s just like the Obama plan. There is growing evidence that many are gaming the system by purchasing health insurance when they need surgery or other expensive medical care, then dropping it a few months later.

Those words were written in 2010 to describe the effects of Massachusetts’ health care law, but they apply just as equally to the Heritage plan, and the Graham-Cassidy bill, in 2018. Surprisingly, then, they came from another member of the group that is releasing the plan this week.

Despite these organizations’ own prior statements opposing these costly insurance requirements, the plan released by Heritage and others would leave them in place at the federal level, hamstringing states’ ability to manage their own insurance markets—and belying the supposed goal of devolving power away from Washington.

The Bill Is Getting Worse

Unfortunately, however, the revised draft takes major steps that would undermine states’ ability to create multiple risk pools. Language on page 31 would reduce the block grant allotment for states maintaining multiple risk pools, by a percentage not yet specified. Other new provisions on pages 44 and 45 of the revised draft would allow states to create multiple risk pools only if they follow a series of bureaucratic parameters—parameters that a future Democratic administration would likely use to quash any state’s attempt to establish or maintain multiple risk pools.

Not Flexible, Not Federalism

Even as the Graham-Cassidy bill moves further to the left, Heritage seems insistent on chasing it ever leftward. The bill never addressed what Heritage itself called the prime drivers of premium increases. Now a more recent version further erodes the little flexibility that earlier drafts gave to states.

As I wrote more than one year ago, Republicans can choose to leave the status quo intact on Obamacare’s major regulations, or they can choose to keep their promise to voters to repeal the law. But they cannot do both. It comes down to a binary choice that simple. And Heritage has chosen a path that would effectively break the promise of repeal.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

24 New Federal Requirements Added to the Graham-Cassidy Bill

Last week, I outlined how a white paper Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) released essentially advocated for Obamacare on steroids. That plan would keep the law’s most expensive (and onerous) federal insurance requirements, while calling for more taxpayer dollars to make that expensive coverage more “affordable.”

Unfortunately, Cassidy also would extend this highly regulatory approach beyond mere white papers and into legislation. A recently disclosed copy of a revised Graham-Cassidy bill—originally developed by Cassidy and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) last fall—imposes two dozen new requirements on states. These requirements would undermine the bill’s supposed goal of “state flexibility,” and could lead to a regime more onerous and expensive than Obamacare itself.

18 New ‘Adequate and Affordable’ Coverage Rules

Specifically, that coverage must:

  • Include four categories of basic services defined in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) statute:
    • Inpatient and outpatient hospital services;
    • Physicians’ surgical and medical services;
    • Laboratory and X-ray services, and
    • Well-baby and well-child care, including age-appropriate immunizations;
  • Include three categories of additional services also defined in the SCHIP statute:
    • Coverage of prescription drugs;
    • Vision services; and
    • Hearing services;
  • Include two other categories of services as defined by Obamacare:
    • Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; and
    • Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices;
  • Comply with actuarial value standards set by the SCHIP statute:
    • Cover at least 70 percent of estimated health expenses for the average consumer; and
  • Comply with requirements included in eight separate sections of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by Obamacare:
    • Section 2701—Rating premiums only based on age (with older applicants charged no more than three times younger applicants), family size, geography, and tobacco use;
    • Section 2702—Required acceptance for every individual or employer who applies for coverage (i.e., guaranteed issue);
    • Section 2703—Guaranteed renewability of coverage;
    • Section 2704—Prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions;
    • Section 2705—Prohibition on discriminating against individuals based on health status;
    • Section 2708—Prohibition on excessive waiting periods;
    • Section 2711—Prohibition on annual or lifetime limits; and
    • Section 2713—Requiring first-dollar coverage of preventive services without cost-sharing (i.e., deductibles and co-payments).

As noted above, “adequate and affordable health insurance coverage” would include many of Obamacare’s insurance requirements, and in at least one way would exceed them. Whereas Section 1302(d) of Obamacare requires selling insurance with an actuarial value—that is, the percentage of medical expenses paid for the average individual—of at least 60 percent, the revised Graham-Cassidy would require “adequate and affordable” coverage with an actuarial value of at least 70 percent.

If asked, Graham and Cassidy might state that these requirements would only apply to a certain subset of the population. After all, the revised bill text indicates that each state “shall ensure access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage (as defined in clause (ii))”—the clause referring to the 18 separate requirements listed above—“for [high-risk individuals].” The bill lists the brackets in the original, which might indicate that Cassidy’s office intends to apply these 18 separate coverage requirements only to plans that high-risk persons purchase.

Thankfully, the new draft removes the “population adjustment factor” allowing CMS to rewrite the block grant formula unilaterally. But even as it took away CMS’ power to alter the funding formula, new language on page 15 of the revised draft allows CMS to cancel states’ block grant funds for “substantial noncompliance.” That provision, coupled with the revised bill’s lack of definition regarding “affordable” coverage and “high-risk individual” provides a future Democratic administration with two clear ways to hijack the block grant program.

For instance, a new administration could define “high-risk individual” so broadly that it would apply to virtually all Americans, subjecting them to the 18 costly coverage requirements. A new administration could also define “affordable” in such a manner—for instance, premiums may not exceed 5 percent of an individual’s income—that states would have to subsidize insurance with sizable amounts of state funds, in addition to the federal dollars included in the block grant. Any state failing to comply with these edicts could see its entire block grant yanked for “substantial noncompliance” with the bureaucratically imposed guidelines.

It seems paradoxical to assert that a bill can be both too prescriptive, imposing far too many requirements on states that undermine the supposed goal of “state flexibility,” and too vague, giving vast amounts of authority to federal bureaucrats. Yet somehow the section on “adequate and affordable health coverage” manages to do both.

Two New Required Uses of Block-Grant Funds

Supporters of the bill would argue that these supposed “guardrails” will prevent states from subsidizing Medicaid coverage, or creating some other government-run health program. But as I noted last week, Obamacare has its own “guardrails” regarding state waivers, which undermine any attempt to deregulate insurance markets.

By adding these new “guardrails,” Graham-Cassidy would essentially replicate Obamacare, albeit with slightly different policy objectives: “The Cassidy plan would give states the ‘flexibility’ to do what Bill Cassidy wants them to do, and only what Bill Cassidy wants them to do. That isn’t flexibility at all.”

Block Grant Reductions with Multiple Risk Pools

On Page 31, the bill includes new language requiring a reduction in block-grant funds, by a percentage not specified, for states electing to create multiple risk pools. Under current law, Section 1312(c) of Obamacare requires insurers to place all individual insurance market enrollees—whether they purchase coverage through the exchange or not—in a single risk pool.

If a state elects to choose multiple risk pools and uses a “substantial portion” of its block grant to subsidize insurance with an actuarial value of under 50 percent, then the state would see an unspecified reduction in its block grant. This language contains many of the flaws of the other provisions described above: It nowhere defines what comprises a “substantial portion” of the block grant, and penalizes states that may choose to create multiple risk pools and subsidize only catastrophic insurance coverage, thus belying Graham-Cassidy’s promise of “state flexibility.”

3 New Requirements for State Waivers

The revised Graham-Cassidy text moves and alters language regarding state waivers of Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements, and in so doing makes three substantive changes. (The original language started in the middle of page 143 of the bill; the new language begins on the top of page 42 of the revised bill.)

First, and perhaps most disturbingly, the revised bill requires the Department of Health and Human Services to waive Obamacare’s insurance requirements for a state only if “such state establishes an equivalent requirement applicable to such coverage in such state.” Taken literally, this provision could mean that states could “opt-out” of Obamacare’s federal requirements if and only if they enshrine those exact same requirements in state law—rendering any supposed “flexibility” under Graham-Cassidy completely nonexistent.

Graham and Cassidy may not have meant to craft language with such a literal interpretation. They may mean to say, for instance, that a state can waive out of Obamacare’s age-rating requirements (which prohibit insurers from charging older people more than three times what they charge younger people) if they establish a more permissive regime—for instance, five-to-one age rating—on the state level.

But taken literally, that’s not what the current bill text says. That vague language raises serious questions about the authors’ intent, and why they chose such unclear, and arguably sloppy, bill language.

Second, the section imposes two new requirements on states selecting multiple risk pools. As noted above, those states would have to comply with the 18 new requirements regarding “adequate and affordable” health coverage, and states creating multiple risk pools could see their block grant reduced as a result.

In addition, however, states must also guarantee that insurers offering coverage in one risk pool offer coverage in all of them. Moreover, premiums charged “by a health insurance issuer for the same health coverage offered in different risk pools in the state [may] not vary by more than 3 to 1.”

The first requirement echoes the Consumer Freedom Amendment offered by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) last year. That amendment allowed insurers to offer plans that did not comply with Obamacare’s requirements, so long as they continued to offer one Obamacare-compliant plan. The second requirement would effectively limit the extent to which insurers could charge individuals more on the basis of pre-existing conditions or health status.

Two Dozen (More) Reasons for State Concern

Both individually and collectively, these two dozen new requirements inserted into the most recent version of Graham-Cassidy present problems for conservatives. The myriad requirements would sharply limit the bill’s ability to deliver lower premiums to consumers—one major goal of “repeal-and-replace” legislation.

More broadly, though, the revised bill drifts further away from any semblance of conservative objectives. While Graham-Cassidy purports to provide more flexibility to states, the revised bill would instead ensnare them in numerous requirements that would impede any attempt at innovation.

Like the proverbial Lilliputians who attempted to tie down Gulliver, the new bill looks to rob states of their ability to manage their own insurance markets and lower premiums for residents, one federal requirement at a time.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Bill Cassidy’s New Health Plan Is Obamacare on Steroids

On Tuesday, Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) released a policy white paper with ideas he claimed would “make health care affordable again.” By and large, however, the plan would do no such thing.

Some of the plan’s ideas—promoting consumer transparency in health care, for instance, promoting primary care, and cracking down on monopolistic practices that impede competition—have merit, although people can quibble with the extent to which Washington can, or should, solve those problems.

Fake Flexibility

Cassidy bases his plan on a state-based block-grant funding model, similar to the legislation he and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) developed last fall. Cassidy cites various state experimental programs to argue that a block-grant approach would allow more room for innovation.

However, the last sentence of the proposal undermines the rest of the discussion: “Flexibility to states would not jeopardize protections for individuals with pre-existing conditions.” That phrase implies that Cassidy believes, as the Graham-Cassidy bill indicated, that Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements regarding pre-existing conditions should remain in place.

That sentence belies the idea that states would get true flexibility to construct their insurance markets however they like. Instead, the Cassidy plan would represent a variation on Obamacare, whose state waiver program essentially lets them add more requirements and more government to their insurance markets, but not take requirements away. Put another way, the Cassidy plan would give states the “flexibility” to do what Bill Cassidy wants them to do, and only what Bill Cassidy wants them to do. That isn’t flexibility at all.

Costly Requirements Remain in Place

For instance, loosening Obamacare’s essential health benefits while keeping the pre-existing condition requirements will encourage insurers to stop covering treatments like chemotherapy. Because they must continue to accept all sick patients, and charge them the same rates as healthy ones, insurers will try to limit their losses by not covering cancer drugs, thereby discouraging cancer patients from applying for coverage.

The combination of these two policy dilemmas could result in the worst of all possible worlds, from both a political and policy standpoint: A plan that does not reduce premiums appreciably—because it keeps the most costly federal insurance requirements intact—yet still encourages insurers to discriminate against the sick.

Throwing Money at the Problem

Rather than trying to solve the problems Obamacare’s federal insurance requirements have caused, as I previously suggested, Cassidy’s plan goes to great lengths to avoid them. He endorses the health insurance “stability” (read: bailout) measure proposed by Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) earlier this year. Rather than lowering premiums by removing the federal insurance requirements, that plan would lower premiums—albeit only temporarily—by throwing more taxpayer funds at insurers.

Moreover, the need for more federal funding belies Cassidy’s claim that his plan would “make health care affordable again.” States should not need any more funding to encourage insurance enrollment, particularly if they receive sufficient flexibility from federal requirements to bring down premiums. Cassidy knows that any flexibility will prove illusory. As with a “stability” package, he proposes making coverage more “affordable” by throwing other people’s money at the problem.

Neither Repeal Nor Reform

I wrote last April, well before lawmakers ever contemplated the Graham-Cassidy measure, that “Republicans have a choice: They can either retain the ban on pre-existing condition discrimination—and the regulations and subsidies that go with it—or they can fulfill their promise to repeal Obamacare.” Judging from the ideas in his policy paper, Cassidy has made his choice: He supports Obamacare.

But more of the same—more spending to finance the same costly insurance because of the same costly federal insurance requirements—doesn’t constitute a repeal of Obamacare. It doesn’t even come close. Would that Cassidy, and his colleagues in Congress, actually thought about keeping their word and enacting the repeal they promised.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Does the Heritage Health Plan Include Taxpayer Funding of Abortion?

When lawmakers write legislation, little details matter—a lot. In the case of a health plan that the Heritage Foundation and former Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) are reportedly preparing to release in the coming days, a few words indicate the plan has not considered critically important details—like how Senate procedure intertwines with abortion policy—necessary to any substantive policy endeavor.

A few short words in a summary of the Heritage plan leave the real possibility that the plan, if enacted as described, could lead to taxpayer funding of abortion coverage. Either Heritage and Santorum—both known opponents of abortion—have undertaken dramatic changes in their pro-life positions over the past few months, or they have failed to think through the full import of the policies they will release very shortly.

However, multiple individuals participating in the Heritage meetings told me that the concepts and policies Spiro’s document discusses align with Heritage discussions. Spiro may have created that document based on verbal descriptions given to him of the Heritage plan (just as the New York Times’ list of questions Robert Mueller wants to ask President Trump likely came via Trump’s attorneys and not Mueller). But regardless of who created it, people in the Heritage group told me it accurately outlined the policy proposals under discussion.

What Cost-Sharing Reductions Do

The summary describes many policies, but one in particular stands out: Under “Short-term stabilization/premium relief,” the plan “Adopts the [Lamar] Alexander and [Susan] Collins appropriation for CSRs [cost-sharing reductions] and state reinsurance/high risk pool programs for 2019 and 2020.”

On one level, this development should not come as a surprise. Party leaders often incorporate recalcitrant members’ pet projects (or, in the old days, earmarks) into a bill to obtain their votes: “See, we included the language that you wanted—you have to vote for our bill now!” Given that Collins as of last week had not even heard about the Heritage-led effort, one might think she would need some incentive to support the measure, which attaching her “stability” language might provide.

About the Hyde Amendment and Byrd Rule

The reference to CSRs takes on more importance because of the way Congress would consider Heritage’s plan. As with the Graham-Cassidy bill and other “repeal-and-replace” bills considered last year, the Senate would enact them using expedited budget reconciliation procedures.

Those procedures theoretically allow all 51 Senate Republicans to circumvent a Democratic filibuster and pass a reconciliation bill on a party-line vote. However, as I outlined last year, the reconciliation process comes with procedural restrictions (i.e., the “Byrd rule”) to prevent senators from attaching “extraneous” and non-budgetary matter to a bill that cannot be filibustered.

“Hyde amendment” restrictions—which prevent federal funding of abortion coverage, except in the cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—represent a textbook example of the “Byrd rule,” because they have a fiscal impact “merely incidental” to the policy changes proposed. Former Senate Parliamentarian Bob Dove said as much about abortion restrictions Congress considered in 1995:

The Congressional Budget Office determined that it was going to save money. But it was my view that the provision was not there in order to save money. It was there to implement social policy. Therefore I ruled that it was not in order and it was stricken.

After pushing for a vote for months, Collins suddenly backed off and didn’t force the issue on the Senate floor. She knew she didn’t have the votes—everyone knew she didn’t have the votes—because Democrats wouldn’t support a measure that restricted taxpayer funding of abortion coverage. Exactly nothing has changed that dynamic since Congress considered the issue in March.

Why We Can’t Fund CSRs

Republicans recognize the problems the abortion funding issue creates, and the Graham-Cassidy bill attempted to solve them by providing subsidies via a block grant to states. Graham-Cassidy funneled the block grant through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), largely because the SCHIP statute includes the following language: “Funds provided to a state under this title shall only be used to carry out the purposes of this title, and any health insurance coverage provided with such funds may include coverage of abortion only if necessary to save the life of the mother or if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.”

Because SCHIP already contains full Hyde protections on taxpayer funding of abortion, Graham-Cassidy ran the block grant program through SCHIP. Put another way, Graham-Cassidy borrowed existing Hyde amendment protections because any new protections would get in a budget reconciliation bill. It did the same thing for a “stability” fund for reinsurance or other mechanisms intended to lower premiums by subsidizing insurers, also referred to in Spiro’s document.

Creating a pot of money elsewhere in law—for instance, through the SCHIP statute, which does contain Hyde protections—and using that money to compensate insurers for reducing cost-sharing would prove just as unrealistic. The CSR payments reimburse insurers for discrete, specific discounts provided to discrete, specific low-income individuals.

If the subsidy pool gave money to all insurers equally, regardless of the number of low-income enrollees they reduced cost-sharing for, then insurers would have a ready-built incentive to avoid attracting poor people, because enrolling low-income individuals would saddle them with an unfunded (or only partially funded) mandate. If the subsidy pool gave money to insurers based on their specific obligations under the Obamacare cost-sharing reduction requirements, then the parliamentarian would likely view this language as an attempt to circumvent the Byrd rule restrictions and strike it down.

Not Ready for Prime Time

Four participants in the Heritage meetings told me the group has discussed appropriating funds for CSR payments to insurers as part of the plan. Not a single individual said the Senate’s “Byrd rule” restrictions—which make enacting pro-life protections for such CSR payments all-but-impossible—came up when discussing an appropriation for cost-sharing payments to insurers.

That silence signals one or more potential problems: A lack of regard for pro-life policy; an ignorance of Senate procedure, and its potential ramifications on the policies being considered; or a willingness to fudge details—allowing people to believe what they want to believe. Regardless, it speaks to the unformed nature of the proposal, despite meetings that have continued since the last time “repeal-and-replace” collapsed” nearly eight months ago.

Earlier this month, Santorum claimed in an interview that while the original “Graham-Cassidy was a rush…this time we have the opportunity to get the policy better.” But any serious attempt to “get the policy better” wouldn’t have major lingering questions about tens of billions of dollars in “stability” funding, and whether such funds would subsidize abortion coverage, mere days before its public release. In this case, eight months of deliberations may not lead to a deliberative and coherent policy product.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Graham-Cassidy and Conservative Health Reform

In its February budget submission to Congress, the Trump administration endorsed legislation “modeled after” the bill Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) introduced last year, which would devolve much of Obamacare’s entitlement spending to the states.

The budget claims this legislation “would allow states to use the block grant for a variety of approaches in order to help their citizens.” But based on the most recent public version, the Graham-Cassidy bill needs significant changes to deliver true flexibility to states.

The administration endorsed Graham-Cassidy because it believes the legislation would give states flexibility to embrace a “variety of approaches” to health care and health insurance. But would the most recent version of the bill allow Idaho to implement its reforms without federal intrusion? In a word, no.

In at least two respects, Idaho’s plan violates the many federal requirements that would remain intact under Graham-Cassidy. Idaho’s proposal to allow annual limits of over $1,000,000, and its proposal to allow surcharges of up to 50 percent for individuals who do not maintain continuous coverage, both contravene the Washington-imposed regulatory apparatus Graham-Cassidy retains.

This raises an obvious question: If the only state-based insurance reform plan proposed to date violates Graham-Cassidy, then how much “flexibility” does the legislation really provide? To paraphrase Margaret Thatcher, conservatives have not spent the past eight years fighting to roll back a Washington-based, regulatory leviathan imposed by a Democratic Congress, only to see that leviathan reimposed by a Republican one.

To its credit, the Trump administration has worked to roll back Obamacare’s regulatory regime. Consistent with its promise in the budget to generate “relie[f] from many of [Obamacare’s] insurance rules and pricing restrictions,” the administration has proposed rules allowing greater access to short-term insurance coverage and association health plans, both of which are exempt from some or all of the Obamacare statutory restrictions.

But make no mistake: While these actions will give some individuals freedom from Obamacare’s restrictions, they will not give states the control they deserve over their own insurance markets. To give the states the freedom that the Trump administration promised, Congress must repeal the federally imposed regulatory superstructure Obamacare created. Only by doing so will Washington give states the true flexibility to explore alternative visions of health care for their citizens—Graham-Cassidy’s stated goal.

If Congress does not act to give states freedom, a future Democratic administration will reimpose each and every health care regulation the Trump administration loosened—and many more besides. The Center for American Progress made as much crystal-clear recently, when in releasing the Left’s next plan for (more) government-run health care, it proposed legislation that would “leave little to no discretion to the Administration [of the day] on policy matters.”

To the Left, Obamacare isn’t about power so much as control. As President Reagan famously stated, the “little intellectual elite in a far-distant capital” think they can “plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves.” To liberals’ unquenchable desire to arrogate more power in Washington, conservatives must respond with freedom—freedom for states, and ultimately to businesses and individuals, to buy the coverage they want, and innovate in ways that can lower health spending.

The Graham-Cassidy bill has other flaws. It retains most of Obamacare’s spending (albeit disbursed to the states through the block grant) and all of its major tax increases. But at its core, the debate over health care remains one of control: Whether Washington will try to micromanage 50 states and more than 300 million people, or whether states and citizens can lead the way. We stand with the people—and hope that, after eight years of promises, the Republican Congress finally does likewise.

This post, co-written with former Sen. Jim DeMint, was originally published at The Federalist.

Republicans, Stop Avoiding Obamacare’s Problems and Start Fixing Them

With Congress having barely staved off attempts at a massive bailout of health insurers and Obamacare, the obvious question in health policy becomes: What should Congress do now?

Unfortunately, Republicans seem insistent on doing anything but solving the ultimate problem. As I have written on more occasions than I care to count, Obamacare’s regulatory scheme—particularly its requirements for pre-existing conditions—explain why premiums more than doubled from 2013 to 2017. That onerous regime necessitated requiring individuals to purchase, and employers to offer, health coverage; subsidies to make the (newly expensive) coverage more “affordable”; and tax increases and Medicare reductions to fund the subsidies.

One other option discussed of late would avoid addressing the problem entirely, by codifying the Trump administration’s proposed changes to short-term health plans. On one hand, this approach would provide a benefit, as short-term plans remain exempt from all the new requirements Obamacare imposes.

But the health care law’s regulatory regime created not one, but two, related problems. First, it raised premiums for most forms of insurance. But just as importantly, it did so via a massive federal intrusion into a realm—health insurance—where states had virtual free rein for nearly seven decades. Following passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1947, the federal government exercised minimal control of states’ individual health insurance markets, until Obamacare.

To see the effects of Obamacare on state markets, take the case of Idaho. The state wants to permit the sale of insurance plans that meet some, but not all, of the law’s regulatory requirements. But unfortunately, because the federal statute supersedes a state’s wishes, the Trump administration recently told Idaho it cannot offer policies that do not comply with federal law.

However, the idea that a Republican Congress would codify the rules on short-term plans, while keeping in place the onerous federally imposed regime that micro-manages all 50 states’ health insurance markets, defies any commitment to the principles of federalism. At least one state has publicly called short-term plans an insufficient option for its residents. Others very likely agree. If they believe in federalism, why would lawmakers in Washington purposefully deny Idahoans the freedom to make their own choices?

Last month’s White House budget claimed the Graham-Cassidy health care legislation would “support states as they transition to more sustainable health care programs that provide appropriate choices for their citizens.” But a bill keeping Obamacare’s regulatory regime in place, while allowing short-term plans as a “lifeboat” for those who wish it, would do the exact opposite. Such legislation might give freedom to some individuals, but it would not give any freedom to states to manage their own health insurance markets as they see fit, or to “provide appropriate choices for their citizens.”

I wrote last April that Republicans faced a binary choice: They could keep the status quo on pre-existing conditions, or they could repeal Obamacare—but they cannot do both. Instead of throwing money at the problem, or using political dodges like short-term plans to avoid it, they should get about actually fixing the underlying problem. Or come clean with the American people, and admit that they never wanted to repeal Obamacare in the first place.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.