Medicaid Expansion Has Louisianans Dropping Their Private Plans

If any state can serve as the poster child for the problems associated with ObamaCare’s Medicaid expansion, it’s Louisiana, which joined the expansion in 2016, after Democrat John Bel Edwards became governor. An audit released last year exposed ineligible Medicaid beneficiaries, including at least 1,672 people who made more than $100,000. But Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion has revealed another waste of taxpayer funds, both in the Pelican State and nationwide: the money spent providing coverage to people who already had health insurance.

Via a public-records request, the Pelican Institute obtained data demonstrating that thousands of Louisiana residents dropped their private coverage to enroll in Medicaid under the expansion. A spreadsheet compiled by the Louisiana Department of Health put the count between 3,000 and 5,000 people a month, and that doesn’t count those who enrolled in Medicaid first, then dropped private coverage.

When asked about the spreadsheet, Medicaid officials stated in an email that the Health Department “stopped producing” the data in late 2017 when it discovered its vendor’s information “was limited to [third-party liability] during the period of Medicaid enrollment.” Because the vendor couldn’t track beneficiaries before or after their Medicaid enrollment, the spreadsheet arguably underestimated the number of people dropping private coverage to enroll in Medicaid.

The Health Department’s internal spreadsheet information comports with other coverage estimates. A survey by Louisiana State University researchers found that, from 2015-17, enrollment in private insurance fell precipitously among low-income Louisiana residents eligible for Medicaid under the expansion. The number of people covered by private health insurance declined by tens of thousands, even as Medicaid enrollment skyrocketed by more than 141,000.

That masses of Louisiana residents canceled their private coverage to enroll in “free” Medicaid should surprise no one. In 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Jonathan Gruber, who later became an architect of ObamaCare, concluded that some coverage expansions would see rates of “crowd-out”—government programs squeezing out private insurance—approaching 60%. Eight years later, Louisiana’s Legislative Fiscal Office estimated that crowd-out would cost taxpayers between $900 million and $1.3 billion over five years. Because enrollment in Medicaid expansion vastly exceeded initial projections, the true cost may rise far higher.

Federal budget analysts have yet to quantify the effect of crowd-out on Medicaid expansion—but they should, because estimates suggest that Washington is spending billions annually funding Medicaid for people with prior health coverage. Montana officials recently released a study boasting of 8,700 workers who would have employer-sponsored coverage but for Medicaid expansion, claiming that expansion provided “cost savings to businesses” of up to $114 million. Only in a bureaucrat’s mind would more government spending, taxes and government dependency represent “cost savings.”

In response to the Louisiana audit, the state recently purged more than 30,000 ineligible people from the rolls. Health Secretary Rebekah Gee claimed the action demonstrated how she and Gov. Edwards “want to make sure that only those that need Medicaid have Medicaid.” But good stewards of taxpayer dollars, upon receiving preliminary reports of people dropping coverage to enroll in Medicaid, would have demanded better data and fashioned policy solutions to address the problem. The Louisiana Department of Health did neither and stopped compiling the data.

Generations of Louisiana politicians, since Gov. Huey Long in the 1930s, have claimed that fostering an economy rooted in government dependence will lead to prosperity. But the more than 67,000 residents who have left the state in the past three years alone see a stagnant economy and a slowly sinking state. Louisiana can do better, and other states thinking about Medicaid expansion should think again.

This post was originally published at The Wall Street Journal.

What You Need to Know About Medicaid Crowd Out

A PDF version of this document is available on the Pelican Institute’s website

In recent weeks, lawmakers have focused on the tens of thousands of ineligible individuals who improperly received benefits under Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion. But fighting waste, fraud, and abuse in Medicaid should also include reforms to address another important issue—crowd out. The term refers to Louisiana residents who have dropped their existing coverage to enroll in Medicaid expansion—in other words, government programs “crowding out” private insurance. Here’s what you need to know about crowd out and Medicaid expansion:

Tens of Thousands of People Have Dropped Private Coverage to Enroll in Medicaid

Recently, the Pelican Institute filed a public records request to obtain internal Louisiana Department of Health (LDH) data showing that for much of 2016 and 2017, several thousand individuals dropped their existing health coverage to enroll in Medicaid expansion. With enrollment in Medicaid expansion averaging approximately 15,000 individuals per month in 2017, the data indicates a significant percentage of enrollees dropped their prior coverage to join Medicaid expansion.

Funding Benefits for People Who Previously Had Health Insurance Consumes Scarce Medicaid Resources

Crowd out populations pose big potential costs for Louisiana taxpayers. In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office assumed that if Louisiana expanded Medicaid, the state would spend between $900 million and $1.3 billion over five years providing Medicaid coverage to individuals with prior health coverage.

When testifying before the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, LDH staff indicated that, during the fiscal year ending this June 30, the average expansion enrollee cost Medicaid $523.85 per month, or $6,286.20 per year. Multiplying this average cost per enrollee by the number of individuals who dropped private coverage, according to last year’s LSU Health Insurance Survey, yields a potential cost to state and federal taxpayers of $461.6 million this fiscal year:

  • Dropped coverage from a current employer: 40,147; Potential cost to taxpayers: $252.4 million
  • Dropped coverage from a former employer: 23,086; Potential cost to taxpayers: $145.1 million
  • Dropped privately purchased coverage: 10,201; Potential cost to taxpayers: $64.1 million

Because the LSU researchers extrapolated the coverage numbers from survey responses, and because the survey responses varied only slightly from 2015 to 2017, the results for privately purchased coverage, and coverage from a former employer, might have occurred due to random chance, rather than any actual drop in coverage rates. Regardless, the decline in coverage from a former employer DID meet the tests of statistical significance; this crowd out is costing the Medicaid program on the order of $145.1 million per year. Moreover, the potential fiscal impact of the crowd out problem demonstrates the need for more accurate data on the issue.

Crowd Out Metrics

The March 2019 LSU report cites a seminal 1996 work from MIT Professor Jonathan Gruber to define crowd out—the decrease in private insurance divided by the change in public insurance. To put it simply, crowd out should quantify the percentage of Medicaid enrollees who dropped their private coverage to enroll in expansion. Unfortunately, LDH has used different—and inaccurate—metrics to define crowd out on several occasions in attempts to minimize its impact.

For instance, in August 2017, the Department counted 5,659 “Medicaid expansion members who have private insurance whose private insurance policies ended 0-60 days prior to Medicaid expansion enrollment”—4,957 whose coverage ended 0-30 days prior to enrollment in expansion, and another 702 whose coverage ended 31-60 days prior to enrollment. The Department’s internal spreadsheets calculated one crowd out rate of 1.3%, based on a total enrollment in expansion of 442,674.

But this calculation creates an inherently inaccurate result, because it divides the number of new enrollees who dropped coverage by the number of total enrollees in the program. An accurate crowd out rate would compare like with like—dividing the number of new enrollees who dropped private coverage in a given month by the overall number of new enrollees in that month. This metric would accurately determine what percentage of new enrollees are dropping coverage.

Using that rubric, Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion suffers from far higher crowd out rates. According to data provided by LDH in response to the Pelican Institute’s public records request, in August 2017 a total of 13,955 individuals enrolled in expansion—8,783 who had previously enrolled in Medicaid, and 5,172 who had never done so before. Dividing the number of new enrollees who dropped private coverage in the prior 30 days (4,957) by the number of new enrollees overall (13,955) yields a potential crowd out rate of 35.5%—far higher than the 1-2% figure cited in the internal LDH spreadsheets.

At the April 23 House Appropriations Committee hearing, Medicaid director Jen Steele cited data from the LSU Health Insurance Survey to estimate a crowd out rate of 2.4%. But that survey data expressed coverage changes as a percentage of the overall low-income population, not based as a percentage of Medicaid enrollees—making it another inaccurate metric.

Based on LDH’s own internal data, that rate more likely approaches 30-40%.

Need for Better Program Integrity

The debate regarding crowd out comes on the heels of the Medicaid eligibility situation, in which LDH acknowledged that 1,672 individuals with six-figure incomes—including at least one individual reporting a higher income than Gov. John Bel Edwards’ annual salary—enrolled in Medicaid expansion. LDH’s failure to address the crowd out problem, and at the same time, the expansion enrollment of individuals with six-figure incomes suggests the need for fundamental reform to Louisiana’s Medicaid program. Government officials at all levels must serve as smart stewards of scarce taxpayer dollars, and a growing number of signs raise questions about LDH’s fulfillment of this critical role.

Conclusion

Solutions to mitigate crowd out should focus on using scarce government resources wisely, while promoting independence and self-sufficiency amongst beneficiaries. For instance, Indiana recently proposed a waiver that would allow beneficiaries transitioning off of Medicaid to keep a portion of their Medicaid dollars. Those retained dollars could fund co-payments on their new private insurance, whether purchased through an employer or individually. These and similar innovative concepts would encourage beneficiaries to transition off of government assistance and into private coverage.

High Risk Designation Reinforces Problems in Louisiana’s Medicaid Expansion

That the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently designated Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied as “high risk,” following the release of a “deeply troubling” report by the state’s Legislative Auditor late last year, should surprise no one. As the Pelican Institute first reported last year, enrollment in Medicaid expansion has exploded, with state officials only now scrambling to detect waste and fraud in the program.

At the time of Medicaid expansion, officials first stated that enrollment could reach 306,000, only to up its projections later. By the time Pelican released its report last January, enrollment had exceeded 466,000—well above the state’s highest estimates. As of this March, enrollment now stands at 502,647, nearly a 10% increase compared to January 2018.

With enrollment nearly two-thirds higher than original projections, it should not have come as a shock to the state that ineligible individuals had enrolled in Medicaid expansion. As enrollment in expansion grew and grew, seemingly without limit, the state’s Department of Health should have spent more time scrutinizing enrollees, to make sure only eligible individuals receive program benefits.

Yet the auditor’s report last November found that out of 100 randomly selected applicants, fully 93 of them did not qualify for Medicaid benefits at some point during their coverage. Nearly two-thirds (66.3%) of the dollars given to insurers on these individuals’ behalf was improperly paid. Based on this sample, the auditor estimated that the Medicaid program spent up to $85.5 million providing benefits to ineligible individuals.

The applicants selected by the legislative auditor reported incomes to the state well beyond the threshold where they would qualify for Medicaid expansion. One Medicaid enrollee reported an income of $145,146—this for a one-person household. By comparison, Louisiana’s governor, John Bel Edwards, earns only $130,000 per year. So why did an individual making more than the state’s governor spend a full 12 months on a program for “low-income” individuals?

The Department of Health now claims that it has updated its enrollment systems to allow for more frequent eligibility checks, in the hopes of reducing the types of abuses uncovered by the legislative auditor. But if the Department of Health really wants to serve as a good steward of taxpayer dollars, it should go much farther, and propose solutions to the problem of Medicaid expansion crowding out private coverage.

In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office estimated that approximately 30-40% of Medicaid expansion enrollees would drop their private coverage to enroll in Medicaid. In other words, taxpayers would spend between $900 million and $1.3 billion over a five-year period providing insurance to individuals who already had coverage prior to expansion.

The dramatic increase in program enrollment, well beyond original projections, indicates that Medicaid expansion is indeed crowding out private coverage. An LSU survey released last year provided further confirmation, suggesting that approximately 75,000 individuals dropped employer-based or private coverage to enroll in Medicaid during the expansion’s first year alone. Yet the Department of Health has failed to acknowledge this problem, let alone propose solutions to fix it.

As the Pelican Institute report last year noted, Medicaid expansion has led to an explosion of government spending, taking the program away from the vulnerable populations for whom it was originally designed. Policy-makers should develop a way to phase out the expansion over time, while applying for a state-based waiver to reform—and transform—the Medicaid program.

This post was originally published at the Pelican Institute.

The High Costs of Medicaid Expansion in Louisiana

The data indicates that as a result of Medicaid expansion, taxpayers face an ever-growing tab for benefits provided to able-bodied adults — many of whom already had health insurance prior to Obamacare — even as the most vulnerable wait and wait for care. Louisiana can — and should — do better.

This post was originally published in the New Orleans Times-Picayune.

Debunking the Government’s Pro-Medicaid Report

Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion helped far too few people obtain good, affordable health coverage and actually cost Louisiana desperately needed jobs. But a taxpayer-funded report released by the Louisiana Department of Health on April 10 claims that the state’s Medicaid expansion – by opening the program to able-bodied adults – will generate billions of dollars in economic activity and thousands of jobs. The report’s flawed perspective cannot mask the state’s poor track record at growing the economy and jobs the past few years – an environment which current proposals for tax increases would only further undermine.

I. The Louisiana Department of Health’s report is factually inaccurate. The Louisiana Department of Health’s pro-Medicaid report discusses “net federal money” gained from the state’s Medicaid expansion, but in reality, it only looks at Medicaid-specific dollars. This perspective ignores the fact that people were dropping Obamacare Exchange coverage to enroll in the Medicaid expansion – and losing federal subsidy dollars in the process.

Over the past two years, subsidized enrollment on Louisiana’s health insurance Exchange has fallen nearly in half—from 170,806 in March 2016 to 93,865 earlier this year. The dramatic drop in enrollment illustrates that many individuals qualified for federal Exchange subsidies prior to expansion taking effect, and then switched to Medicaid.

The report’s discussion of “net new federal dollars” inaccurately ignores the substantial funding in federal Exchange subsidies that at least some expansion enrollees gave up by enrolling in Medicaid. In 2012, CBO noted that, for similarly situated low-income individuals, Exchange subsidies would average about $9,000 per year, but Medicaid coverage would cost $6,000. For those individuals who would have qualified for discounted Exchange policies, their Medicaid coverage may have actually cost Louisiana additional federal dollars – and jobs – because Medicaid could cost less than federal insurance subsidies.

Moreover, the Legislative Fiscal Office in 2015 assumed that approximately 20 percent of the enrollees in expansion would give up other private coverage to enroll in Medicaid. If Medicaid enrollees dropped employer-sponsored coverage to enroll in expansion, the supposedly “new” federal subsidy dollars would instead supplant existing coverage subsidies provided by the employer. The report does not acknowledge this trade-off.

II. Money doesn’t grow on trees – and tax hikes caused by Medicaid expansion actually cost Louisiana jobs. The report only examines federal spending on Medicaid, and not the tax increases used to finance that federal spending. Those tax increases cause job losses, but the report makes no attempt to count them. However, as others have noted, Christina Romer, one of former President Barack Obama’s chief economic advisers, believes that, on an economic impact basis, tax increases used to fund federal spending far outweigh that federal spending.

III. Medicaid creates a disincentive for work. The Congressional Budget Office concluded that Obamacare would, as a whole, reduce the workforce by the equivalent of 2.5 million jobs; Medicaid expansion provides some of the reason for that net job reduction. CBO analysts note that, because an extra dollar of income would cause individuals to lose Medicaid eligibility – subjecting them to sizable premiums and deductibles for Exchange coverage – expansion “effectively creates a tax on additional earnings” that “reduces the incentive to work.”

IV. Health care is not a jobs program. Those words come from none other than Zeke Emanuel, a former White House adviser who helped craft Obamacare. In a 2013 article in The New York Times, Emanuel noted that “the more we can control health care costs, the more Americans will prosper.” Other researchers from Harvard University have made the same point: “It is tempting to think that rising health care employment is a boon, but if the same outcomes can be achieved with lower employment and fewer resources, that leaves extra money to devote to other important public and private priorities.”

Taking the Governor’s report to its logical conclusion, to maximize the generous federal match rate for Medicaid expansion, Louisiana should, for instance, start paying doctors $5,000 for a simple office visit. That added Medicaid spending would create even more jobs and economic growth—as would a government program paying individuals to dig ditches and fill them in again. But, as the Harvard researchers note, neither approach would represent the most efficient use of taxpayer resources. And the report makes little attempt to argue that Medicaid expansion represents the best and most efficient source of economic activity.

V. Asking Washington for more funding isn’t a solution. The report argues for more reliance on federal dollars to support Louisiana, even though, according to the Pew Charitable Trusts, the state budget remains the most dependent on spending from Washington. As of 2015 – even before Medicaid expansion took effect in Louisiana – fully 42.2 percent of the state budget came from Washington. With the federal government facing a $21 trillion (and rising) debt, making Louisiana even more dependent on Washington’s largesse represents a recipe for fiscal ruin.

VI. If Medicaid is a job creator, why is Louisiana still down jobs year over year? If Medicaid expansion has created so many jobs, why has Louisiana lost a net of 200 jobs in the past year? According to the most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the Louisiana workforce shrank from February 2017 to February 2018. With a shrinking workforce, the second-lowest economic growth rate in the country, and the largest decrease in incomes nationwide in 2016, if Louisiana receives any more “prosperity” from Medicaid expansion, the current malaise in the state could turn into a full-fledged economic crisis.

Conclusion

At a time when Louisiana faces its own “fiscal cliff,” the Department of Health should have better things to do with taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars than commission what amounts to a misleading propaganda campaign claiming that more government can grow Louisiana’s economy. Rather than spending time growing the public sector, policy-makers should instead focus on giving businesses the tools they need to create jobs in the private sector.

This post was originally published by the Pelican Institute.

The Rising Costs of Medicaid Expansion in Louisiana

A recent Associated Press story claimed that Louisiana’s Medicaid program is spending less than expected. Don’t you believe it. By multiple measures, Medicaid expansion has proved a budget buster — with worse outcomes ahead.
Take the claim that “more than $535 million of the less-than-projected spending is in the Medicaid expansion program.” But Medicaid expansion’s enrollment, or costs, have not dipped below projections. Far from it, in fact.

In 2015, the state’s Legislative Fiscal Office estimated that expanding Medicaid eligibility would raise spending on benefits by $5.8 billion over five years under moderate enrollment, or $7.1 billion over five years in a high enrollment scenario — roughly $1.2 to $1.4 billion annually.

Compare those numbers to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals’ January estimate. Instead of costing $3.45 billion this fiscal year, Medicaid expansion will “only” cost taxpayers $2.91 billion. In other words, rather than nearly tripling the 2015 cost estimates, expansion will instead exceed the original high-end projections by a mere 108 percent.

First, the Department of Health’s analysis touting purported “savings” to the state ignores the “woodwork effect” — individuals already eligible for Medicaid who only sign up because of the “hoopla” surrounding expansion. The analysis trumpets the individuals previously enrolled in Medicaid for whom the state can receive a higher federal match, saving the state money. However, it does not examine the opposite phenomenon — whether the publicity surrounding expansion has increased enrollment in populations for which the state must pay a larger share of costs.

In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office assumed no “woodwork” effect when analyzing the effects of expansion. But since then, enrollment in Medicaid expansion has skyrocketed. While the Edwards administration first claimed only 300,000 would sign up for expansion, enrollment now exceeds 460,000. A serious fiscal analysis would use the exploding enrollment numbers to study the “woodwork” issue afresh; the Department’s did not.

Second, the analysis also ignores the issue of “crowd-out” — individuals dropping private coverage to enroll in government programs. In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office assumed that between 67,000 and 89,000 individuals would drop their private coverage to enroll in “free” Medicaid; that coverage would cost $1.3 billion over five years, $99 million of that coming from the state general fund.

Particularly given the higher than projected enrollment since the 2015 estimate, the department should analyze the costs to taxpayers associated with individuals who dropped private coverage to join a government program. It has not.

Third, the proposed savings rest on a budget gimmick: Providers and insurers agreeing to pay higher taxes — because those “taxes” generate themselves money. The doctors, hospitals and insurers agree to give more funds to the state, the state collects federal Medicaid matching dollars on that money, and then gives both the state and federal funds right back to hospitals and insurers.

If this fiscal maneuvering — providers raising taxes on themselves to obtain more government funding — sounds like a scam to you, you’re not alone. None other than Joe Biden called it as much back in 2011. Other liberal researchers have called the gimmick “egregious” and a “national disgrace.”

President Trump’s budget endorsed legislation that would crack down on this “Medicaid tax gimmick,” and in 2010 the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles commission endorsed eliminating it entirely. With our nation facing trillion-dollar deficits, Washington will soon have to return to fiscal discipline, putting both parts of the Medicaid expansion in Louisiana — Obamacare’s enhanced federal match for able-bodied adults, and the tax gimmick used to pay Louisiana’s portion of expansion costs — under threat.

Far from small or stable, Medicaid expansion in Louisiana has become a sprawling monstrosity built on a fiscal house of cards. Policy-makers should examine ways to unwind the expansion sooner rather than later, before it starts falling down of its own weight.

This post was originally published in the Shreveport Times.

Medicaid Reforms Can Stave Off Louisiana’s Fiscal Cliff

As the old saying goes, when you’re in a hole, stop digging. Unfortunately, Gov. John Bel Edwards keeps digging Louisiana’s fiscal hole deeper, looking for tax increases to “solve” the state’s fiscal shortfall. He should instead examine the massive Medicaid expansion under Obamacare, the spending on which will only add to Louisiana’s budgetary woes.

Only two years ago, Gov. Edwards took office pledging that expanding Medicaid to able-bodied adults—that is, adults of working age without dependents—would see “only” 300,000 individuals added to the government health care rolls. Then, within weeks of taking office, Gov. Edwards revised his numbers upward, claiming that expansion could cover up to 450,000 individuals. But by November 2017—less than eighteen months after the expansion took effect in Louisiana—the state had already exceeded the maximum number of individuals ever projected to enroll in the program.

Louisiana’s explosion in Medicaid enrollment should not come as a surprise, as dozens of other states that expanded Medicaid under Obamacare face the same problem. According to a November 2016 study by the Foundation for Government Accountability, in 24 states that expanded Medicaid, enrollment exceeded maximum projections by an average of 110%.

Unfortunately, this enrollment explosion puts Louisiana’s budget situation in even greater peril. State officials admitted in 2016 that enrollment exceeding 300,000 would reduce the supposed “savings” from Medicaid expansion. As enrollment has now exceeded the even higher projection of 450,000, costs will continue to rise.

Other states that expanded Medicaid before Louisiana have faced similar problems, with rising spending on Medicaid crowding out other important budgetary priorities. One Democratic legislator from New Mexico noted that “The most vulnerable of our citizens—the children, our senior citizens, our veterans, individuals with disabilities—I get concerned that those could be areas that get hit” because of Medicaid expansion.

Medicaid expansion could indeed hurt vulnerable citizens, because it prioritizes the needs of able-bodied adults. Even as Louisiana expanded Medicaid to the able-bodied, the state’s Department of Health and Hospitals advertises a seven year—yes, seven year—wait for individuals with developmental disabilities to be evaluated for personal care services. Any state’s policy that prioritizes coverage of able-bodied adults, yet makes the most vulnerable individuals wait for years and years to receive care, needs a major re-assessment.

As a new Pelican Institute paper makes clear, Louisiana should start phasing out the Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied—both to right the fiscal ship and to right the state’s wrong priorities. The state should freeze enrollment in expansion, allowing those currently participating in the program to remain so long as they stay eligible, while transitioning people into employer-sponsored insurance or other coverage as they lose Medicaid eligibility. One study found that this policy, if implemented nationwide, could save states between $56-64 billion, while generating additional savings for federal taxpayers.

As the state winds down its expansion, lawmakers should work with federal policy-makers to develop a comprehensive waiver program to reform Medicaid in Louisiana. Such a waiver program could include work requirements, to accelerate the transition from welfare to work. But it should also include improvements in care management—providing better care to beneficiaries, and home-based care where possible. Reforming Medicaid could encompass other important elements, including incentives for wellness and healthy behaviors, better coordination with employer-based insurance where applicable, and improved program integrity to crack down on Medicaid fraud.

Louisiana has suffered enough from the near-constant turmoil of annual budget crises. Instead of digging deeper with more taxes and spending, lawmakers should put down their spades, and freeze enrollment in Medicaid expansion. Once they have done so, the state can work to build the reformed and modernized Medicaid program Louisiana desperately needs.

This post was originally published in The Advocate.

Republicans’ SCHIP Surrender

In spring 2015, Senate Republican leaders pressured their members to accept a clean, two-year reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) added as part of a larger health spending measure.

The SCHIP reauthorization added to a larger Medicare bill included none of the reforms Republicans had proposed that year, many of which attempted to turn the program’s focus back toward covering low-income families first, as the George W. Bush administration had done. But Republican leaders said that the two-year extension, rather than the four-year extension Democrats supported, would allow conservatives to fight harder for reforms in 2017.

The press has focused on the disputes over paying for the SCHIP program, which have held up final enactment of a long-term reauthorization. (The House passed its version of the bill in November; the Senate, failing to find agreement on pay-fors, has not considered the bill on the floor.) But the focus on pay-fors has ignored Republicans’ abject surrender on the policy behind the program, because the media defines “bipartisanship” as conservatives agreeing to do liberal things. That occurred in abundance on this particular bill.

So Much for Our Promises, Voters

On the underlying policy, all the groups who pledged to fight for conservative reforms vacated the field. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who brags about how he created the program as part of the Balanced Budget Act in 1997, cut a deal with Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-OR) that, as detailed below, includes virtually no conservative reforms to the program—raising questions about whether Hatch was so desperate for a deal to preserve his legacy that he failed to fight for conservative reforms.

House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) did not repudiate the agreement Hatch and Wyden struck, even though that agreement maintained virtually the provisions of the 2009 SCHIP reauthorization that Ryan himself, then the ranking member of the House Budget Committee, called “an entitlement train wreck.”

Republicans have thus suffered the worst of both worlds: getting blamed for inaction on a program’s reauthorization, while already having conceded virtually every element of that program, save for its funding.

Details About the SCHIP Proposals

A detailed examination of the Hatch-Wyden agreement (original version here, and slightly revised version in Sections 301-304 of the House-passed bill here) demonstrates how it extends provisions of the 2009 reauthorization passed by a Democratic Congress and signed by President Obama—which Republicans in large part opposed. Moreover, the Hatch-Wyden agreement and House-passed bill includes none of the reforms the House Energy and Commerce Committee proposed, but were not enacted into law, in 2015.

The only “reform” in the pending reauthorization consists of phasing out an enhanced match for states included in Section 2101(a) of Obamacare—one already scheduled to expire. Even though the enhanced match will end on its own in October 2019, the Hatch-Wyden agreement and the House-passed bill would extend that enhanced match by one year further, albeit at a reduced level, before phasing it out entirely.

Child Enrollment Contingency Fund: Created in Section 103 of the 2009 reauthorization. As I noted then, “Some Members may be concerned that the fund—which does not include provisions making additional payments contingent on enrolling the low-income children­ for which the program was designed—will therefore help to subsidize wealthier children in states which have expanded their programs to higher-income populations, diverting SCHIP funds from the program’s original purpose” (emphasis original). Section 301(c) of the House-passed bill would extend this fund, without any reforms.

Express Lane Eligibility: Created in Section 203 of the 2009 reauthorization, as a way of using eligibility determinations from other agencies and programs to facilitate enrollment in SCHIP. As I noted then, “Some Members may be concerned first that the streamlined verification processes outlined above will facilitate individuals who would not otherwise qualify for Medicaid or SCHIP, due either to their income or citizenship, to obtain federally-paid health benefits.” Section 301(e) of the House-passed bill would extend this option, without any reforms.

Citizenship Verification: Section 211 of the 2009 reauthorization created a new process for verifying citizenship, but not identity, to circumvent strict verification requirements included in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. As I wrote in 2009:

Some Members may echo the concerns of Social Security Commissioner Michael Astrue, who in a September 2007 letter stated that the verification process proposed in the bill would not keep ineligible individuals from receiving federal benefits—since many applicants would instead submit another person’s name and Social Security number to qualify. Some Members may believe the bill, by laying out a policy of ‘enroll and chase,’ will permit ineligible individuals, including illegal aliens, to obtain federally-paid health coverage for at least four months during the course of the verification process. Finally, some Members may be concerned that the bill, by not taking remedial action against states for enrolling illegal aliens—which can be waived entirely at the Secretary’s discretion—until states’ error rate exceeds 3%, effectively allows states to provide benefits to illegal aliens.

Legal Aliens: Section 214 of the 2009 reauthorization allowed states to cover legal aliens in their SCHIP programs without subjecting them to the five-year waiting period required for means-tested benefits under the 1996 welfare reform law.

As I wrote in 2009, “Some Members may be concerned that permitting states to cover legal aliens without imposing waiting periods will override the language of bipartisan welfare reform legislation passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democrat President, conflict with decades-long practices in other federally-sponsored entitlement health programs (i.e., Medicare), and encourage migrants to travel to the United States for the sole or primary purpose of receiving health benefits paid for by federal taxpayers.” The House-passed bill includes no provisions modifying or repealing this option.

Premium Assistance: Section 301 of the 2009 reauthorization created new options regarding premium assistance—allowing states to subsidize employer-sponsored coverage, rather than enrolling individuals in government-run plans. While that reauthorization contained some language designed to make premium assistance programs more flexible for states, it also expressly prohibited states from subsidizing health savings account (HSA) coverage through premium assistance. The House-passed bill includes no provisions modifying or repealing this prohibition on states subsidizing HSA coverage.

Health Opportunity Accounts: Section 613 of the 2009 reauthorization prohibited the Department of Health and Human Services from approving any new demonstration programs regarding Health Opportunity Accounts, a new consumer-oriented option for low-income beneficiaries created in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. The House-passed bill includes no provisions modifying or repealing this prohibition on states offering more consumer-oriented options.

Covering Poor Kids First: The 2015 proposed reauthorization looked to restore SCHIP’s focus on covering low-income children first, by 1) eliminating the enhanced federal match rate for states choosing to cover children in families between 250-300 percent of the federal poverty level ($61,500-$73,800 for a family of four in 2017) and 2) eliminating the federal match entirely for states choosing to cover children in families above 300 percent of poverty. These provisions were consistent with the policy of the George W. Bush administration, which in 2007 issued guidance seeking to ensure that states covered low-income families first before expanding their SCHIP programs further up the income ladder. The House-passed bill includes no such provision.

Maintenance of Effort: Section 2001(b) of Obamacare included a requirement that states could not alter eligibility standards for children enrolled in SCHIP through October 1, 2019, limiting their ability to manage their state programs. Whereas the 2015 proposed reauthorization would have repealed this requirement, effective October 1, 2015, Section 301(f) of the House-passed bill would extend this requirement, through October 1, 2022. (However, under the House-passed bill, states could alter eligibility for children in families with incomes over 300 percent of poverty, beginning in October 2019.)

Crowd-Out: The 2015 proposed reauthorization allowed states to impose a waiting period of up to 12 months for individuals who declined an offer of, or disenrolled from, employer-based coverage—a provision designed to keep families from dropping private insurance to enroll in a government program. The House-passed bill contains no such provision.

Program Name: The 2009 reauthorization sought to remove the “state” element of the “State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” renaming the program as the “Children’s Health Insurance Program.” While the 2015 proposed reauthorization looked to restore the “state” element to “SCHIP,” the House-passed bill includes no such provision.

Cave, Not a Compromise

For all the focus on paying for SCHIP, the underlying policy represents a near-total cave by Republicans, who failed to obtain any meaningful reforms to the program. Granted, Democrats likely would not agree to all the changes detailed above. But the idea that a “bipartisan” bill should include exactly none of them also seems absurd—unless Republicans threw in the towel and failed to fight for any changes.

The press spent much of 2017 focused on Republican efforts to unwind Obamacare. But the SCHIP bill represents just as consequential a story. The cave on SCHIP demonstrates how many Republicans, after spending the last eight years objecting to the Obama agenda, suddenly have little interest in rolling it back.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Contradictory Messages on SCHIP

When the bill reauthorizing the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) comes to the House floor for an expected vote on Friday, it will feature numerous examples of oxymoronic policy messages from the Republican majority. Call them contradictory, call them hypocritical, but regardless, the lack of coherence sends decidedly mixed messages about what exactly Republicans consider good, conservative health policy.

Voting to Reduce Medicare Spending the Day After Voting to Increase It

On Wednesday, the House Rules Committee finally decided the on-again, off-again question of whether to include provisions expanding Medicare means-testing for the affluent in the bill. The rule the committee reported states that, upon the rule’s adoption by the House, the base bill will be replaced by a substitute amendment—as well as a separate amendment adding the means-testing language back into the bill.

Rewarding States that Expanded Medicaid 

Section 305 of the new substitute amendment would postpone by two years reductions in Obamacare’s Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments—scheduled to total $4.7 billion in both fiscal years 2018 and 2019—for two years, until 2020. Theoretically the bill would “pay for” this additional spending (i.e., cancelling spending reductions now) by increasing the size of DSH reductions in future years. However, given that Congress has already postponed Obamacare’s DSH reductions three times in as many years, some may view the move as a “can-kicking” exercise and fiscal gimmick that lawmakers do not believe will ever take effect.

More to the point: In undoing the DSH reductions, the bill makes absolutely no distinction between states that expanded Medicaid under Obamacare and those that did not. In 2009 and 2010, Democrats thought the DSH payment reductions would partially offset the increased revenues hospitals would generate as a result of gaining more insured patients under Obamacare. But by failing to target the DSH reductions only toward states that have not expanded Medicaid to the able-bodied, the Republican House would effectively allow expansion states to “double-dip,” gaining both additional revenue from the Medicaid expansion and from the postponement (or the eventual cancellation) of the DSH reductions.

Passing a Not-That-Conservative Bill with Only GOP Votes

As previously noted, the underlying SCHIP reauthorization—separate and distinct from the controversies about how to pay for the spending—deviates from prior legislative proposals designed to return SCHIP towards its original purpose: Covering low-income kids. In addition to the reward for Medicaid expansion states discussed above, the bill:

  • Extends Obamacare’s maintenance of effort requirements, which constrain states’ flexibility in managing their programs, for three years, through 2022;
  • Extends—albeit only for one-year, and at a lower rate as part of a phase-out approach—Obamacare’s enhanced match rate for SCHIP programs;
  • Omits prior language requiring states to focus their programs’ efforts on covering children from low-income households;
  • Omits prior language permitting states to impose waiting periods in SCHIP programs for people who turn down an offer of, or disenroll from, employer-sponsored health coverage, given that studies suggest as many as three in five children enrolled in programs like SCHIP do so after first dropping their prior health coverage (i.e., “crowd-out”).

Even though the bill does not contain any of these conservative proposals, Democrats claim they will not support the legislation, given their objections to the SCHIP “pay-fors.” The Democratic position raises an obvious question: If Republicans will end up passing a SCHIP reauthorization along party lines, why not ensure that the legislation includes solid conservative policies throughout, instead of just conservative offsets? It’s one of several relevant questions given the decidedly mixed messages coming from House Republicans on health care this week.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

What’s Congress Doing with SCHIP?

Amidst the wrangling over Obamacare, reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) expired on September 30, the end of the federal government’s fiscal year. The two committees of jurisdiction—energy and commerce in the House, and finance in the Senate—each marked up their reauthorization bills last week. But House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Greg Walden (R-OR) said Monday the bill would not come to the House floor this week.

What’s the holdup? Why the delays in bringing to the floor for votes a bill whose authorization has already expired?

A Mixed House Package

The SCHIP reauthorization text varies little between the House and the Senate versions. On that front, conservatives may have qualms with supporting little more than a straight extension of the status quo. The bill extends—albeit for only one year, as part of a more gradual phase-out—enhanced funding to state SCHIP programs. The full 23 percent match increase would end in 2019, as under current law, while states would receive an additional 11.5 percent increase in 2020. Some states have received a 100 percent federal match for their child enrollees due to this Obamacare provision, which is a clear disincentive for states to fight fraud and improper spending.

Moreover, the bill extends Obamacare’s maintenance of effort requirement—limiting states from making changes to their programs—by an additional three years in most cases, from 2019 to 2022. The bill also does not include reforms the House proposed two years ago, which would require states to focus on covering poor children first—the program’s prime emphasis before the 2009 reauthorization signed by President Obama envisioned states expanding their programs to more affluent families.

On the positive side, however, the House did include good reforms to help pay for the new SCHIP spending. It includes several provisions designed to promote program integrity in Medicaid, including one that would effectively ensure that lottery winners, or others who receive large lump-sum payments, do not maintain coverage for this low-income program. The House bill would also increase Medicare means-testing for affluent families, reducing taxpayer subsidies for Part B (outpatient care) and Part D (prescription drug) coverage for individuals making over $160,000, and eliminating the subsidies entirely for individuals making more than $500,000.

In the Senate, a Stalemate

Meanwhile, over in the Senate—which has yet to decide how to pay for the new SCHIP spending—Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) demanded last week that the Republican majority “immediately bring this bill to the Senate floor for a vote and include much-needed bipartisan provisions to stabilize the markets, lower premiums for 2018,” and extend other programs.

Schumer made those demands despite two inconvenient truths: Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee Chairman Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and Ranking Member Patty Murray (D-WA) haven’t yet reached agreement on a bipartisan “stabilization” bill—and most states finalized their 2018 insurance premiums on September 27, weeks ago. In other words, Schumer wants to enact an agreement that doesn’t exist to achieve premium reductions that can’t happen.

A cynic might surmise that, with his talk of “stabilization” measures, Schumer wants to use SCHIP to sneak through tens of billions of dollars in cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers—a provision that might prove unpopular, and controversial, as a stand-alone measure, but could pass through relatively unnoticed as part of a larger, “Christmas tree”-sized bill.

While the policy outcomes seem uncertain, and could range from fair to poor, the political ramifications seem clear. In 2007 and 2008, when President George W. Bush vetoed SCHIP bills due to provisions that would have diverted the program from the low-income children for which it was designed, Democrats organized protests, and ran ads against him. This year, when Democrats are holding up an arguably too-generous SCHIP bill literally because they want to defend the wealthy and insurance companies, Republicans have responded by…negotiating with them.

If one wants reasons behind conservative discontent with Washington, look no further than this bill.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.