What You Need to Know About Medicaid Crowd Out

A PDF version of this document is available on the Pelican Institute’s website

In recent weeks, lawmakers have focused on the tens of thousands of ineligible individuals who improperly received benefits under Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion. But fighting waste, fraud, and abuse in Medicaid should also include reforms to address another important issue—crowd out. The term refers to Louisiana residents who have dropped their existing coverage to enroll in Medicaid expansion—in other words, government programs “crowding out” private insurance. Here’s what you need to know about crowd out and Medicaid expansion:

Tens of Thousands of People Have Dropped Private Coverage to Enroll in Medicaid

Recently, the Pelican Institute filed a public records request to obtain internal Louisiana Department of Health (LDH) data showing that for much of 2016 and 2017, several thousand individuals dropped their existing health coverage to enroll in Medicaid expansion. With enrollment in Medicaid expansion averaging approximately 15,000 individuals per month in 2017, the data indicates a significant percentage of enrollees dropped their prior coverage to join Medicaid expansion.

Funding Benefits for People Who Previously Had Health Insurance Consumes Scarce Medicaid Resources

Crowd out populations pose big potential costs for Louisiana taxpayers. In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office assumed that if Louisiana expanded Medicaid, the state would spend between $900 million and $1.3 billion over five years providing Medicaid coverage to individuals with prior health coverage.

When testifying before the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, LDH staff indicated that, during the fiscal year ending this June 30, the average expansion enrollee cost Medicaid $523.85 per month, or $6,286.20 per year. Multiplying this average cost per enrollee by the number of individuals who dropped private coverage, according to last year’s LSU Health Insurance Survey, yields a potential cost to state and federal taxpayers of $461.6 million this fiscal year:

  • Dropped coverage from a current employer: 40,147; Potential cost to taxpayers: $252.4 million
  • Dropped coverage from a former employer: 23,086; Potential cost to taxpayers: $145.1 million
  • Dropped privately purchased coverage: 10,201; Potential cost to taxpayers: $64.1 million

Because the LSU researchers extrapolated the coverage numbers from survey responses, and because the survey responses varied only slightly from 2015 to 2017, the results for privately purchased coverage, and coverage from a former employer, might have occurred due to random chance, rather than any actual drop in coverage rates. Regardless, the decline in coverage from a former employer DID meet the tests of statistical significance; this crowd out is costing the Medicaid program on the order of $145.1 million per year. Moreover, the potential fiscal impact of the crowd out problem demonstrates the need for more accurate data on the issue.

Crowd Out Metrics

The March 2019 LSU report cites a seminal 1996 work from MIT Professor Jonathan Gruber to define crowd out—the decrease in private insurance divided by the change in public insurance. To put it simply, crowd out should quantify the percentage of Medicaid enrollees who dropped their private coverage to enroll in expansion. Unfortunately, LDH has used different—and inaccurate—metrics to define crowd out on several occasions in attempts to minimize its impact.

For instance, in August 2017, the Department counted 5,659 “Medicaid expansion members who have private insurance whose private insurance policies ended 0-60 days prior to Medicaid expansion enrollment”—4,957 whose coverage ended 0-30 days prior to enrollment in expansion, and another 702 whose coverage ended 31-60 days prior to enrollment. The Department’s internal spreadsheets calculated one crowd out rate of 1.3%, based on a total enrollment in expansion of 442,674.

But this calculation creates an inherently inaccurate result, because it divides the number of new enrollees who dropped coverage by the number of total enrollees in the program. An accurate crowd out rate would compare like with like—dividing the number of new enrollees who dropped private coverage in a given month by the overall number of new enrollees in that month. This metric would accurately determine what percentage of new enrollees are dropping coverage.

Using that rubric, Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion suffers from far higher crowd out rates. According to data provided by LDH in response to the Pelican Institute’s public records request, in August 2017 a total of 13,955 individuals enrolled in expansion—8,783 who had previously enrolled in Medicaid, and 5,172 who had never done so before. Dividing the number of new enrollees who dropped private coverage in the prior 30 days (4,957) by the number of new enrollees overall (13,955) yields a potential crowd out rate of 35.5%—far higher than the 1-2% figure cited in the internal LDH spreadsheets.

At the April 23 House Appropriations Committee hearing, Medicaid director Jen Steele cited data from the LSU Health Insurance Survey to estimate a crowd out rate of 2.4%. But that survey data expressed coverage changes as a percentage of the overall low-income population, not based as a percentage of Medicaid enrollees—making it another inaccurate metric.

Based on LDH’s own internal data, that rate more likely approaches 30-40%.

Need for Better Program Integrity

The debate regarding crowd out comes on the heels of the Medicaid eligibility situation, in which LDH acknowledged that 1,672 individuals with six-figure incomes—including at least one individual reporting a higher income than Gov. John Bel Edwards’ annual salary—enrolled in Medicaid expansion. LDH’s failure to address the crowd out problem, and at the same time, the expansion enrollment of individuals with six-figure incomes suggests the need for fundamental reform to Louisiana’s Medicaid program. Government officials at all levels must serve as smart stewards of scarce taxpayer dollars, and a growing number of signs raise questions about LDH’s fulfillment of this critical role.

Conclusion

Solutions to mitigate crowd out should focus on using scarce government resources wisely, while promoting independence and self-sufficiency amongst beneficiaries. For instance, Indiana recently proposed a waiver that would allow beneficiaries transitioning off of Medicaid to keep a portion of their Medicaid dollars. Those retained dollars could fund co-payments on their new private insurance, whether purchased through an employer or individually. These and similar innovative concepts would encourage beneficiaries to transition off of government assistance and into private coverage.

High Risk Designation Reinforces Problems in Louisiana’s Medicaid Expansion

That the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently designated Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied as “high risk,” following the release of a “deeply troubling” report by the state’s Legislative Auditor late last year, should surprise no one. As the Pelican Institute first reported last year, enrollment in Medicaid expansion has exploded, with state officials only now scrambling to detect waste and fraud in the program.

At the time of Medicaid expansion, officials first stated that enrollment could reach 306,000, only to up its projections later. By the time Pelican released its report last January, enrollment had exceeded 466,000—well above the state’s highest estimates. As of this March, enrollment now stands at 502,647, nearly a 10% increase compared to January 2018.

With enrollment nearly two-thirds higher than original projections, it should not have come as a shock to the state that ineligible individuals had enrolled in Medicaid expansion. As enrollment in expansion grew and grew, seemingly without limit, the state’s Department of Health should have spent more time scrutinizing enrollees, to make sure only eligible individuals receive program benefits.

Yet the auditor’s report last November found that out of 100 randomly selected applicants, fully 93 of them did not qualify for Medicaid benefits at some point during their coverage. Nearly two-thirds (66.3%) of the dollars given to insurers on these individuals’ behalf was improperly paid. Based on this sample, the auditor estimated that the Medicaid program spent up to $85.5 million providing benefits to ineligible individuals.

The applicants selected by the legislative auditor reported incomes to the state well beyond the threshold where they would qualify for Medicaid expansion. One Medicaid enrollee reported an income of $145,146—this for a one-person household. By comparison, Louisiana’s governor, John Bel Edwards, earns only $130,000 per year. So why did an individual making more than the state’s governor spend a full 12 months on a program for “low-income” individuals?

The Department of Health now claims that it has updated its enrollment systems to allow for more frequent eligibility checks, in the hopes of reducing the types of abuses uncovered by the legislative auditor. But if the Department of Health really wants to serve as a good steward of taxpayer dollars, it should go much farther, and propose solutions to the problem of Medicaid expansion crowding out private coverage.

In 2015, the Legislative Fiscal Office estimated that approximately 30-40% of Medicaid expansion enrollees would drop their private coverage to enroll in Medicaid. In other words, taxpayers would spend between $900 million and $1.3 billion over a five-year period providing insurance to individuals who already had coverage prior to expansion.

The dramatic increase in program enrollment, well beyond original projections, indicates that Medicaid expansion is indeed crowding out private coverage. An LSU survey released last year provided further confirmation, suggesting that approximately 75,000 individuals dropped employer-based or private coverage to enroll in Medicaid during the expansion’s first year alone. Yet the Department of Health has failed to acknowledge this problem, let alone propose solutions to fix it.

As the Pelican Institute report last year noted, Medicaid expansion has led to an explosion of government spending, taking the program away from the vulnerable populations for whom it was originally designed. Policy-makers should develop a way to phase out the expansion over time, while applying for a state-based waiver to reform—and transform—the Medicaid program.

This post was originally published at the Pelican Institute.

Do Coverage Expansions Save Lives? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

A few weeks after two studies called into question whether one particular element of Obamacare—its hospital readmissions program—may have increased mortality rates nationwide, another study released by several economists expressed doubt about whether the law’s more than $1 trillion in spending on coverage expansions actually reduced mortality. Moreover, the latest study also raises fundamental questions about whether any coverage expansion will generate measurable reductions in mortality rates.

Coming in a week when Democrats prepare to release the latest version of their single-payer legislation, which estimates suggest could cost at least $30 trillion, the study raises an obvious question: What exactly will Americans receive for all the trillions of dollars in new government spending the left proposes? The study basically shrugs.

Effects of Medicaid Expansion

The analysis showed the problems inherent with attributing changes in mortality rates to expansions in insurance coverage. The study noted that “if one simply compares the…difference in mortality rates for non-expansion versus full-expansion states…it would appear that Medicaid expansion has a large, immediate effect in reducing mortality.” But in reality, mortality rates among those two groups of states had begun to move in opposite directions before the main provisions of Obamacare took effect in 2014. “There is little additional divergence during 2014-2016.”

The researchers’ work highlights the inherent flaws in this field of study. Because mortality is by definition a rare event (particularly for younger populations), and because so many different factors affect mortality, it becomes exceedingly difficult to attribute any change in mortality rates to changes in insurance coverage.

For instance, the opioid crisis, which has led to a decrease in life expectancy, hit just before Obamacare’s coverage expansions took effect, and in many cases affected the same populations. This and other similar factors introduce statistical “noise” that make it difficult to conclude with any certainty that expanded coverage (as opposed to some other factor) impacted mortality rates.

Simulations Expose Flaws

In most cases, the “power analysis” simulations concluded that, to find a statistically significant reduction in mortality rates at least 80 percent of the time, the coverage expansions would have to reduce mortality by more than 100 percent—a statistically impossible result. Because Obamacare reduced the uninsured rate by only a few percentage points, and because most available data sets lack corresponding income and insurance information—to prove, for instance, that X person had Y type of insurance and Z income over a certain number of years—the researchers could not make conclusive assertions about coverage expansions’ effects on mortality.

As it is, the uninsured already receive significant amounts of health care. One 2017 study found they consume nearly 80 percent of the care used by Americans with health insurance. Therefore, to test the effects of coverage expansions on mortality, researchers either need an incredibly large increase in the number of insured individuals—tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, of Americans—or much more precise data about the income and coverage sources of those who gain insurance.

Liberals’ Alarmist Rhetoric

The authors caution that “our analysis should not be interpreted as evidence that health insurance does not affect mortality or health, either overall or for particular diseases or subgroups.” (Emphasis original.) However, the analysis does demonstrate that health insurance likely has a small and difficult to quantify effect on mortality rates. The study therefore proves how liberal claims two years ago that Republican “repeal-and-replace” legislation would kill tens of thousands of individuals annually had little bearing in reality.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Bill Clinton’s Right: Pre-Existing Condition Vote IS “The Craziest Thing in the World”

The new House Democratic majority is bringing to the floor a resolution on Wednesday seeking to intervene in Texas’ Obamacare lawsuit. The House already voted to approve the legal intervention, as part of the rules package approved on the first day of the new Congress Thursday, but Democrats are making the House vote on the subject again, solely as a political stunt.

I have previously discussed what the media won’t tell you about the pre-existing condition provisions—that approval of these Obamacare “protections” drops precipitously when people are asked if they support the provisions even if they would cause premiums to go up. I have also outlined how a Gallup poll released just last month shows how all groups of Americans—including Democrats and senior citizens—care more about rising premiums than about losing their coverage due to a pre-existing condition.

Bill Clinton Got This One Right

The current system works fine if you’re eligible for Medicaid, if you’re a lower income working person, if you’re already on Medicare, or if you get enough subsidies on a modest income that you can afford your health care. But the people that are getting killed in this deal are small business people and individuals who make just a little too much to get any of these subsidies. Why? Because they’re not organized, they don’t have any bargaining power with insurance companies, and they’re getting whacked. So you’ve got this crazy system where all of a sudden 25 million more people have health care, and then the people who are out there busting it, sometimes 60 hours a week, wind up with their premiums doubled and their coverage cut in half. It’s the craziest thing in the world.

Why did people “who are out there busting it, sometimes 60 hours a week, wind up with their premiums doubled and their coverage cut in half”? Because of the pre-existing condition provisions in Obamacare.

Clinton knew of which he spoke. Premiums more than doubled from 2013 to 2017 for Obamacare-compliant individual coverage, only to rise another 30 percent in 2018. A Heritage Foundation paper just last March concluded that the pre-existing condition provisions—which allow anyone to sign up for coverage at the same rate, even after he or she develops a costly medical condition—represented the largest driver of premium increases due to Obamacare.

The Congressional Budget Office concluded that the law would reduce the labor supply by the equivalent of 2.5 million workers. Because so many people cannot afford their Obamacare coverage without a subsidy now that the law has caused premiums to skyrocket, millions of Americans are working fewer hours and earning less income precisely to ensure they maintain access to those subsidies. Obamacare has effectively raised their taxes by taking away their subsidies if they earn additional income, so they have decided not to work as hard.

Why Do Republicans Support This ‘Crazy’ Scheme?

Given this dynamic—skyrocketing premiums, millions dropping coverage, taxes on success—you would think that Republicans would oppose the status quo on pre-existing conditions, and all the damage it has wrought. But no.

Guarantees no American citizen can be charged higher premiums or cost sharing as the result of a previous illness or health status, thus ensuring affordable health coverage for those with pre-existing conditions.

I’ve said it before, but I’ll say it again: As a matter of policy, any proposal that retains the status quo on pre-existing conditions by definition cannot repeal Obamacare. In essence, this Republican proposal amounted to a plan to “replace” Obamacare with the Affordable Care Act.

Even more to the point: What’s a good definition for a plan that charges everyone the exact same amount for health coverage? How about “I’ll take ‘Socialized Medicine’ for $800, Alex”?

There are better, and more effective, ways to handle the problem of pre-existing conditions than Obamacare. I’ve outlined several of them in these pages of late. But if Republicans insist on ratifying Obama’s scheme of socialized medicine, then they are—to use Bill Clinton’s own words—doing “the craziest thing in the world.”

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Exclusive: Inside the Trump Administration’s Debate over Expanding Obamacare

Last August, I responded to a New York Times article indicating that some within the Trump administration wanted to give states additional flexibility to expand Medicaid under Obamacare. Since then, those proposals have advanced, such that staff at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) believe that they have official sign-off from the president to put those proposals into place.

My conversations with half a dozen sources on Capitol Hill and across the administration in recent weeks suggest that the proposal continues to move through the regulatory process. However, my sources also described significant policy pitfalls that could spark a buzz-saw of opposition from both the left and the right.

The Times reported that some within the administration—including CMS Administrator Seema Verma and White House Domestic Policy Council Chairman Andrew Bremberg—have embraced the proposal. But if the plan overcomes what the Times characterized as a “furious” internal debate, it may face an even tougher reception outside the White House.

How It Would Work

After the Supreme Court made Medicaid expansion optional for states as part of its 2012 ruling upholding Obamacare’s individual mandate, the Obama administration issued guidance interpreting that ruling. While the court made expansion optional for states, the Obama administration made it an “all-or-nothing” proposition for them.

Under the 2012 guidance—which remains in effect—if states want to receive the enhanced 90 percent federal match associated with expansion, they must cover the entire expansion population—all able-bodied adults with incomes under 138 percent of the federal poverty level (just under $35,000 for a family of four). If states expand only to some portion of the eligible population, they would only receive their regular Medicaid match of 50-76 percent, not the enhanced 90 percent match.

The Internal Debate

The August Times article indicated that, after considering partial expansion, the administration postponed any decision until after November’s midterm elections. Since that time, multiple sources disclosed to me a further meeting that took place on the topic in the Oval Office late last year. While the meeting was originally intended to provide an update for the president, CMS staff left that meeting thinking they had received the president’s sign-off to implement partial expansion.

Just before Christmas, during a meeting on an unrelated matter, a CMS staffer sounded me out on the proposal. The individual said CMS was looking for ways to help give states additional flexibility, particularly states hamstrung by initiatives forcing them to expand Medicaid. However, based on my other reporting, I believe that the conversation also represented an attempt to determine the level of conservative opposition to the public announcement of a decision CMS believes the president has already made.

Why Liberals Will Object

During my meeting, I asked the CMS staffer about the fiscal impacts of partial expansion. The staffer admitted that, as I had noted in my August article, exchange plans generally have higher costs than Medicaid coverage. Therefore, moving individuals from Medicaid to exchange coverage—and the federal government paying 100 percent of subsidy costs for exchange coverage, as opposed to 90 percent of Medicaid costs—will raise federal costs for every beneficiary who shifts coverage under partial expansion.

The Medicare actuary believes that the higher cost-sharing associated with exchange coverage will lead 30 percent of the target population—that is, individuals with incomes from 100-138 percent of poverty—to drop their exchange plan. Either beneficiaries will not be able to afford the premiums and cost-sharing, or they will not consider the coverage worth the money. And because 30 percent of the target population will drop coverage, the partial expansion change will save money in a given state—despite the fact that exchange coverage costs more than Medicaid on a per-beneficiary basis.

Why Conservatives Will Object

I immediately asked the CMS staffer an obvious follow-up question: Did the actuary consider whether partial expansion, by shifting the costs of expansion from the states to the federal government, would encourage more states to expand Medicaid? The staffer demurred, saying the actuary’s analysis focused on only one hypothetical state.

However, the CMS staffer did not tell me the entire story. Subsequent to my “official” meeting with that staffer, other sources privately confirmed that the actuary does believe that roughly 30 percent of the target population will drop coverage.

But these sources and others added that both the Medicare actuary and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) agree that, notwithstanding the savings from current expansion states—savings associated with individuals dropping exchange coverage, as explained above—the partial expansion proposal will cost the federal government overall, because it will encourage more states to expand Medicaid.

For instance, the Council of Economic Advisers believes that spending on non-expansion states who use partial expansion as a reason to extend Medicaid to the able-bodied will have three times the deficit impact as the savings associated with states shifting from full to partial expansion.

Because the spending on new partial expansion states will overcome any potential savings from states shifting from full to partial expansion, the proposal, if adopted, would appreciably increase the deficit. While neither CBO nor the Medicare actuary have conducted an updated analysis since the election, multiple sources cited an approximate cost to the federal government on the order of $100-120 billion over the next decade.

One source indicated that the Medicare actuary’s analysis early last summer arrived at an overall deficit increase of $111 billion. The results of November’s elections—in which three non-expansion states voted to accept expansion due to ballot initiatives—might have reduced the cost of the administration’s proposal slightly, but likely did not change the estimate of a sizable deficit increase.

A net cost of upwards of $100 billion, notwithstanding potential coverage losses from individuals dropping exchange coverage in current expansion states, can only mean one thing. CBO and the Medicare actuary both believe that, by lowering the cost for states to expand, partial expansion will prompt major non-expansion states—such as Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina—to accept Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion.

Who Will Support This Proposal?

Based on the description of the scoring dynamic my sources described, partial expansion, if it goes forward, seems to have no natural political constituency. Red-state governors will support it, no doubt, for it allows them to offload much of their state costs associated with Medicaid expansion onto the federal government’s debt-laden dime. Once CMS approves one state’s partial expansion, the agency will likely have a line of Republican governors out its door looking to implement waivers of their own.

But it seems unlikely that Democratic-led states will follow suit. Indeed, the news that partial expansion would cause about 30 percent of the target population to drop their new exchange coverage could well prompt recriminations, investigations, and denunciations from Democrats in Congress and elsewhere. Because at least 3.1 million expansion beneficiaries live in states with Republican governors, liberals likely would object to the sizable number of these enrollees who could decide to drop coverage under partial expansion.

Conversely, conservatives will likely object to the high net cost associated with the proposal, notwithstanding the potential coverage losses in states that have already expanded. Some within the administration view Medicaid expansion, when coupled with proposals like work requirements, as a “conservative” policy. Other administration officials view expansion in all states as something approaching a fait accompli, and view partial expansion and similar proposals as a way to make the best of a bad policy outcome.

But Medicaid expansion by its very nature encourages states to discriminate against the most vulnerable in society, because it gives states a higher match for covering able-bodied adults than individuals with disabilities. In addition to objecting to a way partial expansion would increase government spending by approximately $100 billion, some conservatives would also raise fundamental objections to any policy changes that would encourage states to embrace Obamacare—and add even more able-bodied adults to the welfare rolls in the process.

Particularly given the Democratic takeover of the House last week, the multi-pronged opposition to this plan could prove its undoing. Democrats will have multiple venues available—from oversight through letters and subpoenae, to congressional hearings, to use of the Congressional Review Act to overturn any administration decisions outright—to express their opposition to this proposal.

A “strange bedfellows” coalition of liberals and conservatives outraged over the policy, but for entirely different reasons, could nix it outright. While some officials may not realize it at present, the administration may not only make a decision that conservatives will object to on policy grounds, they may end up in a political quagmire in the process.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Poll: People Care MORE About Rising Costs Than Pre-Existing Conditions

Now they tell us! A Gallup poll, conducted last month to coincide with the midterm elections and released on Tuesday, demonstrated what I had posited for much of the summer: Individuals care more about rising health insurance premiums than coverage of pre-existing condition protections.

Of course, liberal think tanks and the media had no interest in promoting this narrative, posing misleading and one-sided polling questions to conclude that individuals liked Obamacare’s pre-existing condition “protections,” without simultaneously asking whether people liked the cost of those provisions.

Overwhelming Concern about Premiums

Ironically, a majority of 57 percent said the denial of coverage for pre-existing conditions did not constitute a major concern for them, with only 42 percent agreeing with the statement. Lest one believe that the relative insouciance over pre-existing conditions came because Democrats won a majority in the House, therefore “protecting” Obamacare, Gallup conducted the survey from November 1–11, meaning more than half the survey period came before the American people knew the election outcome.

By comparison, more than three-fifths (61 percent) of respondents viewed rising premiums as a major concern, with only 37 percent not viewing it as such. Not only did premiums register as a bigger concern by 19 percentage points overall, it registered as a larger concern in each and every demographic group Gallup surveyed:

Income under $30,000: +15 percent (70 percent said premiums were a major concern, 55 percent said pre-existing condition coverage was a major concern)

Income between $30,000-$75,000: +19 percent (63 percent premiums, 44 percent pre-ex)

Income above $75,000: +24 percent (57 percent premiums, 33 percent pre-ex)

On Medicare/Medicaid: +16 percent (60 percent premiums, 44 percent pre-ex)

On private insurance: +24 percent (60 percent premiums, 36 percent pre-ex)

Republicans: +25 percent (52 percent premiums, 27 percent pre-ex)

Independents: +19 percent (64 percent premiums, 45 percent pre-ex)

Democrats: +16 percent (68 percent premiums, 52 percent pre-ex)

Aged 18-29: +16 percent (54 percent premiums, 38 percent pre-ex)

Aged 30-49: +23 percent (65 percent premiums, 42 percent pre-ex)

Aged 50-64: +21 percent (67 percent premiums, 46 percent pre-ex)

Aged over 65: +13 percent (57 percent premiums, 44 percent pre-ex)

Men: +18 percent (56 percent premiums, 38 percent pre-ex)

Women: +20 percent (67 percent premiums, 47 percent pre-ex)

With those double-digit margins (i.e., outside the poll’s margin of error) in every demographic group—including among groups more likely concerned about pre-existing conditions, for reasons either practical (i.e., older Americans) or ideological (i.e., Democrats)—Gallup has overwhelming evidence to support its claim that “concerns are greatest about the possibility of having to pay higher premiums.”

Premiums more than doubled from 2013 to 2017, as the law’s major provisions, including the pre-existing condition requirements, took effect. They again rose sharply in 2018, causing approximately 2.5 million individuals to drop their Obamacare-compliant coverage completely.

Not a Surprise Outcome

The Gallup results confirm prior surveys from the Cato Institute, which also demonstrate that support for Obamacare’s pre-existing condition provisions drops dramatically once people recognize the trade-offs—namely, higher premiums and a “race to the bottom” among insurers, reducing access to specialist providers and lowering the quality of care:

But the polling suggests that Democrats have no such mandate, and that they should think again in their approach. Rather than making an already bad situation worse, and potentially raising premiums yet again, they should examine alternatives that can solve the pre-existing condition problem (and yes, it is a problem) by making it easier for people to buy coverage before they develop a pre-existing condition in the first place.

As the polling indicates, the American people—to say nothing of the 2.5 million priced out of the marketplace in the past 12 months—will thank them for doing so.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The High Costs of Medicaid Expansion in Louisiana

The data indicates that as a result of Medicaid expansion, taxpayers face an ever-growing tab for benefits provided to able-bodied adults — many of whom already had health insurance prior to Obamacare — even as the most vulnerable wait and wait for care. Louisiana can — and should — do better.

This post was originally published in the New Orleans Times-Picayune.

Why Smaller Premium Increases May Hurt Republicans in November

Away from last week’s three-ring circus on Capitol Hill, an important point of news got lost. In a speech on Thursday in Nashville, Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Alex Azar announced that benchmark premiums—that is, the plan premium that determines subsidy amounts for individuals who qualify for income-based premium assistance—in the 39 states using the federal healthcare.gov insurance platform will fall by an average of 2 percent next year.

That echoes outside entities that have reviewed rate filings for 2019. A few weeks ago, consultants at Avalere Health released an updated premium analysis, which projected a modest premium increase of 3.1 percent on average—a fraction of the 15 percent increase Avalere projected back in June. Moreover, consistent with the HHS announcement on Thursday, Avalere estimates that average premiums will actually decline in 12 states.

On the other hand, however, given that Democrats have attempted to make Obamacare’s pre-existing condition provisions a focal point of their campaign, premium increases in the fall would remind voters that those supposed “protections” come with a very real cost.

How Much Did Premiums Rise?

The Heritage Foundation earlier this year concluded that the pre-existing condition provisions collectively accounted for the largest share of premium increases due to Obamacare. But how much have these “protections” raised insurance rates?

Overall premium trend data are readily available, but subject to some interpretation. An HHS analysis published last year found that in 2013—the year before Obamacare’s major provisions took effect—premiums in the 39 states using healthcare.gov averaged $232 per month, based on insurers’ filings. In 2018, the average policy purchased in those same 39 states cost $597.20 per month—an increase of $365 per month, or $4,380 per year.

Moreover, the trends hold for the individual market as a whole—which includes both exchange enrollees, most of whom qualify for subsidies, and off-exchange enrollees, who by definition cannot. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that, from 2013 to 2018, average premiums on the individual market rose from $223 to $490—an increase of $267 per month, or $3,204 per year.

Impact of Pre-Existing Condition Provisions

The HHS data suggest that premiums have risen by $4,380 since Obamacare took effect; the Kaiser data, slightly less, but still a significant amount ($3,204). But how much of those increases come directly from the pre-existing condition provisions, as opposed to general increases in medical inflation, or other Obamacare requirements?

The varying methods used in the actuarial studies make it difficult to compare them in ways that easily lead to a single answer. Moreover, insurance markets vary from state to state, adding to the complexity of analyses.

However, given the available data on both how much premiums rose and why they did, it seems safe to say that the pre-existing condition provisions have raised premiums by several hundreds of dollars—and that, taking into account changes in the risk pool (i.e., disproportionately sicker individuals signing up for coverage), the impact reaches into the thousands of dollars in at least some markets.

Republicans’ Political Dilemma

Those premium increases due to the pre-existing condition provisions are baked into the proverbial premium cake, which presents the Republicans with their political problem. Democrats are focusing on the impending threat—sparked by several states’ anti-Obamacare lawsuit—of Republicans “taking away” the law’s pre-existing condition “protections.” Conservatives can counter, with total justification based on the evidence, that the pre-existing condition provisions have raised premiums substantially, but those premium increases already happened.

If those premium increases that took place in the fall of 2016 and 2017 had instead occurred this fall, Republicans would have two additional political arguments heading into the midterm elections. First, they could have made the proactive argument that another round of premium increases demonstrates the need to elect more Republicans to “repeal-and-replace” Obamacare. Second, they could have more easily rebutted Democratic arguments on pre-existing conditions, pointing out that those “popular” provisions have sparked rapid rate increases, and that another approach might prove more effective.

Instead, because premiums for 2019 will remain flat, or even decline slightly in some states, Republicans face a more nuanced, and arguably less effective, political message. Azar actually claimed that President Trump “has proven better at managing [Obamacare] than the President who wrote the law.”

Conservatives would argue that the federal government cannot (micro)manage insurance markets effectively, and should not even try. Yet Azar tried to make that argument in his speech Thursday, even as he conceded that “the individual market for insurance is still broken.”

‘Popular’ Provisions Are Very Costly

The first round of premium spikes, which hit right before the 2016 election, couldn’t have come at a better time for Republicans. Coupled with Bill Clinton’s comments at that time calling Obamacare the “craziest thing in the world,” it put a renewed focus on the health-care law’s flaws, in a way that arguably helped propel Donald Trump and Republicans to victory.

This year, as paradoxical as it first sounds, flat premiums may represent bad news for Republicans. While liberals do not want to admit it publicly, polling evidence suggests that support for the pre-existing condition provisions plummets when individuals connect those provisions to premium increases.

The lack of a looming premium spike could also neutralize Republican opposition to Obamacare, while failing to provide a way that could more readily neutralize Democrats’ attacks on pre-existing conditions. Maybe the absence of bad news on the premium front may present its own bad political news for Republicans in November.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Is Donald Trump “Sabotaging” Obamacare?

Is Donald Trump “sabotaging” Obamacare? And are he and his administration violating the law to do so?

Democrats intend to make this issue a prime focus of their political messaging ahead of the November elections. And several developments over the month of August — a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, a New York Times op-ed by two legal scholars, and a lawsuit filed by several cities — all include specific points and charges related to that theme.

1. The GAO Report

The most recent data point comes from the GAO, which at the behest of several congressional Democrats analyzed the administration’s outreach efforts during the most recent open enrollment period last fall. Those efforts culminated in a report GAO released Thursday.

The report made a persuasive case that the administration’s decision to reduce and re-prioritize funding for enrollment navigators utilized flawed data and methods. While the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based navigators’ 2018 funding on their effectiveness in enrolling individuals in coverage in prior years, GAO noted that HHS lacked solid data on navigators’ enrollment on which to base 2018 funding, and that enrollment was but one of navigators’ stated goals in prior years. HHS agreed with GAO’s recommendation that it should provide clearer goals and performance metrics for navigators to meet.

GAO also recommended that the administration reinstitute an overall enrollment target, as one way to determine the adequate distribution of resources during open enrollment. However, a cynic might note that Obamacare advocates, including the Democratic lawmakers who requested the report, may want the Trump administration to publicize an enrollment target primarily so they can attack HHS if the department does not achieve its goals.

Even though reporters and liberals like Andy Slavitt cried foul last year when HHS announced planned maintenance time for healthcare.gov in advance, actual downtime for the site dropped precipitously in 2018 compared to 2017. Which could lead one to ask who is sabotaging whom.

2. The New York Times Article

In The New York Times piece, law professors Nicholas Bagley and Abbe Gluck provide an overview of the lawsuit filed against the Trump Administration (about which more below). As someone who has cited Bagley’s work in the past, I find the article unpersuasive, even disappointing.

Take for instance some of the article’s specific allegations:

Here’s one: “To make it harder for people to enroll in Obamacare plans, for example, the administration shortened the open enrollment period on the health care exchanges from three months to six weeks.”

This charge would have evaporated entirely had Bagley specified which Administration first proposed shortening the open enrollment period to six weeks. The Obama Administration did just that.

This rule also establishes dates for the individual market annual open enrollment period for future benefit years. For 2017 and 2018, we will maintain the same open enrollment period we adopted for 2016—that is, November 1 of the year preceding the benefit year through January 31 of the benefit year, and for 2019 and later benefit years, we are establishing an open enrollment period of November 1 through December 15 of the year preceding the benefit year.

The Trump administration merely took the shorter open enrollment period that the Obama team proposed for 2019 and accelerated it by one year. If shortening the enrollment period would make it so much “harder for people to enroll in Obamacare plans,” as Bagley and Gluck claim, then why did the Obama Administration propose this change?

Another allegation: “To sow chaos in the insurance markets, Mr. Trump toyed for nine months with the idea of eliminating a crucial funding stream for Obamacare known as cost-sharing payments. After he cut off those funds, he boasted that Obamacare was ‘being dismantled.’”

This charge seems particularly specious — because Bagley himself has admitted that Obamacare lacks a constitutional appropriation for the cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers. Bagley previously mentioned that he took no small amount of grief from the left for conceding that President Obama had exceeded his constitutional authority. For him to turn around and now claim that Trump violated his constitutional authority by ending unconstitutional payments represents a disingenuous argument.

Here and elsewhere, Bagley might argue that Trump’s rhetoric — talk of Obamacare “being dismantled,” for instance — suggests corrupt intent. I will gladly stipulate that presidential claims Obamacare is “dead” are both inaccurate and unhelpful. But regardless of what the President says, if the President does what Bagley himself thinks necessary to comport with the Constitution, how on earth can Bagley criticize him for violating his oath of office?

A third allegation:

This month, the Trump administration dealt what may be its biggest blow yet to the insurance markets. In a new rule, it announced that insurers will have more latitude to sell ‘short-term’ health plans that are exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s rules. These plans … had previously been limited to three months.

Under Mr. Trump’s new rule, however, such plans can last for 364 days and can be renewed for up to three years. … In effect, these rules are creating a cheap form of ‘junk’ coverage that does not have to meet the higher standards of Obamacare. This sort of splintering of the insurance markets is not allowed under the Affordable Care Act as Congress drafted it.

This claim also fails on multiple levels. First, if Congress wanted to prohibit “short-term” health plans as part of Obamacare, it could have done so. Congress chose first to allow these plans to continue to exist, and second to exempt these plans from all of Obamacare’s regulatory regime. If Bagley and Gluck have an objection to the splintering of insurance markets, then they should take it up with Congress.

Second, the so-called “new rule” Bagley and Gluck refer to only reverts back to a definition of short-term coverage that existed under the Obama Administration. This definition existed for nearly two decades, from when Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) through 2016. The Obama administration published a rule intended to eliminate much of the market for this type of coverage — but it did so only in the fall of that year, more than two years after Obamacare’s major coverage provisions took effect.

As with the shortening of the open enrollment period discussed above, if Bagley and Gluck want to scream “Sabotage!” regarding the Trump administration’s actions, they also must point the finger at Barack Obama for similar actions. That they did not suggests the partisan, and ultimately flawed, nature of their analysis.

3. The Lawsuit

The 128-page complaint filed by the city plaintiffs earlier this month makes some of the same points as the New York Times op-ed. It also continues the same pattern of blaming the Trump administration for actions previously taken by the Obama administration.

The lawsuit criticizes numerous elements of the administration’s April rule setting out the payment parameters for the 2019 Exchange year. For instance, it criticizes the removal of language requiring Exchanges to provide a direct notification to individuals before discontinuing their eligibility for subsidies, if individuals fail to reconcile the subsidies they received in prior years with the amount they qualified for based on their income. (Estimated subsidies, which are based on projected income for a year, can vary significantly from the actual subsidy levels one qualifies for, based on changes in income due to a promotion, change in life status, etc.)

As part of this charge, the lawsuit includes an important nugget: The relevant regulation “was amended in 2016 to specify that an Exchange may not deny [subsidies] under this provision ‘unless direct notification is first sent to the tax filer.’” As with the New York Times op-ed outlined above, those claiming “sabotage” are doing so because the Trump administration decided to revert to a prior regulatory definition used by the Obama administration for the first several years of Obamacare implementation.

The lawsuit similarly complains that the Trump administration is “making it harder to compare insurance plans” by eliminating support for “standardized options” from the Exchange. Here again, the complaint notes that “prior rules supported ‘standardized options,’” while mentioning only in a footnote that the rules implementing the “standardized options” took effect for the 2017 plan year. In other words, the Obama administration did not establish “standardized options” for the 2014, 2015, or 2016 plan years. Were they “sabotaging” Obamacare by failing to do so?

The suit continues with these types of claims, which collectively amount to legalistic whining that the Trump administration has not implemented Obamacare in a manner the (liberal) plaintiffs would support. It even includes this noteworthy assertion:

Maryland has been cleared by state legislators to petition CMS to ‘establish a reinsurance program that would create a pot of money for insurers to cover the most expensive claims,’ but a health economist ‘said he would be shocked if the Trump administration approved such a request, given its efforts to weaken Obamacare’: ‘It just seems very unlikely to me that Trump would approve this. … Maryland is easily saying we want to help prop up Obamacare, which the Trump administration doesn’t want to have anything to do with.’

Fact: The Trump administration just approved Maryland’s insurance waiver this week. So much for that “sabotage.”

A review of its “prayer for relief” — the plaintiffs’ request for actions the court should take — shows the ridiculously sweeping nature of the lawsuit’s claims. Among other things, the plaintiffs want the court to order the defendants to “comply with their constitutional obligation to take care to faithfully execute the ACA,” including by doing the following:

  • “Expand, rather than suppress, the number of individuals and families obtaining health insurance through ACA exchanges;
  • “Reduce, rather than increase, premiums for health insurance in the ACA exchanges;
  • “Promote, rather than diminish, the availability of comprehensive, reasonably-priced health insurance for individuals and families with preexisting conditions;
  • “Encourage, rather than discourage, individuals and families to obtain health insurance that provides the coverage that Congress, in the ACA, determined is necessary to protect American families against the physical and economic devastation that results from lesser insurance, with limits on coverage that leaves them unable to cover the costs of an accident or unexpected illness…
  • “Order Defendants to fully fund advertising under the ACA;
  • “Enjoin Defendants from producing and disseminating advertisements that aim to undermine the ACA;
  • “Order Defendants to fully fund Navigators under the ACA;
  • “Enjoin Defendants from incentivizing Navigators to advertise non-ACA compliant plans;
  • “Order Defendants to lengthen the open enrollment period;
  • “Order Defendants to resume participation in enrollment events and other outreach activities under the ACA…
  • “Order Defendants to process states’ waiver applications under the ACA so as to faithfully implement the Act.”

In other words, the lawsuit asks a court to micro-manage every possible element of implementation of a 2,700-page law — tell HHS what it must say, what it must do, how much it must spend, and on and on. It would create de facto entitlements, by stating that HHS could never reduce funding for advertising and outreach, or lower spending on navigators, or reject states’ waiver applications — potentially even if those applications violate the law itself. And it asks for impossible actions — because HHS cannot unilaterally “expand, rather than suppress” the number of people with coverage, just as it cannot unilaterally “reduce, rather than increase, premiums.”

Despite its questionable claims, and the highly questionable remedies it seeks, the lawsuit may yet accomplish some of its goals. The complaint spends much of its time alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that HHS did not “meaningfully” or “adequately” consider comments from individuals who objected to the regulatory changes in question. While I have not examined the relevant regulatory dockets in any level of detail, the (pardon the pun) trumped-up nature of elements of the complaint makes me skeptical of such assertions. That said, the administration has suffered several setbacks in court over complaints regarding the regulatory process, so the lawsuit may force HHS to ensure it has its proverbial “i”s dotted and “t”s crossed before proceeding with further changes.

Words Versus Actions

On many levels, the “sabotage” allegations try to use the president’s own words (and tweets) against him. Other lawsuits have done likewise, with varying degrees of success. As I noted above, the president’s rhetoric often does not reflect the actual reality that Obamacare remains much more entrenched than conservatives like myself would like.

But for all their complaints about the administration’s “sabotage,” liberals have no one to blame but themselves for the current situation. Obamacare gave a tremendous amount of authority to the federal bureaucracy to implement its myriad edicts. They should not be surprised when someone who disagrees with them uses that vast power to accomplish what they view as malign ends. Perhaps next time they should think again before proceeding down a road that gives government such significant authority. They won’t, but they should.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Will the Trump Administration Help Republicans Expand Obamacare?

For all the allegations by the Left about how the Trump administration is “sabotaging” Obamacare, a recent New York Times article revealed nothing of the sort. Instead it indicated how many senior officials within the administration want to entrench Obamacare, helping states to expand the reach of one of its costly entitlements.

Thankfully, a furious internal battle took the idea off the table—for now. But instead of trying to find ways to increase the reach of Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion, which prioritizes able-bodied adults over individuals with disabilities, the Trump administration should instead pursue policies that slow the push towards expansion, by making the tough fiscal choices surrounding expansion plain for states to see.

What ‘Partial Expansion’ Means

Following the court’s decision, the Obama administration determined expansion an “all-or-nothing” proposition. If states wanted to receive the enhanced match rate for the expansion—which started at 100 percent in 2014, and is slowly falling to 90 percent for 2020 and future years—they must expand to all individuals below the 138 percent of poverty threshold.

However, some states wish to expand Medicaid only for adults with incomes below the poverty level. Whereas individuals with incomes above 100 percent of poverty qualify for premium and cost-sharing subsidies for plans on Obamacare’s exchanges, individuals with incomes below the poverty level do not. (In states that have not expanded Medicaid, individuals with incomes below poverty may fall into the so-called “coverage gap,” because they do not have enough income to qualify for subsidized exchange coverage.)

States that wish to cover only individuals with incomes below the poverty line may do so—however, under the Obama administration guidance, those states would receive only their regular federal match rate of between 50 and 74 percent, depending on a state’s income. (Wisconsin chose this option for its Medicaid program.)

How ‘Partial Expansion’ Actually Costs More Money

The Times article says several administration supporters of “partial expansion”—including Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Alex Azar, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Administrator (CMS) Seema Verma, and Domestic Policy Council Director Andrew Bremberg—believe that embracing the change would help to head off full-blown expansion efforts in states like Utah. An internal HHS memo obtained by the Times claims that “HHS believes allowing partial expansion would result in significant savings over the 10-year budget window compared to full Medicaid expansion by all.”

In reality, however, “partial expansion” would explode the budget, for at least three reasons. First, it will encourage states that have not embraced expansion to do so, by lowering the fiscal barrier to expansion. While states “only” have to fund up to 10 percent of the costs of Medicaid expansion, they pay not a dime for any individuals enrolled in exchange coverage. By shifting individuals with incomes of between 100-138 percent of poverty from Medicaid to the exchanges, “partial expansion” significantly reduces the population of individuals for whom states would have to share costs. This change could encourage even ruby red states like Texas to consider Medicaid expansion.

Second, for the same reason, such a move will encourage states that have already expanded Medicaid to switch to “partial expansion”—so they can fob some of their state costs onto federal taxpayers. The Times notes that Arkansas and Massachusetts already have such waiver applications pending with CMS. Once the administration approves a single one of these waivers, virtually every state (or at minimum, every red state with a Medicaid expansion) will run to CMS’s doorstep asking for the federal government to take these costs off their hands.

Medicaid expansion has already proved unsustainable, with exploding enrollment and costs. “Partial expansion” would make that fiscal burden even worse, through a triple whammy of more states expanding, existing states offloading costs to the federal government through “partial expansion,” and the conversion of millions of enrollees from less expensive Medicaid coverage to more costly exchange plans.

What Washington Should Do Instead

Rather than embracing the fiscally irresponsible “partial expansion,” the Trump administration and Congress should instead halt another budget gimmick that states have used to fund Medicaid expansion: The provider tax scam. As of last fall, eight states had used this gimmick to fund some or all of the state portion of expansion costs. Other states have taken heed: Virginia used a provider tax to fund its Medicaid expansion earlier this year, and Gov. Paul LePage (R-ME)—who heretofore has steadfastly opposed expansion—recently floated the idea of a provider tax to fund expansion in Maine.

The provider tax functions as a scam by laundering money to generate more federal revenue. Providers—whether hospitals, nursing homes, Medicaid managed-care plans, or others—agree to an “assessment” that goes into the state’s general fund. The state uses those dollars to draw down new Medicaid matching funds from the federal government, which the state promptly sends right back to the providers.

For this reason, politicians of all parties have called on Congress to halt the provider tax gimmick. Even former vice president Joe Biden called provider taxes a “scam,” and pressed for their abolition. The final report of the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles commission called for “restricting and eventually eliminating” the “Medicaid tax gimmick.”

If Republicans in Congress really want to oppose Obamacare—the law they ran on repealing for four straight election cycles—they should start by imposing a moratorium on any new Medicaid provider taxes, whether to fund expansion or anything else. Such a move would force states to consider whether they can afford to fund their share of expansion costs—by diverting dollars from schools or transportation, for instance—rather than using a budget gimmick to avoid those tough choices. It would also save money, by stopping states from bilking the federal government out of billions in extra Medicaid funds through what amounts to a money-laundering scam.

Rhetoric vs. Reality, Take 5,000

But of course, whether Republicans actually want to dismantle Obamacare remains a very open question. Rather than opposing “partial expansion” on fiscal grounds, the Times quotes unnamed elected officials’ response:

Republican governors were generally supportive [of “partial expansion”], but they said the change must not be seen as an expansion of the Affordable Care Act and should not be announced before the midterm elections. Congressional Republican leaders, while supportive of the option, also cautioned against any high-profile public announcement before the midterm elections.

In other words, these officials want to expand and entrench Obamacare, but don’t want to be seen as expanding and entrenching Obamacare. What courage!

Just as with congressional Republicans’ desperate moves to bail out Obamacare’s exchanges earlier this year, the Times article demonstrates how a party that repeatedly ran on repealing Obamacare, once granted with the full levers of power in Washington, instead looks to reinforce it. Small wonder that the unnamed politicians in the Times article worry about conservative voters exacting a justifiable vengeance in November.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.