Physician-Owned Hospitals

Background:  The past few years have seen the significant growth of so-called specialty hospitals.  These facilities, which generally concentrate on one medical practice area (often cardiac or orthopedic care), are often able to provide higher-quality care than general hospitals due to their focused mission.  Critics of specialty hospitals claim that, by “cherry-picking” the best—and therefore most lucrative—candidates for surgical procedures, they siphon off revenues from general and community hospitals, threatening their future viability.

The ownership arrangements of many specialty hospitals have also been questioned.  While federal law against physician self-referral prohibits doctors from holding an ownership stake in a particular department of a hospital facility, the “whole hospital” exemption permits physicians to hold an ownership stake in an entire facility.  Because many specialty hospitals are physician-owned in whole or in part, some critics believe that physicians owning a stake in a specialty hospital may be inclined to perform additional tests and procedures on patients due to a stronger profit motive.

Legislative History:  Congressional action on specialty hospitals over the past several years has focused on the “whole hospital” exemption and the issue of physician self-referral.  In December 2003, Section 507 of the Medicare Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173) placed an 18-month moratorium on physician self-referrals to any new specialty hospital and ordered reports to Congress regarding the issue.  Upon expiration of the moratorium in June 2005, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a further suspension in the processing of Medicare enrollment applications for specialty hospitals, pending a CMS review.

In February 2006, Section 5006 of the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 109-171) extended the CMS suspension of applications for new specialty hospitals until CMS submitted a report to Congress.  The report, issued in August 2006, summarized the earlier reports on specialty hospitals and outlined a strategic plan for examining the issues raised.  Although the report included no legislative recommendations, CMS did subsequently issue regulations in August 2007 requiring all hospitals, not just specialty hospitals, to notify patients of their physician ownership arrangements beginning in Fiscal Year 2008.

In July 2007, Section 651 of H.R. 3162, the Children’s Health and Medicare Protection (CHAMP) Act, proposed several modifications to the “whole hospital” exemption for physician self-referral.  Most notably, the bill applied the exemption only to those facilities with Medicare provider agreements in place prior to July 2007—excluding new specialty hospitals or other facilities, including those currently under construction, from protection under the self-referral statute—and prohibited existing facilities from expanding their number of operating rooms or beds.  While the bill passed the House by a 225-204 vote, the Senate has yet to take up the measure.

Quality of Care:  Many public and private studies that have examined the specialty hospital issue have compared the quality of care and patient outcomes for both specialty and general hospitals.  Most studies have found that specialty hospitals perform no worse than general hospitals with respect to patient outcomes, and many studies have found measurable performance improvements.  The independent quality review firm HealthGrades found that specialty hospitals constitute a disproportionate share of the highest-quality facilities among the top tier of facilities it surveyed.[1]

The focus on improved quality control comes at a time when the impact of medical errors and hospital-acquired infections has risen to greater prominence.  The landmark 1999 Institute of Medicine study To Err Is Human estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die annually in hospitals due to preventable medical errors, creating a total economic cost of as much as $29 billion.[2]  A November 2006 report utilizing data from a new infection-reporting regime in Pennsylvania found 19,154 cases of hospital-acquired infections in 2005 alone, representing an infection incident rate of more than 1 in 100 hospitalizations, and average costs for patients who developed infections nearly six times higher than those who did not ($185,260 vs. $31,389).[3]

For this reason, many specialty hospitals include their physician-owners in all aspects of the planning, design, and implementation of the facility and its treatment delivery systems, so as to minimize the possibility of preventable errors and the spread of infection.  Additionally, regular performance of surgical procedures in specialized settings permits physicians and medical staff to develop expertise and innovative techniques that improve the quality of care delivered.  For instance, physicians in one cardiac specialty hospital developed new procedures to recognize and treat irregular heartbeats following surgery; the new protocol reduced incidence of this dangerous symptom by two-thirds.[4]

Although some critics of specialty hospitals cite concerns about “cherry-picking”—whereby physician-owned facilities attract comparatively healthy patients, leaving general hospitals to treat the sickest cases—reports such as the HealthGrades study have quantified the better care provided by many specialty hospitals on a risk-adjusted basis that controls for patients’ varied health status.  Some specialty hospitals have been found to have patients sicker than average when compared to Medicare claims data are used to compare patients in specialty hospitals and general hospitals.[5]  Moreover, to the extent that specialty hospitals may wish to pick the “easiest” cases, such changes can be resolved by reforms currently being implemented by CMS to reform Medicare’s diagnosis-related group (DRG) classification system and adjust reimbursements to more closely reflect health status upon admission.

Financial Arrangements:  Much of the criticism surrounding specialty hospitals has focused on the potential conflict-of-interest associated with physician ownership, and specifically whether an ownership stake motivates physicians to increase the number and scope of tests and procedures performed, increasing patient costs.  In scoring the additional restrictions proposed by Section 651 of the CHAMP Act, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) asserted that Medicare spends more for outpatient services for patients treated in specialty hospitals than for treatments provided in other facilities.  Based on this assumption and related changes in reimbursements, CBO estimated that the CHAMP Act’s proposed restrictions on specialty hospitals would generate $3.5 billion in savings to the federal government over a ten-year period by diverting patient care to general and community hospitals.

However, the CBO score did not take into account any potential savings due to differential rates of medical errors and acquired infections when comparing costs in specialty and general hospitals.  One study noted that the nearly 9,000 infections acquired by Medicare and Medicaid recipients hospitals during 2004 cost taxpayers nearly $1.4 billion in added costs in Pennsylvania alone—and the study also noted that hospital-acquired infections, and thus the costs associated with them, were likely to be underreported during the report’s time frame.[6]  Given the existing studies documenting better patient outcomes and lower infection rates in physician-owned facilities, reduced costs to the federal government from an expansion of specialty hospitals could well exceed the $3.5 billion in purported savings CBO attributes to lower utilization rates by general hospitals.

In addition, some critics of the ownership arrangements of specialty hospitals have failed to acknowledge the implications of the vast growth of hospital-owned physician networks in the past two decades.  While a 2005 CMS report to Congress noted that “we did not see clear, consistent patterns of preference for referring to specialty hospitals among physician owners relative to their peers,” it also added that “physicians in general are constrained in where they refer patients by several factors.”[7]  Physicians working for networks affiliated with a particular community hospital may be contractually obligated to refer their patients to that hospital.  When viewed from this prism, the significant growth—from 24% in 1983 to 39% in 2001—of physicians directly employed by hospitals or other medical centers is likely to have had a greater impact on physician referral patterns than the growth of approximately 200 specialty hospitals when compared to 60,000 hospitals nationwide.[8]

Conclusion:  The benefits of increased specialization have been examined and analyzed by economists for more than two centuries.  In his seminal work The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith highlighted the benefits of a division of labor to focus on discrete tasks as providing the greatest possible improvement in productivity, and thus economic growth, for all individuals.  In health care, specialization can increase productivity gains, which are the key to controlling the rise of health care costs without relying on heavy-handed rationing of care.  The growth of specialty hospitals—which focus on performing discrete groups of surgical procedures well, improving quality and thus reducing costs—is consonant with the theories which Smith and his adherents used to expound open markets and free trade worldwide.

Amidst spiraling costs and uneven quality, the health sector warrants more competition, not less: new entrants to introduce innovative techniques and practices improving the quality of care; greater transparency of both price and quality information, so patients can make rational choices about the nature of their treatment options; and a funding system that reduces where possible the distortionary effects of third-party payment and empowers consumers to take control of their health.  Viewed from this perspective, opposition to undue and onerous restrictions on the specialty hospitals that have driven innovation within health care may strike many conservatives as a return to first principles.

 

[1] Cited in David Whelan, “Bad Medicine,” Fortune 10 March 2008, available online at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0310/086_print.html (accessed March 1, 2008).

[2] Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, summary available online at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/4/117/ToErr-8pager.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008).

[3] Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Hospital Acquired Infections in Pennsylvania, available online at http://www.phc4.org/reports/hai/05/docs/hai2005report.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008).

[4] Regina Herzlinger and Peter Stavros, “MedCath Corporation (A),” Harvard Business School Case No. 303-041, rev. August 2006, p. 10.

[5] Regina Herzlinger and Peter Stavros, “MedCath Corporation (C),” Harvard Business School Case No. 305-097, rev. May 2006, p. 1.

[6] Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Reducing Hospital-Acquired Infections: The Business Case (Issue Brief No. 8, November 2005), available online at http://www.phc4.org/reports/researchbriefs/111705/docs/researchbrief2005report_hospacqinfections_bizcase.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008).

[7] Department of Health and Human Services, “Study of Physician Owned Specialty Hospitals Required in Section 507(c)(2) of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003,” available online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNProducts/Downloads/RTC-StudyofPhysOwnedSpecHosp.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008).

[8] Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends and Indicators in the Health Care Marketplace, Section Five, available online at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec5.cfm (accessed March 3, 2008) ; Whelan, “Bad Medicine.”

President’s Medicare “Trigger” Proposals

Background:  Title VIII of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) includes provisions requiring the President to submit legislation within 15 calendar days of his annual budget submission in the event of a funding warning being issued by the Medicare trustees.  Because the trustees last April submitted their second consecutive warning that Medicare is projected to claim a growing share of general revenues within the next seven years, the President put forward his proposals to address the pending funding shortfall.  Under provisions established in statute, the legislative proposals will be introduced by the House Majority and Minority Leaders on the President’s behalf within three legislative days.

During the conference committee’s consideration of MMA, the funding warning mechanism was included at the behest of the Republican Study Committee as one device to help alleviate conservatives’ concerns about Medicare’s long-term solvency and ensure that Medicare’s claims on general budgetary revenues would not overwhelm either other federal budgetary priorities or the national debt.  By providing “fast-track” procedures for considering bills to improve the program’s solvency, the Medicare trigger also provides conservatives with another opportunity to examine more fundamental reforms to the way seniors’ health care is financed and delivered.

Summary of Proposal:  The Administration’s legislative proposal to address the “trigger” contains two titles.  The first title puts forward suggestions to make the Medicare purchasing system more cost-effective from a budgetary standpoint.  The second incorporates liability reforms that will reduce Medicare expenditures, as well as additional means-testing proposals that will increase Medicare revenues by raising premiums on wealthy seniors.  A preliminary summary of the legislation follows:

Value-based Purchasing:  This concept, also known as “pay-for-performance,” would vastly expand the federal government’s role in health care by adjusting physician and provider reimbursement levels to reflect successful patient outcomes on a risk-adjusted basis.  The proposed legislative package would provide for greater transparency of price and quality measures, and would further authorize the Secretary to take steps to adjust reimbursement levels in order to purchase care from those providers which provide the greatest value to beneficiaries and the Medicare program.  The legislation also requires the Secretary to make high-deductible health plans available in the Medicare program, and provide a transition for individuals not yet enrolled in Medicare who own Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).

While policy-makers of all political stripes believe in providing consumers with additional price and quality transparency information, the further step of tying Medicare reimbursement levels crafted by federal bureaucrats to either process or outcome measures could prove much more problematic.  Although its advocates believe pay-for-performance can achieve significant budgetary savings, existing Congressional Budget Office (CBO) models have failed to realize any measurable impact on future Medicare expenditures.  Additionally, some conservatives may be concerned that this methodology would deepen the government’s role in health care by altering the fundamental doctor-patient relationship, leading to a more intrusive federal bureaucracy dictating the terms of patient care.

Medical Liability Reform: This proposal would help bring down health spending both within and outside Medicare by helping to eliminate frivolous lawsuits and providing reasonable levels of compensation to victims of medical malpractice.  Provisions of the bill include a three-year statute of limitations, a cap on non-economic damages of $250,000, and reasonable limits on attorney contingency fees charged to successful claimants.

In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office scored a similar liability reform bill passed by the House (H.R. 5) as lowering Medicare spending by $11.2 billion over a ten-year period.  While CBO staff have indicated that state liability reforms in the intervening time have reduced the savings level below the baseline for federal liability reform, savings from passage of the President’s proposal would likely still generate several billion dollars in savings to Medicare.

Means Testing:  The legislation proposes to establish an income-related Part D premium consistent with the Part B “means testing” included in Title VIII of the Medicare Modernization Act.  The proposal—which was included in the Fiscal Year 2009 budget—would achieve savings of $3.2 billion over five years.  The RSC has previously included similar proposals in its budget documents as one way to constrain costs and ensure consistency between a Part B benefit that is currently means-tested and a Part D benefit that is not.

Other Reform Options:  The legislative package advanced by the Administration comes on the heels of a Fiscal Year 2009 budget that proposed $178 billion in Medicare savings over the next five years, largely through adjustments to provider reimbursements.  In addition to the various proposals put forward by the Administration and described above, the opportunity afforded by the trigger could be used to advance other comprehensive proposals to reform Medicare, which could include:

Premium Support:  This model would convert Medicare into a system similar to the Federal Employees Benefit Health Plan (FEHBP), in which beneficiaries would receive a defined contribution from Medicare to purchase a health plan of their choosing.  Previously incorporated into alternative RSC budget proposals, a premium support plan would provide a level playing field between traditional Medicare and private insurance plans, providing comprehensive reform, while confining the growth of Medicare spending to the annual statutory raise in the defined contribution limit, thus ensuring long-term fiscal stability.

Restructure Cost-Sharing Requirements:  This concept would restructure the existing system of deductibles, co-payments, and shared costs, which currently can vary based on the type of service provided.  Additionally, Medicare currently lacks a catastrophic cap on beneficiary cost-sharing, leading some seniors to purchase Medigap policies that insulate beneficiaries from deductibles and co-payments and therefore provide little incentive to contain health spending.  Reforms in this area would rationalize the current system, generating budgetary savings and reducing the growth of health spending.

Increase Medicare Part B Premium:  The RSC has previously proposed increasing the Part B premium from 25% to 50% of total Medicare Part B costs, consistent with the original goal of the program.  This concept would not impact low-income seniors, as Medicaid pays Medicare premiums for individuals with incomes under 120% of the federal poverty level.

Bipartisan Commission:  This proposal would provide an expedited mechanism requiring Congress to hold an up-or-down vote on the recommendations of a bipartisan commission examining ways to reform Medicare and other federal entitlements.

Sequestration Mechanism: This proposal would cap the growth of overall Medicare spending levels, and provide adjustments in benefit structures in the event that spending exceeded statutory levels.  The budget submission to Congress did include the proposal that physician payments be reduced 0.4% for every year in which general tax revenues cover more than 45% of Medicare costs—the level at which the Medicare Modernization Act required that a funding warning be issued, and action taken by Congress.  The Administration proposal is designed to provide Congress with an impetus to embrace comprehensive entitlement reform by requiring across-the-board cuts absent pre-emptive legislative action.

Conclusion: The Medicare funding warning issued by the trustees last year provides an opportunity to re-assess the program’s structure and finance.  While competition among drug companies has ensured that expenditures for the MMA’s prescription drug benefit remain below the bill’s original estimates, introduction of pharmaceutical coverage has dramatically increased the overall growth of health care costs within the Medicare program, leading to the trustees’ funding warning.  The confluence of these two events should prompt Congress to consider the ways in which competition could be used to reduce the growth of overall Medicare costs, similar to the way in which the market for pharmaceutical coverage reduced the estimated cost of the Part D prescription drug benefit.

The Administration has put forward two separate proposals—the first in its budget submission to Congress last week, the second as part of its formal “trigger” submission this week—to address Medicare’s long-term solvency issues and begin a process of comprehensive reform.  Many conservatives are likely to view the President’s proposals as a positive first step in the discussions about ways to curb soaring entitlements, while considering additional proposals described above to advance the discussion further and to ensure Medicare’s long-term fiscal stability.

Legislative Bulletin: H.R. 3963, Children’s Health Insurnace Program Reauthorization Act

Order of Business:  Today the House will consider the President’s second veto of SCHIP legislation, H.R. 3963.  This bill passed the House by a vote of 265-142 on October 25, 2007, and was vetoed by President Bush on December 12, 2007.  On December 12, 2007, the House by a 211-180 vote postponed consideration of the President’s veto until today.

An earlier version of SCHIP legislation, H.R. 976, was vetoed by President Bush on October 3, 2007.  This bill was originally passed in the House by a vote of 265-159 on September 25, 2007.  On October 18, 2007, the House sustained the President’s veto of H.R. 976 by a vote of 273–156 (needing 2/3 to override a veto).

On December 19, 2007, the House passed by a 411—3 margin S. 2499, which was signed into law by President Bush on December 29, 2007.  This legislation reauthorized the SCHIP program through March 2009, and included $800 million in additional funding to ensure that all states would have sufficient funds to cover existing populations through the 18 months of the authorization.

Summary:  H.R. 3963 reauthorizes and significantly expands the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), while increasing cigarette taxes to supposedly offset the bill’s costs.  The legislation follows closely the recently-vetoed version of SCHIP reauthorization.  Highlights of the revised legislation are as follows:

Cost:  H.R. 3963 provides $35.4 billion over five years and $71.5 billion over ten years in new mandatory spending—this spending is on top of the $25 billion over five years that would result from a straight extension of the program.

The new spending is partially offset by increasing taxes on tobacco products (see below).  However, this CBO score overlooks a major gimmick which the bill employs to lower its costs.  The bill dramatically lowers the SCHIP funding in the fifth year by 84%, from $13.75 billion in the first six months to $1.15 billion.  In all likelihood, such a reduction would not actually take effect, which would make this a gimmick to generate unrealistic savings in order to comply with PAYGO rules.  To that end, H.R. 976 is technically compliant with PAYGO.

Block Grant:  Under current law, a federal block grant is awarded to states, and from the total annual appropriation, every state is allotted a portion for the year according to a statutory formula.  The bill extends the SCHIP block grants from FY 2008-12.  In addition, the bill also creates a new Child Enrollment Contingency Fund capped at 20% of the total annual appropriation, for states that exhaust their allotment by expanding coverage, and Performance Bonus Payments comprised of a $3 million lump sum in FY 2008 plus unspent SCHIP funds in future years.

Expansion to Higher Incomes:  Under current law, states can cover families earning up to 200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) or $41,300 for a family of four in 2007 or those at 50% above Medicaid eligibility.  However, states have been able to “disregard” income with regard to eligibility for the program, meaning they can purposefully ignore various types of income in an effort to expand eligibility.  For instance, New Jersey covers up to 350% of FPL by disregarding any income from 200-350%, allowing them to cover beyond 200% with the enhanced federal matching funds that SCHIP provides.

H.R. 3963 increases the eligibility limit to 300% of FPL or $61,950 for a family of four but also continues the current authority for states to define and disregard income.  States which extend coverage beyond 300% of FPL would receive the lower Medicaid match rate.  The bill limits states from expanding their programs above 300% of FPL through an income disregard whereby they block “income that is not determined by type or expense or type of income.”  However, a state could get around this restriction in a host of ways by disregarding specific types of income, such as income paid for rent or transportation or food.  Practically speaking, H.R. 3963 still places no limit on SCHIP eligibility since states can still manipulate the definition of income to expand coverage, and CMS is limited in its ability to reject such determinations. [New Jersey would be grandfathered from this limitation until 2010, but they would then have to ensure that they are in the top ten of states with the highest coverage rate for low-income children.]

Furthermore, Section 116 overturns CMS’ current policy of requiring states to ensure that 95% of the eligible children in their state below 250% of FPL are enrolled before expanding coverage to higher incomes.  As a result, some conservatives may be concerned that this does not adequately ensure that SCHIP funding targets truly low-income children.

Unlike past legislation, the bill would not grandfather New York’s proposed plan (seeking to cover 400% of FPL or $82,600 for a family of four).  However, New York could merely use specific income disregards to effectively cover up to 400% of FPL.  Some conservatives may be concerned that a family with an income of $82,600 will still potentially be eligible for SCHIP funding after this bill is enacted.

Childless Adults:  The earlier bill phased adults off of the program within two years.  H.R. 3963 would remove childless adults from the program (all would be off by 2009), while allowing parents of eligible SCHIP kids to continue receiving healthcare under SCHIP.  According to CBO estimates, there will still be approximately 700,000 (roughly 10% of total SCHIP enrollees) adults (parents of eligible kids and pregnant women) enrolled in SCHIP by 2012.

H.R. 3963 states that no new waivers for non-pregnant childless adults will be granted to states, and any currently existing waivers will be extended through FY 2008 (terminating such waivers at the end of FY 2008).  H.R. 3963 states that any current state waiver for non-pregnant childless adults which expires before January 1, 2009 may be extended until December 31, 2008 to retain all currently covered non-pregnant childless adults on the program until the end of FY 2008.  The bill extends enhanced FMAP to apply to such waivers through December 31, 2008.

H.R. 3963 grants states the opportunity to apply for a Medicaid waiver for non-pregnant childless adults by September 30, 2008, for those whose SCHIP coverage will end December 31, 2008, and requires that the Secretary approve such waivers within 90 days or the application is automatically deemed approved.

Parents:  The bill provides a two year transition period and automatic extension at the state’s discretion through FY 2009 for the currently covered parents of SCHIP eligible/covered kids, and states that no new waivers be granted or renewed to states to cover the parents of SCHIP kids if such waivers do not currently exist.  Similar to what would be done with non-pregnant childless adults, H.R. 3963 states that any current state waiver for parents of SCHIP kids which expires before October 1, 2009 may be extended until September 30, 2009 to retain all currently covered parents on the program until the end of FY 2009.  The bill states that the enhanced FMAP shall apply to these expenditures under an existing waiver for parents of eligible SCHIP kids during FY 2008 and 2009.

H.R. 3963 requires that any state which provides coverage under a currently existing waiver for a parent of an SCHIP child may continue to provide such coverage through FY 2010, 2011, or 2012, but such coverage must be paid for by a block grant funded from the state allotment.  If the state makes the decision to continue the coverage of parents through 2012, the Secretary may set aside for the state for each fiscal year an amount equivalent to the federal share of 110% of the state’s projected expenditures under currently existing waivers.  The Secretary will then pay out such funds quarterly to the state.  States that enhanced FMAP only applies in fiscal year 2010 for states with “significant child outreach or that achieve child coverage benchmarks.”

In addition, H.R. 3963 retains the statement from H.R. 976 that states there shall be no increase in income eligibility level for covered parents (i.e. no expenditures for providing child health assistance or health benefits coverage to a parent of a “targeted low-income child” whose family income exceeds the income eligibility level applied under the applicable existing waiver).

Private Insurance Crowd-Out:  According to CBO, under H.R. 3963, 2 million children will still shift from receiving private health insurance to government health insurance.  This means that they may get worse health care service and become increasingly dependent on the federal government.  In addition, as H.R. 3963 begins to reduce SCHIP funding in 2012 (if such a reduction is actually intended, see above), some have noted that states may shift these children made newly eligible for a government program into Medicaid.  This phenomenon takes place despite a provision in H.R. 3963 to offer a premium assistance subsidy under SCHIP for employer-sponsored coverage.  A qualifying employer-sponsored plan would have to contribute at least 40 percent of the cost of any premium toward coverage.  The bill includes new language requiring the Secretary, in consultation with the states, to measure crowd-out and to develop best practices designed to limit it.  States would then be required to limit SCHIP crowd-out and incorporate those best practices.  However, many conservatives are likely to be concerned that this language is not enough of protection when CBO maintains that two million will lose their health insurance under this bill.

Legal Immigrants and Citizenship Certification:  H.R. 3963 states that “nothing in this Act allows Federal payment for individuals who are not legal residents.”  However, the bill weakens existing law by removing the documentation requests under the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), specifically the burden that citizens and nationals provide documentation proving their citizenship in order to be covered under Medicaid and SCHIP.  Instead, the bill would require that a name and Social Security number be provided as documentation of legal status to acquire coverage and that those names and Social Security numbers be submitted to the Secretary to be checked for validity.  If a state is notified that a name and Social Security number do not match, the state must contact the individual and request that within 90 days the individual present satisfactory documentation to prove legal status.  During this time, coverage for the individual continues.  If the individual does not provide documentation within 90 days, he is “disenrolled” from the program but maintains coverage for another 30 days (after the 90 days given to come up with proper documentation), giving the individual up to four months of coverage on a false identity.

It is unclear what substantive changes were made to the vetoed bill beyond the cosmetic, with regard to citizenship certification.  Some conservatives may be concerned that a Social Security number and name are not enough for a proof of citizenship and that more documents should be required to determine eligibility.  For instance, according to a recent letter from Social Security Administration Commissioner Michael Astrue, a Social Security number would not keep someone from fraudulently receiving coverage under Medicaid or SCHIP (if they claimed they were someone they were not).  Thus, this bill may allow illegal aliens the opportunity to enroll falsely in Medicaid or SCHIP and retain coverage for an undetermined amount of time before they are disenrolled for lack of proper identification.

Tax Increase:  H.R. 3963 increases the cigarette tax by 61 cents to $1 per pack, and the cigar tax up to $3 per cigar, supposedly generating $35.5 billion over five years and $71.1 billion over ten years.  It is important to note that this is a substantial tax increase on low-income individuals in order to pay for an expansion of SCHIP to higher income levels, which it was not initially designed for.  In addition, this revenue source is constantly declining as fewer and fewer individuals smoke, and since placing a tax on cigarettes will likely deter sales, some have questioned the efficacy of the offset.  According to a study by the Heritage Foundation, “To produce the revenues that Congress needs to fund SCHIP expansion through such a tax would require 22.4 million new smokers by 2017.”  The bill also changes the timing for some corporate estimate tax payments.

Encourages Spending:  H.R. 3963 shortens from three to two years the amount of time a state has to spend its annual SCHIP allotment.  Under current law, states are given three years to spend each year’s original allotment, and at the end of the three-year period, any unused funds are redistributed to states that have exhausted their allotment or created a “shortfall,” i.e. making commitments beyond the funding it has available.  In addition, the bill establishes a process through which any unspent funds would be redistributed to any states with a shortfall.  Some conservatives may be concerned that this process provides incentives both for states to spend their allotment quickly and to extend their programs beyond their regular allotments into shortfall, so as to be relieved by the unspent funds of other states or the new Contingency Fund.

Other Provisions:

  • Disregarding of Pension Contributions as Income.  The bill disregards “extraordinary employer pensions” as income.  According to CMS, only one state would fall into this category—Michigan, due to the auto manufacturers.  Some conservatives may view this as an authorizing earmark.
  •  Name Change.  H.R. 3963 renames the program the “Children’s Health Insurance Program.”
     
  • Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Allotment for TN and HI.  The bill sets the DSH allotments for Tennessee at $30 million a year beginning in FY 2008, and sets the DSH allotment increases for Hawaii, beginning in FY 2009 and thereafter, as the allotments for low DSH states.  Some conservatives may view these provisions as authorizing earmarks.
  • Premium Assistance and Health Savings Accounts.  The bill streamlines procedures for states to provide premium assistance subsidies for children eligible to enroll in employer-sponsored coverage, rather than placing such children in a state-sponsored SCHIP program.  However, all high-deductible health insurance plans and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) would be ineligible for premium assistance, even if employers and/or states chose to make cash contributions to the HSA up to the full amount of the plan’s high deductible.  Some conservatives may be concerned that these restrictions would undermine the recent growth of HSAs and consumer-driven health care plans.

Does the Bill Expand the Size and Scope of the Federal Government?:  Yes, the bill would expand the SCHIP program by $35 billion over five years and loosen the program’s eligibility requirements.

Does the Bill Contain Any New State-Government, Local-Government, or Private-Sector Mandates?:  A detailed CBO cost estimate with such information is not available.