Medicaid’s Blue State Bailout

In discussing future coronavirus legislation, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has taken a skeptical view towards additional subsidies to states, including a potential “blue state bailout.” But current law already includes just such a mechanism, giving wealthy states an overly generous federal Medicaid match that results in bloated program spending by New York and other blue states.

Section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act establishes Federal Medical Assistance Percentages, the matching rate each state receives from the federal government under Medicaid. The statutory formula compares each state’s per capita income to the national average, calculated over a rolling three-year period. Poorer states receive a higher federal match, while richer states receive a lower match.

However, federal law sets a minimum Medicaid match of 50 percent, and a maximum match of 83 percent. No poor states come close to hitting the 83 percent maximum rate, but a total of 14 wealthy states would have a federal match below 50 percent absent the statutory minimum. (In March, Congress temporarily raised the federal match rate for all states by 6.2 percentage points for the duration of the coronavirus emergency.)

Absent the statutory floor, Connecticut would receive a match rate of 11.69 percent in the current fiscal year, according to Federal Funds Information Service, a state-centered think-tank. At that lower federal match, Connecticut would receive approximately one federal dollar for every eight the state spends on Medicaid, rather than the one-for-one ratio under current law.

Federal taxpayers pay greatly because the overly generous match rate for wealthy states leads to additional Medicaid spending. In fiscal year 2018, Connecticut spent far more on its traditional Medicaid program ($6.5 billion in combined state and federal funds) than similarly sized states like Oklahoma ($4.9 billion) and Utah ($2.5 billion). Those totals exclude the dollars Connecticut received from Obamacare, which guarantees all states a 90 percent Medicaid match for covering able-bodied adults.

The budget crisis in New York that preceded the pandemic stems in large part from Washington’s overly generous match for wealthy states. Absent the statutory floor, the state would receive a Medicaid match of 34.49 percent this fiscal year, meaning it would have to spend approximately two dollars to receive an additional federal dollar.

But the one-to-one Medicaid match guaranteed under federal law led New York to expand its program well beyond most states’. At more than $77 billion in 2018, New York Medicaid cost taxpayers more than three times the $23.4 billion spent by the larger state of Florida. And a federal audit last summer concluded that New York Medicaid spent $1.8 billion on more than 600,000 ineligible enrollees in just a six-month period. Little wonder that Gov. Andrew Cuomo in January called the state’s fiscal situation “unsustainable” after the state announced a $6 billion budget deficit, most of which came from Medicaid.

To his credit, Cuomo proposed changes to crack down on Medicaid fraud and enact other program reforms. He also criticized Congress when it passed legislation to block New York and other states from changing their Medicaid programs during the pandemic. But he has not acknowledged the underlying flaws in federal law that, by encouraging profligate blue state spending, created the problem in the first place.

Of the 14 wealthy states that benefit from the guaranteed 50 percent minimum Medicaid match, Hillary Clinton won 11. If the dramatic drop in oil and commodity prices in recent weeks persists, the three traditionally red states—Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming—that benefit from the statutory floor may no longer do so, should those states’ income decline. In the number of states affected and overall spending levels, the 50 percent minimum Medicaid match encourages overspending by blue states at the expense of federal taxpayers in red states.

In December 2018, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that removing the guaranteed 50 percent Medicaid match would save $394 billion over ten years. If McConnell and his colleagues want to tackle rising federal debt while stopping blue state bailouts, they should amend the Medicaid statute accordingly.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Bigger Problem with SCOTUS’ Obamacare Bailout Ruling

I’ll start with the bad news: The Supreme Court granted insurers nearly $12 billion in Obamacare bailout funds. And now the worse news: It allowed the executive to stick Congress with the bill for unconstitutional actions lawmakers never authorized.

The ruling, issued on Monday after the Court heard oral arguments in December, made the case sound simple: Obamacare created an obligation on the federal government to pay insurers’ risk corridor claims. Congress refused to appropriate the money. Therefore insurers can go to court and obtain the $12 billion in question from the Judgment Fund, which has a permanent, unlimited appropriation to pay legal claims against the government.

But the reality doesn’t match the ruling’s cut-and-dried approach. Unilateral actions by the executive paved the way for risk corridors’ massive losses, a fact neither insurers nor liberal Obamacare supporters like to admit.

The Bailout’s Origins

In many ways, the Supreme Court case has its roots in guidance released by the Obama administration in November 2013. At that point, millions of people had received plan cancellation notices, but couldn’t buy health insurance plans while healthcare.gov remained in meltdown. President Obama faced withering and justified criticism for his “Lie of the Year”—the promise that “If you like your plan, you can keep it.”

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) tried to stanch the political bleeding. Instead of sending cancellation notices, states and insurers could allow individuals to retain plans purchased after Obamacare’s March 2010 enactment, but before the major insurance regulations went into effect on January 1, 2014.

Coming at a very late date, HHS’s unilateral action threatened to create more chaos for insurers. The carriers had priced their policies assuming millions of individuals with pre-Obamacare policies would lose their existing plans and sign up for exchange coverage. Instead, these largely healthy individuals would remain outside of Obamacare, as millions of sicker individuals flooded onto exchanges to obtain the richer Obamacare coverage.

How did HHS propose to offset insurers’ potential losses from this late change to their enrollee profile? The same November 2013 guidance allowing pre-Obamacare policies to remain in place proposed risk corridors as the solution:

Though this transitional policy was not anticipated by health insurance issuers when setting rates for 2014, the risk corridor program should help ameliorate unanticipated changes in premium revenue. We intend to explore ways to modify the risk corridor program final rules to provide additional assistance.

In theory, risk corridors required plans with outsized profits on Obamacare policies to subsidize insurers with outsized losses. But because many insurers kept their pre-Obamacare policies in place, many more insurers suffered losses than gains. The program suffered approximately $12 billion in losses during its three years (2014-16), losses which prompted insurers’ suit, to recover the billions they consider themselves owed.

Unconstitutional Actions

But as law professor Nicholas Bagley (an Obamacare supporter) and others have pointed out, HHS’s November 2013 guidance came with a big catch: It violated the president’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” In essence, the Obama administration had stated that it would not enforce the law—the new insurance regulations coming into effect, which had led insurers to send the cancellation notices in the first place—because it found doing so politically inconvenient. (Sadly, the Trump administration has continued the unconstitutional behavior, by similarly allowing the plans to remain in effect.)

Those unconstitutional actions imposed major financial losses on insurers, an assertion that comes not just from the HHS guidance quoted above, but from the insurers themselves. An amicus brief submitted in the Supreme Court case by Americans for Prosperity noted that the insurer plaintiffs themselves admitted the administration’s unilateral actions represented the root cause of much of their financial losses:

As one Petitioner notes, this ‘unexpected policy change had marked and predictable effects.’ It lowered enrollment and since ‘the announcement came after premiums had been set[,]’ Petitioners were stuck with the prices they set, forced to ‘[b]ear greater risk than they accounted for[.]’ Petitioners argue that HHS recognized ‘that its unexpected policy shift could subject insurers on the exchanges to unanticipated higher average claims costs … [b]ut,’ the agency allayed their fears by providing reassurance that the risk corridors program would cover any losses. The Petitioners go through a lengthy history of HHS’s actions, pinning much of the blame on HHS’s ‘rosy scenario’ of how things would work out. [Internal citations omitted.]

Sticking Taxpayers with the Tab

Insurers could have responded in a different manner to the HHS guidance. They could have cancelled all their pre-Obamacare policies anyway, or they could have challenged the guidance in court. Some took the former action, because some states forced carriers to cancel all pre-Obamacare plans—but none took the latter course. In the main, insurers decided to take their chances, roll the dice, and not take a confrontational tack with the Obama administration, largely hoping they would receive the risk corridor bailout HHS alluded to in its guidance.

But Congress can, and should, have a say in the matter. A policy enacted unilaterally, and unconstitutionally, by HHS resulted in a financial impact (in the form of risk corridors) to the tune of billions of dollars.

Yes, Congress could have passed more stringent language blocking any appropriation for a risk corridor bailout. But following that logic to its conclusion would have effectively turned the Constitution on its head: The executive can make a unilateral, and unconstitutional, change, and both Congress and taxpayers have to pay the bill for it—unless and until Congress passes legislation by a veto-proof majority to undo the financial consequences of an action the executive never had authority to take in the first place.

A Costly ‘Bait-and-Switch’

Insurers decried the risk corridor funding shortfall as a “bait-and-switch” by Congress: Lawmakers authorized the payments as part of Obamacare, but never ponied up an appropriation for an obligation Congress created.

Risk corridors did suffer from a “bait-and-switch,” but it came from the Obama administration, not Congress. HHS changed the rules of the game, causing insurers major losses on their Obamacare plans—and sticking taxpayers with much of that tab via risk corridors.

But neither the majority opinion in the Supreme Court ruling, nor Justice Alito’s dissent, addressed the Obama administration’s “bait-and-switch.” As a result, the court created a bad precedent that empowers the executive, further diminishes the role of Congress, and places taxpayers at risk for more unilateral bailouts in the future.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Shameful Spectacle of Friday’s Coronavirus “Vote”

Ten years ago, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) infamously proclaimed that we had to pass Obamacare to find out what was in it. On Friday, she and her House colleagues enacted one of the largest pieces of legislation in American history, a more than $2 trillion bill that represented Congress’ third piece of coronavirus-related legislation, all while refusing to take a recorded position on it.

The first coronavirus bill, signed into law on March 6, provided $8.3 billion in spending to fight the virus; the second bill, signed into law on March 18, spent another $100 billion on testing, food stamps, paid family leave, and additional subsidies to to state Medicaid programs; and the third bill, which President Trump signed last Friday, contained a broader package of unemployment and economic bailouts to businesses and families.

That Pelosi would resort to such procedural chicanery should surprise few Americans. In 2010 she wanted the House to enact Obamacare without actually voting on the legislation—the so-called “deem-and-pass” maneuver—although she eventually abandoned that strategy after a massive public outcry.

But unlike the Obamacare debate, House Republican leaders and many rank-and-file members of Congress actively participated in Pelosi’s successful attempt to deny the American people a vote on the legislation. In so doing, they abdicated their responsibilities as lawmakers and leaders out of a mixture of fear and spite.

Members of Congress Are Essential

The fear came because House lawmakers did not want to travel back to Washington to vote on the “stimulus.” The combination of several representatives and senators testing positive for coronavirus (with several others in self-isolation due to potential exposure), public advisories against large gatherings and travel, the close quarters in which members congregate in the Capitol, and the advanced age of some members made them understandably nervous about a return to Washington.

But members of Congress do not have any ordinary job. Their roles as our elected lawmakers make them essential to our democracy—and Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution recognizes them as such: “They shall in all cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”

While the Supreme Court has since narrowed the scope of members’ privilege from arrest, its inclusion in the nation’s founding document shows how the Framers considered full participation by all members essential to American self-rule.

Pelosi’s Incompetence Prompted the Debacle

Much of the member frustration regarding the process came not just from the fact that they had to travel to Washington, but were asked to do so on short notice—a particular difficulty given airlines’ dramatic reductions to their flight schedules. Some members could not arrive back in Washington by the time of Friday’s debate and “vote.”

But why did members have to rush back late Thursday for proceedings in the House on Friday morning? Because Pelosi mismanaged the process and then sought to blame others for her mistakes.

For starters, House members remained in their districts for most of last week only because Pelosi had sent them there. Early on March 14, House leaders dismissed members to their districts, in an attempt (ultimately successful) to force the Senate to accept the second coronavirus bill without amendments. Had the Senate made any changes to the legislation, the House would have had to return into session to ratify the Senate amendments, holding up passage. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell told his colleagues to “gag and vote for it anyway.”

Ironically enough, Pelosi not three days before dismissing her colleagues claimed, “We are the captains of the ship—we are the last to leave.” Had Pelosi kept the House in session as the Senate passed the second coronavirus bill and debated the third, members would not have needed to travel back to Washington in the first place—they would have remained here.

The speaker claimed she would give members 24 hours’ notice prior to any votes, should they become necessary. But she waited until late Thursday to tell members they would have to attend proceedings in the House beginning at 9:00 Friday morning.

Following Senate passage of the third coronavirus bill early Thursday morning, Pelosi and House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) should have instructed all members to report to Washington the following day. Instead, they wasted most of Thursday playing a game of “chicken” with the rank-and-file—daring someone to demand all members attend, and then blaming that member, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), when he insisted the House assemble a quorum of 216 members to conduct business.

A very similar scenario happened in Congress’ upper chamber two years ago. McConnell (R-Ky.) tried to ram through a spending bill at the last minute, but miscalculated when Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) raised objections. Rather than blaming McConnell for mis-managing the Senate floor, leadership staffers—and the reporters who rely on leadership staffers to spoon-feed them gossip and stories—decided to blame Paul instead.

Rep. Thomas Massie Did Not Grandstand

House leaders took the same tack with Massie last week, enlisting President Trump to attack the congressman. On Friday morning, Trump called Massie a “third rate grandstander” for insisting that members of Congress return to Washington to vote on the legislation.

But to someone well-versed in House procedure, the facts indicate otherwise. Massie had multiple other opportunities to throw sand in the proverbial gears regarding Friday’s coronavirus bill, but did not do so:

  • The House passed the rule governing debate on the bill by unanimous consent. Massie (or any member) could have objected to the House even considering the rule on Friday morning. Such an objection would have required the House Rules Committee to hold an emergency meeting, and could have postponed consideration of the bill by 24 hours. He raised no objections.
  • Massie could have demanded a vote on the rule. Demanding that vote would have required House leaders to muster a quorum of 216 members at 9:00 on Friday—a time many members were still rushing back to Washington. Massie raised no objections.
  • Massie could have demanded one or more votes on a motion to adjourn—a frequent stalling tactic the minority party in the House uses to express outrage when it feels the majority has committed a “process foul.” He never did.

If Massie truly wanted to act like a “glass-bowl,” to paraphrase a tweet by former Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.), he could have done so. He could have wound the House in knots for much of Friday with procedural objections, parliamentary inquiries, motions to adjourn, and other dilatory tactics.

To his credit, he didn’t do any of that. Massie cared about one thing: That members of Congress have an up-or-down vote—“yay” or “nay”—on the massive, multi-trillion-dollar bill. House leaders conspired against that reasonable request.

‘Mean Girls’ Try Their Tricks in Washington

Massie, or any member of Congress, can object that the House lacks a quorum to conduct business. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution prescribes that a majority of members (216 at present, given several vacancies) constitutes a quorum. Given Massie’s publicly stated intent to object, the House could not pass the coronavirus bill without a majority of members present in the chamber. Hence the frantic messages from congressional leaders Thursday night seeking member attendance the next morning.

But no one member can demand a roll call vote, in which each takes a recorded “yay” or “nay” position. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution also states that “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”

When debate on the bill concluded Friday afternoon, Massie suggested the absence of a quorum. The presiding officer counted, and concluded that a majority of members, many sitting in the House gallery above the chamber to observe social distancing protocols, were present. But when Massie requested a roll call vote, one-fifth of members (somewhere between 43 and 85, depending on the number of congressman present in the House chamber) would not agree, meaning the $2 trillion-plus bill passed on a voice vote, with lawmakers’ positions not recorded.

Under the most charitable interpretation, members didn’t want to force a vote when at least dozens of their colleagues could not participate, either because they remained in quarantine or couldn’t get back to Washington in time. But consider Clause 10 of Rule XX of the rules of the House for the current Congress:

The yeas and nays shall be considered as ordered when the Speaker puts the question on passage of a bill or joint resolution, or on adoption of a conference report, making general appropriations, or on final adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget or conference report thereon. [Emphasis added.]

In just about every other circumstance, House rules require a roll-call vote on an appropriations bill like the one the House passed on Friday. This requirement did not apply to Friday’s coronavirus legislation only because the House considered it as a message from the Senate, rather than as an original bill or the report of a House-Senate conference committee.

As noted above, members had to come into town anyway, to ensure the House had a quorum to conduct business. Usual practice, as indicated by the excerpt from the House’s own rules, suggests members would record their votes publicly.

They did not even need to congregate in mass groups to vote electronically on the House floor. The clerks could have engaged in an actual roll call vote, which would have allowed members sitting in the House gallery to respond verbally from their places. Rather than following this usual practice—to say nothing of giving their own voters the respect of making their positions known on a $2 trillion bill —the House instead decided to take a passive-aggressive approach, turning Friday’s session into another real-life episode of “Mean Girls.”

To put it bluntly, members did not approve a roll-call vote to spite Massie, because Massie had the temerity to force them to come to Washington and do the job they are paid to do. Pelosi, McCarthy, and their leadership teams likely instructed rank-and-file members not to “reward bad behavior” (as one senator described the McConnell-Paul incident two years ago) and to deny Massie a recorded vote.

The members, either due to their own irritation at Massie, or fear of the consequences from leadership, politely complied. In so doing, they abdicated their responsibilities as lawmakers, prioritizing revenge and anger at Massie over conducting an open, transparent, and fully recorded vote.

Do Your Job, Congress!

Early in my career, a boss of mine offered some matter-of-fact advice that members of Congress should think about: “If you don’t like the job, don’t take the check.”

As Massie noted, grocery store clerks and many others such as nurse’s aides and orderlies in hospitals get paid far less than members of Congress’ $174,000 salary. They continue to show up on the frontlines of this pandemic day-in, day-out, performing heroically in grueling conditions. But when members of the House get asked to do their duties in public for one day, they lash out like preschoolers at the individual forcing them into service.

Massie’s solitary stand against his colleagues may cost him re-election. He faces a primary challenge in June (possibly fomented by House Republican leaders), and his opponent will no doubt use Trump’s Twitter tirade against him.

But Massie acted as he did out of the belief that our elected representatives should not add more than $2 trillion to the national debt without accepting public responsibility for their actions. Of course, to many of his congressional colleagues, Massie’s actions represent a novel—and truly revolutionary—concept: Standing up for principle.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Nancy Pelosi’s Obamacare Bailout Also Funds Abortion Coverage

In the words of her former House colleague Rahm Emanuel, Nancy Pelosi never wants to let a crisis go to waste. The House speaker not only wants to use the coronavirus pandemic to entrench Obamacare, she wants to make taxpayers fund abortion in the process.

A recent summary of the legislation Pelosi plans to introduce as an alternative to Senate Republicans’ “stimulus” bill laid out the strategy. House Democrats want to force insurers to reopen enrollment in the Obamacare Exchanges, and cover their losses via a taxpayer-funded bailout.

Leftist Wish List

The available summary of the bill—the summary!—totals 62 pages, and nearly 25,000 words. It contains a veritable menagerie of liberal big-government programs and boondoggles. For instance, it creates a “cash for clunkers” program for the government to buy old airplanes. (I’m not making this up—check out page 53 of the summary.)

Page 13 of the summary also notes that the bill would spend $400,000 so Congress’ Office of the Attending Physician can buy “N95 masks, surgical masks, gloves, swabs, test[s]…and personal protective equipment.” Somehow, the fact that Pelosi ensured Congress appropriated funds to protect itself failed to surprise this jaded observer.

New Open Enrollment Period

Division G of the 1,404-page legislation includes a variety of health-care provisions, only some of which directly relate to the coronavirus pandemic. For instance, Section 70301 (which begins on page 337) would create a “one-time special enrollment period for the [Obamacare Exchanges], allowing Americans who are uninsured to” purchase coverage.

This proposal raises an obvious problem: Moral hazard. If individuals know they can forego coverage during the usual open enrollment period and obtain coverage later, healthy individuals will do just that: only buy insurance when they need it.

Some may argue that those who lose their jobs due to coronavirus—either a temporary furlough, or a permanent layoff, during the resulting downturn—need a way to buy coverage after losing their insurance. But individuals who lose employer coverage already have a way to purchase a new plan: They automatically qualify for a special enrollment period, during which they can replace their former employer plan with exchange coverage.

Bailout Funds

News reports suggest that insurers support reopening the exchanges for a special enrollment period. However, the insurance industry also wants federal dollars to offset their potential losses from such a move.

Insurers obviously did not account for the costs of coronavirus treatments last spring and summer, when they set their 2020 premiums; no one knew of the disease at that point. The unexpected costs associated with treating the disease will likely eat into insurers’ margins for 2020.

But allowing people to buy “insurance” in the middle of a pandemic will raise insurers’ costs even further. Consider that life insurers are already imposing waiting periods for at least some applicants during the pandemic. One actuary believes life insurers will shut down applications entirely, due to the overwhelming risks they face.

By contrast, health carriers will allow anyone to apply for “insurance” during the pandemic, “if the government cover[s] anticipated losses.” Hence Section 70308 of Pelosi’s “stimulus” bill (beginning on page 404) provides for a two-year program of risk corridors.

Pelosi’s bill would recreate an Obamacare program in place from 2014 through 2016 that would have exposed taxpayers to billions of dollars in losses, but for language inserted at the insistence of Republican members of Congress. Just a few months ago, insurers took a case over risk corridors to the Supreme Court, asking for the justices to give them the bailout funds that Congress declined to pay.

Taxpayer Funding of Abortion Coverage

But as I noted nearly three years ago, when Republicans wanted to pass a “stability” bill bailing out Obamacare insurers, providing new federal dollars to insurers by definition represents taxpayer funding of abortion coverage. Only codifying the Hyde amendment’s pro-life protections for the risk corridor program would ensure that the bailout dollars will not flow to plans that cover abortion.

Separate provisions included in Section 104 of Division T of the bill (beginning on page 1089) would also substantially increase the generosity of Obamacare subsidies. The provisions would reduce the percentage of income that individuals would have to pay towards their premiums, with the federal government picking up a greater share of the tab. The same section would also eliminate the current income cap that prevents households with incomes of over 400% of the federal poverty level ($104,800 for a family of four in 2020) from receiving subsidies.

Joe Biden also included these changes to the Obamacare subsidy regime in his own health plan, released last summer, illustrating Pelosi’s attempt to exploit the coronavirus pandemic to enact Democrats’ pre-existing agenda. As with the risk corridors funding, if the legislation does not include strong pro-life protections, it means that billions of federal taxpayer dollars will flow to plans that cover abortion.

Of course, Pelosi did not include these Hyde Amendment protections in the summary of her bill, and likely would not allow a measure containing the protections to come to the House floor. Instead, the legislation represents a giveaway to both health insurers and the abortion industry.

Ironically, Senate Democrats objected to Republicans’ “stimulus” bill because they claimed it included a “slush fund” designed to bail out corporations. Perhaps they should have a conversation with Pelosi, because the Obamacare “slush fund” included in her bill would do the exact same thing.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

This post was updated subsequent to publication with additional details regarding the introduced bill.

The Other Epidemic Plaguing Washington: Bailouts and Moral Hazard

While lawmakers face tough decisions about the economic impact of coronavirus, they should keep in mind that they face battles on two fronts. They want to promote a healthy economy (or as close to one as is feasible) during the coronavirus downturn, but they also don’t want to exacerbate moral hazard.

Moral hazard reared its ugly head during the 2008-09 recession, particularly in the form of the infamous (and unpopular) TARP program. The concept holds that policy actions supporting people who engaged in “bad” behavior—for instance, bailing out the Wall Street firms that caused the financial crisis—will only encourage such behavior in the future. Multiple examples in recent days, featuring both corporations and individuals, suggest the concept remains alive and well in Washington.

Corporations and Buybacks

On the corporate side, individuals as varied as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and billionaire investor Mark Cuban have highlighted prior actions by airlines, who now seek a government bailout totaling $50 billion. Both noted that the airline industry as a whole spent 96 percent of its free cash flow over the past decade buying back shares—an act that might juice company stock prices, while leaving little cash on hand should a major calamity like a pandemic emerge.

Some have argued that because the Internal Revenue Code currently taxes corporations’ accumulated earnings, airlines have a strong disincentive to build up larger “rainy day funds,” notwithstanding the historically volatile nature of their industry. But the optics of this potential bailout reek of moral hazard, by privatizing gains (i.e., stock buybacks) and socializing losses.

Student Debt

The issue of moral hazard has not remained confined only to corporations. For instance, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has demanded that Congress include “broad student loan forgiveness,” along the lines of her presidential campaign proposal, as part of any “stimulus” legislation.

That student loan bailout proposal, originally released in May 2019, “cancels $50,000 in student loan debt for every person with household income under $100,000,” and “provides substantial debt cancellation for every person with household income between $100,000 and $250,000.”

That type of proposal has all sorts of flaws to it. Most notably, by rewarding individuals who picked costlier, private institutions (e.g., Harvard University), it punishes those who chose a less expensive school (e.g., a public institution or community college) to save money. It likewise punishes those who chose their degree based upon earning potential (e.g., an MBA) compared to those who decided to study what they love, even if it would not help their future earning prospects (e.g., art history).

Of course, such a massive (and expensive) bailout would have little to do with the immediate task at hand, in the form of the virus’ economic impacts. A household with income last year of $80,000, but where the income-earners telework, would receive far more debt forgiveness than the owner of a restaurant who earned far more last year but whose small business now lies in ruin because of the virus.

One can cite the present circumstances to make a case for some student loan assistance. Forbearance, a waiver of interest, and suspension of collections—all make sense, particularly for families suffering financial turmoil. But outright loan forgiveness? That would only exacerbate the rising cost of college education, as future students would spend away, thinking Washington will erase their debts in a similar fashion.

Don’t Pick Winners and Losers

Various publications have noted that the “stimulus” activity represents a bonanza for K Street. Lobbyists continue to make their pitch for bailing out various industries, and using coronavirus as a justification to enact agenda items that existed well before the epidemic.

But Congress should avoid the temptation to enact bailouts targeted at particular industries. Such activity only picks winners and losers, further entrenching Washington in the nation’s economy. Moreover, some of the industries seeking assistance have a less-than-critical role in the nation’s economy.

Cruise lines—most of whom base their ships in other countries anyway—how do they represent a vital national interest? Casinos—does anyone really think Americans won’t want to gamble again once the coronavirus restrictions get lifted?

Lawmakers always feel the need to “do something,” seemingly irrespective of what that “something” is. The current pandemic only exacerbates that dilemma. But Congress should proceed very cautiously, because the “cure” for the coronavirus economy could in the long run end up worse than the disease.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Sorry Story of Congress’ Latest “Stimulus” Bill

As Yogi Berra’s infamous saying goes, it’s déjà vu all over again—and not in a good way.

I refer not just to the rapid economic slowdown, panicky markets, and multiple Federal Reserve bailouts related to the coronavirus epidemic, all of which echo the financial crisis of 2008. I speak also of Nancy Pelosi’s infamous comments a decade ago this month about Obamacare:

The House of Representatives—both Democrats and most (all but 40) Republicans—went along with legislation that not only wasn’t paid for, and didn’t contain any long-term reforms to programs desperately in need of them. They passed a bill whose cost still remains unknown (the Congressional Budget Office has yet to issue a cost estimate), which none of them had time to read—and might not even accomplish its supposed objectives.

Word emerged over the weekend that flaws in the bill require at least one, and possibly more than one, correction. The Wall Street Journal reported the House will attempt to pass “a technical fix on Monday.” But even as Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who negotiated the package with Pelosi despite being “relatively green” on such matters, tried to minimize the objections, others weighed in more strongly.

The Capitol Hill publication Roll Call said the bill may need a “do-over” regarding its paid family leave provisions. The National Federation of Independent Business weighed in with objections after the bill’s passage in the House, saying that small firms wouldn’t receive the tax credits quickly enough, and could face cash-flow problems as a result.

A congressional source confirmed to me that concerns about the family leave provisions could prompt a rewrite that’s more than technical in nature. These developments should surprise no one acquainted with prior slapdash attempts to legislate on the fly, but they should force Congress to slow down such a ridiculous process.

TARP and Obamacare

This past weekend, House leaders released the final version of their “stimulus” legislation at 11:45 p.m. Friday night. The House’s vote on the bill ended at 12:51 a.m. Saturday—just more than an hour later. Members of Congress had a whopping 66 minutes to review the 110-page bill before voting on it. Even the Republican Study Committee, a conservative caucus in the House, barely had time to issue a 10-page summary of the bill before the vote gaveled to a close.

That the legislation needs a technical fix (and possibly more than one) merely continues Congress’ practice of passing complicated legislation members do not understand. For instance, in March 2009 Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) had to accept responsibility for inserting a provision into the “stimulus” at the behest of Obama administration officials that allowed AIG officials to collect more than $1 billion in bonuses, despite the firm requiring a massive bailout from the federal government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program. The entire controversy demonstrated that no one, not even the lawmakers who drafted the “stimulus” and TARP bills, fully understood the bills or their effects.

Consider too this description of the infamous Obamacare bill:

The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting. (To cite just one, the Act creates three separate Section 1563s.) Several features of the Act’s passage contributed to that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through ‘the traditional legislative process.’…. As a result, the Act does not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.

That description comes from Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2015 ruling in King v. Burwell, a case about whether individuals purchasing coverage from the federal exchange qualified for subsidies. Roberts’s ruling called the language a drafting error, and permitted individuals in all states to receive the subsidies. But if an innocent drafting error, the mistake had potentially far-reaching implications, which few if any members of Congress realized when they voted for the bill—without reading it, of course.

Rushing for the Exits

To call the nascent controversy surrounding the “stimulus” legislation a fiasco would put it mildly. Worse yet, much of the controversy seems unnecessary and entirely self-inflicted.

Congress had absolutely no reason to pass the bill just before 1 a.m. on Saturday. Financial markets had closed for the weekend, and the Senate had adjourned until Monday afternoon. Voting early Saturday morning, as opposed to later in the day on Saturday, or even on Sunday, didn’t accelerate passage of the bill one bit. However, it did allow members of Congress to leave Washington more quickly.

In other words, the leaders of both parties—who agreed to the rushed process leading up to the vote—made getting members out of town a bigger priority than giving members the time to do their due diligence as lawmakers. It’s an understandable instinct, given the serious consequences of the coronavirus on all Americans, particularly the older profile of many legislators. But it’s also an abdication of Pelosi’s own claim last week that “we’re the captains of this ship.”

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Don’t Just Bail Out a Flawed Medicaid Program

In recent days, some observers have discussed the possibility of targeted assistance to state Medicaid programs affected by the coronavirus outbreak. Unfortunately, the legislation proposed by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) falls far short of that marker, providing a gusher of new spending with no long-term reforms to the program. Conservatives should insist on better.

The House’s bill, introduced late in the night Wednesday, contains several noteworthy flaws. By increasing the federal Medicaid match for all states by 8 percentage points for the entire public health emergency, it prevents the targeting of assistance to those states most affected by coronavirus cases.

Increasing the federal match for able-bodied adults to 98 percent encourages states to prioritize these individuals over disabled populations, while discouraging states from rooting out fraud. The legislation also precludes states from making any changes to their Medicaid programs for the duration of the bailout, reinstituting the fiscal straight-jacket contained in President Obama’s “stimulus” bill.

Like that 2009 package, Pelosi’s legislation proposes tens of billions in new spending for an already-sprawling Medicaid program without any structural changes. But if Pelosi or conservatives wish to pay for the short-term largesse via long-term changes to Medicaid, they need not look far: President Obama’s budgets included several proposals that, if enacted into law, would change incentives in Medicaid for the better.

One area ripe for reform: Medicaid provider taxes. Hospitals and other medical providers often support these taxes—the only entities that ever endorse new taxes on themselves—because they immediately come right back to the health care industry, after states use the tax revenue to draw down additional Medicaid matching funds. In 2011, none other than Joe Biden reportedly called this form of legalized money laundering a “scam.”

At minimum, Congress should immediately enact a moratorium on any new provider taxes, or any increases in existing provider taxes, cutting off the spigot of federal dollars via this budget gimmick. Lawmakers can echo President Obama’s February 2012 budget submission, which would have saved $21.8 billion by reducing states’ maximum provider tax rate.

That proposal delayed its effective date by three years, “giv[ing] states more time to plan”—which would in this case delay the changes until the coronavirus outbreak subsides. Another positive solution: Codifying the Trump administration’s Medicaid fiscal accountability rule, which includes welcome reforms reining in states’ most egregious accounting gimmicks, effective a future date.

More broadly, Congress should also consider the ways the existing matching rate formula encourages additional Medicaid spending by states. For instance, current law provides all states with a minimum 50 percent match rate, encouraging richer states to spend more on Medicaid. Absent that floor, 14 states—11 of them blue—would face a lower match; Connecticut’s rate would plummet from 50 percent to 11.69 percent.

Gradually lowering or eliminating the federal floor on the match rate, beginning 2-3 years hence, would discourage wealthier states from growing their Medicaid programs beyond their, and the federal government’s, control. Had lawmakers enacted this proposal as part of the 2009 “stimulus,” New York—which would have a federal match rate of 34.49 percent in the current fiscal year absent the 50 percent minimum—might have right-sized its Medicaid program well before the program’s current budget crunch.

Alternatively, Congress could embrace Obama’s budget proposal for a blended Medicaid matching rate. Replacing the current morass of varying federal match rates for different populations could save money, and eliminate the perverse incentives included in Obamacare, which gives states a higher match rate to cover able-bodied adults than individuals with disabilities.

Judging from her initial bid in the “stimulus” wars, Pelosi has taken Rahm Emanuel’s advice never to let a serious crisis go to waste. If she wishes to emulate Obama’s first chief of staff, conservatives should insist that she also enact some of the Medicaid changes proposed in Obama’s own budgets, to begin the process of reforming the program.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Elizabeth Warren’s Health Care “Choice:” Dishonesty

In Thursday night’s Democratic presidential debate, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) may debut before a nationwide audience a surprising mantra for someone openly committed to enacting a single-payer system of socialized medicine: Choice.

NBC reports that Warren said on Saturday: “We’re going to push through…full health care coverage at no cost for everyone else who wants it—you can buy it for a modest amount. You don’t have to, but it’s your choice.”

To clarify her “you can buy it” comments, Warren’s most recent health care plan said she would immediately make “free” coverage available to anyone making less than two times the federal poverty level ($51,500 for a family of four in 2019), with sliding-scale premiums capped at no more than 5% of income for those making more than 200% of poverty. Her recent speeches have focused on selling this “transition” plan—“free” coverage if you want it, but only if you want it—rather than her earlier single-payer program.

Some conservatives have claimed that Warren’s change in rhetoric marks the “last gasp” for the left’s move towards socialized medicine. Don’t you believe it. Warren hasn’t given up on anything. Nor have Pete Buttigieg and the other candidates who have campaigned against “Medicare for All.” They, and she, have just chosen to become less candid with the American people about how they hope to achieve their ultimate objectives.

Why Warren Pivoted

Two reasons in particular explain why Warren suddenly embraced the mantra of choice. First, most Americans who have health insurance right now like their plan. A Gallup survey found that nearly seven in ten Americans find their health coverage either excellent (27%) or good (42%). In the 18 years since Gallup first started asking this question, the approval number for Americans’ health coverage has never dropped below 63%.

When millions of people received cancellation notices as Obamacare took effect, Barack Obama found out in 2013 how much people like their current coverage. He felt compelled to issue a public apology for his “Lie of the Year,” telling people they could keep their existing plans when many could not. In part due to these events six years ago, the fear of taking people’s coverage away has dominated the health care discussions at this year’s Democratic presidential debates.

By emphasizing choice, Warren seeks to minimize this potential source of controversy for key constituencies. In the Democratic primaries, union households who have negotiated generous health benefits may blanch at losing those benefits; one confronted Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) about the issue in Iowa this past summer.

Then in next year’s general election, educated and affluent voters who have good health coverage will similarly fear a new plan taking that coverage away. As Philip Klein recently noted in the Washington Examiner, proposing the eradication of existing insurance options could well cost Warren in places like the suburbs of Philadelphia, Detroit, and Milwaukee—critically important battleground areas in battleground states.

De-Emphasizing (Middle Class) Tax Increases

Second, Warren’s earlier rhetoric about taking coverage away from all Americans implies another, similarly awkward question: How will you pay for this massive expansion of government? Warren tried to answer this query by releasing a funding proposal in early November, but in truth, it raised more questions than it answered.

To give but one example: Since Warren released her plan, one study found that her proposed wealth tax would raise $1 trillion less in revenue than she claimed. That $1 trillion gap represents money that she would have to get from somewhere else.

Her revenue plan has myriad other gimmicks buried inside (analyzed in detail here). For instance, her estimates didn’t take into account the fact that the tax increases will shrink the economy, and therefore by definition won’t produce all the revenue she claims.

Warren released her revenue plan claiming that she could fund the full cost of her single-payer plan without raising taxes on the middle class. But the more she pushed that plan, the more people would pick apart all the gimmicks—and Warren’s opponents would rightly claim the gap between what she said her plan would raise and what it actually does would end up coming from the middle class. As a result, Warren “chose” to pivot to her “choice” mantra, navigating away from the Scylla and Charybdis of taking away people’s coverage, and raising taxes on the middle class to do so.

Forcing People to ‘Choose’ Socialism

The change in Warren’s tone doesn’t mean she’s changed her ultimate objective, however. Consider her comments at a town hall on Monday: “When tens of millions of people have had a chance to try [the buy-in proposal], I believe, at that point, we’re going to be ready to vote for” single payer (emphasis added).

Like Buttigieg, Warren sees a buy-in program—call it a “government-run plan,” call it a “public option,” call it “Medicare for All Who Want It”—as creating a natural “glide path” to single payer. They remain quite outspoken in their goal: They want to achieve a socialized medicine system. If given the opportunity, they will use policy to accomplish that objective—just slightly more slowly than under an immediate transition to single payer.

A throwaway line in a recent Vox article got at this same point. The article focused on open enrollment for exchange plans, and the fact that insurers must limit enrollment to a certain period of time, because Obamacare’s costly pre-existing condition provisions encourage individuals to wait until they become sick to sign up for coverage. The penultimate paragraph included this claim:

Under the various public options that have been proposed, uninsured people would be automatically enrolled in the new optional government plan. One advantage the government has over private insurers is it doesn’t need its books to balance perfectly; adverse selection [a disproportionate number of sick people signing up] isn’t as big a concern. [Emphasis mine.]

The highlighted line demonstrates how liberals would use taxpayer funds for the government-run plan: subsidizing coverage in advance, or bailing out the government plan after the fact if premiums are set too low, or too many sick people enroll, or both. Vox’s line hints at the left’s true goal through a “public option:” To sabotage private plans, and force people into socialized medicine, one person at a time.

Warren’s “choice” mantra sounds innocuous, but its underlying premise—by her own admission—seeks to create a single-payer system, just over a slightly longer period. Conservatives who think her approach represents anything other than a change in tactics should think again. The wolf attacking private insurance hasn’t disappeared so much as put on a disguise of sheep’s clothing.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Joe Biden’s Health Care Plan: SandersCare Lite

On Monday morning, former vice president Joe Biden released the health care plan for his 2020 presidential campaign. The plan comes ahead of a single-payer health plan speech by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) scheduled for Wednesday.

Biden’s plan includes several noteworthy omissions. For instance, it does not include any reference to health coverage for foreign citizens illegally present in the United States. That exclusion seems rather surprising, given both Democrats’ embrace of health benefits for those unlawfully present in last month’s debate, and Biden’s repeated references to the issue.

Biden said later on Monday that illegally present foreign citizens should have access to “public health clinics if they’re sick,” but not health insurance. He also claimed that last month’s debate format did not give him enough time to explain his position.

Overall, however, Biden’s plan includes many similarities to Sanders’. While both Sanders and Biden want to draw contrasts on health care—Sanders to attack Biden as beholden to corporate interests, and Biden to attack Sanders for wanting to demolish Obamacare—their plans contain far more similarities than differences.

Losing Coverage

Sanders’ bill would, as the American people have gradually learned this year, make private insurance “unlawful,” taking coverage away from approximately 300 million Americans. Biden’s plan specifically attacks single payer on this count, for “starting from scratch and getting rid of private insurance.”

As with Obamacare, Biden’s promise will echo hollow. By creating a government-run “public option” like Sanders’, the Biden plan would also take away health coverage for millions of Americans. As I have previously explained, a government-run plan would sabotage private insurance, using access to Treasury dollars and other in-built structural advantages.

In 2009, the Lewin Group concluded that a government-run health plan, available to all individuals and paying doctors and hospitals at Medicare rates (i.e., less than private insurance), would lead to 119.1 million individuals losing employer coverage:

More Spending

Biden would also expand the Obamacare subsidy regime, in three ways. He would:

  1. Reduce the maximum amount individuals would pay in premiums from 9.86% of income to no more than 8.5% of income, with federal subsidies making up the difference.
  2. Repeal Obamacare’s income cap on subsidies, so that families with incomes of more than four times the poverty level ($103,000 for a family of four in 2019) can qualify for subsidies.
  3. To lower deductibles and co-payments, link insurance subsidies to a richer “gold” plan, one that covers 80% of an average enrollee’s health costs in a given year, rather than the “silver” plan under current law.

All three of these recommendations come from the liberal Urban Institute’s Healthy America plan, issued last year. However, they all come with a big price tag. Consider the following excerpt from Biden’s plan:

Take a family of four with an income of $110,000 per year. If they currently get insurance on the individual marketplace [i.e., Exchange], because their premium will now be capped at 8.5% of their income, under the Biden Plan they will save an estimated $750 per month on insurance alone. That’s cutting their premiums almost in half. [Emphasis original.]

That’s also making coverage “affordable” for families through unaffordable levels of federal spending. By its own estimates, Biden’s plan will give a family with an income of $110,000 annually—which is approximately double the national median household income—$9,000 per year in federal insurance subsidies. Some families with that level of income may not even pay $9,000 annually in federal income taxes, depending upon their financial situation, yet they will receive sizable amounts of taxpayer-funded largesse.

Price Controls and Regulations

The drug price section of the Biden plan includes the usual leftist tropes about “prescription drug corporations…profiteering off of the pocketbooks of sick individuals.” It proposes typical liberal “solutions” in the form of price controls, whether importing price-controlled pharmaceuticals from overseas, or allowing “an evaluation by…independent board members” (i.e., bureaucrats) to determine prices.

Ironically, Biden’s plan implicitly acknowledges Obamacare’s flaws. In talking about prescription drug pricing, Biden omits any discussion of the “rock-solid deal” that the Obama administration cut with Big Pharma, so that pharmaceutical companies would run ads supporting Obamacare.

Likewise, Biden’s plan notes that “the concentration of market power in the hands of a few corporations is occurring throughout our health care system, and this lack of competition is driving up prices for consumers.” Yet it fails to note the cause of much of this consolidation: Obamacare encouraged hospitals to gobble up physician practices, and each other, to obtain clout in negotiations with insurers. Typically, after acknowledging government’s failures, Biden, like Sanders, prescribes yet more government as the solution.

In the leadup to debate on “repeal-and-replace” legislation several years ago, conservative Republicans said they did not want any replacement to become “Obamacare Lite.” Just as history often repeats itself, Democrats seem ready to embark on a similar intra-party debate. That’s because, no matter how much Biden wants to draw distinctions between his proposals and single payer, his plan looks suspiciously like “SandersCare Lite.”

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How Democratic Health Proposals Will Take Your Coverage Away

Following her performance in last week’s Democratic presidential debates, California Senator Kamala Harris once again tripped up over the issue of health care. For a second time, Harris attempted to claim that she would not eliminate private health coverage. In reality, however, virtually all Democrats running for president would enact policies jeopardizing Americans’ health insurance. The candidates differ largely in their level of honesty about their proposals’ effects.

During the debates on Wednesday and Thursday, only Harris, New York Mayor Bill DeBlasio, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders said they supported eliminating private insurance. But in an interview Friday morning, Harris claimed she heard the question as asking whether she would give up her insurance, not whether she would take others’ coverage away.

The facts defy Harris’ lawyerly parsing. Section 107(a) of the bill that Sanders introduced, and which Harris, Warren, and New Jersey’s Cory Booker have co-sponsored, would make it “unlawful for a private health insurer to sell health insurance coverage that duplicates the benefits provided” under the legislation.

In May, Harris claimed that Sanders’ legislation would permit private health insurance to supplement the government-run program. But as CNN’s Jake Tapper pointed out at the time, Sanders’ bill would provide such comprehensive benefits that supplemental coverage could only cover treatments like cosmetic surgery. It raises an obvious question: Who would want to buy “insurance” covering breast implants and Botox injections? Harris’ Hollywood constituents, perhaps, but few middle-class Americans.

Other candidates have similarly tried to disguise their intentions when it comes to taking away Americans’ health coverage. During last week’s debates, New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand—another co-sponsor of Sanders’ legislation to make private coverage “unlawful”—did not raise her hand when asked about eliminating health insurance. She said she supported a government-run “public option” instead: “I believe we need to get to…single payer. The quickest way you get there is you create competition with the insurers.”

But individuals with private coverage cannot, and should not, rest easy. The fact that Gillibrand says she supports a government-run health system as an eventual outcome means that she would work to sabotage the private health insurance system, to drive all Americans into a government-run program.

Even Democratic candidates who claim they oppose Sanders’ single-payer legislation have proposed policies that would eventually lead to such a government-run health system. In Thursday’s debate, Sen. Michael Bennet claimed that his proposal for a “public option” “could easily” see 35 million people enroll. Bennet proved off in his estimate by only about 100 million individuals. In 2009, the Lewin Group estimated that a plan similar to Bennet’s could enroll as many as 131.2 million Americans.

A review of Bennet’s legislation demonstrates how it would sabotage private coverage, by giving the government plan major structural advantages. Bennett’s bill grants the government plan $1 billion in start-up funding from taxpayers—with additional bailout funds likely should the plan ever run into financial distress. It would require all doctors participating in Medicare to join the government plan. And it would pay doctors and hospitals the much lower rates that Medicare pays, even though nearly three-quarters of hospitals lost money on their Medicare patients in 2017.

Among the Democrats running for president, Sanders has remained outspoken in his desire to take away Americans’ health coverage, and ban private insurance. While most of the other candidates say that they want to preserve private coverage, their policies would do the exact opposite. Just as Barack Obama eventually had to apologize for his infamous “If you like your plan, you can keep it” broken promise, so too will most of this year’s candidates have to explain why American families couldn’t keep their insurance if and when their policy plans go into effect.

In accepting his party’s nomination for president at the 1984 Democratic National Convention, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale infamously claimed that “[Ronald] Reagan will raise taxes, and so will I. He won’t tell you; I just did.” Thirty-five years later, virtually all Democrats have embraced a position almost as unpopular as raising taxes: Taking away Americans’ health insurance. Unlike Mondale, most of this year’s candidates won’t tell you the full truth about their policies. I just did.

This post was originally published at Fox News.