What the Press Isn’t Telling You about the Politics of Pre-Existing Conditions

For months, liberals have wanted to make the midterm elections about Obamacare, specifically people with pre-existing conditions. Of late, the media has gladly played into that narrative.

Numerous articles have followed upon a similar theme: Republicans claim they want to protect people with pre-existing conditions, but they’re lying, misrepresenting their records, or both. Most carry an implicit assumption: If you don’t support Obamacare, then you cannot want to protect individuals with pre-existing conditions, because defending the law as holy writ has become a new religion for the left.

Covering People Before They Develop Conditions

The Kaiser Family Foundation noted in a study earlier this year that the off-exchange individual insurance market shrank by 38 percent in just one year, from the beginning of 2017 to the beginning of 2018. Overall, enrollment in Obamacare-compliant plans for people who do not qualify for income-based subsidies fell by 2.6 million:

Most of these individuals likely dropped their plan because the rapid rise in insurance rates under Obamacare has priced them out of coverage. As a Heritage Foundation study from March noted, the pre-existing condition provisions represent the largest component of those premium increases.

Or consider the at least 4.7 million people who received cancellation notices a few short years ago, because their plan didn’t comport with Obamacare’s new regulations. The father of a friend and former colleague received such a notice. He lost his plan, couldn’t afford a new Obamacare-compliant policy, then got diagnosed with colon cancer. His “coverage” has consisted largely of a GoFundMe page, where friends and colleagues can help his family pay off tens of thousands of dollars in medical debt.

How exactly did Obamacare “protect” him—by stripping him of his coverage, or by pricing the new coverage so high he and his wife couldn’t afford it, and had to go without at the exact time they developed a pre-existing condition?

In fact, by getting politicians of both parties to claim that they want to cover people with pre-existing conditions, this campaign may actually encourage more healthy people to drop their insurance, thinking they can easily buy coverage if they do develop a costly condition.

Obamacare Plans Discriminate Too

The left’s messaging also ignores another inconvenient truth: Because they must accept all applicants, Obamacare plans have a strong incentive to avoid sick people. They can accomplish this goal through tactics like narrow provider networks. Because plans must offer rich benefits and accept all applicants, shrinking doctor and hospital networks provides one of the few ways to moderate premiums. Of course, keeping a clinic like the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center out of one’s network—which all Texas-based Obamacare plans do—also discourages cancer patients from signing up for coverage, a “win-win” from the insurer’s perspective.

Some plans have used more overt forms of discrimination. For instance, in 2014 a group of HIV patients filed a complaint against several Florida insurers. The complaint alleged that the carriers placed all their HIV drugs into the highest formulary tier, to discourage HIV-positive patients from signing up for coverage.

Problem with Pre-Existing Condition Provisions

More than 18 months ago, I wrote that Republicans could either maintain the status quo on pre-existing conditions, or they could repeal Obamacare, but they could not do both. That scenario remains as true today as it did then.

Also true: As long as the pre-existing condition “protections” remain in place, millions of individuals will likely remain priced out of coverage, and insurers will have reason to discriminate against the sick. In fact, the last several years of premium spikes have already turned the exchanges into a de facto high-risk pool, where only the sickest (or most heavily subsidized) patients bother enrolling.

For individuals with pre-existing conditions, there are several—and, in my view, better—alternatives to both the status quo and the status quo ante that preceded Obamacare. But we will never have a chance to have that conversation if few will examine the very real trade-offs the law has created. Based on the past few months, neither the left nor the media appear interested in doing so.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How an Obscure Regulatory Change Could Transform American Health Insurance

Between the election campaign and incidents of terrorism ranging from attempted bombings to a synagogue shooting, an obscure regulatory proposal by the Trump administration has yet to captivate the public’s attention. However, it has the potential to change the way millions of Americans obtain health insurance.

In the United States, unique among industrialized countries, most Americans under age 65 receive health coverage from their employers. This occurs largely due to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling issued during World War II, which excluded health insurance coverage from income and payroll taxes. (Businesses viewed providing health insurance as one way around wartime wage and price controls.)

The Trump administration’s proposed rule would, if finalized, allow businesses to make a pretax contribution towards individual health insurance—that is, coverage that individuals own and select, rather than employers. This change may take time to have an impact, but it could lead to a much more portable system of health insurance—which would help to solve the pre-existing condition problem.

How Would It Work?

Under the proposed rule, employers could provide funds through a Health Reimbursement Arrangement (HRA) to subsidize the purchase of individual health insurance. Employers could provide the funds on a pretax basis, and—provided that the workers purchase their coverage outside of the Obamacare exchanges—employees could pay their share of the premiums on a tax-free basis as well.

In practical terms, some employers may choose to provide a subsidy for health coverage—say, $300 per month, or $5,000 per year—in lieu of offering a firm-sponsored health plan. Individuals could go out and buy the plan they want, which covers the doctors whom they use, rather than remaining stuck with the plan their employer offers. And employers would get better predictability for their health expenses by knowing their exposure would remain fixed to the sums they contribute every year.

Could Employers Game the System?

The proposed rule acknowledged the possibility that employers might try to “offload” their costliest patients into individual health coverage, lowering expenses (and therefore premiums) for the people who remain. The rule contains several provisions designed to protect against this possibility.

Employers must choose to offer either an HRA contribution towards individual coverage or a group health plan. They cannot offer both options, and whatever option they select, they must make the same decision for an entire class of workers.

A “class” of workers would mean all full-time employees, or all part-time employees, or all employees under one collective bargaining agreement. Hourly and salaried workers would not count as separate “classes,” because firms could easily convert workers from one form of compensation to another. These provisions seek to ensure that firms will offer some employees health insurance, while “dumping” other employees on to individual coverage.

Can Workers Buy Short-Term Coverage with Employer Funds?

Yes—and no. The proposed rule would allow HRA funds to purchase only individual (i.e., Obamacare-compliant) health insurance coverage, not short-term insurance.

However, the rule creates a separate type of account to which employers could contribute that would fund workers’ “excepted benefits.” This term could include things like long-term care insurance, vision and dental insurance, and the new short-term plans the Trump administration has permitted. But employers could only fund these accounts up to a maximum of $1,800 per year, and they could create these special “excepted benefits” accounts only if they do not offer an HRA that reimburses workers for individual insurance, as outlined above.

Will Firms Drop Health Coverage?

Some firms may explore the HRA option over time. However, the extent to which businesses embrace defined-contribution coverage may depend upon the viability of the individual health insurance market, and the status of the labor market.

However, if and when more insurers return to the marketplace, firms may view the defined-contribution method of health coverage as a win-win: employees get more choices and employers get predictability over health costs. Particularly if unemployment ticks upward, or one firm in an industry makes the move towards the HRA model, other businesses may follow suit in short order.

Will the Proposal Cost Money?

It could. The proposed rule should cost the federal government $29.7 billion over the first ten years. That estimate assumes that 800,000 firms, offering coverage to 10.7 million people, will use the HRA option by 2028. (It also assumes an 800,000 reduction in the number of uninsured Americans by that same year.)

The cost, or savings, to the federal government could vary widely, depending on factors like:

  • Whether firms using the HRA option previously offered coverage. If firms that did not offer coverage take the HRA option, pretax health insurance payments would increase, reducing tax revenues. (The rule assumes a reduction in income and payroll tax revenue of $13 billion in 2028.)
  • Whether individuals enrolling in individual market coverage via the HRA option are more or less healthy than current enrollees. If the new enrollees are less healthy than current enrollees, individual market premiums will rise, as will spending on Obamacare subsidies for those individuals. (The rule assumes a 1 percent increase in individual market premiums, and thus exchange subsidies.)
  • The extent to which HRAs affect eligibility for Obamacare subsidies. If some low-income individuals whose employers previously did not offer coverage now qualify for HRA subsidies, they may lose eligibility for Obamacare subsidies on the exchanges. (The rule assumes a reduction in Obamacare subsidies of $6.9 billion in 2028.)

Given the many variables in play, the rule has a highly uncertain fiscal impact. It could cost the federal government billions (or more) per year, save the federal government similar sums, or have largely offsetting effects.

An Overdue (and Welcome) Change

The proposed rule would codify the last element of last October’s executive order on health care. It follows the release of rules regarding both short-term health insurance and association health plans earlier this year.

Ironically, the Trump administration represents but the most recent Republican presidency to examine the possibility of defined-contribution health insurance. While working on Capitol Hill in 2008, I tried to encourage the Bush administration to adopt guidance similar to that in the proposed rule. However, policy disagreements—including objections raised by, of all places, scholars at the Heritage Foundation—precluded the Bush administration from finalizing the changes.

Since I’ve fought for this concept for more than a decade, and included it in a series of regulatory changes the administration needed to make in a paper released shortly before Trump took office, I can attest that this change is as welcome—and needed—since it is overdue. Although overshadowed at the time of its release, this rule could have a substantial effect on Americans’ health insurance choices over time.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Senate Republicans’ Attempt to Entrench Obamacare

Earlier this month, I wrote about how when Republicans talk about the “need to govern,” they normally mean the “need to govern like liberals.” Last week, a group of ten Senate Republicans perfectly illustrated that axiom.

The Republicans, led by Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC), introduced “legislation to protect Americans with pre-existing conditions.” Their bill would codify as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements that insurers accept all applicants, regardless of health, and do not vary premiums based upon health conditions.

Democrats have used the pending lawsuit to mount political attacks on pre-existing conditions. For instance, last week Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) attempted to offer an amendment directing the Senate’s legal counsel to intervene in the lawsuit to defend Obamacare, which some Republicans viewed as a politically difficult vote. Hence Tillis’ bill, which gave the ten Senate Republicans political cover to oppose Manchin’s amendment while still claiming to protect pre-existing conditions.

Although likely a messaging exercise, the Tillis bill sends at least four messages to voters about Republican views on health policy—none of them positive.

Senators Don’t Want to Repeal Obamacare

Last spring, I wrote that Republicans had a choice: They could either retain Obamacare’s pre-existing condition provisions, or they could fulfill their promise to repeal the law. They keep trying to do both, but as a policy matter, they cannot.

The premium increases caused by those regulations necessitated requirements to purchase coverage, and for businesses to offer coverage, to try and keep healthy people purchasing (more costly) insurance. They necessitated Obamacare’s insurance subsidies—to make coverage “affordable.” And the premium increases caused by the regulations required Obamacare’s taxes and Medicare reductions to finance those federal subsidies.

The pre-existing condition provisions stand as the foundation stone of Obamacare. Conservatives who want a true alternative to the law have other policy options for people with pre-existing conditions than merely retaining Obamacare’s federal regulations. But if Republican senators want to codify that provision elsewhere, then, as a practical matter, they want to retain the law.

Republicans Once Again Oppose Federalism

Among others, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) sponsored Tillis’ legislation. Last year, of course, Graham stood as one of the prime co-sponsors of the Graham-Cassidy bill, which sought to devolve most of Obamacare’s health spending to the states via a block grant. Graham’s website retains press releases talking about how he supports a “state-centric” system that would “return power” outside of Washington.

The sharp contrast between Graham’s rhetoric on state-centered solutions, and his actions supporting a Washington-centered health-care system, show that he and his colleagues either do not understand the principles of federalism, or they discard those principles when they find them politically inconvenient.

Effectively Taxes the American People

Multiple analyses have discussed how Obamacare’s high deductibles make coverage feel meaningless to exchange enrollees. As an example, this year I will pay nearly $3,500 for a Bronze Obamacare policy with a $6,200 deductible—a deductible I have little chance of meeting unless I get run over by the proverbial bus, or suffer some other catastrophic incident.

I do have some pre-existing conditions, including mild asthma and a foot condition that required reconstructive surgery some years ago. Between these and the general randomness of life, the risk of a major medical condition that causing me to exceed my deductible remains greater than zero. But I doubt it warrants a $3,500 premium either.

Lawmakers don’t like talking about this “tax.” Wouldn’t you know it, few liberal organizations have attempted to quantify how much of a “tax” the average healthy person pays in state exchanges, although they’re quick to quantify the individuals with pre-existing conditions “at risk.” But this forcible redistribution of wealth exists nonetheless, and the Republican lawmakers just endorsed it.

Liberals Always Find Republican Concessions Insufficient

Hours after Tillis introduced his bill, liberal analysts already had outlined reasons to call it insufficient. According to them, the Tillis legislation would prohibit insurers from rejecting applications from people with pre-existing conditions outright, but they could still impose exclusions on specific conditions.

Therein lies Republicans’ problem: The more they concede, the more the Left demands. When the next wave of greater government control of health care comes along, don’t say I didn’t warn you—and don’t say that Republicans acted to protect you, either.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Is Donald Trump “Sabotaging” Obamacare?

Is Donald Trump “sabotaging” Obamacare? And are he and his administration violating the law to do so?

Democrats intend to make this issue a prime focus of their political messaging ahead of the November elections. And several developments over the month of August — a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, a New York Times op-ed by two legal scholars, and a lawsuit filed by several cities — all include specific points and charges related to that theme.

1. The GAO Report

The most recent data point comes from the GAO, which at the behest of several congressional Democrats analyzed the administration’s outreach efforts during the most recent open enrollment period last fall. Those efforts culminated in a report GAO released Thursday.

The report made a persuasive case that the administration’s decision to reduce and re-prioritize funding for enrollment navigators utilized flawed data and methods. While the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based navigators’ 2018 funding on their effectiveness in enrolling individuals in coverage in prior years, GAO noted that HHS lacked solid data on navigators’ enrollment on which to base 2018 funding, and that enrollment was but one of navigators’ stated goals in prior years. HHS agreed with GAO’s recommendation that it should provide clearer goals and performance metrics for navigators to meet.

GAO also recommended that the administration reinstitute an overall enrollment target, as one way to determine the adequate distribution of resources during open enrollment. However, a cynic might note that Obamacare advocates, including the Democratic lawmakers who requested the report, may want the Trump administration to publicize an enrollment target primarily so they can attack HHS if the department does not achieve its goals.

Even though reporters and liberals like Andy Slavitt cried foul last year when HHS announced planned maintenance time for healthcare.gov in advance, actual downtime for the site dropped precipitously in 2018 compared to 2017. Which could lead one to ask who is sabotaging whom.

2. The New York Times Article

In The New York Times piece, law professors Nicholas Bagley and Abbe Gluck provide an overview of the lawsuit filed against the Trump Administration (about which more below). As someone who has cited Bagley’s work in the past, I find the article unpersuasive, even disappointing.

Take for instance some of the article’s specific allegations:

Here’s one: “To make it harder for people to enroll in Obamacare plans, for example, the administration shortened the open enrollment period on the health care exchanges from three months to six weeks.”

This charge would have evaporated entirely had Bagley specified which Administration first proposed shortening the open enrollment period to six weeks. The Obama Administration did just that.

This rule also establishes dates for the individual market annual open enrollment period for future benefit years. For 2017 and 2018, we will maintain the same open enrollment period we adopted for 2016—that is, November 1 of the year preceding the benefit year through January 31 of the benefit year, and for 2019 and later benefit years, we are establishing an open enrollment period of November 1 through December 15 of the year preceding the benefit year.

The Trump administration merely took the shorter open enrollment period that the Obama team proposed for 2019 and accelerated it by one year. If shortening the enrollment period would make it so much “harder for people to enroll in Obamacare plans,” as Bagley and Gluck claim, then why did the Obama Administration propose this change?

Another allegation: “To sow chaos in the insurance markets, Mr. Trump toyed for nine months with the idea of eliminating a crucial funding stream for Obamacare known as cost-sharing payments. After he cut off those funds, he boasted that Obamacare was ‘being dismantled.’”

This charge seems particularly specious — because Bagley himself has admitted that Obamacare lacks a constitutional appropriation for the cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers. Bagley previously mentioned that he took no small amount of grief from the left for conceding that President Obama had exceeded his constitutional authority. For him to turn around and now claim that Trump violated his constitutional authority by ending unconstitutional payments represents a disingenuous argument.

Here and elsewhere, Bagley might argue that Trump’s rhetoric — talk of Obamacare “being dismantled,” for instance — suggests corrupt intent. I will gladly stipulate that presidential claims Obamacare is “dead” are both inaccurate and unhelpful. But regardless of what the President says, if the President does what Bagley himself thinks necessary to comport with the Constitution, how on earth can Bagley criticize him for violating his oath of office?

A third allegation:

This month, the Trump administration dealt what may be its biggest blow yet to the insurance markets. In a new rule, it announced that insurers will have more latitude to sell ‘short-term’ health plans that are exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s rules. These plans … had previously been limited to three months.

Under Mr. Trump’s new rule, however, such plans can last for 364 days and can be renewed for up to three years. … In effect, these rules are creating a cheap form of ‘junk’ coverage that does not have to meet the higher standards of Obamacare. This sort of splintering of the insurance markets is not allowed under the Affordable Care Act as Congress drafted it.

This claim also fails on multiple levels. First, if Congress wanted to prohibit “short-term” health plans as part of Obamacare, it could have done so. Congress chose first to allow these plans to continue to exist, and second to exempt these plans from all of Obamacare’s regulatory regime. If Bagley and Gluck have an objection to the splintering of insurance markets, then they should take it up with Congress.

Second, the so-called “new rule” Bagley and Gluck refer to only reverts back to a definition of short-term coverage that existed under the Obama Administration. This definition existed for nearly two decades, from when Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) through 2016. The Obama administration published a rule intended to eliminate much of the market for this type of coverage — but it did so only in the fall of that year, more than two years after Obamacare’s major coverage provisions took effect.

As with the shortening of the open enrollment period discussed above, if Bagley and Gluck want to scream “Sabotage!” regarding the Trump administration’s actions, they also must point the finger at Barack Obama for similar actions. That they did not suggests the partisan, and ultimately flawed, nature of their analysis.

3. The Lawsuit

The 128-page complaint filed by the city plaintiffs earlier this month makes some of the same points as the New York Times op-ed. It also continues the same pattern of blaming the Trump administration for actions previously taken by the Obama administration.

The lawsuit criticizes numerous elements of the administration’s April rule setting out the payment parameters for the 2019 Exchange year. For instance, it criticizes the removal of language requiring Exchanges to provide a direct notification to individuals before discontinuing their eligibility for subsidies, if individuals fail to reconcile the subsidies they received in prior years with the amount they qualified for based on their income. (Estimated subsidies, which are based on projected income for a year, can vary significantly from the actual subsidy levels one qualifies for, based on changes in income due to a promotion, change in life status, etc.)

As part of this charge, the lawsuit includes an important nugget: The relevant regulation “was amended in 2016 to specify that an Exchange may not deny [subsidies] under this provision ‘unless direct notification is first sent to the tax filer.’” As with the New York Times op-ed outlined above, those claiming “sabotage” are doing so because the Trump administration decided to revert to a prior regulatory definition used by the Obama administration for the first several years of Obamacare implementation.

The lawsuit similarly complains that the Trump administration is “making it harder to compare insurance plans” by eliminating support for “standardized options” from the Exchange. Here again, the complaint notes that “prior rules supported ‘standardized options,’” while mentioning only in a footnote that the rules implementing the “standardized options” took effect for the 2017 plan year. In other words, the Obama administration did not establish “standardized options” for the 2014, 2015, or 2016 plan years. Were they “sabotaging” Obamacare by failing to do so?

The suit continues with these types of claims, which collectively amount to legalistic whining that the Trump administration has not implemented Obamacare in a manner the (liberal) plaintiffs would support. It even includes this noteworthy assertion:

Maryland has been cleared by state legislators to petition CMS to ‘establish a reinsurance program that would create a pot of money for insurers to cover the most expensive claims,’ but a health economist ‘said he would be shocked if the Trump administration approved such a request, given its efforts to weaken Obamacare’: ‘It just seems very unlikely to me that Trump would approve this. … Maryland is easily saying we want to help prop up Obamacare, which the Trump administration doesn’t want to have anything to do with.’

Fact: The Trump administration just approved Maryland’s insurance waiver this week. So much for that “sabotage.”

A review of its “prayer for relief” — the plaintiffs’ request for actions the court should take — shows the ridiculously sweeping nature of the lawsuit’s claims. Among other things, the plaintiffs want the court to order the defendants to “comply with their constitutional obligation to take care to faithfully execute the ACA,” including by doing the following:

  • “Expand, rather than suppress, the number of individuals and families obtaining health insurance through ACA exchanges;
  • “Reduce, rather than increase, premiums for health insurance in the ACA exchanges;
  • “Promote, rather than diminish, the availability of comprehensive, reasonably-priced health insurance for individuals and families with preexisting conditions;
  • “Encourage, rather than discourage, individuals and families to obtain health insurance that provides the coverage that Congress, in the ACA, determined is necessary to protect American families against the physical and economic devastation that results from lesser insurance, with limits on coverage that leaves them unable to cover the costs of an accident or unexpected illness…
  • “Order Defendants to fully fund advertising under the ACA;
  • “Enjoin Defendants from producing and disseminating advertisements that aim to undermine the ACA;
  • “Order Defendants to fully fund Navigators under the ACA;
  • “Enjoin Defendants from incentivizing Navigators to advertise non-ACA compliant plans;
  • “Order Defendants to lengthen the open enrollment period;
  • “Order Defendants to resume participation in enrollment events and other outreach activities under the ACA…
  • “Order Defendants to process states’ waiver applications under the ACA so as to faithfully implement the Act.”

In other words, the lawsuit asks a court to micro-manage every possible element of implementation of a 2,700-page law — tell HHS what it must say, what it must do, how much it must spend, and on and on. It would create de facto entitlements, by stating that HHS could never reduce funding for advertising and outreach, or lower spending on navigators, or reject states’ waiver applications — potentially even if those applications violate the law itself. And it asks for impossible actions — because HHS cannot unilaterally “expand, rather than suppress” the number of people with coverage, just as it cannot unilaterally “reduce, rather than increase, premiums.”

Despite its questionable claims, and the highly questionable remedies it seeks, the lawsuit may yet accomplish some of its goals. The complaint spends much of its time alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that HHS did not “meaningfully” or “adequately” consider comments from individuals who objected to the regulatory changes in question. While I have not examined the relevant regulatory dockets in any level of detail, the (pardon the pun) trumped-up nature of elements of the complaint makes me skeptical of such assertions. That said, the administration has suffered several setbacks in court over complaints regarding the regulatory process, so the lawsuit may force HHS to ensure it has its proverbial “i”s dotted and “t”s crossed before proceeding with further changes.

Words Versus Actions

On many levels, the “sabotage” allegations try to use the president’s own words (and tweets) against him. Other lawsuits have done likewise, with varying degrees of success. As I noted above, the president’s rhetoric often does not reflect the actual reality that Obamacare remains much more entrenched than conservatives like myself would like.

But for all their complaints about the administration’s “sabotage,” liberals have no one to blame but themselves for the current situation. Obamacare gave a tremendous amount of authority to the federal bureaucracy to implement its myriad edicts. They should not be surprised when someone who disagrees with them uses that vast power to accomplish what they view as malign ends. Perhaps next time they should think again before proceeding down a road that gives government such significant authority. They won’t, but they should.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Do Democrats Want Obamacare to Fail under Donald Trump?

In their quest to take back the House and Senate in November’s midterm elections, Democrats have received a bit of bad news. The Hill recently noted:

Health insurers are proposing relatively modest premium bumps for next year, despite doomsday predictions from Democrats that the Trump administration’s changes to Obamacare would bring massive increases in 2019. That could make it a challenge for Democrats looking to weaponize rising premiums heading into the midterm elections.

Administration officials confirmed the premium trend last Friday, when they indicated that proposed 2019 rates for the 38 states using healthcare.gov averaged a 5.4 percent increase—a number that may come down even further after review by state insurance commissioners. So much for that “sabotage.”

The messaging strategy once again illustrates the political peril of rooting for something—particularly legislation Democrats worked so hard to enact in the first place—to fail on someone else’s watch. Like officials accused of “talking down the economy” so they can benefit politically, Democrats face the unique task of trying to talk down their own creation, while blaming someone else for all its problems.

The Obamacare Exchanges’ Prolonged Malaise

While Obamacare hasn’t failed due to President Trump, it hasn’t succeeded much, either. Enrollment continues to fall, particularly for those who do not qualify for subsidies. Two years ago—long before Donald Trump had any power to “sabotage” Obamacare as president—Bill Clinton called Obamacare “the craziest thing in the world” for these unsubsidized persons, and their collective behavior demonstrates that fact.

A recent study from the liberal Kaiser Family Foundation concluded that, away from Obamacare exchanges, where individuals cannot receive insurance subsidies, enrollment fell by nearly 40 percent in just one year, from the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of this year. However, the rich subsidies provided to those who qualify for them—particularly those with incomes below 250 percent of the federal poverty level, who receive reduced cost-sharing as well—strongly encourage enrollment by this population, making it unlikely that the insurance exchanges will collapse on their own.

President Trump can talk all he wants about Obamacare imploding, but so long as the federal government props tens of billions of dollars into the exchanges, it probably won’t happen.

Good Reasons for Premium Moderation

Those premium subsidies, which cushion most low-income enrollees from the effects of premium increases, coupled with a lack of competition among insurers in large areas of the country, have allowed premiums to more-or-less stabilize, albeit at levels much of the unsubsidized population finds unaffordable. Think about it: If you have a monopoly, and a sizable population of individuals either desperate for coverage (i.e., the very sick) or heavily subsidized to buy your product, it shouldn’t take a rocket scientist to break even, much less turn a profit.

As a recent Wall Street Journal article notes, insurers spent the past several years ratcheting up premiums, for a variety of reasons: A sicker pool of enrollees than they expected when the exchanges started in 2014; a recognition that some insurers’ initial strategy of underpricing products to attract market share backfired; and the end of Obamacare’s “transitional” reinsurance and risk corridor programs, which expired in 2016.

While some carriers have adjusted 2019 premiums upward to reflect the elimination of the individual mandate penalty beginning in January, some had already “baked in” lax enforcement of the mandate into their rates for 2018. Some have long called the mandate too weak and ineffective to have much effect on Americans’ decision to buy coverage.

It Could Have Been Worse?

Liberals have started to make the argument that, but for the Trump administration’s so-called “sabotage” of insurance markets, premiums would fall instead of rise in 2019. (Some insurers have proposed premium reductions regardless.) The Brookings Institution recently released a paper claiming that in a “stable policy environment” without repeal of the mandate, or the impending regulatory changes regarding short-term insurance and Association Health Plans, premiums would fall by an average of approximately 4.3 percent.

But as the saying goes, “‘It could have been worse’ isn’t a great political bumper sticker.” Democrats tried to make this point regarding the economic “stimulus” bill they passed in 2009, after the infamous chart claiming unemployment would remain below 8 percent if the “stimulus” passed didn’t quite turn out as promised:

In 2011, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) tried to make the “It could have been worse” argument, claiming that unemployment would have risen to 15 percent without the “stimulus”:

But even she acknowledged the futility of giving such a message to the millions of people still lacking jobs at that point (to say nothing of the minor detail that studies reinforcing Pelosi’s point didn’t exist).

There’s No Need for a Bailout

While the apparent moderation of premium increases complicates Democrats’ political message, it also undermines the Republicans who spent the early part of this year pressing for an Obamacare bailout. Apart from the awful policy message it would have sent by making Obamacare’s exchanges “too big to fail,” such a measure would have depressed turnout among demoralized grassroots conservatives who want Congress to repeal Obamacare.

As it happens, most state markets didn’t need a bailout. That’s a good thing on multiple levels, because a “stability” bill passed this year would have had little effect on 2019 premiums anyway.

That said, if Democrats want to make political arguments about premiums in this year’s elections, maybe they can tell the American people where they can find the $2,500 in annual premium reductions that Barack Obama repeatedly promised would come from his health care law. Given the decade that has passed since Obama first made those claims without any hint of them coming true, trying to answer for that broken promise should keep Democrats preoccupied well past November.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

About That “Junk” Insurance

On Wednesday, the Trump administration released its final rule regarding short-term, limited-duration insurance coverage. For all critics’ carping about how short-term coverage epitomizes “junk insurance,” these plans will provide another option for individuals who find Obamacare-compliant policies unattractive and unaffordable.

Pros and Cons of the Rule

The Cato Institute’s Michael Cannon lists a good summary of the rule’s benefits. At a time when the market for unsubsidized coverage away from the exchanges has dropped by nearly 40 percent, short-term plans will allow individuals who find Obamacare-compliant coverage unaffordable to purchase coverage.

Whereas the Obama administration defined “consumer protections” as “protecting people from being a consumer” of anything other than exchange plans, the Trump administration’s rule allows consumers to buy coverage that actually protects them from future harmful health events.

That said, the rule brings with it two notable drawbacks. First, the administration believes it could raise federal spending by $28.2 billion over a decade. The estimate comes because some healthy people likely will leave the exchanges to buy more affordable short-term coverage, raising premiums—and thus premium subsidies—for those who remain in Obamacare-compliant plans. While the Congressional Budget Office estimated a much smaller (and slightly positive) fiscal impact, the rule could end up increasing spending at a time when the federal government has racked up $21 trillion in debt (and counting).

Second, the rule doesn’t repeal Obamacare—an obvious statement, but one with important implications. Another president can easily revoke the Trump administration’s actions, and the next Democrat will almost certainly do just that. While helpful, the rule itself should not serve as an excuse for Congress not to take action to repeal Obamacare’s harmful regulations—because if you like your short-term plan, and Congress does nothing, you probably won’t be able to keep it.

What’s the Real ‘Junk Insurance’?

But as I wrote last week, Kofman has refused to buy an Obamacare plan, because she claims she requires an employer subsidy—this despite making more than $217,000 per year. Given her sizable income, Kofman must not think exchange policies unaffordable, even without an employer subsidy.

After all, the Exchange Authority recently endorsed, and the District enacted, a mandate requiring people with far less income than her—that is, people like me—to buy unsubsidized coverage or pay a tax. Why does she not buy the insurance policies she sells—because she considers them “junk insurance?”

She’s not alone. At a briefing last month, Sara Collins, a vice president at the Commonwealth Fund, asked whether short-term plans and other non-Obamacare policies would have “warning labels on them.” Collins neglected to provide a warning of her own: She has not purchased an exchange plan. Lest one think she cannot afford to do so, Commonwealth’s tax filings reveal that for the 12 months ending in June 2017, Collins received $334,353 in total compensation (including benefits).

I consider the very definition of “junk insurance” a policy that one encourages others to buy but refuses to purchase. On that, Corlette has a sterling track record. At a 2016 briefing, her presentation included a bullet point about the need to increase exchange sign-ups. She went further in her oral remarks: “I think it’s critical to do everything we can do boost enrollment.”

But when I asked Corlette at that same 2016 briefing if she had taken her own advice and bought an exchange plan, I received a song-and-dance about her life as a “spoiled academic.” Lest anyone think her unfeeling, however, she allowed that “I do try to think about” individuals without employer-sponsored coverage when designing insurance coverage standards.

Principles Versus Power

That’s the point. If Obamacare advocates thought achieving the law’s goals was so critical, they would have put their money where their mouths are and enrolled in exchange plans long ago. For all liberals’ talk of solidarity and “We’re all in this together,” the unwillingness for individuals making hundreds of thousands per year to enroll in exchange coverage, even though they could easily afford to do so, astounds. Given their own failures to enroll, who are they to criticize President Trump for “sabotaging” the law?

In their quiet moments, people like Kofman, Collins, and Corlette may wonder what strange confluence of events led the American people to elect Donald Trump, and empower him with the authority to dismantle their liberal paradise. But their failure to practice what they preach yields a ready answer: They need only look in the mirror.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How the Obama Administration Hid Facts to Pass Obamacare

Over the weekend, Politico ran a report about how a “Trump policy shop filters facts to fit his message.” The article cited several unnamed sources complaining about the office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and its allegedly politicized role within the current administration.

One of the article’s anonymous sources called ASPE’s conduct over the past 18 months “another example of how we’re moving to a post-fact era.” Richard Frank, a former Obama appointee and one of the few sources to speak on the record, said that he found the current administration’s “attack on the integrity and the culture of the office…disturbing.”

As a congressional staffer conducting oversight of the CLASS Act in 2011-12, I reviewed thousands of pages of e-mails and documents from the months leading up to Obamacare’s passage. Those records strongly suggest that ASPE officials, including Frank, withheld material facts from Congress and the public about CLASS’s unsustainability, because full and prompt disclosure could have jeopardized Obamacare’s chances of passage.

About the CLASS Act ‘Ponzi scheme’

The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports program, or CLASS for short, intended to provide a voluntary insurance benefit for long-term care. Included as part of Obamacare, the program never got off the ground. In October 2011, HHS concluded it could not implement the program in an actuarially sound manner; Congress repealed the program entirely as part of the “fiscal cliff” deal enacted into law in the early days of 2013.

CLASS’s prime structural problem closely resembled that of the Obamacare exchanges—too many sick people, and not enough healthy ones. Disability lobbyists strongly supported the CLASS Act, hoping that it would provide financial support to individuals with disabilities. However, its voluntary nature meant that the more people already with disabilities enrolled and qualified for benefits, the higher premiums would rise, thereby discouraging healthy people from signing up.

Moreover, although actuarially questionable in the long-term, CLASS’s structure provided short-term fiscal benefits that aided Obamacare’s passage. Because CLASS required a five-year waiting period to collect benefits, the program would generate revenue early in its lifespan—and thus in the ten-year window budget analysts would use to score Obamacare—even if it could not maintain balance over a longer, 75-year timeframe.

This dynamic led the Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad (D-ND), to dub CLASS “a Ponzi scheme of the first order, the kind of thing Bernie Madoff would have been proud of.”

Internal Concerns Minimized in Public

A report I helped draft, which several congressional offices released in September 2011—weeks before HHS concluded that program implementation would not go forward—highlighted concerns raised within the department during the debate on Obamacare about CLASS’ unsustainable nature. For instance, in September 2009, one set of talking points prepared by ASPE indicated that, even after changes made by Congress, CLASS “is still likely to create severe adverse selection problems”—i.e., too many sick people would enroll to make the program sustainable.

Frank told me that, during one public speech in October 2009, “I spent about half my time setting out the problems with CLASS that needed to be fixed.” He did indeed highlight some of the actuarial challenges the CLASS program faced. But Frank’s remarks, at a Kaiser Family Foundation event, closed thusly:

We’ve, in the department, have modeled this extensively, perhaps more extensively than anybody would want to hear about [laughter] and we’re entirely persuaded that reasonable premiums, solid participation rates, and financial solvency over the 75-year period can be maintained. So it is, on this basis, that the Administration supports it that the bill continues to sort of meet the standards of being able to stand on its own financial feet. Thanks.

Frank told me over the weekend that his comments “came at the end of my explaining that we were in the process of addressing those issues” (emphasis mine). But Frank actually said that the Obama administration was “entirely persuaded” of CLASS’ solvency, which gives the impression not that the department had begun a process of addressing those issues, but had already resolved them.

Frank’s public comments notwithstanding, ASPE had far from resolved the actuarial problems plaguing CLASS. Two days after his speech, one of Frank’s employees sent around an internal e-mail suggesting that the CLASS Act “seems like a recipe for disaster.”

But the ‘Fixes’ Fall Short

In response to these new analyses, HHS and ASPE came up with a package of technical fixes designed to make the CLASS program actuarially sound. One section of those fixes noted that “it is possible the authority in the bill to modify premiums will not be sufficient to ensure the program is sustainable.”

However, the proposed changes came too late:

  • No changes to the CLASS Act made it into the final version of Obamacare, which then-Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) filed in the Senate on December 19, 2009.
  • The election of Scott Brown (R-MA) to replace the late Kennedy in January 2010 prevented Democrats from fixing the CLASS Act through a House-Senate conference committee, as Brown had pledged to be the “41st Republican” in the Senate who would prevent a conference report from receiving a final vote.
  • While the House and Senate could (and did) pass some changes to Obamacare on a party-line vote through the budget reconciliation process, the Senate’s “Byrd rule” on inclusion of incidental matters in a budget reconciliation bill prevented them from addressing CLASS.

The White House’s own health care proposal, released in February 2010, discussed “a series of changes to the Senate bill to improve the CLASS program’s financial stability and ensure its long-run solvency.” But as HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius later testified before the Senate Finance Committee, the “Byrd rule” procedures for budget reconciliation meant that those changes never saw the light of day—and could not make it into law.

Kinda Looks Like a Conspiracy of Silence

By the early months of 2010, officials at ASPE knew they had a program that they could not fix legislatively, and could fail as a result. Yet at no point between January 2010, when ASPE proposed its package of technical changes, through Obamacare’s enactment, did anyone within the administration admit that the program could prove impossible to implement.

Over the weekend, I asked Frank about this silence. He responded that “when the reconciliation package was shelved”—which I take to mean that the CLASS changes did not make it into the reconciliation bill, which did pass—“we began working on regulatory remedies that might address the flaws in CLASS.” However, from the outset some of Frank’s own employees believed those changes might prove insufficient to make the program actuarially sound, as it later proved.

To put it another way: In February 2011, Sebelius testified before the Senate Finance Committee that “the snapshot [of CLASS] in the bill, I would absolutely agree, is totally unsustainable.” She, Frank, and others within the administration had known this fact one year previously: They just hoped they could arrive at a package of regulatory changes that would overcome the law’s structural flaws.

But did anyone within the administration disclose that CLASS was “totally unsustainable” as written back in February 2010? No, because doing so could have jeopardized Obamacare’s chances of passage. The law passed the House on a narrow 219-212 margin.

If HHS had publicly conceded that CLASS could become a “zombie” program—one that they could not fix, but could not remove—it would have caused a political firestorm, and raised broader questions about the bill’s fiscal integrity that could have prevented its enactment.

Was Obamacare Sold on a Lie?

Conservatives have pilloried Obamacare for the many false statements used to sell the law, from the infamous “Lie of the Year” that “If you like your plan, you can keep it” to the repeated promises about premium reductions, Barack Obama’s “firm pledge” to avoid middle-class tax increases, and on and on.

But there are sins of both commission and omission, and the CLASS Act falls into the latter category. Regardless of whether one uses the loaded term “lie” to characterize the sequence of events described above, the public statements by HHS officials surrounding the program prior to Obamacare’s enactment fell short of the full and unvarnished truth, both as they knew it at the time, and as events later proved.

Politico can write all it wants about ASPE under Trump “filter[ing] facts to fit his message.” But ASPE’s prior failure to disclose the full scope of problems the CLASS Act faced represents a textbook example of a bureaucracy hiding inconvenient truths to enact its agenda. If anonymous HHS bureaucrats now wish to attack a “post-fact era” under Trump, they should start by taking a hard look in the mirror at what they did under President Obama to enact Obamacare.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How Andy Slavitt Sabotaged Obamacare

Over the weekend, former Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) acting administrator and Obamacare defender Andy Slavitt took to Twitter to denounce what he viewed as the Trump administration’s “aggressive and needless sabotage” of the health care law:

Unfortunately for Slavitt, the facts suggest otherwise. The Trump administration took actions to comply with a federal court order that vacated rules promulgated by the Obama administration—including rules CMS issued when Slavitt ran the agency. If Slavitt wants to denounce the supposed “sabotage” of Obamacare, he need look no further than the nearest mirror.

What’s the Issue?

This legal dispute involves risk adjustment payments, one of the three “Rs” Obamacare created. Unlike the risk corridor and reinsurance programs, which lasted only from 2014 through 2016, Obamacare made the risk adjustment program permanent.

In general, risk adjustment transfers funds from insurers with healthier-than-average enrollment to insurers with sicker-than-average enrollment. Without risk adjustment, plans would have perverse incentives to avoid enrolling sick people, due to the Obamacare regulations that require insurers to accept all applicants, and prohibit them from charging higher premiums due to health status.

Since the Obamacare exchanges began operations in 2014, many newer and smaller insurers say that the federal risk adjustment formula unfairly advantages incumbent carriers—in many cases, local Blue Cross Blue Shield plans. The small carriers complain that larger insurers do a better job of documenting their enrollees’ health conditions (e.g., diabetes, etc.), entitling them to larger risk adjustment payments.

A July 2016 analysis concluded that “for most co-ops, these recently announced risk adjustment payments have made a bad situation worse, and for a subset, they may prove to be the proverbial last straw.” Indeed, most Obamacare co-ops failed, and the risk adjustment methodology proved one reason. Two co-ops—Minuteman Health in Massachusetts (now in receivership) and New Mexico Health Connections—sued to challenge the risk adjustment formula.

What Happened in the Lawsuits?

On January 30, a federal district court in Massachusetts ruled in favor of the federal government with respect to Minuteman Health’s case. Judge Dennis Saylor ruled that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner when setting the risk adjustment formula.

However, a few weeks later, on February 28, another federal district court in New Mexico granted partial summary judgement in favor of New Mexico Health Connections, ruling that one element of the risk adjustment formula—the use of statewide average premium (discussed further below)—violated the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious. Judge James Browning vacated that portion of the risk adjustment formula for the years 2014 through 2018, and remanded the matter back to HHS and CMS for further proceedings.

If the Trump administration wanted to use the risk adjustment ruling to “sabotage” Obamacare, as people like Slavitt claim, it would have halted the program immediately after Browning issued his order in February. Instead, the administration on March 28 filed a motion to have Browning reconsider his decision in light of the contrary ruling in the Minuteman Health case.

The administration also asked Browning to lift his order vacating the risk adjustment formula, and just remand the matter to CMS/HHS instead. In that case, the rule would remain in effect, but the administration would have to alter it to comply with Browning’s ruling. However, at a June 21 hearing, Browning seemed disinclined to accept the government’s request—which likely led to the CMS announcement this weekend.

Who Issued ‘Arbitrary and Capricious’ Rules?

The Obama administration did, in all cases. Browning’s ruling vacated a portion of the risk adjustment formula for plan years 2014 through 2018 (i.e., the current one). Even though President Trump took office on January 20, 2017, the outgoing Obama administration rushed out rules for the 2018 plan year on December 22, 2016, with the rules taking effect just prior to Obama leaving office.

However, Browning believed the statute does not require budget neutrality—it does not prohibit it, nor does it require it. Therefore, the administration needed to provide a “policy rationale” for its budget neutrality assumption. For instance, HHS could have argued that, because Obamacare did not include a separate appropriation for the risk adjustment program, implementing risk adjustment in a budget neutral manner would prevent the diversion of taxpayer resources from other programs.

But as Browning noted, “the Court must rely upon the rationale the agency articulated in its internal proceedings and not upon post hoc reasoning.” HHS did not explain the reasoning behind budget neutrality in its final rules for the 2014 plan year, nor for several years thereafter.

While both the 2011 white paper and 2014 rules (the final version of which HHS released in March 2013) preceded the July 2014 start of Slavitt’s tenure in senior management at CMS, the agency released rules for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 plan years on his watch. If Slavitt believes “sabotage” occurred as a result of Browning’s court ruling, he should accept his share of the responsibility for it, by issuing rules that a federal judge struck down as “arbitrary and capricious.”

Ironically, as one observer noted, the federal government “argued that the court’s ruling as it applies to the 2018 benefit year should be set aside because the agency responded directly to comments regarding its rationale for budget neutrality in the final 2018 payment rule.” However, Browning held that “subsequent final rules” did “not elaborate further on [HHS’] budget neutrality rationale,” and struck down the 2018 rule along with the rules for 2014 through 2017.

Browning’s decision to strike down the 2018 rule demonstrates Slavitt’s “sabotage.” HHS released that rule months after Minuteman Health and New Mexico Health Connections filed their lawsuits, and thus had adequate time to adjust the rule in response to their claims. Regardless, Browning thought the agency did not elaborate upon or justify its policy reasoning regarding budget neutrality in the risk adjustment program—a direct swipe at Slavitt’s inability to manage the regulatory process inside his agency.

What Would Andy Slavitt Do Instead?

On Friday night, Slavitt claimed that an interim final rule could “clarify and resolve everything:”

However, on Sunday, Slavitt tweeted a link to a New York Times article entitled “A Fatal Flaw as Trump Tries to Remake Health Care: Shortcuts.” That article cited several court cases “that the Administration has lost [that] have a common theme: Federal judges have found that the Administration cut corners in trying to advance its political priorities.” It continues:

Two federal courts blocked Trump Administration rules that would have allowed employers who provide health insurance to employees to omit contraceptive coverage if the employers had moral or religious objections. Two federal judges, in separate cases, said the Administration had violated the law by adopting the rules without a public comment period, which the Trump Administration had declared ‘impracticable and contrary to the public interest.’

Those rules regarding the contraception mandate that the Trump administration adopted “without a public comment,” and which were struck down as unlawful, were both interim final rules—the same type of rule Slavitt now wants to use to change the risk adjustment formula. (Interim final rules do require the agency to take comments, but go into effect on the date of their release—thus notice-and-comment occurs retroactively.)

Nicholas Bagley, an Obamacare supporter, explained at the time of their release why he thought the contraception rules would get stricken (as they were) for violating the notice-and-comment requirement. It’s certainly possible that the administration could use Browning’s ruling as a reason to justify forgoing notice-and-comment, and releasing an interim final rule

But it also makes sense that, given the series of legal setbacks the administration has suffered in recent weeks—and the Times article highlighted—officials at CMS and HHS would take a more cautious approach to issuing regulations, to ensure their actions withstand legal scrutiny.

More to the point, it’s disingenuous of Slavitt to tweet an article criticizing the Trump administration for using interim final rules to enact policies he dislikes, then accuse the administration of “sabotage” for not using that same expedited process for policies he likes. It’s even more disingenuous for Slavitt given that the legal dilemma the Trump administration faces regarding risk adjustment comes entirely from a mess they inherited from the Obama administration—and Slavitt himself.

On Sunday, Slavitt cited a conservative article that in his view “called out Trump’s motivation for ending risk adjustment and raise [sic] premiums on millions: Punishing a former President.” Maybe the next time Slavitt makes allegations about supposed “sabotage” by the Trump administration, he should get his facts straight—CMS’s announcement didn’t “end” the risk adjustment program; only Congress can do that—rather than making unfounded against the current president.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

What’s Going on with Premium Increases under Obamacare?

Multiple articles in recent weeks have outlined the ways Democrats intend to use Obamacare as a wedge issue in November’s midterm elections. While only a few states have released insurer filings—and regulators could make alterations to insurers’ proposals—the preliminary filings to date suggest above-average premium increases have been higher than the underlying trend in medical costs.

Democrats claim that such premium increases come from the Trump administration and Republican Congress’s “sabotage.” But do those charges have merit? On the three primary counts discussed in detail below, the effects of the policy changes varies significantly.

End of Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments

The administration’s decision meant most insurers increased premiums for 2018, to recoup their costs for discounting cost-sharing indirectly (i.e., via premiums) rather than through direct CSR payments. However, as I previously noted, most states devised strategies whereby few if any individuals would suffer harm from those premium increases. Low-income individuals who qualify for premium subsidies would receive larger subsidies to offset their higher costs, and more affluent individuals who do not qualify for subsidies could purchase coverage away from state exchanges, where insurers offer policies unaffected by the loss of CSR payments.

These state-based strategies mean that the “sabotage” charges have little to no merit, for several reasons. First, the premium increases relating to the lack of direct CSR payments already took effect in most states for 2018; this increase represents a one-time change that will not recur in 2019.

Second, more states have announced that, for 2019, they will switch to the “hold harmless” strategy described above, ensuring that few if any individuals will incur higher premiums from these changes. Admittedly, taxpayers will pay more in subsidies, but most consumers should see no direct effects. This “sabotage” argument was disingenuous when Democrats first raised it last year, and it’s even more disingenuous now.

Eliminating the Individual Mandate Penalty

Repealing the mandate will raise premiums for 2019, although questions remain over the magnitude. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) last month officially reduced its estimate of the mandate’s “strength” in compelling people to purchase coverage by about one-third. However, another recent study suggests that, CBO’s changes notwithstanding, the mandate had a significant impact on getting people to buy insurance—suggesting that many healthy people could drop coverage once the mandate penalty disappears.

To insurers, the mandate repeal represents an unknown factor shaping the market in 2019. In the short term at least, whether or not people will drop coverage in 2019 due to the mandate’s repeal matters less than what insurers—and, just as important, insurance regulators—think people will do in response. If insurers think many people will drop, then premiums could rise significantly; however, if insurers already thought the mandate weak or ineffective, then its repeal by definition would have a more limited impact.

New Coverage Options

The Trump administration’s moves to expand access to association health plans and short-term insurance coverage, while still pending, also represent a factor for insurers to consider. In this case, insurers fear that more affordable coverage that does not meet all of Obamacare’s requirements will prove attractive to young and healthy individuals, raising the average costs of the older and sicker individuals who remain in Obamacare-compliant plans.

If association plans and short-term coverage do not entice many enrollees—or if most of those enrollees had not purchased coverage to begin with—then the market changes will not affect exchange premiums that much. By contrast, if the changes entice millions of individuals to give up exchange coverage for a non-compliant but more affordable plan, then premiums for those remaining on the exchanges could rise significantly.

Estimates of the effects of these regulatory changes vary. For instance, the administration’s proposed rule on short-term plans said it would divert enrollment from exchanges into short-term plans by only about 100,000-200,000 individuals. However, CBO and some other estimates suggest higher impacts from the administration’s changes, and a potentially greater impact on premiums (because short-term and association plans would siphon more healthy individuals away from the exchanges).

But the final effect may depend on the specifics of the changes themselves. If the final rule on short-term plans does not allow for automatic renewability of the plans, they may have limited appeal to individuals, thus minimizing the effects on the exchange market.

However, those same proponents seem less interested in advertising the same study’s premium impact. The Urban researchers believe short-term plans will draw roughly 2.6 million individuals away from exchange coverage, raising premiums for those who remain by as much as 18.3 percent.

Why Prop Up Obamacare?

The selective use of data regarding short-term plans illustrates Republicans’ problem: On one hand, they want to create other, non-Obamacare-compliant, options for individuals to purchase more affordable coverage. On the other hand, if those options succeed, they will raise premiums for individuals who remain on the exchanges.

But some might argue that fixating on exchange premiums for 2019 misses the point, because Republicans should focus on developing alternatives to Obamacare. The exchanges will remain, and still offer comprehensive coverage—along with income-based premium subsidies for that—to individuals with costly medical conditions. But rather than trying to bolster the exchanges by using bailouts and “stability” packages to throw more taxpayer money at them, Republicans could emphasize the new alternatives to Obamacare-compliant plans.

Of course, if that stance presents too much difficulty for Republicans, they have another option: They could repeal the root cause of the premium increases—Obamacare’s myriad new federal insurance requirements. Of course, in Washington, following through on pledges made for the last four election cycles seems like a radical concept, but to most Americans, delivering on such a long-standing promise represents simple common sense.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Tom Price Accidentally Exposes Republicans’ Obamacare Problem

The Trump administration’s former Health and Human Services secretary could have changed his surname to Kinsley this week. Kinsley refers to columnist Michael, creator of the “Kinsley gaffe,” defined as “When a politician tells the truth—some obvious truth he isn’t supposed to say.”

Price did just that on Tuesday, when in a speech he said provisions in the tax legislation effectively eliminating the individual mandate penalty “will actually harm the pool in the exchange market, because you’ll have individuals who are younger and healthier not participating in that market, and consequently, that drives up the cost for other folks within that market.”

But the remarks prompted the typical Washington food fight. Democrats had a field day, claiming that Republicans “sabotaged” Obamacare, and that Price took a contrary position last year, when he said repealing the mandate would lower health costs.

Within 24 hours, Price attempted to “clarify” his original comments, in a statement saying that “repealing the individual mandate was exactly the right thing to do. Forcing Americans to buy something they don’t want undermines individual liberty as well as free markets.”

Ironically enough given the controversy, it’s relatively easy to reconcile both Price’s original Tuesday comments and his Wednesday statement, when taking his earlier comments in their full context.

On Tuesday, Price said repealing the individual mandate “may help, but it still is nibbling at the side.” Price is exactly right. Repealing the individual mandate, while keeping the rest of Obamacare in place, only undoes a portion of the law—and a relatively small portion at that.

Particularly when viewed from a freedom perspective, repealing the mandate seems quite insufficient. Republicans prevented some Americans from incurring tax penalties for buying a product they may not want or could not afford. But what does repealing the mandate do to give Americans the affirmative choice to buy a product they can afford? Absolutely nothing

Admittedly, the administration has put forward some helpful proposals to give consumers more choices. But any fix done solely through regulations by definition carries major limitations—most notably the fact that any future presidential administration could, and any Democratic administration likely will, attempt to undermine or reverse the executive actions.

Price’s Tuesday comments hit at the point I originally made last fall, when Congress considered the tax bill: Repealing the individual mandate while leaving the regulations in place will raise premiums. The only question is how much. Healthy individuals will have a greater reason to avoid costly Obamacare coverage, making the remaining population sicker and costlier. This dynamic also motivated Congress to consider a “stability” (i.e., bailout) bill earlier this year, which sought to blunt the effects of premium increases by throwing taxpayer money at the problem.

But as I have previously written, “It’s the regulations, stupid!” Throwing money at the problem won’t fix the underlying problem. Only fixing the problem will. Rather than criticizing Price for his candid and impolitic comments, Republicans would do better to go back and work to pass legislation repealing the Obamacare regulations—to give people the freedom to buy coverage they want, rather than just eliminating penalties for people who refuse to buy coverage they don’t need or can’t afford.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.